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Ight  binding  may  cause  shadows  or  distortion  along 
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it^rieure. 

ilank  leaves  added  during  restorations  may  appear 
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ossible,  ces  pages  n'ont  pas  ^t^  filmies. 

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plaire qui  sont  peut-6tre  unk^ues  du  point  de  vue  bibli- 
ographique,  qui  peuvent  modifier  une  image  reproduite. 
ou  qui  peuvent  exiger  une  modification  dans  la  m^tho- 
de  normale  de  filmage  sont  indiqu^s  ci-dessous. 

I     I  Coloured  pages  /  Pages  de  couleur 

I I  Pages  damaged  /  Pages  endommag^es 


D 


Pages  restored  and/or  laminated  / 
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D 

D 


D 


Quality  indgale  de  I'impression 

Includes  supplementary  material  / 
Comprend  du  materiel  suppl^mentaire 

Pages  wholly  or  partially  obscured  by  errata  slips, 
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partiellement  obscurcies  par  un  feuillet  d'errata,  une 
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obtenir  la  meilleure  image  possible. 

Opposing  pages  with  varying  colouration  or 
discolourations  are  filmed  twice  to  ensure  the  best 
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colorations  variables  ou  des  decolorations  sont 
film^es  deux  fois  afin  d'obtenir  la  meilleure  image 
possible. 


1  is  filmed  at  tht  rtduction  ratio  checked  below  / 
ment  est  filmi  au  taux  de  reduction  indlqui  ci-desiout. 


14x 


18x 


22x 


26x 


30x 


12x 


16x 


20x 


24x 


28x 


32x 


The  copy  filmed  h«r«  hM  b««n  r«predue«d  thanks 
to  th«  g«n«ro»itv  of: 

National  Library  of  Canada 


L'oxomplairo  film4  fut  roproduit  qrict  k  la 
g4n«rositA  da: 

Bibliotheque  nationale  du  Canada 


Tha  imagaa  appaaring  hara  ara  tha  baat  quality 
poMibIa  eensidaring  tha  condition  and  iagibility 
of  tha  original  copy  and  in  kaaping  with  tha 
filming  eontraet  apiacif icationa. 


Original  eopiaa  in  printad  papar  eovars  ara  filmad 
beginning  with  ttia  front  eovar  and  anding  on 
tha  laat  paga  «vith  a  printad  or  illuatratad  impraa* 
sion.  or  tha  back  covar  whan  appropriate.  All 
othar  original  copies  are  filmed  beginning  on  the 
first  paga  with  a  printed  or  illustrated  imprea- 
sion.  snd  anding  on  the  lest  pege  with  e  printed 
or  iilustreted  impression. 


Ths  laat  recorded  frame  on  eech  microfiche 
shall  contain  tha  symbol  «^  (meening  "CON- 
TINUED").  or  the  symbol  ▼  (meening  "END"), 
whichever  applies. 


Lea  images  suivsntes  ont  iti  raproduitas  svac  Is 
plus  grand  soin.  compts  tenu  da  la  condition  st 
da  la  netteta  de  rexempiaira  film*,  at  an 
eonformita  avac  las  conditions  du  contrst  de 
filmaga. 

Lee  esempleiree  originauK  dent  la  couvarture  an 
popier  est  Imprimae  sent  filmto  en  commenpsnt 
par  la  premier  plot  et  en  terminant  soit  par  la 
darniire  paga  qui  comporte  une  emprsints 
d'impression  ou  d'illustration,  soit  par  la  second 
plat,  salon  la  cas.  Tous  las  autres  axemplairas 
origineu*  sent  filmas  en  commen^ant  par  la 
premiire  pege  qui  comporte  une  emprainte 
d'impraasion  ou  d'illustration  at  an  terminant  par 
la  damiire  pege  qui  comporte  une  telle 
empreinte. 

Un  des  symboles  suivants  spparaftra  sur  la 
darniire  image  de  cheque  microfiche,  telon  ie 
cas:  Is  symbols  — »-  signifie  "A  SUIVRE".  Ie 
symbols  ▼  signifie  "FIN". 


Meps.  pistes,  charts,  stc.  may  be  filmed  et 
different  reduction  retios.  Those  too  lerge  to  be 
entirely  included  in  one  exposure  ere  filmed 
beginning  in  the  upper  left  hend  corner,  left  to 
right  and  top  to  bonom,  as  msny  frsmes  ss 
required.  The  following  diegrams  illustrate  the 
method: 


Lea  cartas,  planches,  tableaux,  etc..  pauvant  itre 
filmte  *  dss  Uux  da  reduction  diffSrsnts. 
Lorsqus  Is  document  est  trop  grsnd  pour  itrs 
reproduit  en  un  seul  clicha,  il  est  filmS  S  psrtir 
de  I'sngle  suparieur  gsuche,  de  gauche  i  droits. 
et  de  haut  an  bas.  en  prenant  la  nombra 
d'images  nacsssaire.  Las  diagrsmmes  suivants 
illustrant  la  mathode. 


1 

2 

3 

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i. 


BRITISH   COLONIAL  POLICY 
1764-1765 


i 


■s>^° 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

KBW  VOBK  •    BOSTON   .   CHICAGO 
ATLANTA  ■    (AN    rilANCI«CO 

MACMILLAN  ft  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •   BOHBAV  •   CALCUTTA 
MBLIOVIINB 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA.  Ltd. 

TOIONTO 


J 


3 

§ 

-I 


■J 
1 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY 


1754-1765 


Xnm  quit  M»eU,  primam 
eme  hinioriae  legem,  ne 
quid  /(ilti  dicert  audeatf 
deinde  ne  guiii  itri  non 
audtnt.  —  Cicero,  De 
Oratore,  lib.  ii,  ch.  xv. 


J. 


BY 


GEORGE   LOUIS   BEER 

lOMBTIIH    LBCTIRER    iw   HltTORT 
AT  COLCMBU    VMIVEBSITT 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 
1907 

All  rigUt  rutrtti 


vyV/- 


J 


/^ 


ib£^-'"',  c:?^.. 


CoPTiiaBT,  INT, 
Bt  THK  MACMILLAN  COtiPAHT. 


S«t  up  and  tkctratrpcd.    PublUhcd  ScpMmber,  1907. 


J.  S.  CocbtDB  Co.  —  Berwick  <•  Smith  Co. 
Norwood,  Man.,  C.8.A. 


PREFACE 

The  matter  contained  in  this  essay  was  collected  in  the 
course  of  an  extensive  study  of  the  old  British  colonial 
system.    At  the  outset  of  the  investigation,  more  atten- 
.on  was  paid  to  the  development  of  the  eighteenth,  than 
to  that  of  .he  preceding  century;  but  as  the  work  pro- 
gressed, the  necessity  of  treating  the  origins  and  estab- 
hshment  of  the  system  on  a  larger  scale  became  patent. 
Consequently,  although  the  material  for  the  eighteenth 
century  was  to  a  great  extent  elaborated,  it  appeared 
advisable  to  defer  its  publication  until  the  preceding  age 
could  be  more  carefully  investigated.     As.  however,  it 
was  deeded  at  the  same  time  to  treat  the  entire  subject 
apart  from  the  controversies  of  the  American  Revolution 
there  exists  no  valid  reason  to  refrain  from  publishing 
I      Tl'V    ^^^  '^"''^  °^  ^^^  transitional  years  from 
The  subject  of  the  work,  its  exact  scope  and  limits,  are 
clearly  md.cated  by  the  title.     It  is  a  study  of  British 
policy  dunng  the  critical  period  of  the  old   Empire 
Thus  the  essay  belongs  distinctly  to  the  domain  of  Brit- 
ish histoiy ;  but  to  the  extent  that  English  and  American 
development  were  then  inseparable,  it  also.  CuTTore 

history.     The  focus  of  interest  is.  however,  the  British 
Empire  and  not  the  rise  of  the  American  Nation.     On 
Its  positive  side  the  book  is  a  portrayal  of  British  policy 
a  study  in  imperial  history;  on  its  negative  side  iU    an 


PREFACE 


!      . 


account  of  the  preliminaries  of  the  American  Revolution. 
Hence  necessarily,  if  viewed  as  a  study  in  American 
history,  the  essay  is  incomplete. 

The  material  upon  which  the  book  is  based  is  some- 
what diverse  in  nature.  To  a  preponderant  extent  it  is 
composed  of  the  official  liriti^n  state  papers,  deposited  in 
the  Public  Record  Office  in  London.  Of  these  docu- 
ments a  very  large  proportion  remains  still  unpublished, 
and  many  of  them  have  been  virtually  undisturbed  since 
they  were  filed  away  a  century  and  a  half  ago  in  the  course 
of  departmental  routine.  Secondly,  the  large  contempo- 
rary pamphlet  literature  has  been  intensively  studied. 
Thirdly,  the  British  statutes  have  to  a  great  extent  fur- 
nished the  framework  of  the  essay.  In  addition,  use  ha'i 
been  made  of  the  parliamentary  journals,  of  various  manu- 
script collections,  of  the  reports  of  the  Historical  Mar:u- 
scripts  Commission,  of  contemporary  newspapers,  of  the 
published  papers  of  English  and  American  statesmen, 
and  of  the  printed  records  of  the  various  colonies.  It 
should  be  noted,  that  of  the  British  Museum  manuscripts, 
the  transcripts  in  the  Library  of  Congress  at  Washington, 
not  the  originals,  were  examined. 

The  nature  and  extent  of  this  material  are  clearly  indi- 
cated in  the  book,  as  the  authority  for  every  statement 
is  given  in  the  foot-notes.  Furthermore,  there  has  been 
relegated  to  this  place  a  large  mass  of  details,  and  in 
addition  considerable  illustrative  material  which,  it  was 
thought,  would  make  the  text  more  complete  for  the 
professional,  as  distinct  from  the  lay  reader.  To  have 
i.icorporated  this  matter  in  the  body  of  the  book,  without 
at  the  same  time  sacrificing  the  readability  of  the  text, 
would  have  unduly  expanded  the  essay.     It  is  hoped  that 


PREFACE 


VU 


the  compromise  adopted  will  be  satisfactory  in  meetinjr 
the  .vants  both  of  the  scholarly  world  and  of  the  general 
readmg  public.  ® 

It  would  be  ungracious  not  to  acknowledge  the  unfail- 
mg  courtesy  of  the  officials  of  the  Public  Record  Office 
especally  of  Mr.  Hubert  Hall.whose  unrivalled  knowledge 
of  the  archives  in  his  charge  is  placed  unsparingly  at  the 
disposal  o  students.  Similar  acknowledgment  is  due  to 
the  officials  of  the  Privy  Council  Office,  to  Mr.  V  H 
Paltsits  of  the  Lenox  Library,  to  Mr.  Erb  of  the  Colum' 
bia  University  Library,  and  to  Mr.  W.  C.  Ford  of  the 
Library  of  Congress.  Professor  E.  R.  A.  Seligman  has 
not  only  generously  allowed  unrestricted  access  to  his 

Zihl  '  K  °"r'''"  ''  eighteenth-century  econom  c 
pamphlets,  but  has  m  addition  assisted  in  the  drudgery 
of  reading  the  proof.  To  Professor  H.  L.  Osgood  thanks 
are  due  for  uniform  encouragement,  but  more  especially 
because  he  first  directed  the  writer's  attention  ^o  this 
field  of  research,  and  initiated  him  into  the  scientific 

of  the  tenets  of  modern  science,  whose  methods  demand 
an  exhaustive  and  critical  study  of  the  most  rSe 
sources  o  information,  and  whose  spirit  is  one  of  s  rt 
est  objectivity  and  impartiality.  It  has  been  the  aim  of 
the  writer  to  follow  the  principle,  which  according  to 
Ocero  IS  the  primary  law  of  historical  writing,  namely 
to  refrain  from  accepting  anything  that  is  falsf  and  not' 
to  Ignore  anything  that  is  true. 

UPPER  SARA.VAC  UK..  ^^°^«E  ^OUIS  BEER. 

Ju.y  26, 1907. 


i 

I! 


CONTENTS 


Introduction     . 

CHAPTER  I 

THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF  IMPERIAL  L  J^ENCE,  Pr.OR  «,   , 


CHAPTER  II 
Plans  for  a  Union  of  the  Continental  Colonies  in  i 

CHAPTER   III 
Proposed  Taxation  of  THE  Colonies,  .754-1756   . 

CHAPTER  IV 
The  Requisition  System  during  the  War,  1756-1763  . 

CHAPTER  V 
The  Regulation  of  Trade  during  War       .       .       . 

CHAPTER  VI 
Colonial  Trade  with  the  Enemy,  1756-1763  . 


CHAPTER  VII 
Means  adopted  to  check  this  Intercourse 

CHAPTER  VIII 
Tropical  and  Continental  Colonization 


rACB 

I 


7S4 


754  16 


31 


52 


72 


86 


WITH  the  Enemy   .    114 


CHAPTER  IX 
The  Peace  OF  Paris  AND  the  Empire    .... 


IX 


132 


160 


T 


M 


"fo- 


!  '  X 


X  CONTENTS 

rACB 

CHAPTER   X 
Readjustment  of  the  Laws  of  Trade,  1763-1765         .       .       .193 

CHAPTER  XI 

Reforms  in  the  Administration  of  the  Laws  of  Trade,  1763- 

1765 228 

CHAPTER  XH 
Indian  Poucy  and  Colonial  Defence,  1763-1765  .       .        .       .252 

CHAPTER  XIII 
The  Revenue  Acts  of  1764  and  1765 274 

CHAPTER  XIV 
Colonial  Opposition 287 

Index 317 


i   t 


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BRITISH   COLONIAL   POLICY 


1754-1765 


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BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY 

■754-l7'55 

INTRODUCTION" 
JZ  "'T'"'""'r  =''°"  l*'^''^  »'  "•™  embraced  withm 

.oust" :!'"' ".'  T' ""  '"^  -■'-  "-'^  ■»  ™-- 

ous  .mpomnce  m  the  h,story  of  th.  British  Empire.    The« 
e-  years  wtoessed  botf,  a  vas.  e«e„sio„  of  L  Empi^ 

so  ftmdamenul  an  event  apart  f,«m  ,he  u„derl™g  condi- 

An«nca  deeded  that  the  civflizaeion  of  Xonh  .America  was 
to  be  .A.glo-Sa.™.  no.  Latin  in  character.    I„  m;,  ^ 

«o^'  ;t  ""'  '  '"^-  ''^^  --  ^-  •-  French  al 
^rn^and  a  firm  foundation  wa.  laid  for  future  British  pom  - 
cal  supremao-.  In  West  .Africa  also  a  policv  of  tem^ri^l 
acqu.s,t,on  „s  definitely  adopted.  I-  r„„t  ,he  p"^ 
of  A,s  essay  .0  describe  these  weIi.k„o,„  events  m 
pmspects  of  future  imperial  e^nsion.  disclosed  by  1 
mones  m  India  and  in  .Africa.  wiU  be  disregarded   and 

.o"i:S  LeZTf  Britil^V^  ■'"^'^- '" "*' 
^a  me  effects  of  Bntish  policy,  f=  ft  the  mtention 


-''! 


U 

i  ; 
J  'i 


(i  \ 


3  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 

to  analyze  the  deeply  seated  causes  that  led  to  the  secession 
of  the  North  American  colonics  from  the  Empire.  Felix 
qui  potuit  rerum  cognoscere  causas.  To  acquire  such  a 
state  of  happiness  would  necessitate  an  exhaustive  exami- 
nation of  the  Empire's  development  from  its  very  origins. 
The  tendency  toward  independence  was  present  at  the 
outset.  It  was  in  part  due  to  the  extreme  individualism  of 
the  settlers,  a  characteristic  which,  while  possessing  distinct 
advantages,  is  not  conducive  to  the  creation  of  large  political 
entities.  In  part  also  this  tendency  was  due  to  the  fact  that 
the  movement  of  colonization  was  largely  the  result  of 
private  enterprise.  The  mother  country  sanctioned  the 
movement,  supervised  and  aided  it,  and  thus  incurred 
dcf  nite  responsibilities.  But  the  colonies  were  not  incor- 
porated as  organic  parts  of  the  English  body  politic.  They 
were  expected  to  provide  the  funds  for  their  own  local  public 
affairs,  and,  to  a  great  extent  with  this  object  in  view,  large 
powers  of  self-government  were  granted  to  them.  Under 
these  conditions,  each  colony,  whether  in  the  Antilles  or  on 
the  continent,  had  developed  a  vigorous  political  life  of  its 
own,  in  which  the  popular  branch  of  the  local  legislature, 
through  its  control  of  the  purse,  had  become  the  most 
important  factor.  Each  colony  had  its  own  historical  tradi- 
tions and  institutions,  its  own  peculiar  customs  and  usages, 
to  which  the  home  government  adapted  itself,  thus  giving 
to  the  British  imperial  administrative  system  a  typically 
flexible  character,  though  an  unsymmetrical  aspect.  To  a 
great  extent,  pride  of  race  had  disappeared  in  the  colonies, 
and  patriotism  was  bounded  by  the  physical  limits  of  each 


II. 


INTRODUCTION  , 

province.  The  colonist,  in  general.  regarderJ  himself  not 
as  an  Englishman,  nor  even  as  an  American,  but  as  a  Bar- 
badian, a  Virginian,  and  so  on  throughout  the  entire  list  of 
Briti--h  colonies.  Thus  the  Empire  was  a  kx.sc-lv  organized 
political  structure,  composed  of  a  numhxr  of  heierogeneous 
colonies  with  different  economic  institutions  and  with 
var>ing  degrees  of  local  self-government,  all  tending,  how- 
ever, toward  virtual  autonomy. 

In  an  empire  of  this  nature,  one  of  the  most  difficult  prob- 
lems IS  to  create  an  efifective  system  of  defence  which  shall 
neither  bear  inequitably  on   the  taxpaver  in   the  mother 
countr>-.  nor  offend  the  political  principles  of  the  colonists 
It  IS  a  problem  for  which  as  yet  no  s^.Iution  has  been  found 
and  which  at  the  present  day  is  one  of  the  most  serious 
of  Bntish  imperial  questions.     MwJem  English  statesmen 
have  not  solved  the  difficulty;  they  have  merelv  cut  the  knot 
Great  Britain  is  to-day  chafing  at  a  decision  which  forces 
her  to  provide  for  virtually  the  entire  naval  defence  of  the 
Empire.     Imperial  defence  was  the  rrxk  upon  which  the  ' 
old  Empire  shattered  itself,  and  toward  which  similar  dis- 
niptn-e  currents  in  the  modem  Empire  again  tend  to  draw 
the  ship  of  state.    The  unfortunate  experience  in  the  past 
has.  however,  clearly  located  the  point  of  danger,  though 
other  uncharted   reefs  may  still   be  encountered.    In  the 
years   1754  to   1765   this  question  of  defence   became  of 
supreme  importance  because  of  the  struggle  with  France 
Simultaneously   the  k^oseness  of  the  Empire's  organization 
was  emphasized  by  the  trade  of  the  colonies  with  the  enemv, 
which  led  to  reforms  tending  to  increase  the  efficiency  of 


■f 


!H 


4  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-176$ 

the  imperial  administrative  system.  These  were  the  chief 
colonial  questions  of  the  time,  and  it  was  to  them  that  British 
statesmen  devoted  their  especial  attention. 

It  is  the  object  of  this  essay  to  describe  the  main  features 
of  English  policy  during  this  decade.    At  the  outset,  an 
attempt  was  made  to  solve  the  problem  of  defence  by  a 
voluntary  union  of  the  continental  colonies  for  this  purpose. 
This  failed,  and  shortly  thereafter  war  with  France  was 
formaUy  declared.    The  chief  questions  during  the  war  were 
to  secure  the  necessary  support  from  the  colonies  in  America, 
and  also  to  force  them  to  subordinate  their  local  interests 
,   to  those  of  the  Empire  as  a  whole  by  stopping  their  trade 
with  the  enemy.    The  universal  success  of  British  arms  in 
all  comers  of  the  worid,  under  the  inspiring  genius  of  Pitt, 
to  a  certaiu  extent  allowed  Great  Britain  a  choice  as  to 
the  direction  of  the  Empire's  future  expansion  in  America. 
The  discussions  on  this  subject,  and  the  final  decision  reached 
to  retain  Canada  and  not  the  tropical  French  islands  in  the 
West  Indies,  revealed  the  fact  that  a  distinct  change  had 
taken  place  in  the  economic  theory  of  colonization.    This 
change  resulted  in  some  modifications  of  the  laws  of  trade, 
while  at  the  same  time  the  return  of  the  rich  West  Indian 
islands  to  France  led  to  a  counter-movement  designed  to 
increase  the  importance  of  the  British  colonies  in  the  same 
region.    The  old  colonial  system  also  required  some  read- 
justment in  view  of  the  territory  acquired  by  the  treaty  of 
peace  of  1763.    At  the  same  time,  the  successes  of  the  war 
produced  in  England  increased  interest  in  colonial  affairs 
generally,  and  led  to  a  desire  to  reform  patent  abuses  in 


INTRODUCTION  - 

their  administration.  As  a  consequence  there  ensued  not 
only  an  attempt,  based  on  the  experience  gained  in  break- 
ing  up  the  colonial  trade  with  the  enemy,  to  stop  all  illegal  v 
trade,  but  also  to  some  extent  the  determination  to  reform 
the  colonial  system  of  defence  and  to  impose  parliamentary 
taxes  for  this  purpose. 


>  ! 


CHAPTER  I 

THEORY    AND    PRACTICE    OF    IMPERIAL   DEFENCE,   PRIOR 

TO   1754 

The  general  formula  which  summed  up  the  reciprocal 
duties  of  mother  country  and  colony  was  that  the  former 
owed  protection,  the  latter  obedience.*  Neither  protection 
nor  obedience  was  a  clearly  defined  term,  yet  theory  and  cus- 
tom had  bestowed  upon  each  a  fairly  distinct  meaning. 
By  obedience,  in  general,  was  meant  submission  to  acts  of 
Parliament  affecting  the  Emjjire  as  a  whole.  As  the  aim  of 
British  statesmen  had  been  directed  more  toward  creating 
a  commercial  than  a  closely  welded  political  empire,  obe- 
dience had  come  to  mean,  more  specifically,  conformity 
with  the  complex  system  of  laws  regulating  the  trade  of  the 
Empire.  The  duty  of  Great  Britain  as  regards  protection 
was  also  somewhat  vague,  yet  there  had  developed  a  well- 
defined  theory  of  imperial  defence,  and  with  it  a  general 
agreement  as  to  the  equitable  apportionment  of  the  burden 
thereof  among  the  component  parts  of  the  Empire. 

English  statesmen  fully  understood  the  doctrine  of  "sea 
power,"  and  recognized  that  the  safety  of  the  Empire  de- 
pended primarily  upon  British  naval  strength.    Thus  in 

'  Thus  in  1766  Grenville  said:  "Protection  and  obedience  are  reciprocal. 
Great  Britain  protects  America ;  America  is  bound  to  yield  obedience."  Pari. 
Hist.  16,  p.  102. 


THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE    7 

1764  the  Earl  of  Halifax,  when  secretary  of  state,  wrote: 
"It  is  upon  the  Superiority  of  the  Fleets  of  Great  Britain, 
that  the  Defence   &  Security  of  Her  Colonies  ever  have, 
&  ever  must  principally  depend."  >    In  time  of  war,  the 
fleet  was  used  for  the  general  purposes  of  naval  strategy, 
for  the  protection  of  the  coasts  of  the  colonies,  and  for  the 
security  of  the  trade  between  them  and  the  mother  country. 
In  time  of  peace  the  navy  was  used  to  protect  English  and 
colonial  commerce.    The  ocean  in  those  days  was  not  the 
peaceful  highway  of  the  twentieth  century.    British  v-ssels 
trading  to  the  West  Indies  were  not  infrequently  in  time 
of  peace  seized  by  the  Spaniards  and  even  by  the  French. 
The  security  of  this  trade  depended  on  the  strength  of  the 
royal  navy.     Then  piracy  was  the  great  scourge  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  and  it  was  only  the  nav;        .ver  of  Great 
Britain  that  forced  upon  the  Barbary  corsi.   s  a  series  of 
treaties  removing  British  and  colonial  ships  from  the  range 
of  their  depredations.    The  important  trade  carried  on  from 
the  American  continental  colonies  to  Madeira  and  to  South- 
em  Europe  in  fish,  lumber,  and  grain  depended  on  such  im- 
munity^   This  entire  burden  fell  upon  the  British  taxpayer,  v 

'  Col.  Corr.  Bahama  I,  Halifax  to  Shirley,  Oct.  30, 1764  The  reference  is 
to  a  senes  of  colonial  state  papers  in  the  English  Record  Office  called  Colonial 
Correspondence.  Future  references  to  this  series  will  be  made  in  the  above 
abbreviated  form.  In  their  report  to  the  House  of  Commons,  Feb.  5,  1702 
the  Board  of  Trade  said:  "The  Safety  of  his  Maj"  Dominions  in  America 
Dependmg  chiefly  on  the  Naval  force  to  be  sent  thither  at  proper  Seasons  " 
B.  T.  Trade  Papers  15,  p.  302.  This  reference  is  to  the  Board  of  Trade  Papers 
jn  the  English  Public  Record  Office.  All  future  references  to  this  series  will 
Dt  made  in  the  above  abbreviated  form. 

'Colonial  vesseU  engaged  in  this  trade  were  furnished  with  passes  by  the 


[ 


■f 


8  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 

In  the  general  formula  expressing  the  reciprocal  duties  of 
colony  and  mother  country,  protection  meant  primarily 
naval  defence. 

There  was,  however,  also  a  military  side  to  the  scheme  of 
imperial  defence,  and  on  this  side  the  apportionment  of  the 
respective  shares  of  the  burden  to  be  borne  by  mother  coun- 
try and  colony  was  not  so  simple  a  matter.  During  war 
between  Great  Britain  and  a  European  power,  the  military 
forces  of  the  colonies  were  often  used  in  conjunction  with 
those  of  Great  Britain  for  operations  outside  the  limits  of 
the  colonics.  In  17 10  and  171 1,  during  the  War  of  the  Span- 
ish  Succession,  the  colonies  cooperated  with  the  British 
forces  in  the  campaigns  against  Nova  Scotia  and  Canada. 
In  the  following  war,  a  considerable  body  of  troops  was 
raised  in  North  America  for  the  unfortunate  attack  on  the 
Spanish  colonies  in  i74o-i74i;»  and  it  was  intended  also 

Admiralty.  These  passes  entitled  the  ship  to  a  free  passage  unmolested  by  the 
Barbary  pirates.  Full  details  concerning  the  working  of  this  system  in  the 
colonies  can  be  found  in  the  Admiralty  Records  in  the  English  Public  Record 
Office.  See  especially  Admiralty  Secretary,  Out-Letters  1319  to  ijaa,  end 
Admiralty  Secretary,  In-Letters  381 7  to  3819.  A  letter  of  the  Lieutenant-Gov- 
emor  of  Virginia  to  the  Admiralty  may  be  quoted  to  indicate  the  importance 
of  this  system.  There  had  been  some  delay  in  sending  the  rBquest^d  passes  to 
Virginia,  and  on  June  «,  1764,  Francis  Fauquier  wrote :  "The  Merchants  in 
this  Colony  who  are  concerned  in  the  Com  and  Madeira  Trade  are  in  great 
Distress,  and  are  daily  applying  to  me  for  them."  Adm.  Sec.  In-Letters  3810 
Future  references  to  these  documents  will  be  made  in  the  above  abbreviated 
form. 

'Thirty-six  hundred  men.  Am.  and  W.L  669.  The  reference  is  to  the 
State  Papers,  Colonial,  America  and  W.  .  Indies,  in  the  English  Public  Record 
Office.  All  future  references  to  this  series  wiU  be  made  in  the  above  abbreviated 
form. 


f 


,-i 


THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF  IMPERIAL   DEFENCE  9 

to  use  colonial  troops  in  the  abort. /c  Canada  expedition 
toward  the  end  of  the  war.    In  addition,  the  colonics  on 
their  own  account  engaged  in  military  enterprises  against 
the  »^rench.    Such  were  the  expeditions  of  New  England 
against  Nova  Scotia  and  Canada  at  the  end  of  the  seven- 
teenth  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  following  century.    In  this 
category  also  belongs  the  successful  attack  of  the  New  Eng- 
land military  forces,  assisted  by  the  royal  navy,  on  the  French 
fortress  of    Louisburg  in   1745.     The  extent  of  this  co- 
operation depended  on  the  willingness  of  the  colonies  to 
assist  and  on  the  ability  of  the  English  government  to  recruit 
soldiers  within  them,  for  it  was  recognized  that  the  Crown 
had  no  right  to  -ommand  the  inhabitants  of  any  British 
colony  to  march  -     sail  on  any  expedition  beyond  its  own 
limits.'    Naturally,  each  colony  was  expected  to  do  its  ut- 
most in  resisting  the  attacks  of  a  European  power  in  time  of 
war.    But  the  earnest  efforts  of  the  English  government  to 
bring  about  systematic  cooperation  among  the  colonies  for 
their  joint  defence,  especially  for  the  protection  of  the  most 
exposed  colony  upon  whose  security  their  common  safety  ' 
depended,  had  ended  in  complete  failure.' 
Thus  there  was  no  distinct  theory  nor  any  well-defined 
'  Am  and  VV.I.  602:  Some  Considerations  upon  the  Assistance  thtt  may  be 

r.r  r  iir ""'  °^  ^-^  ^--  -  -  — -  --  - 

JJ^""-  V^t  "l',^"8"^''  government  fixed  the  quotas  to  be  furnished  by 
he  coIon.es  for  the  defence  of  New  York,  but  the  colonies  refused  to  obey  thesi 

oiLnl  p  T  .       ''^'*"^' ""  "^f*"  °^ ""  ^''^  °f  Trade  to  the  House 
of  Lords,  Feb.  .6,  X70,.    B.  T.  Conunercial  SeHes  II,  64.,  pp.  36,-38.. 


i  1 


I 


10 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


', ,    't 


•  t 


practice  regarding  the  military  activities  and  duties  of  the 
colonies  in  time  of  war  with  a  European  power.    On  the 
other  hand,  it  was  a  fundamental  principle  of  British  colonial 
administration  that  during  peace  in  Europe  the  defence  of 
each  colony  against  any  local  enemy  should  devolve  pri- 
marily on  the  colony  itself,  and  that  assistance  should  be 
given  by  the  mother  country  only  if  the  situation  were  so 
serious  as  to  endanger  the  Empire  as  a  whole.    Thus,  while 
the  brunt  of  the  Indian  wars  had  fallen  on  the  colonies.  Great 
Britain,  in  response  to  their  insistent  requests,  frequently 
sent  them  arms  and  ammunition.    This  was  done  despite 
the  protests  of  the  Ordnance  Board,  which  objected  to  these 
extraordinary  outlays  for  which  Parliament  had  made  no 
provision.    Great  Britain  also  spent  annually  large  sums 
on  presents  for  the  Indians  with  the  object  of  securing  their 
friendship.'    In  addition,   the  mother  country  supported 
garrisons  in  a  number  of  the  colonies.    The  largest  forces 
were  kept  in  the  West  Indian  colonies  which,  on  account  of 
their  position  in  the  midst  of  Europe's  "cock-pit,"  were 
exposed  to  sudden  attacks.*    Owing  to  the  large  numerical 
preponderance  of  the  slave  population  in  these  colonies, 
their  military  strength  was  small ;  Jamaica  unaided  was  not 
even  able  to  cope  with  the  negro  insurrections.    Similarly, 

»B.  T.  So.  Ca.  16  Ks;  17  K  87. 

'  Part  of  the  expense  of  these  garrisons  was  indirectly  defrayed  by  the  West 
Indian  colonies.  Thus  Jamaica  provided  the  quarters  for  the  soldiers  located 
there.  C/.  B.  T.  Jam.  s8,  p.  336;  59,  pp.  60,  82  and  11  K  44.  This  was 
also  true  in  the  Windward  and  I.€eward  Islands,  owing  to  the  fact  that  the 
four  and  one-half  per  cent  export  duty  produced  a  considerable  revenue,  which 
the  British  government  had  promised  to  devote  to  the  defence  of  the  islands. 


THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE    II 


small  garrisons  were  kept  in  the  Bahamas  and  the  Bermudas, 
as  their  strategic  value  was  important  owing  to  their  location 
on  much  frequented  trade-routes.    Then,  mainly  to  protect 
the  fisheries,  of  both  old  and  new  England,  garrisons  were  ^ 
placed   in  Newfoundland  and   in  Nova  Scotia.    Finally, 
owing  to  the  refusal  of  the  continental  colonies  to  cooperate 
for  defence  against  the  Indians,  the  mother  country  was 
forced  also  to  keep  small  garrisons  in  the  two  most  exposal  " 
colonies,  New  York  and  South  Carolina.'    It  was  recognized 
that  this  was  a  departure  from  the  accepted  theory  of  defence ; 
for  prior  to  the  great  wars  in  the  middle  of  the  century  the 
Indian  danger  was  considered  primarily  a  matter  of  colonial 
interest,  and  one  well  within  the  limits  of  the  military  strength 
of  the  continental  colonics.    In  these  cases  the  mother  coun- 
try assumed  a  burden  which  the  colonies  as  a  whole  were  un- 
willing to  bear  and  which  was  deemed  too  heavy  for  either 
of  the  two  colonics  most  directly  concerned.     After  the  es- 
tablishment of   Georgia,  the  South  Carolina  garrison  was 
temporarily  removed  to  the  more  exposed  colony,  and  was 
subsequently  considerably  increased.* 

The  charge  on  the  British  exchequer  on  account  of  these 
permanent  forces  in  the  colonies  was  not  large.  In  1737 
it  was  only  ;C53.ooo,  and  in  1743  it  was  about  ;C75,ooo. 
But  of  these  respective  amounts,  only  a  small  part  was  spent 

'  New  York  supplied  the  provisions  for  these  regular  troops.  B.  T.  N.  Y.  ag 
Hh  126.  South  Carolina,  after  the  removal  of  the  independent  companies 
to  Georgif.,  offered  to  give  additional  pay  to  these  regular  soldiers  if  they  were 
again  placed  in  the  colony.  This  was  done  in  1 746-1 748.  Wm.  Roy  Smith, 
South  Carolina,  pp.  193-195. 

'  Col.  Rec.  of  Ga.  I,  p.  520. 


12 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


I  :  W 


in  the  continenta'  colonies  that  ultimately  seceded  from  the 
Empire.  In  1737  only  ;£io,ooo  was  thus  spent;  in  1743 
£25,000,  the  increase  being  due  to  the  larger  force  established 
in  Georgia.*  In  addition  to  this  purely  military  expense, 
Parliament  appropriated  also  large  sums  for  the  settlement 
of  Georgia,  which  was  to  a  great  extent  a  military  enter- 

'  Annual  appropriations  were  made  by  Parliament  for  the  forces  in  the 
colonies,  and  in  Minorca  and  Gibraltar.  In  173a  the  grant  was  £160,214 
(5  Geo.  II,  c.  1 7) ;  in  1 733,  £164,835  (6  Geo.  II,  c.  25,  J  xii) ;  in  1 734,  £203,996 
(7  Geo.  IL  c.  12);  in  1736,  £216,228  (9  Geo.  II,  c.  34);  in  1737,  £215,710 
(10  Geo.  II,  c.  17);  in  1739,  £228,062  (12  Geo.  II,  c.  19).  Of  these  giants 
the  larger  portion  was  for  the  garrisons  in  Minorca  and  Gibraltor.  Thus  the 
grant  of  1737  was  distributed  as  follows:  — 


Leeward  Islands 

Jamaica 

Bahamas 

Bermudas 

New  York 

Georgia 

Nova  Scotia  and  Newfoundland 

Nova  Scotia  and  Newfoundland 

Total  for  the  above  colonies 
Minorca  and  Gibraltar 

Total  grant  of  1737 


One  regiment 
Eight  companies 
One  company 
One  company 
Four  companies 
One  company 
One  regiment 
Garrisons  and  provisions 


f  i 


£9,776 
15,367 
2,466 
1,004 
7,i4« 
3,071 
9,830 
4,098 

£sa,7S4 
162,956 

£ai5,7io 

These  figures  are  derived  from  the  War  Office  estimate  for  1737  to  the  House 
of  Commons.  Commons  Journal  22,  p.  740.  C/ also  Dinwiddle's  Memorial, 
1 738,  in  B.  T.  Bermuda  14  M  1 7.  At  this  time  the  force  in  Georgia  was  con- 
siderably increased,  and  at  the  same  time,  owing  to  the  war,  the  pariiamentary 
appropriations  for  the  garrisons  in  the  colonies,  and  in  Gibraltar  and  in  Mi- 
norca, grew  large..  In  1 740  they  were  £266,203  ('3  Geo.  II,  c.  23) ;  in  1 741 
they  were  £266,512  (14  Geo.  II,  c.  41).  In  1743  the  annual  expense  of  the 
forces  in  America  was  £73,833,  of  which  £7,141  was  spent  on  the  forces  in 
New  York,  and  £17,881  on  those  in  Geoi^ia.  Am.  and  W.  I.  670:  A  State 
of  the  annual  Expense  of  the  Forces  in  America,  1743. 


*  I 


THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE         13 

prise  designed  for  the  protection  of  the  Southern  colonies. 
Prior  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  1739,  the  annual  grants 
for  this  purpose  averaged  about  ;£2o,ooo.'  After  the  re- 
storation of  peace  in  1748,  there  was  only  a  slight  increase 
in  the  cost  of  the  colonial  garrisons,  about  ;i(^8o,ooo  being 
expended  yearly  for  this  purpose.'  The  regiment  in  Georgia 
was  disbanded  at  that  time,  as  the  small  force  in  South 
Carolina  was  deemed  sufficient  for  the  protection  of  the 
Southern  colonies.*  The  annual  outlay  for  these  "inde- 
pendent companies"  in  New  York  and  South  Carolina  was 
in  1752,  1753,  and  1754  only  ;Ci3.ooo.*  On  the  other  hand, 
large  sums  were  spent  on  settling  and  fortifying  Nova 
Scotia,  the  total  parliamentary  grants  for  this  military 
colony  aggregating  £543,625  in  the  eight  years  from  1750 
to  1757  inclusive.*    Reviewing  these  fat      't  becomes  ap- 

'8  Geo.  II,  c.  23;  9  Geo.  II,  c.  34,  §  xxiii;  10  Geo.  II,  c.  17;  la  Geo. 
n,  c.  19. 

'  The  grants  for  the  forces  in  the  plantations  and  for  those  in  Minorca  and 
in  Gibraltar  were,  in  1751,  1753,  and  1754,  £2;6,420  (24  Geo.  II,  c.  47;  26 
Geo.  II,  c.  25;  27  Geo.  II,  c.  10).  In  1752  they  were  £229,943  (25  Geo.  II, 
c.  25),  of  which  £151,104  was  for  Minorca  and  Gibraltar,  and  £78,839  for  the 
colonies  (Commons  Journal  26,  p.  308).  In  the  other  years  these  respective 
amounts  were  £155.360  and  £81,060  (ibid.,  26,  pp.  528,  850).  These  amounts 
would  be  increased  by  about  £20,000  if  the  expenditure  of  the  Ordnance 
Poard  were  taken  into  account. 

•  Col.  Rec.  of  Ga,,  pp.  520,  522,  523,  527.  Detachments  of  the  three 
independent  companies  in  South  Carolina  were  placed  in  Georgia.  Ibid., 
P-  525- 

*  Commons  Journal  26,  pp.  308,  528,  850.  At  this  time  £36,000  was  spent 
yearly  for  the  forces  in  Nova  Scotia. 

» 23  Geo.  II,  c.  21 ;  24  Geo.  II,  c.  47;  25  Geo.  II,  c.  25;  26  Geo.  II,  c.  23; 
27  Geo.  II,  c.  10;  28  Geo.  II,  c.  22;  29  Geo.  II,  c.  29;  30  Geo.  II,  c.  26. 
The  parliamentary  grants  for  this  purpose  decreased  from  this  date  on,  being 


M 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


'f 


5  ■. 

u 

i  I 

1 1 

i    { 

i  I 

i  :■ 

f;' 


parent  that  Great  Britain  was  willing  to  spend  large  sums 
upon  the  defence  of  the  outlying  frontiers  of  the  Empire, 
and  that  she  was  likewise  willing  when  necessarj'  to  estab- 
lish garrisons  in  the  most  exposed  colonies.  In  general, 
however,  the  colonies  were  expected  to  assume  the  burden 
of  local  defence  in  time  of  peace.  Until  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  with  France  in  the  sixth  decade  of  the  century, 
the  cost  of  the  permanent  garrisons  in  all  the  colonies  was 
unimportant,  and  in  the  case  of  those  that  ultimately  formed 
the  United  States  it  was  trifling. 

It  was  universally  recognized  at  the  time  that  the  treaty 
of  Aix-la-Chapelle  was  merely  a  truce,  and  that  the  conflict 
would  soon  be  resumed.    The  phrase  then  current  m  Paris, 
"bete  comme  la  paix,"  expressed  the  dissatisfaction  of  the 
governing  classes  with  a  treaty  that  gratified  no  one  of  their 
ambitions.    The  fundamental  questions  at  issue  between 
France  and  England  in  America  had  not  been  settled.    The 
boundary  line  of  Nova  Scotia  wa.,  still  in  dispute;  and,  in 
order  to  strengthen  their  position,  the  French  erected  forts 
in  the  disputed   area  and   stirred   up  the  Nova  Scotian 
Indians  to  attack  the  English.    Similarly  in  the  Southwest 
of  North  America,  a  definite  boundary  line  had  not  been 
agreed  upon.     Moreover,  France  was  building  a  series  of 
forts  in  the  "hinterland"  of  the  North  American  colonies, 
connecting  Louisiana  and  Canada,  and  thus  confining  the 

£16,528  in  1758  (31  Geo.  II,  c.  33),  £io,S95  in  1761  (i  Geo.  Ill,  c.  19),  and 
£S,68a  in  1762  (2  Geo.  Ill,  c.  34).     Oglethorpe  criticised  this  heavy  expen- 
diture     .7  severely,  claiming  that  the  money  could  have  been  used  much 
more  advantageously.    See  James  Oglethorpe  to  Field  Marshal  Keith,  May  , 
1756.    Hist.  MSS.  Com.  IX,  2,  p.  2296. 


s   < 


I    . 


THEORY  AND  PRACTICE  OF  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE        15 

English  to  a  no rrow  fringe  of  land  along  the  coast. *  Finally, 
in  the  West  Indies,  France  on  various  pretexts  delayed  the 
evacuation  and  retained  possession  of  the  four  "neutral 
islands,"  St.  Lucia,  Dominica,  St.  Vincent,  and  Tobago,  in 
direct  violation  of  the  agreement  made  shortly  after  the 
peace  of  1748^  The  prospect  of  an  early  renewal  of 
hostilities  directed  the  attention  of  the  English  government 
to  the  system  of  imperial  defence,  especially  in  North 
America,  where  France  was  forcing  the  issue. 

•  CJ.  Am.  and  W.I.  604. 

» Am.  and  W.I.  604.  See  especially  the  despatches  of  Henry  Grenville, 
governor  of  Barbados,  to  Bedford  and  Holdemesse  in  1750  and  1751.  ,\m. 
and  W.I.  40,  nos.  63,  106,  109,  125,  133,  141,  147. 


H      ? 


n 


\ 


CHAPTER  II 

PLANS  FOR  A  UNION  OF  THE  CONTINENTAL  COLONIES 

IN   1754 

The  English  government  was  loath  to  renew  the  struggle. 
Great  Britain  was  in  one  of  her  frequent  pessimistic  moods, 
belittling  her  own  strength  and  magnifying  that  of  the  enemy 
It  was  feared  that  France  would  acquire  not  only  political 
but  also  complete  commercial  supremacy,  and  that  Great 
Britain  would  be  absolutely  at  the  mercy  of  her  rival.    The 
aggressions  of  the  French  in  the  Ohio  Valley,  however,  forced 
the  government  to  take  some  action.    On  August  28,  1753 
Holdemesse,  the  secretary  of  state  in  charge  of  colonial 
affairs,  addressed  a  circular  despatch  to  the  governors  au- 
thorizing them  to  repel,  by  force  if  necessary,  any  invasion 
of  his  Majesty's  unquestioned  dominions,  but  cautioning 
them  not  to  be  the  aggressors.'    At  the  same  time,  in  view 
of  the  great  emergency,  the  home  government  sent  ;^io  000 
to  Dmwiddie,  the  lieutenant-governor  of  Virginia,  that  colony 
being  the  one  most  affected  by  the  French  advance,  and 
allowed  him  to  draw  ;£io,ooo  in  addition  for  the  defence  of 

'  Am.  and  W  L  74. 
16 


i'l 
i      i 


iX 


PLANS  FOR  A  UNION  OF  THE  COLONIES 


»7 


I    "■- 


■  5 


I 


North  America.'  This  departure  from  the  regular  practice 
was  fully  justified  by  the  existing  abnormal  condition,  for  not 
only  was  an  Indian  war,  aided  and  abetted  by  the  French, 
in  sight,  but  in  addition  a  war  with  France  was  imminent.' 
Then  on  September  i8,  1753,  the  Board  of  Trade  instructed 
the  governors  of  New  York,  Virginia,  Maryland,  Pennsyl- 
vania, New  Jersey,  New  Hampshire,  and  Massachusetts  to 
hold  a  joint  meeting  with  the  Iroquois  Indians  in  order  to 
secure  their  wavering  friendship.  According  to  these  in- 
structions, all  the  colonies  were,  if  practicable,  to  be  "com- 
prized in  one  general  Treaty  to  be  made  in  his  Majesty's 


name 


n  1 


II 


The  idea  of  cooperation  contained  in  these  instruc- 
tions was  a  most  fertile  one,  and  it  rapidly  gained  ground 
with  the  ablest  men  in  the  colonies.  Outnumbering  the 
French,  approximately  in  the  ratio  of  fifteen  to  one,  the 
English  colonies  would,  if  united,  have  been  fully  able  to  cope 
with  the  enemy.  But  unfortunately  for  them,  as  Governor 
Glen  said,  they  were  but  "a  Rope  of  Sand  .  .  .  loose  and  in- 
connected."  '  France  was  encouraged  in  her  aggressions 
by  this  lack  of  union  among  the  English  colonies.'    Thus 

•  Brit.  Mus.  Addit.  MSS.  33029  (Newcastle  Papers  CCCXLIV);  Am.  and 
W.L  604:  Braddock's  Instructions. 

'It  was,  however,  intended  that  until  the  outbreak  of  formal  war  with 
France  the  colonies  should,  in  the  main,  defend  themselves  in  America. 

•  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  pp.  799,  800. 

•  Am.  and  W.I.  67:  James  Glen  to  Dinwiddle,  March  14,  1754. 

•On  May  8,  1754,  Franklin  wrote  to  Partridge:  "The  confidence  of  the 
French  in  this  Undertaking  seems  well-grounded  on  the  present  disunited 
State  of  the  British  Colonies,  &  the  extremt  Difficulty  of  bringing  so  many 
different  Governments  and  Assemblies  to  agree  in  any  speedy   &  effectual 


i8 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


I, 


T  I   1 


I   I 


Robert  Dinwiddle  wrote  to  the  secretary  of  state:  "The 
French,  too  justly  observe  the  want  of  Connection  in  the 
Colonies  &  from  them  conclude  (as  they  declare  without 
Reserve)  that  although  we  are  vastly  superior  to  them  in 
Numbers,  yet  they  can  take  &  secure  the  Country  before  we 
can  agree  to  hinder  them."  •  The  problem  was  to  overcome 
the  jealousies  of  the  various  colonies  and  to  get  them  to  unite 
for  purposes  of  defence.  During  the  early  months  of  1754, 
such  plans  were  being  formulated  in  America  by  Shirley,' 
Franklin,  and  others. 

The  Albany  Congress  of  1754  assembled  as  a  result  of  the 
Board  of  Trade's  instructions » of  September  18,  1753,  which 
contemplated  only  a  joint  treaty  with  the  Indians.  The 
course  of  events  had,  however,  demonstrated  that  some  more 
or  less  comprehensive  scheme  of  defence  was  necessary,  and 
hence  the  subject  for  deliberation  was  enlarged.*    Of  the 

Measures  for  our  common  Defence  and  Security,  while  our  Enemies  have  the 
very  great  Advantage  of  being  under  one  Direction,  with  one  Council  &  one 
Purse."    Am.  and  W.L  67. 

'  Ibid.  67:  Dinwiddie  to  Sir  Thomas  Robinson,  June  18,  1734. 

'N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  p.  82a:   Shirley  to  Holdemesse,  Jan.  7,  1754. 

'Ibid.  VI,  pp.  853-856;  Hutchinson,  Mass.  Ill,  p.  20. 

'  Hutchinson,  who  was  present,  says:  "The  king  in  his  instructions  tor  this 
convention,  proposed  that  a  quota  should  be  settled,  and  that,  bv  acts  of  the 
respective  assemblies,  this  should  be  established  as  the  rule  for  raising  men  and 
monies."  Hutchinson,  Mass.  Ill,  p.  ai.  Cf.  DeLancey  to  Board  of  Trade 
Apnl  27,  1754,  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  p.  833,  from  which  it  may  be  inferred  thai 
no  such  instructions  were  sent.  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  the  instructions 
to  which  Hutchinson  refers,  and  there  is  no  mention  of  them  in  the  proceedings 
of  the  congress.  Frothingham  ("  Rise  of  the  Republic  of  the  United  States," 
p.  132)  also  says  that  the  colonies  were  to  "enter  into  artit'  s  of  union  and 
confederation  with  each  other  for  the  mutual  defence  of  his  majesty's  subjects 
and  mterests  in  North  America,  as  well  in  Ume  of  peace  as  war."    The  for- 


% 

^ 

^ 


PLANS  FOR  A  UNION  OF  THE  COLONIES  ,g 

colonics  instructed  to  send  representatives,  two  -Virginia 
and  New  Jersey  -  failed  to  comply,  though  Virginia  was 
represented  by  DeLancey,  the  lieutenant-governor  of  New 
York.    On  the  other  hand,  the  two  charter  colonies  —  Rhode 
Island  and  Connecticut  -  though  not  named  in  the  instruc- 
tions, sent  representatives.^    At  the  meeting  of  these  com- 
missioners, held  on  June  24,  1754,  a  motion  to  the  effect  that 
a  union  of  all  the  colonies  was  absolutely  necessary  for  their 
security  and  defence  was  unanimously  adopted,  and  a  com- 
mittee was  appointed  to  prepare  such  a  plan.'    The  reasons 
that  led  the  congress  to  reach  this  decision  are  embodied  in  a 
document  evidently  drawn  up  by  Franklin.    It  describes 
in  a  comprehensive  manner  the  disheartening  particularism 
of  the  colonies : 

The  commissioners  from  a  number  of  the  northern  colonies,  being   • 
met  at  Albany,  and  considering  the  difficulties  that  have  always  attended 
the  most  necessary  general  measures  for  the  common  defence,  or  for 
the  annoyance  of  the  enemy,  when  they  were  to  be  carried  through  the 
several  particular  Assemblies  of  all  the  colonies;    some  Assemblies 
bemg  before  at  variance  with  their  governors  or  councils,  and  the  sev- 
eral branches  of  the  government  not  on  terms  of  doing  business  with 
each  other;   others  taking  the  opportunity,  when  their  concurrence  is 
wanted,  to  push  for  favourite  laws,  powers,  or  points,  that  they  think 
could  not  at  other  times  be  obtained,  and  so  creating  disputes  and 
quarrels ;  one  Assembly  waiting  to  see  what  another  will  do,  being  afraid 
of  domg  more  than  its  share,  or  desirous  of  doing  less,  or  refusing  to  do 
anythmg  because  its  country  is  not  at .  esent  so  much  exposed  as  others, 

mation  of  such  a  union,  however,  unquestionably  had  the  sanction  of  the 
Bnt.sh  government.  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  p.  846.  Cf.  R.I.  Hist.  Tracts,  o 
PP-  41.  42 

'  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  p.  853;  Hutchinson,  Mass.  Ill,  p.  20. 
'/AW.  VI,  p.  859.  '^ 


30 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  17S4-176S 


or  because  another  will  reap  more  immediate  advantage;  from  one  or 
other  of  which  causes,  the  Assemblies  of  six  out  of  seven  colonies  applied 
to,  had  granted  no  assistance  to  Virginia,  when  lately  invaded  by  the 
French,  though  purjjosely  convened,  and  the  importance  of  the  occasion 
earnestly  urged  upon  them ;  —  considering  moreover,  that  one  principal 
encouragement  to  the  French,  in  invading  and  insulting  the  British 
American  dominions,  was  their  knowledge  of  our  disunited  state,  and 
of  our  weakness  arising  from  such  want  of  union ;  .  .  . 

for  these  reasons  the  commissioners  unanimously  decided 
that  "a  union  of  the  colonies  is  absolutely  necessary  for 
their  preservation."  '  These  difficulties  had  existed  through- 
out the  entire  history  of  the  colonies,'  but  at  no  previous  time 
was  the  situation  so  critical. 

The  committee  appointed  by  the  colonial  commissioners 
accordingly  drafted  a  plan  of  union,'  and  this  plan,  chiefly  the 
work  of  Franklin,  was  in  due  course  unanimously  adopted. 
It  provided  for  an  executive  and  a  legislature;  the  former 
—  the  president-general  —  to  be  appointed  and  supported 
by  the  Crown,  the  latter  —  the  Grand  Council  —  to  be 
elected  by  the  various  assemblies  in  the  eleven  *  colonies. 
This  legislature  was  to  consist  of  forty-eight  members,  the 


1. 


^4 


( 


'  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  III,  pp.  203,  204.  In  1 754  New  Jersey 
refused  to  raise  supplies  for  the  common  defence,  or  to  send  cnmmissionen 
to  Albany.  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  VIII,  Part  I,  pp.  287,  agi,  294-296.  Cf.  B.  T. 
Journals  62,  July  2,  1754. 

'The  most  exposed  colonies  naturally  resented  the  apathy  of  the  other 
colonies.  Thus,  in  1710,  Governor  Dudley  wrote  that  New  England  was 
dissatisfied  at  having  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  war,  while  the  Southern  colonies, 
though  protected  by  those  in  the  North,  did  nothing.  Am.  and  W.I.  vol.  I, 
no.  20  B.     Cf.  also  Ihid.  5,  no.  139. 

•  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  p.  889. 

*  Nova  Scotia  was  not  included  in  the  union. 


i 


^^ 


PLANS  FOR  A  UNION  OF  THE  COLONIES  21 

colonies  being  represented  roughly  according  to  population 
and  wealth.  To  this  Grand  Council  was  given  jurisdiction 
over  Indian  affairs,  both  political  and  commercial.  It 
was  to  raise  and  pay  soldiers,  to  build  forts  for  the  defence  of 
the  colonies,  and  to  "Equip  Vessels  of  Force  to  Guard  the 
Coasts  and  protect  the  Trade  on  the  Ocean,  Lakes  or  Great 
Rivers."  In  order  to  raise  the  requisite  funds  for  these  pur- 
poses, the  Grand  Council  was  given  power  to  make  laws  and 
to  impose  general  duties  and  taxes.  All  acts  of  the  Grand 
Council,  however,  required  the  consent  of  the  president- 
general  and,  in  addition,  all  laws  were  to  be  submitted  to  the 
king  in  council  for  approbation.'  This  plan,  it  is  apparent, 
implied  an  assumption  by  the  colonies  of  a  far  greater  share 
of  the  cost  of  defence  than  had  hitherto  been  customary. 

This  proposal  for  a  political  union  of  the  colonies  under 
one  general  government  in  America  was  ultimately  to  be 
brought  into  effect  by  an  act  of  the  Parliament  of  Great 
Britain.  With  the  exception  of  those  from  Massachusetts, 
the  colonial  commissioners  did  not,  however,  have  full  pow- 
ers,* and  accordingly  it  was  provided  that  the  plan  should  be 
first  submitted  to  the  colonies.  With  the  same  unanimity 
with  which  their  representatives  had  adopted  the  plan,  the  ' 
colonial  assemblies  either  rejected  or  failed  to  ratify  it.'  The 
reasons  for  this  failure  were,  on  the  one  hand,  the  particu- 
larism of  the  colonies,  and  on  the  other,  their  underlying  con- 

'  Am.  and  W.I.  604. 

'  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  p.  930.  For  the  instructions  from  Connecticut,  see 
Col.  Rec.  of  Conn.  X,  p.  268. 

•  Hutchinson,  Mass.  Ill,  p.  33;  Frankhn,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  III,  pp.  aa6, 
"7  n.;  R.I.  Hist.  Tracts,  9;  Col.  Rec.  of  Conn.  X,  p.  293. 


1 1 


32 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-176$ 


victlon  that  Great  Britain,  if  left  no  other  choice,  would  ulti- 
mately have  to  assume  the  task  of  defending  them.  Accord- 
ing to  Shirley,  the  commissioners  at  Albany  "  had  no  expecta- 
tion" that  the  colonies  would  adopt  the  plan ;  and  he  added, 
"nor  could  any  proper  plan  be  form'd,  as  I  apprehend,  in 
w*^  the  several  Gov"  would  unite."  '  Franklin  was  not  more 
sanguine.     On  December  29, 1 754,  h-  wrote  to  Collinson :  — 

All  the  Assemblies  in  the  Colonies  have,  I  suppose,  had  the  Union 
Plan  laid  before  them,  but  it  is  not  likely,  in  my  Opinion,  that  any  of 
them  will  act  upon  it  so  as  to  agree  to  it,  or  to  propose  any  Amendments 
to  it.  Every  Body  cries,  a  Union  is  absolutely  necessary,  but  when  they 
come  to  the  Manner  and  Form  of  the  Union,  their  weak  Noddles  are 
perfectly  distracted.* 

The  action  of  the  colonies  in  rejecting  the  Albany  plan  was 
decisive,  for  it  was  the  understanding  of  the  British  govern- 
ment and  of  th  .olonies,  that  the  plan  should  be  submitted 
to  Parliament  only  after  its  consideration  and  adoption  by 
the  colonial  legislatures.*  In  fact  the  congress  had  made 
especial  provision  that  no  copy  should  be  sent  to  England.* 

•  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  pp.  930,  931. 

•  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  III,  p.  341. 

•  Report  of  Board  of  Trade  to  King,  Oct.  39,  1 754.     Am.  and  W.I.  604. 

•  One  of  the  Rhode  Island  commissioners,  Stephen  Hopkins,  in  defending 
his  conduct,  said  that  the  Congress  "did  not,  as  is  falsely  asserted,  order  it  to 
be  sent  home.  .  .  .  They  did  not  leave  it  in  the  Power  of  any  one  to  obtain 
a  Copy  of  it,  and  send  it  Home;  but  strictly  forbid  their  Secretary  to  give  any 
Copy,  except  to  the  Colonies.  Nor  did  they  ever  agree  to  any  Thing  more,  than 
to  carry  it  to  their  respective  Governments,  and  lay  it  before  their  Constituents." 
Hopkins,  A  True  Representation  of  the  Plan  Formed  at  \lbany  (Providence, 
1 755).  RI  Hist.  Tracts,  9,  pp.  42, 43.  Cf.  p.  39.  A3  the  colonies  had  failed  to 
ratify  the  plan,  it  never  really  came  before  the  British  government.  In  fact 
surprise  was  expressed  that  an  account  of  the  proceedings  had  been  for- 


I 


f 


PLANS  FOR  A  UNION  OF  THE  COLONIES  jj 

However,  to  the  surprise  of  the  colonics,  a  full  account  of  the 
proccctlings  of  the  Albany  Congress  was  forwarded  to  Eng- 
land  by  DeUncey,  and  on  October  ag,  1754,  the  Board  of 
Trade  sent  to  Sir  Thomas  Robinson,  the  secretary  of  state, 
a  detailed  report  thereon.* 

The  Albany  Congress  had  not  succeeded  in  conciliating  the 
Indians,  nor  had  it  provided  for  the  joint  management  of 
Indian  affairs  nor  for  the  strengthening  of  the  frontiers,  which 
were  the  chief  objects  desired  by  the  British  government. 
The  Board  of  Trade  severely  criticised  the  failure  to  regulate 
these  matters,  pointing  out  that  the  situation  was  a  serious 
one  owing  to  the  present  mismanagement  of  Indian  affairs, 
and  that  the  commissioners  at  Albany  had  themselves  unani- 
mously agreed  that  Indian  affairs  "should  be  under  one 
General  Administration  directed  to  the  general  Interest  and 
supported  at  the  general  Expence"  of  all  the  colonies.  As 
to  the  Albany  articles  of  federation,  the  Board  of  Trade  re- 
frained from  expressing  any  opinion,  evidently  awaiting  the 
further  action  of  the  colonic^. 

While  the  failure  of  this  plan  rests  primarily  on  the  colonies, 
it  is  exceedingly  doubtful  whether  the  English  government 
would  have  ratified  it,  even  if  the  colonies  by  their  previous 

warded  to  England.  Ibid.  p.  59;  Sharpe  Correspondence  I,  p.  79.  In  ,789 
Frankhn  wrote  the  following  about  the  fate  of  the  Albany  plan:  "The  Crown 
dlsappro/ed  it,  as  having  placed  too  much  Weight  in  the  Democratic  Part 
of  the  Constitution;  and  every  Assembly  as  having  allowed  too  much  to  Pre- 
rogative. So  it  was  toully  rejected."  Franklin,  Writings  III,  p.  227  n.  It 
IS  worth  while  calling  attention  to  this  gross  misrepresenution,  as  nearly  every 
subsequent  writer  has  repeated  Franklin's  misleading  words. 
'  Am.  and  W.I.  604. 


fl 

f 

u 


f( 


i 
i 

.< 

.1 
n 

i 
1 


1 


U' 


1 5 

I  f. 


24 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


confirmation  had  allowed  it  to  come  to  the  consideration  of 
Parliament.  The  home  authorities  desired  a  union  of  the 
colonies  for  military  purposes,  not  a  political  federation; 
their  aim  was  military  efficiency,  which  unquestionably 
would  have  bee-"  impaired  by  the  liberal  powers  bestowed 
on  the  Grand  Council.  This  will  become  apparent  from 
a  consideration  of  the  scheme  of  union  elaborated  by  the 
Board  of  Trade. 

In  the  early  months  of  1754,  it  came  to  be  recognized  in 
England,  as  in  America,  that  a  union  of  the  colonics  was 
necessary.  On  January  7,  1754,  Shirley  wrote  to  the  secre- 
tary of  state  that  the  old  requisition  system  of  relying  on  each 
colony  to  furnish  men  for  the  defence  of  all  was  impracticable, 
unless  the  Crown  could  find  some  method  of  obliging  the 
colonies  to  contribute  their  quotas.'  On  June  14,  1 754,  some 
days  before  the  meeting  of  the  colonial  commissioners  at 
Albany,  the  secretary  of  state.  Sir  Thomas  Robinson,  di- 
rected the  Board  of  Trade  to  prepare  and  lay  before  the 
king  "a  plan  of  general  concert  to  be  entered  i.ito  by  the 
American  colonies  for  their  mutual  defence,  and  to  prevent 
and  remove  any  encroachments  on  the  British  dominions."  * 

Accordingly,  on  August  9,  1754,  the  Board  of  Trade  sent 
its  plan  of  union  to  Sir  Thomas  Robinson.'  Herein  it  was 
suggested  that  circular  letters  be  sent  to  the  governors  in  the 
continental  colonies,  pointing  out  the  danger  to  which  they 

'  Shirley  to  Holdemesse,  January  7,  1754.    Am.  and  W.I.  67. 
'  B.  T.  Plantations  General  15, 0  125.    The  letter  was  read  at  the  meeting 
of  the  Board  of  Trade  on  June  18,  1754.    B.  T.  Journals  62. 
'Am.  and  W.I.  604;  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  4.1    ^p.  368-397. 


f 


'!1 


I 


■L 


PLANS  FOR  A  UNION  OF  THE  COLONIES  25 

were  exposed  from  the  encroachments  of  France,  and  stating 
"the  urgent  necessity  there  is  of  an  immediate  union  of  the 
sever^?  T  .lo-ilos"  in  order  to  maintain  forts,  to  raise  soldiers, 
to  d,  ^ray  the  ex^c  . ;  of  presents  for  the  Indians  and  to  place 
"Im  1.,  uflairs  ui  .-er  one  general  direction."    The  colonial 
assemblies  v;.  r..  :ach  to  appoint  a  commissioner,  subject  to 
the  approval  of  the  governor,  and  these  commissioners  were 
to  meet  and  agree  upon  the  necessary  military  establish- 
ment of  the  colonies  in  time  of  peace,  and  to  apportion  the 
expense  thereof  among  the  various  colonies  according  to  their 
population,  trade,  wealth,  and  revenue.    Provision  was  also 
made  for  reconvening  this  inter-colonial  assembly  whenever 
a  sudden  emergency,  such  as  actual  invasion,  should  require 
greater  military  exertions.    The  Crown  was  to  appoint  a 
commander-in-chief »  of  all  the  colonial  forces,  and  of  all 
troops  sent  to  the  colonies  from  Great  Britain  "upon  any 
emergency."    This  officer  was  also  to  act  as  commissary 
general  for  Indian  affairs.     He  was  to  be  empowered  to  draw 
upon  the  proper  authorities  in  each  colony  for  such  an  amount 
of  money  as  had  been  previously  determined  upon  as  the  colo- 
ny's share  of  the  whole.    The  convention  drawn  up  on  these 
lines  by  the  colonial  commissioners  was  to  be  sent  to  England 
for  approbation,  and  in  order  to  enable  a  convention  ^o  be 
agreed  upon,  it  was  provided  that  any  seven  colonies  were 
to  constitute  a  quorum,  and  that  the  decision  of  a  majority 
was  to  be  binding. 

The  object  of  this  plan  was  to  increase  the  military 

'Provision  was  to  "be  made  in  the  Estimate  for  the  ordinary  established 
service  for  a  proper  Salary  for  such  Commander  in  chief." 


1! 


t 

f 


!. 


I  I 


f : 

i 

i   !'■■ 


26 


BRITISH   COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


Strength  of  the  colonics  and  to  make  them  provide  for 
the  additional  forts  on  the  frontier  and  presents  to 
the  Indians,  which  the  threatening  condition  of  affairs 
rendered  necessary.  It  was  not  intended  that  thj  Crown 
should  lessen  its  former  expenditures  for  these  purposes,  nor 
that  it  should  refuse  to  aid  the  colonies  in  extraordinary 
emergencies,  such  as  the  actual  outbreak  of  war  with  France. 
It  was  distinctly  stated  that : 

His  Majesty  does  not  intend  to  withdraw  that  part  of  the  expence 
which  the  Crown  has  been  usually  at,  for  the  Security  and  Protection 
of  the  Colonies,  but  that  he  will  be  graciously  pleased  to  continue  to 
maintain  &  subsist  such  a  number  of  his  Troops  as  shall  appear  to  be 
necessary  to  be  stationed  in  America,  &  does  also  consent  that  whatever 
sums  of  money  have  been  usually  given  by  His  Majesty  for  Indian  Ser- 
vices, shall  be  deducted  from  the  general  Estimate  as  the  share  His 
Majesty  is  willing  to  bear  of  the  ordinary  Establishment  for  this  ser- 
vice, &  that  upon  any  great  Emergency  they  shall  receive  such  support 
from  His  Majest}  as  shall  be  thought  reasonable  upon  a  due  Considera- 
tion of  the  Nature  of  the  Case,  &  of  what  the  circumstances  &  condi- 
tions of  the  Colonies  shall  seem  to  require.' 

This  plan  of  the  Board  of  Trade  differed  radically  from  that 
devised  at  Albany;  it  contemplated  only  a  military  union, 
while  Franklin  and  his  associates  planned  a  political  union 
as  well.  Both  the  Board  of  Trade  and  the  Albany  Congress, 
however,  started  from  the  premise  that  the  colonies  should 
in  equity  provide  for  their  own  regularly  established  military 
system. 

The  failure  of  the  colonies  to  adopt  a  plan  of  union  in  1754 
forced  the  English  to  take  some  action  for  their  defence.    In 

•  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  43.  p.  380. 


PLANS  FOR  A  UNION  OF  THE  COLONIES  27 

transmitting  its  plan  in  1754,  the  Board  of  Trade  remarked 
"  that  from  the  delay  which   lust  necessarily  attend  the  execu- 
tion of  any  new  Plan  for  an  Union  of  the  Colonies,  it  cannot  be 
made  to  answer  the  purpose  of  a  present  exigency,"  and  that 
whatever  danger  exists  at  present  must  be  guarded  against 
"by  an  Application  of  such  means  of  strength  &  force,  as 
can  be  procured  in  the  most  expeditious  &  most  effectual 
manner."    The  Board  therefore  suggested  the  appointment 
of  a  commander-ih-chief  over  all  cobnial  and  British  forces 
in  America,  and  likewise  the  appointment  of  a  commis- 
sary general  for  Indian  affairs'    In  its  report  on  the  Al- 
bany plan,  the  Board  of  Trade  also  propo:ed  that  "untill  a 
Plan  of  Union  can  be  settled,  by  which  a  proper  provision 
may  be  made  for  those  Services  at  the  general  Expcnce  of  the 
Colonies,"  William  Johnson  should  be  appointed  colonel 
of  the  Six  Nations,  and  be  given  the  manag^-^nt  of  Indian 
ailairs  in  the  same  manner  and  with  the  same  allowance  as 
when  the  expedition  against  Canada  was  intended  during  the 
last  war.* 

Virginia  was  clamoring  for  assistance,  and  the  other  colo- 
nies showed  little  or  no  disposition  to  respond  to  her  appeal. 
Consequently,  the  English  government  adopted  the  sugges- 
tion of  f  J  Board  of  Trade,  and  sent  Edward  Braddock  as 
commander-in-chief  to  America  and  with  him  two  regiments. 
Parliament  provided  funds  for  this  force  and,  in  addition, 
for  two  regiments  to  be  raised  in  America  for  service  in  1755.' 
The  English  government,  however,  was  loath  to  defray  the 

'  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  43,  pp.  36^3gj.  >  Am.  and  W.I.  604. 

•  28  Geo.  n,  c.  22. 


28 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-176$ 


entire  cost  of  these  troops,  and  accor.     Jy  the  colonies  were 
instructed  to  provide  victuals  and  quarters  for  them.'    In 
conformity  with  the  suggestion  of  the  Board  of  Trade, 
Braddock  placed  William  Johnson  in  charge  of  Indian  affairs. 
Meanwhile  the  plans  for  union  were  not  abandoned  either 
in  England  or  in  America.    In  fact,  the  inadequate  support 
given  by  some  of  the  colonies  to  Braddock  emphasized  the 
necessity  of  such  a  union,  unless  the  mother  country  were 
willing  to  assume  a  disproportionate  share  of  the  burden  of 
imperial  defence.     The  unanimity  of  the  colonies  in  rejecting 
the  Albany  plan  showed  conclusively  that  of  their  own  accord 
they  would  never  form  a  union.    It  meant  that  the  Board 
of  Trade's  plan,  which  was  to  be  brought  into  effect  by  a 
colonial  convention,  had  absolutely  no  chance  of  success. 
Hence  inevitably  it  was  suggested  that  recourse  be  taken  to 
the  sovereign  legislature  of  the  Empire,  and  that  Parliament 

'  On  Oct.  a6,  1754,  the  secretary  of  state,  Sir  Thomas  Robinson,  wrote  to 
the  colonial  governors  to  provide  fresh  provisions  for  the  troops  on  their  arrival 
from  Europe,  to  furnish  the  officers  with  means  of  travel  by  land,  and  to  obey 
the  commander-in-chiefs  orders  about  quartering  the  troops,  impressing  car- 
riages, etc.   As  these  expenses  were  "of  a  Local  &  Peculiar  nature,"  the  colony 
was  to  meet  them.    Other  expenses  of  a  more  general  nature,  such  as  the 
levying  of  troops,  were  to  be  defrayed  out  of  a  common  fund  to  be  established 
in  the  colonies  until  a  general  plan  of  union  could  be  perfected.     N.J.  Col. 
Doc.  VIII,  Part  11,  pp.  17-19;  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  pp.  91s,  916;  Col.  Rec 
of  No.Ca.  V,  pp.  144  d/.    Cf.  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  VIII,  Part  II,  pp.  9a,  93;  N.Y. 
Col.  Doc.  VI,  p.  934.    See  also  Braddock's  instructions.     From  long  expe- 
rience, the  English  government  was  fully  acquainted  with  the  parsimony  of 
the  colonies;   and  accordingly,  in  order  not  to  hamper  military  operations, 
Braddock  was  advised,  in  his  private  and  secret  instructions,  that  if  necessary 
this  point  should  be  waived.    Am.  and  VV.L  604.    See  also  Brit.  Mus.  Addit. 
MSS.  35909  (Hardwicke  Papers  DLXI). 


PLANS  FOR  A  UNION  OF  THE  COLONIES  29 

create  such  a  union.    In  submitting  its  plan  in  1754,  the 
Board  of  Trade  had  pointed  out  that,  in  case  one  or  more  of 
the  colonies  refused  to  concur  in  the  union,  either  by  failing 
to  send  representatives,  or,  after  its  enactment,  by  refusing 
to  raise  the  required  money,  then  "no  other  method  can  be 
taken,  but  that  of  an  application  for  an  interposition  of  the 
Authority  of  Parliament."  *    In  America  the  two  great  cham- 
pions of  such  a  parliamentary  union  were  Benjamin  Frank- 
lin and  William  Shirley.*    "Till  it  is  done,"  the  former 
wrote,  "never  expect  to  sec  an  American  War  carried  on  as 
it  ought  to  be,  nor  Indian  Affairs  properly  managed."  '    The 
imposition  of  such  a  union  was  legally  within  the  power 
of  Parliament,*  but  as  such  a  step  was  in  direct  opposition 
to  the  expressed  wish  of  all  the  colonics,  it  would  have  de- 
feated its  own  purpose,*  which  was  to  secure  the  hearty 

•  Am.  and  W.L  604;  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  43,  pp.  368-397. 
'  Their  ideas  as  to  the  nature  of  the  desired  union  differed  radically.  See 
Shirley  to  Robinson,  Dec.  24,  1754.  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  pp.  930,  931.  On 
Oct.  ai,  1754,  Shirley  wrote  to  Governor  Morris  of  Pennsylvania  that  the 
best  advice  he  could  give  was  to  promote  the  establishment  of  a  colonial  union 
by  act  of  Parliament,  adding:  "I  am  labouring  this  point,  totis  viribus." 
Pa.  Arch.  Hazard  Series  II,  p.  181.  On  Dec.  3,  1754,  Governor  Morris 
of  Pennsylvania  wrote  to  Governor  Sharpe  of  Maryland,  to  the  effect  that  if 
a  union  is  brought  about  by  act  of  Parliament  something  may  be  done  next 
summer,  "but  hardly  if  we  are  to  depend  upon  supplys  to  be  granted  by 
American  Assemblys."  Sharpe  Correspondence  I,  pp.  127,  128;  Pa.  Arch. 
Hazard  Series  II,  pp.  187,  i83. 

•  Franklin  to  Collinson,  June  26, 1 755.     Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  III 
267.     Cf.  also  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  276. 

'  A  statute  of  this  nature  would,  however,  have  been  in  direct  violation  of 
the  colonial  charters  and  of  the  proprietary  grants. 

•However,  on  Aug.  30,  1754,  Franklin  wrote  to  Colden:   "Our  Assembly 
were  not  inclined  to  show  any  approbation  of  the  plan  of  union;  yet  I  suppose 


30 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


cooperation  of  the  colonies  in  the  impending  conflict  with 
France.  The  suggestion  of  a  parh'amentary  union  of  the 
colonies,  especially  one  of  a  purely  military  nature,  contained 
within  it  the  idea  of  parliamentary  taxation  of  the  colonies.' 
To  many  in  1754  and  1755  this  seemed  the  only  way  to 
compel  the  colonies  to  provide  for  their  own  defence  in  an 
adequate  manner. 

they  will  take  no  steps  to  oppose  its  being  established  by  the  government  at 
home."  Frankhn,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  III,  p.  228.  Connecticut  and  Rhode 
Island  did  take  such  steps.  Col.  Rec.  of  Conn.  X,  p.  293 ;  R.I.  Hist.  Tracts,  9, 
pp.  59  e(  seq. 

'  See  especially  Shirley  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  Jan.  5, 1 756.    B.  T.  Mass  74 
Hh  68. 


CHAPTER  III 


PROPOPOSED  TAXATION  OF  THE  COLONIES,   17S4-1756 

The  failure  of  the  schemes  for  union  in  1754,  and  the 
disinclination  of  the  colonies  not  only  to  assist  one  another, 
but  even  to  provide  each  for  its  own  defence  in  an  adequate 
manner,  brought  up  the  question  of  parliamentary  taxation. 
Legally,  Parliament  could  impose  such  a  tax,  though  hitherto 
it  had,  in  general,  refrained  from  so  doing.  It  had,  however, 
passed  several  statutes  regulating  colonial  matters,  which 
were  in  the  form  of  revenue  bills. 

In  1673,'  Parliament  had  imposed  small  duties  on  a  num- 
ber of  colonial  products,  chiefly  tobacco,  sugar,  cotton,  and 
ginger,  when  exported  from  one  English  colony  to  another. 
The  chief  purpose  of  this  act  was  to  prevent  the  evasion  of 
the  "  enumeration  "  provision  of  a  previous  statute  prohibiting 
the  direct  exportation  of  these  commodities  to  foreign  coun- 
tries, but  it  was  intendeu  also  to  raise  some  revenue.*  A  small 

•jsCh.  II.c.  7.  §11. 

'  The  act  of  1673  refers  to  the  navigation  act  of  1660,  which  allowed  these 
products  to  be  shipped  from  one  English  colony  to  another  free  of  duty,  "while 
the  subjects  of  this  your  kingdom  of  England  have  paid  great  customs  and  im- 
positions for  what  of  them  have  been  spent  here."  It  refers  likewise  to  the 
fact  that  taking  advantage  of  this  immunity,  the  colonies  have  shipped  these 
"enumerated"  commodities  direct  to  Europe.  It  was  thus  apparently  the 
purpose  of  the  act  to  put  the  colonial  consumer  on  the  same  footing  as  the 
English  consumer,  and  to  pnr vent  the  illegal  trader,  who  shipped  these  prod- 


3a 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


revenue  was,  in  fact,  derived  from  this  law.'  So  far  as  the 
continental  colonies  were  concerned,  they  were  chiefly 
affected  by  this  act  in  that  it  imposed  duties  or  tobacco 
exported  from  Maryland  or  from  Virginia  to  another  English 
settlement.  But  toward  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
the  income  derived  from  this  source  was  granted  to  William 
and  Mary  College  in  Virginia,  and  was  not  thereafter  re- 
mitted to  England.  As  a  result,  virtually  the  entire 
small  revenue  accruing  to  Great  Britain  from  this  statute 
came  from  the  West  Indian  colonies. 

During  the  course  of  the  war  of  the  Spanish  Succession, 
the  question  came  up,  whether  or  not  European  and  other 
goods  seized  from  the  enemy  and  condemned  as  lawful  prize 
in  the  colonics  were  subject  to  duties.  A  statute  of  1707  ^ 
provided  that  such  goods  should  pay  the  same  duties  in 
the  colonics  as  they  would  have  paid  in  England,  if  first 

ucts  directly  to  Europe,  from  having  any  advantage  over  the  law-abiding  trader 
who  shipped  them  via  England.  The  revenue  feature  of  the  act  was,  however 
the  unimportant  part.  On  June  30,  1692,  the  Commissioners  of  the  Custom^ 
reported  that  the  act  was  not  intended  for  raising  a  revenue,  but  to  enforce 
the  "enumeration"  policy.  Treas.  Misc.  Various,  3/  (Blathwayfs  Journal  I, 
PP-  353-355)-  The  reference  is  to  the  Treasury  Papers  in  the  English  Public 
Record  Office.  All  future  references  will  be  given  in  the  above  abbreviated 
form. 

'  Amounts  paid  into  the  British  exchequer  under  25  Ch.  II,  c. 


1748 
1749 
1750 
1 751 
i7Sa 
1753 


£1366 

a7i3 
861 

1645 
147a 

I0I3 


7: 


1 754 
I7SS 
1756 
1757 
1758 
1759 


£1164 
1207 
3618 
1832 
978 
1849 


1760 
1761 
1763 
^763 
1764 


£"6$ 
381 

704 

1322 

1037 


Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England;,  vols.  50  and  59. 


I'l 


PROPOSED  TAXATION  OF  THE  COLONIES 


33 


imported  there  and  then  re^ixported.'    In  other  words,  the 
duties  made  payable  in  the  colonies  were  equal  to  the  Eng- 
lish duties  less  the  drawback.    Though  somewhat  modified 
subsequently,  owing  to  the  strenuous  opposition  of  Jamaica,' 
this  law  imposed  an  import  duty  payable  in  the  colonies. 
During  the  war,  the  act  produced  some  revenue,*  mainly 
in  the  West  Indies ;  but  in  the  continental  colonies  also  some 
was  collected.*    In  and  about   1730,  during  the  troubles 
with  Spain,  a  very  small  sum  was  received  on  account  of 
these  prize  duties,  but  in  the  subsequent  war,  1 739-1 748, 
nothing  was  paid  on  this  account  into  the  British  exchequer.* 
^^  1733*  another  act  in  the  form  of  a  revenue  bill  was 
passed.'    This  was  the  famous  "Molasses  Act"  which  im- 
posed customs  duties  on  foreign  rum,  sugar,  and  molasses 
imported  into  the  English  colonies.    The  object  of  this  law 
was  not  to  raise  a  revenue,  but  to  hamper  the  development 
of  the  French  colonies,  and  to  prevent  the  importation  of  their 
produce  into  the  English  possessions.     Hence  the  duties 


£1292 
600 


» 6  Anne,  c.  37,  §  11. 

•  Am.  and  W.I.  4,  nos.  6a,  69,  70,  103. 

•  i'aymcnts  into  the  exchequer  for  prize  duties  in  the  colonies: 
17"  £2066  1713  £,51  jyjj 
^7"               1724                  I7M               2267                  1716 
Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  50. 

•  Thus,  on  Nov.  10,  1710,  Robert  Hunter,  governor  of  New  York,  wrote  to 
England  suggesting  that  his  salary  for  the  year  might  be  paid  out  of  the  "  Dutys 
arising  from  Cocoa  imported  here  by  my  Incouragement  in  a  Prize  taken  by 
two  Jamaica  Privateers,  the  Customs  whereof  will  amount  to  a  very  consid- 
erable Sum."    Am.  and  W.I.  6,  no.  44;  c/.  B.  T.  N.Y.  59,  pp.  227,  228. 

•  Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  50. 

•  6  Geo.  II,  c.  13. 

D 


34 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-176$ 


I 


were  made  so  high  as  to  be  virtually  prohibitive.*    About 
;S8oo  yearly  was  collected  under  this  law.' 

The  establishment  by  Parliament  of  a  colonial  postal  sys- 
tem early  in  the  eighteenth  century  •  cannot  be  considered 
a  measure  of  taxation,  although  at  the  outset  it  was  objected 
to  on  this  ground,  a'd  although  it  was  incidentally  designed 
to  produce  some  revenue.* 

There  was,  however,  another  method  by  means  of  which 
Great  Britain  derived  a  revenue  from  parliamentary  statutes 
affecting  the  colonies.  In  accordance  with  two  fundamental 
principles  of  the  old  colonial  system,  the  colonies  could  im- 
port European  goods,  with  some  noteworthy  exceptions, 
from  Great  Britain  only,  and  were  prohibited  from  exporting 

'  Cf.  B.  T.  Journals  (Opinions  of  Council,  1736-1738),  p.  140. 
^  'The  total  amount  collected  from  the  date  of  the  enactment  of  the  law  to 
Christmas,  1749,  was: 

On  these  producU  imported  as  merchandise  £5603        45.        ^\d. 

On  these  products  imported  as  prize  goods  7616        4^        a  rf. 

;gi3,ai9        &.        t\d. 
.\m.  and  W.L  687:  Hearing  of  1750-1751,  appendices  4,  5. 

•  9  Anne,  c.  10. 

•  On  June  24,  1718,  Spotswood  wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade  describing  the 
opposition  in  Virginia  to  the  estabUshment  of  a  postal  system.  He  said  that 
"the  People  were  made  to  believe  that  the  Pariiament  could  not  lay  any  Tax 
(for  so  they  call  the  Rates  of  Postage)  on  them  without  the  consent  of  the 
General  Assembly."  B.  T.  Va.  15  P  ,69.  At  the  time  of  the  controversies 
over  the  Stamp  Act,  in  1765  and  1766,  its  supporters  endeavored  to  use  the 
establishment  of  a  postal  system  in  the  colonies  as  a  precedent  for  a  pariia- 
mentary  tax.  It  was  available  for  this  purpose  on  purely  technical  grounds 
only,  though  it  furnished  an  excellent  instance  of  the  exercise  of  pariiamentary 
authority  over  the  colonies.  See  Franklin's  Examination  before  the  House 
of  Commons  [Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  IV,  pp.  44a,  443,  448],  and 
The  Regulations  Lately  Made  (London,  1765),  p.  105. 


PROPOSED  TAXATION  OF  THE  COLONIES 


35 


some  specifically  enumerated  products  directly  to  any  Euro- 
pean country  but  Great  Britain.    Thus,  non-British  goods 
consumed  in  the  colonies,  and  colonial  products  shipped  via 
Great  Britain  to  European  markets,  came  within  the  reach 
of  the  English  fiscal  system.    This  system  was,  however,  so 
arranged  that  but  small  duties  were  paid  on  these  products,' 
it  being  roughly  estimated  that  the  duties  thus  collected  about 
equalled  the  cost  of  managing  and  controlling  the  trade.' 
It  is  evident  that  this  system  was  one  designed  more  for  the 
regulation  of  trade  than  for  purposes  of  revenue ;   but  it  is 
equally  evident  that  the  revenue  would  be  the  main  considera- 
tion, if  an  enumerated  commodity  were  allowed  to  be  ex- 
ported directly  from  the  colony  to  a  foreign  market  on  pay- 
ment of  a  sum  equivalent  to  the  duties  that  would  have  been 
paid  had  it  first  been  shipped  to  Great  Britain  and  reexported 
thence.    This  happened  in  the  case  of  rice.    Shortly  after 
the  introduction  of  rice  as  a  staple  in  South  Carolina,  Par- 
liament placed  it  among  the  list  of  enumerated  commodi- 
ties.'   As  the  quantity  of  rice  produced  rapidly  increased, 
the  colony  sought  a  broader  market,  especially  direct  access 
to  that  of  Portugal.    In  this,  the  colony  was  supported  by 
the  English  merchants  trading  to  that  country.    These  in  17 15 
suggested  that  it  be  permitted  to  ship  rice  direct  from  America 
to  Portugal  on  payment  in  the  colonies  of  the  English  duties.* 

'  In  the  case  of  the  two  most  important  of  the  enumerated  products,  tobacco 
and  sugar,  no  duty  whatsoever  was  collected  on  shipments  via  Great  BriUin 
to  the  continent  of  Europe. 

'  This  subject  will  be  more  fully  discussed  in  connection  with  the  legislation 
of  1764. 

•  a  and  3  Anne,  c.  5,  §  xii.  « B.  T.  JoumaU  24,  p.  465. 


J6 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


I 


In  1721  the  agent  for  South  Caroh'na  made  the  same  prr- 
posal  to  the  English  government,  suggesting  that  the  equiva- 
lent of  the  English  duties  '  be  levied  in  the  colony,  in  that  case 
as  an  export  duty.*    Similar  suggestions  were  made  by 
the  colony  in  subsequent  years;*  and  accordingly,  shortly 
thereafter.   Parliament  passed   a  law  allowing  the  direct 
exportation   of   Carolina   rice   to  those   parts  of   Europe 
south  of  Cape  Finisterre,  subject  to  the  payment  in  Great 
Britain  on  the  rice  thus  shipped  of  an  amount  equivalent 
to  the  English  duties  less  the  drawback.*    Though  this  duty 
was  made  payable  in  Great  Britain,  it  was  in  its  essence  a 
colonial  export  tax  imposed  by  Parliament.     It  furnishes  a 
unique  and  remarkable  instance  of  colonial  taxation  by  the 
mother  country    at    the  suggestion  of    the  colony  itself. 
This  tax  produced  some  revenue,  about  £1200  yearly  for 
the  first  seven  years,'  increasing  gradually  until  in   1763 
it  yielded  somewhat  more  than  double  this  amount.' 

Though  these  various  measures  were  from  a  legal  stand- 
point revenue  bills,  still  (with  the  exception  of  the  rice  act. 
which  was  an  isolated  instance)  they  were,  in  general,  de- 
signed to  regulate  trade,  not  to  yield  a  revenue.     Even  the 

•The  English  duties  less  the  drawbacks  amounted  approximately  to  yrf  on 
every  hundredweight  of  rice.    The  duty  of  7J.  was  to  be  paid  in  the  colony 

'  B.  T.  So.Ca.  I  A  37. 

'  Ibid.  I  A  48,  3  B  103. 

'  3  Geo.  II,  c.  28. 

•  From  Christmas,  1730,  to  Christmas,  1737.  the  total  direct  exr..rts  of  m^- 
to  Europe  south  of  Cape  Finisterre  were  32,323.871  lbs.  Trru..  .^cc.  •^. 
Misc.  (England)  79. 

'B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  ,9  R  47.  cf.  B.  T.  So.Ca.  16  K  30.  .lad  Coimaom 
Journal  29,  p.  982.    Its  yield  at  this  time  was  about  £jooo. 


'■'Jt 
'  it-' 


i 


PROPOSED  TAX    TION  OF  THE  COLONIES  37 

prize-duty  act  was  intended  mainly  to  place  merchandise 
imported  from  Great  Britain  on  the  same  footing  as  prize 
goods  condemned  in  the  colonies. 

These  acts  yielded  but  a  trifling  income.    At  various 
times,  however,  during  the  eighteenth  century,  it  was  sug- 
gested that  Parliament  should  create  a  colonial  revenue  to 
pay  the  salaries  of  the  ofl^icials  appointed  by  the  Crown  and 
to  defray  the  cost  of  a  permanent  military  establishment  in 
America.     Thus,  .'n   the  course   of  a  serious  controversy 
with  the  legislature,  which  refused  to  pass  a  revenue  bill 
in  the  desired  form,  Robert  Hunter,  the  able  and  public- 
spirued  governor  of  New  York,  suggested  that  his  salary 
should  be  defrayer!  from  import  and  export  duties  in  New 
York  and  from  an  excise  on  alcoholic  liquors  to  l)e  imposed 
by  an  act  of  the  British  Parliament.'    This  proposition  was 
approved  in  England;    and  in  171 1   the  Board  of  Trade 
was  mstructed  to  prepare  a  bill  to  be  laid  l)efore  Parliament 
for  creatmg  such  a  standing  revenue  in  New  York  '    As 
Parliament  "rose"  before   this   bill   could    be   perfected  ' 
nothmg  was  done  at  this  time.     Later  in  the  year,*  and  again 
'n  1713,'  the  Board  of  Trade  recommenderl  that  Parliament 
pass  such  a  measure;   the  latter  recommendation  was  like- 

'Am.  and  W.I.  6,  no.  44;   B.  T.  N.Y.  59,  p.  „; 
bill  T.^  li  '''''  ^  ''■  ''''  '"'  P^-  '^^-'«^'  "^-    -1 '-  d-f  of  the 
wa.vt  s  Journal  III.  pp.  9,,  9,),  ^nd  Dartmouth  MSS.,  Hist.  MSS.  Com.  ,4. 

'  B.  T.  N.^'.  59,  pp.  4^g  fi  jf^ 
*  Nov.  I,,  17,,.    /j,^  pp  45,_456 
'  Ibid.  60,  p.  91. 


38 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


wise  approved  of  by  an  order  in  council.'  Meanwhile  the 
New  York  Assembly,  fearing  the  remedy  proposed  in  Eng- 
land, passed  a  fairly  satisfactory  revenue  act ;  *  but  two  years 
later,  in  171 5,  Hunter  complained  bitterly  to  the  Board  of 
Trade  of  the  inadequate  supplies  granted  from  year  to  year 
by  the  Assembly,  and  again  proposed  an  act  of  Parliament 
as  the  only  possible  solution  of  the  difficulty.'  Shortly  after 
this,  the  controversy  between  the  governor  and  the  legislature 
was  settled  by  a  compromise  measure,*  and  nothing  further 
was  done  toward  creating  a  revenue  by  act  of  Parliament. 
This  episode  is  not  important  in  itself,  except  in  so  far  as  it 
clearly  shows  that  Parliament  was  deemed  fully  competent 
to  pass  such  a  measure.' 

In  1 7 16,  Archibald  Cumings,'  one  of  the  custom-house 
officials  at  Boston,  wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade  suggesting 
the  imposition  of  a  duty  on  foreign  rum,  sugar,  and  molasses 
imported  into  the  British  colonies.^  In  the  following  year 
he  proposed  a  more  extensive  scheme  of  colonial  taxation. 


» B.  T.  N.Y.  60.  pp.  113  et  seq.;  Dartmouth  MSS.,  Hist.  MSS.  Com.  14.  X 
p.  10.  ^' 

'  B.  T.  NY.  60,  pp.  128,  129:  Hunter  to  B.  T.,  July  18,  1713. 
•Ibid.  pp.  296-298:  Hunter  to  B.  T.,  Mareh  28,  1715. 

•  Ibid.  pp.  320  et  seq.:  Hunter  to  B.  T.,  July  25,  1715. 

•  At  a  later  period  this  incident  was  used  as  a  precedent  for  colonial  taxa- 
tion.  Thus  at  the  time  of  the  repeal  of  the  SUmp  Act  in  1 766,  in  his  examina- 
tion before  the  House  of  Commons,  Franklin  was  asked  if  he  knew  of  this 
project.     He  replied  in  the  negative.    Pari.  HUt.  16,  p.  143. 

•  In  1708  Cumings  was  appointed  to  prevent  illegal  trade  in  Newfoundland 
and  was  subsequently  transferred  to  MassachusetU.  B.  T.  Newfoundland  28 
PPS9.60. 

'  B.  T.  New  England  44,  pp.  net  seq. 


PROroSED  TAXATION  OF  THE  COLONIES 


39 


He  gave  the  Board  of  T«de  detailed  statistics  of  the  irapor- 
taoons  ,„,„  the  colonies  both  of  West  Indian  prod^^ . 
-d  of  Fayal,  Madeira,  and  Canai,  wines,  all  of 'Xh  he 

rr;,:rjrAr;;,;r;r.^^^^^^^^^ 

VI  »itc,  lor  as  me  rJantations  can  bear  thi<s  Chir^^  u  • 
cfc.rge.ble  with  lUUe  or  no  Dulies  so  k  is  „o,  r  ',  ™'8''  "*'"« 

b.  .  burien  «  g™.,  Bricin..        '  '  ""'  "^"""'  "■«''  ^'""W 

These  suggestions  were  not  adopted  by  the  home  authorities 
but  neither  were  they  atendoned  by  Cumings.  In  ,!  Te 
wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade  giving  the  detaL  of  an  Indian 

the  colonies  would  no.  be  adequately  protected  unless  the 
Crown  undenook  their  defence.  He  i^ded  that  hH,  H 
propose  a  scheme  for  raising  a  fund  in  the  colonies  wW  1 
wh.  e  no,  burdensome  to  them,  would  be  sufficient  iS 
he  expense  of  maintaining  five  to  six  thousand  regular  t^ 
n  America,  and  also  sufficient  topay  the  salaries^,  th^^^ 

ZTthl  B  ^r  fL°«^'^'^  "PPO'"'")  "y  the  Crow 
naturally,  the  Board  of  Trade' was  ready  to  hear  the  details 

England  an  elaborate  and  detailed  plan  of  colonial  taxation.' 

•  Both  British  and  foreign 

ioZ  tT'^V^'ZVn:;^'  *'"  '°^«^  '''^^'  ^-  ^^^  colonies  to 
•^W.  44,  p.  3^5. 

•  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  xo  L  48:  Cunnings  to  B.  T..  Nov.  3.  ,,„. 


40 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


■   <r 


¥' 


A  large  colonial  revenue  was  to  be  raised  by  a  variety  of 
taxes:  by  stamp  duties,  by  import  duties  on  West  Indian 
products  and  wine,  by  an  excise  tax  on  rum  distilled  in  the 
colonies,  and  by  a  tax  on  unimproved  land.'  In  addition, 
Cumings  suggested  that  in  the  future  no  part  of  the  British 
duties  be  refunded  on  foreign  European  goods  shipped  from 
Great  Britain  to  the  colonies.* 

A  few  years  after  this  proposal  of  Cumings,  Sir  William 
Keith,  who  had  been  deputy-governor  of  Pennsylvania, 
suggested  that  the  stamp  duties  be  extended  to  the  colonies, 
in  order  to  provide  a  fund  for  a  standing  army  and  for  the 
salaries  of  governors,  judges,  and  other  crown  officials.' 

All  of  these  recommendations  failed  of  acceptance.  Thus 
the  colonists  insensibly  drifted  into  the  idea  that  Pariiament 
could  not  legally  tax  them.  The  British  government  never 
raised  the  issue,  seemingly  preferring  the  administrative 
inefficiency  involved  in  the  continuous  quarrels  between  the 
legislatures  and  the  royal  governors  to  so  radical  a  departure 
from  the  customary  practice.  English  character  is  normally 
conservative,  and  this  was  the  age  dominated  by  Sir  Robert 

'  In  this  last  suggestion,  Cumings  anticipates  some  modem  thinkers.  Un- 
improved land  was  to  be  taxerf  because  "great  tracts  of  land  arc  ingrossed,  in 
the  hand  of  Rich  Men,  and  growing  in  value  daily,  tho'  unimproved,  but 
never  taxed." 

'Cumings  estimated  that  this  change  would  yield  ^£40,000  to  £50,000 
yearly.  The  goods  on  which  he  suggested  that  the  drawbacks  be  no  longer 
allowed  were  foreign  linens,  canvas,  calicoes,  muslins,  hemp,  tea,  coffee, 
pepper,  paper,  and  fruits. 

•  Memorial  of  Keith,  1728,  in  Am.  and  W.I.  602,  and  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen. 
10  L  105.  See  also  Sir  William  Keith,  A  Collection  of  Papers  and  other 
Tracts  (London,  1740),  pp.  168  et  seq. 


PROPOSED  TAXATION  OF  THE  COLONIES      4, 

Walpole,  whose  maxim,  accorting  ,„  his  son,  was  "cuieta 
nc^n^cr.,  '    K  was  impossible  .0  p«,ic.  .he  consequerct 
of  a  parliamentary  Ux,  which  though  a  remedy  for  the  patent 
evils  would  create  a  large  amount  of  friction'    T  e  b^^ 
government  was  not  unaware  of  colonial  sentiment  in  regl  d 
to  pirhamentary  .a.xation.    Richarf  Partridge,  who  reC 
sented  the  interests  of  the  continental  colonfes  in  the  p™- 
bnged  struggle  over  the  Molasses  Ac.  of  i;33,'  wrote  oTe 
Duke  of  Newcastle  that  the  duties  imposed  by  that  act  were 
wo.se  than  the  prohibition  of  all  trade  with  the  forei>  W 
lnd«  proposed  the  previous  year,  for  in  addition  .0  .h 
e  onomic  injury  inflicted  on  the  co„.inen.al  colonies  "i.i 
divesling  .hem  of  .heir  Righ.  &  pri,„,.<jg,,  ^  '^■^.^ '' 
Natuiul  bom  Subjects  and  Englishmen  in  ltyi„g  ZuZ 
"pon  .hem  against  their  Consent  when  they  are  „  .^ 
no  County  in  Great  Britain,  have  no  R^presentat^^  L 
pariiam  nor  are  any  part  of  ye  Legislatu^  of  this  King- 

of  1  V  T  '■ '"  ''**■  °«"«<^  Clinton,  then  governor 
of  New  York,  strongly  advised  asain«  in,„  •  ^  °' 
tax  on  fh»  ™i    •  ,  ^8^'"st  imposing  a  stairp 

ta  on  the  colonies,  as  the  people  were  averse  to  any  taxes 
unless  raised  by  themselves.'  '^ 

GreaTB^IinTr'/  "'  ^""'-^"^  ^'"^^'^  '«'-en 
ta  a«on  r  '  ^?'''  ""^^  ="S«-«-^  of  colonial 
taxation  became  more  frequent.    Thus  in  .,50,  Governor 

I  Walpofc,  Memoto  Geoig.  m  (rf.  B„fe„  „ 

Mm.  .„d  W.I  8  „T  1    P« T     ""'""' '"  ^'  "*''  W'IP'I'- 


^i 


4» 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


Clinton,  in  spite  of  his  previous  advice,  proposed  the  par- 
liamentary imposition  of  import  duties  in  the  colonies  to 
provide  a  fund  for  fortifying  the  frontiers.*  In  the  following 
year,  Cadwallader  Golden  prepared  a  detailed  memorial  on 
Indian  affairs,*  contrasting  the  success  of  the  French  policy 
with  the  failure  of  the  English.  This  failure,  he  pointed 
out,  was  due  to  the  fact  that  each  of  the  English  colonies 
pursued  its  own  interests,  which  often  clashed  with  those  of 
another  colony,  and  that  the  interest  of  the  colonies  as  a  whole 
was  entirely  disregarded.  It  followed  therefore  that  Indian 
affairs  ought  to  be  managed  jointly,  and  placed  in  charge 
of  one  man  as  superintendent.  Furthermore,  Golden  pointed 
out  that  forts  ought  to  be  built  on  the  frontiers.  To  provide 
a  fund  for  these  purposes,  he  advised  that  taxes  be  imposed 
on  spirituous  liquors  imported  into  or  made  in  the  North 
American  colonies.  But  "as  this  Duty  is  proposed  to  be 
general  over  all  the  Golonies,  it  must  be  imposed  by  Act  of 
Parliament,  because  it  would  be  a  most  vain  imagination  to 


'  Am.  and  W.I.  11,  no.  146:  Clinton  to  Bedford,  March  26,  1750.  This 
fund  was  also  to  support  the  civil  list,  as  Clinton  had  become  involved  in  an 
acrimonious  dispute  with  the  New  York  legislature  about  the  colonial  revenue. 
See  Am.  and  VV.I.  10  passim,  and  B.  T.  N.Y.  28  Hh  17. 

'  B.  T.  NY.  30  li  10.  In  the  British  State  Papers  for  1747,  though  prob- 
ably of  an  earlier  date,  is  an  elaborate  plan  of  colonial  taxation  designed  to 
produce  a  revenue  of  ^£327,000.  This  scheme  is  anonymous,  but  was  sent  to 
the  secretary  of  state  from  one  of  the  Northern  colonies.  Its  object  was  to 
provide  funds  for  fortifying  all  the  principal  towns  and  ports  in  America,  and 
for  erecting  stone  forts  in  the  interior.  The  taxes  were  of  various  kinds,  and 
were  not  to  be  permanent.  The  most  interesting  suggestion  was  the  proposal 
to  lay  an  import  duty  of  three-penct  a  gallon  on  molasses.  Such  a  duty  called 
forth  intense  opposition  in  1764.    Am.  and  W.I.  603. 


PROPOSED  TAXATION  OF  THE  COLONIES  43 

expect,  that  all  the  Colonies  would  severally  agree  to  impose 

These  suggestions  contemplated  parliamentary  taxation 
for  supporting  a  regular  military  establishment  in  America 
and  for  the  management  of  Indian  affairs.     As  already 
pointed  out,  the  British  government  in  1754  favored  a  union 
of  the  contmental  colonies  for  these  purposes.    But  to  many 
m  America  it  was  apparent,  even  before  the  issue  of  the 
attempt,  that  a  union  of  the  coionies  could  not  be  consum-  ^ 
mated  by  their  own  action.    Thus  at  the  very  time  that  the 
colonial  commissioners  were  sitting  at  Albany,  the  clear- 
sighted heutenant-govemor  of  Virginia,  Robert  Dinwiddle 
m   a  forcible  despatch   to  the  secretary  of  state,  bitterly 
commented  on  the  particularism  of  the  separate  colonies 
and  on  their  lack  of  a  spirit  of  cooperation. 
Now  what.  Sir,  [he  wrote]  must  be  the  result  of  this?    Virginia  alone 
s  not  able  to  suppon  the  whole  Burthen;    &  if  some  MetCis  no 
f  und  to  take  away  these  destructive  Denials  of  Assistance  from  the 
other  Colon.es,  when  it  is  judged  proper  to  be  demanded  by  his  MTi^tv 
^r  the  common  Good,  as  now;  The  Consequence  must  be.  the  ™t 
Loss  of  one  of  the  finest  &  most  fertile  Countries  in  Amer La    & T' 
future  destruction  of  all  the  British  Dominions  on  tlZ:Z:.t^ 
As  a  remedy  for  this  distressing  state  of  affairs.  Dinwiddle 
proposed  "an  Act  of  Parliament  to  oblige  each  Colony  to 

IT    I"      1  /"  °'  ''''  '''"'"^  ^^^^^'"S  -  -^herways 
a  proportional  Quota  of  a  general  Sum  to  be  applied  to  the 

rn    rr'''  ""  P"^  '' ''''  "^'^^'''^'^  -  Great  Britain 
shall  thmk  fit  to  appoint."    Later  in  the  same  year,  when 

'  Am.  and  W.I.  67:  Dinwiddle  t.      •  Thomas  Robinson.  June  18.  ,754. 


It 


44 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


Washington  was  on  the  frontier  striving  to  check  the  French 
advance,  Dinwiddie  was  tr>ing  to  arouse  the  Virginia  Assem- 
bly to  a  realization  of  the  seriousness  of  the  situation  and 
of  the  necessity  of  granting  supplies  adequate  to  meet  it. 
The  result  of  this  discussion  was  that  on  September  23,  1754, 
he  wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade: 

I  cannot  but  observe,  that  I  think  it  impossible  to  conduct  any  Expe- 
dition in  these  parts  with  a  Dependence  of  a  Supply  from  the  Assemblies, 
without  a  British  Act  of  Parliament  to  lay  a  Poll  Tax  on  the  whole 
Subjeits  in  these  Provinces  to  bring  them  to  a  Sense  of  their  Duty  to 
the  King,  to  awaken  them  from  their  Indolence  to  take  Care  of  their 
Lives  &  Fortunes.' 

The  attitude  of  the  Southern  colonies  (including  therein 
Pennsylvania),  in  failing  to  cooperate  heartily  with  the  forces 
sent  over  from  Great  Britain  under  Braddock,  served  to 
strengthen  Dinwiddie  in  his  opinion  that  parliamentary 
taxation  was  essential.'  On  February  12,  1755,  he  wrote 
to  Sir  Thomas  Robinson.  ^h«n  secretary  of  state:  "Indeed 
I  fear  the  Colonies  will  not  be  persuaded  to  grant  mutual 
Supplies,  but  by  a  British  Act  of  Parliament  laying  a  general 
Ta.\  on  the  Whole."  '    Two  months  later,  Dinwiddie  once 

'  B.  T.  Va.  25  VV  1 70.  .\t  this  time  Dinwiddie  was  engr.fs.vl  in  a  bitter 
dispute  with  the  provincial  legislature  about  the  fees  to  be  charged  when  lands 
were  granted.     Brit.  Mus.,  Margrave  MSS.  494,  ff.  46  56. 

'  .After  Braddock's  defeat,  S.  Phips  wrote  to  Governor  Lawrence  of  Nova 
Scotia:  "Had  the  same  Zeal  been  shown  by  the  Southern  Colonies  aa  has 
appeared  in  this  Province  (Massachusetts)  an.l  the  other  Governments  of 
New  England  U'gether  with  New  York  and  the  Jersies,  affairs  would  probably 
have  been  in  a  much  better  situation  than  they  are  at  present."  Nova 
Scotia  ,\rch.  (Malita.x.  iStX)),  pp.  409,  410. 

'.\m.  and  W.L  03. 


PROTOSED  TAXATION  OF  THE  COLONIES  45 

more  wroto  to  Robinson,'  on  the  great  uncertainty  of  obtain- 
ing the  neeess;iry  support  from  the  Virginia  Assenil,Iy,  as 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  had  Iven  so  "  monstrously  Uck- 
wanl,"'  and  adding,  "but  really,  without  a  Uritish  Act  of 
Parliament  to  oblidge  .  11  the  Colonies  to  a  mutual  Supply, 
I  dread  the  Covernours  will  hardly  Ix;  able  to  perswade 
them."    Karly  in  the  following  year,  Dinwiddic  likewise  wrote 
to  the  Boanl  of  Trade  on  the  s;ime  subject,'  jwinting  out  that 
it  would  be  precarious  to  rely  on  the  colonial  assemblies 
for  the  funds  necess:iry  to  carry  on  the  approaching  war, 
and  suggesting  parliamentary  taxation  *  of  the  colonies  on 
the  ground  that  "the  AfTairs  here  offercxl  are  entirely  for  the 
protection  of  their  Estates,  Lives,  and  every  Thing  else 
dear  to  Mankind."    He  added   frankly  that  such  a  tax 
would    arouse   opposition    in    the    colonies.*    Dinwiddle's 
suggestion  was  not  an  isolattxl  one;  •  in  fact,  to  many  this 

I  Am.  and  W.I.  63:  Dinwiddie  to  Robinson,  April  30,  1755. 
'On  Oct.  I,  175s,  Dinwiddie  wrote  to  the  British  government:   "I  hope 
the  PaHmment  will  take  into  their  Consideration  the  shameful  Behaviour  7f 
the  Proprietary-  Governments  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  by  altering 
Uieir  Constitution."    Am.  and  W.I.  69. 
•  B.  T.  Va.  25  W  20S:  Feb.  23,  1756. 

'  Dinwiddie  sui^csted  a  poll-tax  for  two  j^ars  of  one  shilling  sterling,  which 
would  produce  in  all  ^,00,000,  to  build  the  necessary  forts,  and  for  their  sup- 
^rt  he  proposed  a  permanent  land  tax  modelled  on  the  N'irginia  quit-rents  of 
two  shilbngs  yeariy  per  hundrt^d  acres,  which  would  produce  £60,000  yearly 

I  know  our  People  will  be  inflamed  if  they  hear  of  my  making  this 
nwposal,  as  they  are  averse  to  all  Taxes." 

'On  April  ir , ,  755,  Braddock  wrote  at  length  to  Sir  Thomas  Robinson  about 

the  disunion  of  the  colonies,  their  immoderate  jealousy  of  one  another,  and  the 

great  datficu  ties  encountered  in  inducing  them  to  cooperate  w-th  him,  adding: 

1  can  t  help  uking  the  liberty  of  mentioning  the  Necessity  there  appears  to 


4« 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  17$4-I76s 


i 


seemed  the  easiest,  the  quickest,  and  consequently  the  most 
effective  way  to  secure  colonial  cooperation.  It  was  gener- 
ally recognized  that  part  of  the  burden  of  the  approaching 
war  in  America  should  in  equity  be  borne  by  the  colonies. 
No  one  questioned  this.  It  was  also  recognized  that  the 
colonies  would  not  voluntarily  form  a  union  and  thus  bear 
their  proportionate  share.  Though  Franklin  favored  the 
creation  of  such  a  federation  by  act  of  Parliament,  regardless 
of  the  wishes  of  the  colonies,  he  opposed  their  taxation  by 
the  same  body  "where  they  (the  colonies)  have  no  represen- 
tatives." Such  a  course,  he  said,  "would  create  extreme 
dissatisfaction,"  because  it  was  supposed  to  be  "an  undoubted 
right  of  Englishmen,  not  to  be  taxed  but  by  their  consent 
given  through  their  representatives."  ' 

The  ablest  colonial  governor  of  the  time,  William 
Shirley  of  Massachusetts,  was,  however,  strongly  in 
favor  of  a  parliamentary  union  coupled  with  parlia- 
mentary taxation  of  the  colonies.  On  February  4,  1755, 
he  wrote  to  Sir  Thomas  Robinson,'  commenting  on 
the   unpatriotic   action   and   petty  spirit   of  the   various 

me  to  be  of  some  Tax  being  laid  throughout  His  Majesty's  Dominions  in 
North  America"  at  this  crisis.  Am.  and  W.I.  83.  On  Sept.  17,  1755,  Gov- 
ernor Jonathan  Belcher  of  New  Jersey  wrote  to  Robinson  advising  the  con- 
quest of  Canada.  He  suggested  that  5000  regular  troops  be  sent  from  Eng- 
land, and  that  35,000  men  be  raised  in  the  continental  colonies,  and  added: 
"But  what  I  propose  I  believe  will  not  be  effected  without  the  Assistance  of 
the  British  Parliament  to  mark  out  &  ascertain  the  st  veral  Quotas  or  Propor- 
tions of  Men  &  Money  to  be  raised  in  each  several  Colony  or  Province." 
N.J.  Col.  Doc.  VIII,  Part  II,  p.  137.    Cf.  Ibid.  p.  189. 

•  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  III,  pp.  33K-333. 

•Am.  and  W.I.  68. 


^1 


I 


i 

-a 


PROPOSED  TAXATION  OF  THE  COLONIES  47 

colonial  legislatures  in  face  of  the  French  danger.     The 
Pennsylvania     legislature,    after    "an    absurd    obstinate 
Dispute  w'"  Gov  Morris  ab'  Instructions  have  adjourned 
themselves,  whilst  the  Enemy  is  at  their  Doors,  to  the  begin- 
ning of  May.  without  doing  anything  for  the  preservation 
of  their  Country."     The  Maryland  Assembly  has  likewise 
"risen"  without  doing  anything  further  than  providing  for' 
"a  Company  of  fifty  men,  w^  was  done  before."    South 
Carolina  was  not  active  in  the  common  cause,  and  Virginia 
was  not  doing  as  much  as  she  should.* 

This  behaviour  [Shirley  concluded]  seems  to  shew  the  necessity  not 
only  of  a  parliamentary  Union  but  Taxation  for  the  preservation  of  his 
Majestys  Dominions  upon  this  Continent,  W"  the  several  Assemblies 
have,  m  so  great  a  measure  abandon'd  the  Defence  of,  and  thereby 
layd  his  Majestys  Governm'  at  home  under  a  necessity  of  taking  care 
of  It  for  the  State  by  suitoble  assessm"  upon  the  Colonies. 

Shirley's  plan  was  to  convene  an  assembly  of  all  the  gov- 
ernors and  some  members  of  the  various  colonial  councils, 
which  should  have  power  to  draw  on  the  British  exchequer 
for  funds  needed  for  the  defence  of  the  colonies.  Great 
Britam  being  in  turn  reimbursed  for  this  expenditure  by  a 
tax  imposed  on  the  colonies  by  act  of  Parliament.'    This 

collT^Tn^h^r  "?"'  '°  *''  '"'"^"'*^  ^"PP°«  «'-"  "^y  '»«'  Southern  .. 
colonies  and  by  Pennsylvania  to  Braddock.     In  1755  Geoi^a  refused  to  con- 

U^^bute  either  men  or  money,  but.  as  Governor  Reynold;  pointed  out.  this 

colony  was  too  poor  and  too  thinly  populated  to  afford  assistance.     Add;^ 

ofCounci,  and  Assembly   to  Reynolds,  respectively   Feb.  4  and  6.  r^^l 

t.  Z  w.r  7.:  ""'  '^^""^ '°  ^''  ^'^--  ^°^^-"' J-'x  -  '^>  ^ 

'  ""'^^"'  ^"^^  "I'  P-  '3.     This  was  the  plan  that  Fmnklin  opposed. 


48 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1734-1765 


plan  was  considered  by  the  home  authorities,  but  further  in- 
formation  was  desired.    Accordingly,  in  ,755,  the  Board  of 
Trade  wrote  to  Shirley  for  his  opinion  on  three  points. 
First,  the  best  general  system  for  the  defence  of  the  frontiers 
against  all  future  encroachments  and  invasions,  with  a  plan 
of  the  forts  that  should  be  erected  and  an  estimate  of  the 
number  of  regular  troops  that  would  have  to  be  kept  in  the 
colonies.    Second,  a  plan  for  managing  Indian  affairs  under 
one  head;  and  third,  "what  will  be  a  proper  Fund  to  be 
established   for  making  a  constant,  and  permanent  Pro- 
vision for  these  Services,  with  the  least  Burthen  and  Incon- 
venience to  his  Majesty's  Subjects."  »    The  Board,  it  should 
be  noted,  was  considering  a  permanent  military  organiza- 
tion in  the  colonies. 

On  January  5,  1756,  Shirley  sent  a  detailed  reply  to  the 
Board  of  Trade's  request  for  his  opinion  on  these  matters.* 
He  said  that  6480  regular  soldiers  would  be  required  to  gar- 
rison the  necessary  forts  in  time  of  peace,  but  he  pointed  out 
that  the  expense  of  defending  America  would  be  less  if  the 
French  were  removed  from  Canada.    In  order  to  cover  the 
cost  of  this  military  system,  he  advised  the  establishment  of  a 
general  fund  in  all  the  colonies,  each  colony  contributing  to  it 
according  to  its  ability.    He  added,  however,  that  as  the 
colonies  would  not  be  able  to  come  to  an  agreement  as  to 
such  a  fund,  the  only  effectual  way  to  establish  it  would  be 
by  an  act  of  Parliament,  assessing  each  colony  according 
to  Its  white  population  of  the  male  sex.    But  Shirley  was 


'  B.  T.  Mass.  74  Hh  68. 


'Ibid. 


PROPOSED  TAXATION  OF  THE  COLONIES 

more   cautious    now   than    tiA   h.j    i.        .1 
vear     "F„r  ,^  Vt  '*'"    ""^   Preceding 

year.  For  the  general  Satisfaction  of  the  People  in  each 
C^^nr"he  „™,e,  •,.  „„„h  ^e  advisable  to  leave  it  „ 
the,r  Cho,ce  to  ta.se  the  Sun,  assessed  upon  then,  accorfing 
Z^r  "'"""■''"•"    '»  "«  ""/  colony  refused  to 

raise  ,    by  a  polLtax  imposed  on  the  white  and  black 
population  of  the  recalcitrant  province ' 

tJ""!. !!,"''''"  «°'"^"'™"'  ''M  »«  adopt  these  suggestions  . 

hough  they  came  from  men  of  conspicuous  ability  who  fZ 

ong  and  fa.thfu.  service  in  the  colonies,  were  seemingl    ," 

the  best  p„s„K>„  ,0  advise  wisely.    The  interests  of  Lh 

D,nw,dd,e  and  Shirley  wete  colonial  rather  than  EngH  h 

Z.       ;  ,       •  °"  '"^  """^  '•^"<'' '"'' '"'  •^"•'-h  govern- 
me     definuely  reject  these  suggestions.    The  lack  o!  uniTn 

s.™   o  t      :"'"  '"  '"'  "'  "  ^""  """«"  "-  "  -ere 

Tso  rit"?  "  T™"-  J' "  ^"^"'"■^"^  ■"  •"»  P-'-laris- 
c  p,„t  preva  mg  ,n  the  colonies  that  in  r;;;,  a.  a  time  when  , 

the,r  very  existence  was  threatened  by  the  French   Massa 

chusetts  and  New  York  engaged  in  a  bitter  bound'a^-Z 

roversy  leading  to  riot  and  bloodshed.    This  epis«,e  ca Z 

forth  a  caustic  rebuke  from  the  Lords  of  Trade  who  wro^ 

".•M  «,.,  ,800  soldi,™  Jlutr      ^  '""  '"'>''"■    "'  "'i- 

■oner  lo  ,bidi  e„h  colon,  pre/.mi    B.  T.  No.  Cn  j  C  lot. 


$0 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-176^ 


to  Shirley :  "  It  is  very  much  to  be  lamented,  that  the  internal 
peace  of  Government  should  be  disturbed  by  trivial  Disputes 
of  this  kind,  at  a  time  when  the  Colonys  are  so  loudly  called 
upon  to  exert  with  the  greatest  unanimity  their  utmost 
Strength  in  their  own  defence,  and  in  vindication  of  His 
Majesty's  Right."  •    This  attitude  of  the  colonies  forced  the 
British  government  to  the  conclusion  that  a  large  force  of 
soldiers  had  to  be  permanently  kept  in  America  even  in  time 
of  peace.'    According  to  the  established  theory  of  defence, 
the  exjMjnse  incurred  thereby  should,  in  part  at  least,  be  de- 
frayed by  the  colonies ;  but  in  order  to  make  them  assume  it, 
no  other  way  suggested  itself  as  feasible  but  a  tax  laid  by 
Parliament.    Such  a  tax  was,  however,  a  distinct  innovation, 
and  its  effect  on  the  colonies  could  not  be  accurately  gauged. 
Though  all  these  plans,  whether  of  colonial  union  or  of 
parliamentary  taxation,   were   intended   for  a  permanent 
military  establishment  in  the  colonies  in  time  of  peace,  their 
ultimate  object  was  to  effect  the  security  of  the  colonies  in 
the  event  of  war.    A  war  with  France  was  imminent,  and  in 
it  Great  Britain  desired  the  colonies  to  exert  themselves 
to  the  utmost.    The  adoption  at  such  a  crisis  of  a  scheme  of 

•  B.  T.  Mass.  84,  p.  3a6.  Again  in  1757  this  boundary  dispute  led  to 
bloodshed.  B.  T.  N.Y.  34 />aw,«.  In  1754  and  1755  the  boundary  dispute 
between  New  Vorlc  and  New  Jersey  likewise  led  to  riots,  and  induced  the 
Board  of  Trade  to  write  a  similar  letter  of  rebuke  to  Governor  Belcher 
of  New  Jersey.  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  VIII,  Part  I,  pp.  296,  397;  Part  II,  pp.  a8, 
73,  74.  "4,  "S-  In  I7S5  North  CaroUna  was  engaged  in  a  similar  dispute 
with  both  Virginia  and  South  Carolina.  B.  T.  No.  Ca.  la  C  74  rf  poisim. 
For  boundary  disputes  in  1757  between  North  and  South  Carolina,  see  B.  T 
So.  Ca.  19  L  8. 

'  B.  T.  Mass.  74  Hh  68. 


liu 


PROPOSED  TAXATION  OF   THE  COLONIES  j, 

par!iamcntar>'  taxation  would  have  arousal  .nm- 

Canada.    Thus,   mstead  of  strengthening  the  Fmn.v 

•n  the  impending  struggle  with  Franc,  th  ^ 

Dinwiddie's  andSh.Vi!  -  '   ^  ""^'"^^  ''"^  «>' 

aaie  s  and  Shirley's  suggestions  would  have  had  th. 

'  °  ^  ^'^'^  "P  ^8^'"  on  the  restoration  of  peace. 


i 


CHAPTER  IV 


THE  REQUISITION  SYSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR,  1756-1763 


Owing  to  the  failure  of  the  plan  of  union  of  1754  and  the 
hesitation  of  the  British  government  to  adopt  a  policy  of 
colonial  taxation,  coupled  with  a  union  imposed  by  act  of 
Parliament,  nothing  had  been  accomplished  at  the  outbreak 
of  formal  war  with  France  toward  creating  in  the  colonies 
a  regular  military  establishment,  which  in  time  of  peace  would 
be  adequate  to  protect  them  against  the  Indians  and  to  pre- 
vent the  aggressions  of  either  the  French  or  the  Spaniards, 
and  which  in  time  of  war  would  serve  as  a  basis  for  effective 
cooperation  with  the  British  forces.    Thus  the  mother  coun- 
try was  forced  to  rely  on  the  old  requisition  system,  which 
had  never  worked  satisfactorily,  since  it  had  left  the  ultimate 
decision  as  to  the  extent  of  military  support  to  the  colonies 
themselves.    From  such  a  decentralized  system  as  was  this, 
in  which  each  colony  could  refuse  the  requisition  for  soldiers 
or  only  partially  comply  with  it,  the  best  results  could  be 
obtained  only  if  the  colonies  were  encouraged  to  exert  their 
utmost  efforts.    Accordingly,  the  plans  for  colonial  taxation 
were  laid  aside,  and  the  British  government  adopted  measures 
calculated  to  arouse  the  colonies  to  energetic  action. 

52 


3 


THE  REQUISITION  SVSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR         53 

In  addition  ,„  ,he  disastrous  B.^d„ck  expedition  of  ,,„ 
■n  which  support  was  afforfed  by  the  colonies,  three  othe; 
mihury  enterprises  we.  undertaken  that  year.  tZ^ 
0.  successful  campaign  in  Nova  Scotia,  and  the  un"cc4 
M  expedmons  against  Niaga«  and  C:own  Point  h  te 
bemg  a  purely  colonial  undertaking.    On  Dcccmhir 

of  Ihe  vanous  colonies  to  these  military  enterprises  ■    Z 

^ui  e      „, .,,  ^„,„„,^  ^^^  ^^.0;    ^;-_^h 

and    he  Boari  recommended  that  Parliament  be  as^.! 

grant  the  colonies  ;£ijo,ooo  "as  an  Pn,„ 

themselves  fo.-  the  futu^rn  Z      ^"""'^S™™'  '<>  e«rt 

^-o^giventotheColoniL-smrastB-::;^:: 

...•.d»NjEX'«':':;pr':tr""  ""„"••  »""'''-»- 

-fY'*  ^"'  ^'^  »*  ^-y.  N.?Tc  t^^-l  „"""  '^'""' ^i.-  pp. 

the  force  under  Shirley  in  the  Ni««.«  ^-  '  ^^'  ^^^'  "57-  The  bulk  of 
-ts  raised  in  A^erL  ^nlZZlXTc:;'-^^^^  ^^  -o  r.^, 
a3  the  regular  soldien.  In  addSion  the  V  t  '"  ""'  ''"'^  """"^^ 
""3  force.  N.J.  Col.  Doc  ^  Part  n"  •^'"*' '*^'"''^"' ""^'^ -"''' 
PP- 954,  955.  '  ^*"  "•  P-  "7;    N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI. 

«pell!':;i:',^:jj;™^^^^^^    ;:7-  -'^  ;"<:  -'<>».>,  in  the  three 
New  York  r^g      ^    '  *"'*  ^"'*"  P^'nt  as  follows: 


New  York 
New  Jersey 
New  Hampshire 
Massachusetts 
Connecticut 


;Cr8,(joo 

6,900 

9,ooo 

<5o,ooo 

29,000 


Rhode  Island 
Vii;ginia 
North  Carolina 
Pennsylvania 
Maryland 

Total 


The  Board  said  that  it  was  possible  th,t^°'^'     r  ^''^.^^ 

'"-^e  and.  or.  the  other  hand,^"^  .^'I'r  ""^  ^"^  "*'»«"  were  too 
Plant.  Gen.  43,  p.  ^3^         ^    '"'"  "^  »">«"•    Am.  and  W.I.  605;   B.  T. 


54 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


Encouragement"  to  them  in  consideration  of  their  past  ser- 
vices.* Parliament  adopted  this  suggestion,  and  in  1756 
voted  ;£i  15,000  for  distribution  among  the  Northern  colonies, 
and  ;^5ooo  to  Sir  William  Johnson,'  whose  defeat  of  Dieskau 
in  the  Crown  Point  expedition,  together  with  the  success 
obtained  in  Nova  Scotia,  relieved  the  otherwise  dismal  mili- 
tary record  of  the  preceding  year.  This  money  was  dis- 
tributed among  the  Northern  colonies  that  had  undertaken 
the  attacks  on  Crown  Point  and  Niagara,  and  it  practically 
covered  their  entire  expenses  therein.*  Nothing  was  voted 
to  the  Southern  colonies  for  their  support  to  Braddock, 
apparently  because  their  help  was  considered  inadequate. 
This,  however,  led  to  some  ill-feeling;  and  in  1756  Vir- 
ginia and  North  Carolina  applied  to  the  mother  country 

'  Board  of  Trade  to  Henry  Fox,  Jan.  16, 1756.  Am.  and  W.L  605;  B.  T. 
Plant.  Gen.  43,  p.  441. 

•  ag  Geo.  II,  c.  29.  This  money  was  voted  "as  a  free  gift  and  reward  for 
their  past  services,  and  an  encouragement  to  them  to  continue  to  exert  them- 
selves with  vigour  in  defence  of  his  Majesty's  just  rights  and  possessions." 

•  The  Board  of  Trade  recommended  the  following  division  of  this  grant: 


Massachusetts 
New  Hampshire 
Connecticut 
Rhode  Island 

New  England 


£S4,ooo 

8,000 

a6,ooo 

7,000 

£95tO0O 


[New  England 
New  York 
New  Jersey 

Total 


9St00o] 

15.000 

5.000 


£115,000 


The  total  expenses  of  these  colonies  were  estimated  at  £131,800.  B.  T.  Plant. 
Gen.  43,  p.  443.  Massachusetts  was  the  most  public-spirited  of  the  colonies, 
but  even  in  this  colony  there  existed  conditions  hampering  miliUry  efficiency. 
In  1 755  the  men  refused  to  enlist  on  general  terms,  and  refused  to  serve  on  any 
expedition  further  south  than  Niagara.  See  Shirley  to  Robin.son,  June  ao, 
1755.    Am.  and  W.I.  68. 


THE  REQUISITION  SYSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR  55 

what  they  had  done,  both  in  defending  themselves  Td  7n 
a^.ng  against  the  enemy..    Nothing  Js  votedt  Pe"  J  ' 
vania  and   Maryland,   whose  support   was  insignifiZ 

J'  a!::  rr^  t^  °'  ■"* """  ■'" '"™«'" 

Wv  o  .  r  T .        '""'  "^  '''■"  '■"  <"^"  '<-  ^^U"'  a  large 

h^add'  t       ^"°'"-    '"°™"'  "■'  ^l  "'  '"e  year  ,„! 
ne  addressed  circuar  letters  fn  f ho  0^1     -i  -^  *"*  ^757. 

past   campaigns,'  he   wrote   that    all 

Defence  of  frontiers  /■ 

Assistance  to  Braddock  ''^ 

Men  under  Washington  T'"^ 

Support  of  militia  ^'°°° 

30,000 

;C"5.ooo 


*7S3 
1754 
I7SS 
1756 


ThpcA  A'aS.ooo 

£.™rrB°  T  ;r."i:''  ;»^  '^  -  »'  £"..0-  ™s  e,«I  „ 

'  30  Geo.  II,  c.  a6     CY  B   T  V     vi  v 
HeningVII.pp.37,,373    ■  '     '^       ^  ^^^    ^'"^'''"' "^i^ed  £32,369. 

'In  1755  Secretary  Robinson  wrote   fh..  .k    o 
provincial  levies  with  anns  and  clothngN  r'  .7^°""  P~"*^^  *"»  ^ 
PP-  9',  93;  N.Y.  Col.  Doc  VI  D  „7      T     ^^'  ^"^    ^"^'  Part  ". 

only  "the  raising  of  the  Men  t'hdr  Pa^  a  '"f  ^'""'^'^  ^''^  *"'«  ^^at 
qu.-.«d  of  the  colonies.  N  J  Co  dL  v"t  ?'  *  ^''^"""«"  """''J  ^  r^ 
VII.  p.  76.  Similarly. on  Fib:,?"pT'  ""  "'  '*•  "'=  ^•^-  C«'-  D- 
the-r  Pay.  Arms.  I,  cfdathin  wij S  Si  3^^'  "'''  """"« "^  '^^  ^^"' 
on  the  Part  of  the  several  Province  "/'pj'"'*^  ""'""'f  ^"^  ""»  ^-P«"«- 
Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  „6.    i„  „,„";,.     ^"^  Correspondence  I.  p.  6;  NY. 

-d  ;£r3.736  to  ConnecticuVt^Lm;  H  T  ^'^'^^^  '^  Massachusetts 
nished  to  the  troops  raised  in  xyTe    Tr      ,/"  """"""^  ""^  '''"'^^  ^- 

"       3»  Geo.  II.  c.  33.    In,76oParhament 


56 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


liM 


that  was  expected  from  the  colonies  was  the  levying,  clothing, 
and  paying  of  the  provincial  soldiers,  the  Crown  agreeing 
to  furnish  them  with  arms,  ammunition,  tents,  provisions, 
and  artillery.  In  addition,  Pitt  said  that  "strong  Recom- 
mendations will  be  made  to  Parliament,  in  their  Session  next 
y  ^r,  to  grant  a  proper  Compensation  for  such  Expences  as 
above,  according  as  the  active  Vigor,  and  strenuous  Efforts 
of  the  respective  Provinces  shall  justly  appear  to  merit."  * 
A  large  force  was  raised  in  the  colonies  for  the  campaign  of 
1758,  and  in  accordance  with  Pitt's  recommendation.  Par- 
liament in  1759  voted  ;^2oo,ooo  as  compensation  to  the  col- 
onies for  heir  military  services.'  This  system  was  followed 
in  subsequent  years  throughout  the  entire  war.  Each  year 
the  secretary  of  state  addressed  circular  letters  to  the  colonial 
governors,  urging  them  to  raise  troops  and  promising  to 

voted  £2977  to  New  York  for  similar  services.  33  Geo.  II,  c.  19.  In  1757 
there  was  some  discussion  between  Loudoun  and  Massachusetts,  the  colony 
putting  all  camp  necessaries,  such  as  platters,  pans,  kegs,  etc.,  under  the  cate- 
gory of  artillery,  which  the  Crown  had  agreed  to  provide.  Loudoun  to  Pitt, 
May  3,  1757.    Am.  and  W.I.  85. 

'  Pitt  to  the  governors  of  Massachusetts,  New  Hampshire,  Connecticut, 
Rhode  Island,  New  York,  and  New  Jersey,  Dec.  30,  1757.  Am.  and  W.I.  75. 
Printed  in  Thackeray,  Life  of  Chatham  II,  pp.  419-423 ;  also  in  Correspond- 
ence of  William  Pitt  (ed.  G.  S.  Kimball ;  referred  to  in  future  as  Pitt  Corres- 
pondence) I,  p.  136.  Pitt,  same  date,  to  governors  of  Pennsylvania,  Mary- 
land, Virginia,  North  and  South  Carolina.    Am.  and  W.I.  75. 

'  32  Geo.  II,  c.  36.  On  April  30,  1759,  the  House  of  Commons  passed  a 
resolution  that  a  sum  not  exceeding  £200,000  be  granted  to  his  Majesty  to 
enable  him  "to  give  a  proper  Compensation  to  the  respective  Provinces  in 
North  Amtrica,  for  the  Expences  incurred  by  them  in  the  Levying,  Cloathing, 
and  Pay,  of  the  Troops  raised  by  the  same,  according  as  the  active  Vigour  and 
strenuous  Efforts  of  the  respective  Provinces  shall  be  thought  by  his  Majesty 
to  merit."    Commons  Journal  28,  p.  563. 


M 


THE  REQUISITION  SYSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR  57 

recon,me„d  to  Parliament  the  granting  „f  a  proper  compcn- 
2»»  for  such  services..     Each  year.  Pariiam™,  i„  Z 
8-ned  h,«e  s„.s  ,0  the  colonies.'    These  grants  «re 
P^y  .n  the  nature  of  a  reimbursement  due  to  the  colonies 
m  pursuance  of  a  promise  made  by  the  sec^^tao-  of  statf 
partly  .n  the  nature  of  free  gifts  to  encourage  them  to  e^  .' 
ge  .c  act,„n  .    The  object  of  the  system  was  to  raise  in  the 
colon,,,  as  large  a  force  as  was  possible.    This  was  an  im! 
portant  pomt,  as  great  difficulty  was  encountered  in  raisin, 
■oops  m  England.    By  this  means  also  the  heavy  c^of 
transporfng  f.„„  jutcpe  all   the  needed   soldferla' 
avoided..    The  total  amount  granted  by  Parliame'tor 
colomes  as  compensation  for  levying,  clothing,  and  pa^Lg 

*/59.  Aaoo,ooo  (72  Geo  II  r   ,^\.   .  ^      r  ''" 

1761.  £«».ooo  (X  g1  III  e  i      1  7"°'  ^'^^'^  ^33  Geo.  II.  c.  xp); 
£^33,333  (3  Geo.  III.  c.  ")       '^'     "^  '  ^^^^'^^^  ^'  °~-  "^'  ^-  34);  1763. 

' See  James  ueLancey  to  Pitt  Dec   r,   »,,a        1    • 
of  the  New  York  legislature  "nl?„7'.  J:  ?  '  "  *^"«'  "  representation 

.he  p.v.sions  furniL  tthe'^r^.a  .'ir"""' '''  ''^^  "^"^^'  ^- 
gn^atexpence  the  Province  has  C  at  ^h-  """^  «>"«deration  for  the 

cr.  ^  N.J.  Co,.  D„.  vS"^  .^'n;  °;r'  •»"  "  ■"'^  t™.-" 


S8 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4-«76S 


the  soldiers  was  a  large  proportion  of  their  outlay  for  military 
purposes,  amounting  to  about  two-fifths  of  the  whole.' 

The  greatest  difficulty  in  securing  adequate  cooperation 
from  the  colonies  was  encountered  in  the  years  1 756  and  1757, 
before  this  system  was  fully  established.  Loudoun,  the 
commander-in-chief  during  these  years,  had  great  trouble 
with  the  colonies,  and  though  he  showed  little  tact  in  handling 
them,  his  feelings  of  annoyance  were  justifiable.  Not  only 
was  much  difficulty  experienced  in  obtaining  the  levies  them- 
selves, but  there  were  also  interminable  disputes  and  discus- 
sions about  pay,  food,  transportation,  conditions  of  service, 
and  other  matters  of  a  similar  nature.'  As  a  result  of  his  ex- 
periences, Loudoun  reached  the  not  surprising  conclusion 
that  "every  Man  in  this  Country  would,  if  possible,  throw 
the  whole  Expence  on  the  Publick,  and  save  the  Province 
from  being  at  one  Shilling  Expence  for  the  Common  Cause," 
and  that  "it  is  the  constant  study  of  every  Province  here,  to 
throw  every  Expence  on  the  Crown,  and  bear  no  part  of  the 
Expence  of  this  War  themselves."'  On  August  16,  1757,* 
he  wrote  in  detail  to  Holdemesse,  one  of  the  two  Br'tish 
secretaries  of  state,  regarding  the  aid  that  could  be  expected 
from  the  colonies.  The  only  satisfactory  response  to  his 
call  for  troops  had  come  from  Massachusetts,  Connecticut, 
and  New  York,  the  three  colonies  which  throughout  the  entire 

•  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  IV,  p.  40a.  See  also  Pownall  to  Pitt, 
Sept.  30,  1758,  and  Dec.  8,  1758.  Am.  and  W.I.  71.  CJ.  Daniel  Dulany, 
Considerations  on  the  Propriety  of  Imposing  Taxes  (and  ed.  Annapolis, 
176s),  p.  17;  Samuel  Adams,  Writings  I,  p.  33. 

'  Cf.,  e.g.,  Loudoun  to  Pitt,  April  25,  and  May  3, 1757.    Am.  and  W.L  85. 

'LoudountoPitt,  Mayj,  1757.    Am.  and  W.L  85.  *  Ibid. 


I 


THE  REQUISITION  SYSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR  j, 

w"  Showed  .he  mos,  pubhc  spirit.    The  failure  of  the  other 
colonies  to  comply  „i,h  his  demands  was  due  to  variou 
reasons     Georgia  was  too  poor  to  give  any  aid  or  even  to 
pK.v,de  for  her  own  defence.    North  Carolina,  though  fair  y 
populous   was  poor,  and  so  was  New  Hampshire     thus 
I.  .le  could  be  expected  fmm  them.    Rh«,e  Island,  Loudoun' 
a,med  was  unwilling  to  afford  the  required  aid,  and  Vir 
g.n,a    he  sa,d,  had  never  fun,ished  her  quota.    S„„,h  Caro- 
hna  proposed  raising  a  regiment.    By  act  of  the  legislature 

mands.     From  New  Jersey,  on  account  of  the  Strang  Quaker 
.nfluence   httlc  could  be  expected.'    The  system  was  in 
^rent  y  Ud ,  each  colony,  fearing  to  do  more'than  its  ^i    - 

'  1^1  V  ^     ""^  "'  '•^"'J'lvania  and  Maryland 

««led  h,m  w,th  many  difficulties  to  raise  our  people  in 

Virginia  to  a  just  sense  of  their  duty  "  • 
After  Pit,  was  in  full  chaige  of  affairs,  and  the  system  of 

Momentary  grants  bad  l^n  definitely  establish^ "e^ 

bv  Pit  ah!     «!  ""  "'"'«'■«"  "'  '"«■  "^  P'-"ed 

by  Pitt,  about  afty^ne  thousand  soldiets  were  required,  of 

•ppoin^."    A„™^w  1 1        °'  ""  """''*  "'■^  "  "  "y  °"^  <» 
Am.  and  W.I.  71:  Dinwiddle  to  Rtt,  June  x8,  1757. 


60 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


i  . 


which  one-half  was  to  be  raised  in  the  colonies.'  Pitt  in- 
structed the  Northern  colonies  to  raise  twenty  thousand  men,* 
and  the  Southern  colonies  as  many  men  as  possible,'  promis- 
ing that  he  would  recommend  to  Parliament  that  some  com- 
pensation be  granted  them  for  these  services.  The  levies 
of  the  Northern  colonies  were  to  be  used  by  Abercromby 
in  his  attack  on  Crown  Point,  those  of  the  Southern  colonies 
in  the  expedition  against  DuQuesne  under  Forbes.  The 
response  of  the  Northern  colonies  was,  on  the  whole,  satis- 
factory, though  not  completely  so.  The  total  number  of 
soldiers  for  which  these  colonies  made  provision  was  about 
twenty-five  hundred  short  of  the  number  asked.*  Massachu- 
setts and  Connecticut  were  particularly  energetic,  and  the 
former  colony  deserved  all  the  praise  that  its  governor  Pownall 


'Memorandum  of  Troops  for  the  year  1758: 

I.  Louisburg  expedition  under  Amherst   14,215  regulars       600  rangers 
II.  Crown  Point  expedition  under  Aber- 
cromby 9,447  regulars  ao.ooo  provincials 
m  DuQuesne  expedition  under  Forbes     1,880  regulars    5,000  provindals 

Total  35,54a  regulars  35,600  provincials 

Am.  and  W.I.  75.  The  actual  numbers  employed  differed  conaderably  from 
those  in  this  plan. 

•  Pitt  to  governors  of  Northern  colonies,  Dec.  30,  1757.    Am.  and  W.I.  75. 

•  Pitt  to  governors  of  Southern  colonies,  Dec.  30,  1757.    Am.  and  W.I.  75. 

•  Massachusetts  7,000  Rhode  Island  1,000 
Connecticut  5,000  New  Jersey  1,000 
New  York                      a,68o              New  Hampshire  800 

Total  17,480 

James  Abercromby  to  Pitt,  April  38,  1758.  Am.  and  W.I.  87.  The  actual 
number  of  soldiers  raised  did  not  correspond  exactly  with  these  figures,  as 
difficulty  was  encountered  in  enlisting  the  full  numbers  for  which  the  colonial 
legislatures  bad  made  provision. 


THE  REQUISITION  SYSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR         6l 

Claimed  for  it.'    Thougl  Vew  York  also  provided  what  seems 
to  have  been  ,ts  full  quota  of  soldiers,  the  action  of  this  colony 
m  not  domg  more  was  criticised,  because  the  increased  de- 
mand for  us  agricultural  products  during  the  war  had  made 
Jt  very  prosperous.'    Rhode  Island.  New  Hampshire,  and 
New  Jersey  d.d  not  evince  the  same  public  spirit  •    The 
latter  colony  made  provision  for  only  one  thousand  men  -  a 
number  which   according  to  Abercromby.  the  commander- 
m-chief.  was  "far  short  of  their  Abilities."    He  feared  that 

•  Prior  to  the  receipt  of  Pitfs  circular  letter  of  December  i,«  P„,„.ii 

:^:.  N^^,;  irr  rt'-' '"•^'  -^ V-'  pi.«^r:s 

-nL        ^"'V        ■^^*"'»8«  o^  a  "particular  Expression"  in  Pitf»  letter 


f 


I 


03 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1734-1765 


this  action  of  New  Jersey  "might  slacken  the  Ardour  of  the 
other  Colonies,  who  are  but  too  apt  to  seize  upon  every  Pre- 
cedent that  may  Countenance  their  burthening  the  Mother 
Country,  and  exempting  themselves."  ' 

The  action  of  the  Southern  colonies  was  far  less  satisfactory. 
Virginia  proposed  raising  two  thousand  men ;  *  but  in  the  two 
rich  proprietary  colonies,  local  political  disputes  interfered 
with  the  granting  of  effective  support."  The  Maryland 
Assembly  "broke  up  without  providing  any  one  thing  for 
the  prese.it  Service."  *  As  Forbes  was  in  great  need  of 
soldiers,  he  was  forced  to  take  into  the  Crown's  pay  a  small 
body  of  Maryland  troops  that  would  otherwise  have  been 
disbanded."  In  Pennsylvania,  the  dispute  with  the  pro- 
prietors delayed  the  levying  of  the  troops  provided  for  by  the 
Assembly.*  Nothing  was  expected  from  the  Carolinas,' 
but  thanks  to  the  efforts  of  Governor  Dobbs,  a  small  force 
was  sent  from  North  Carolina."  Not  only  was  the  support 
deficient  in  quantity,  but,  according  to  Forbes,  it  was  also 
sadly  lacking  in  quality."    Furthermore  the  colonial  levies 

•  Abercromby  to  Pitt,  April  a8,  1 758.    Am.  and  W.I.  87.  •  IM. 

•  Ibid.    Also  Forbes  to  Pitt,  May  i  and  19, 1 758.    Ibid. 

•  Forbes  to  Pitt,  June  17,  1738.     Ibid. 

•  Pitt  Correspondence  I,  pp.  279,  329. 

•  Abercromby  demanded  6000  men  as  the  quoU  of  Vii^inia,  Maryland,  and 
i'ennsylvania.  The  Pennsylvania  Assembly  voted  to  raise  2700  men,  but  the 
dispute  with  the  proprietor  delayed  the  passage  of  the  supply  bill.  This  bill, 
in  turn,  was  inadequate  and  retarded  the  levying  of  the  soldiers.  Pitt  Cor- 
napondence  I,  pp.  315,  230,  235,  236,  243. 

'  Forbes  to  Pitt,  May  1,  1738.    Am.  and  W.L  87. 
'Pitt  Correspondence  I,  pp.  328,  341. 

•  On  Sept.  6,  1738,  Forbes  wrote  to  Pitt:  "I  vainly  at  the  beginning  flat- 
tered myself  that  some  very  good  Service  might  be  drawn  from  the  Virginia, 


THE  REQUISITION  SYSTUI  DURING  THE  WAR         63 

««  »  l.,e  in  arriving;  ,hal  m,H,a,y  operation,  were  seri- 
ously delayed.  A,  la.e  a.  May  „, .  „8,  Po^te,  wrolc  .ha.  he 
""  ":"  '"  '"''*'  "'  obtaining  a  (air  p™por.ion  of  .ho  Pe„„. 
sylvan,,  troop,  by  J„„e  ..  and  .ha.  he  would  be  well  pleased 
><  he  .0.  a  few  more  ,han  half"  of  ,he  Virginia  fo  J  by  the 
«jne  date..  In  a6ii,U,n  to  the  difficulty  in  securing  he 
colomal  troops,  the  c„mn«™ier.in-ehief  was  beset  by  other 

>mm     Thus  the  words  in  Pi„'s  circular  despatch  -  "the 
-hole,  therefore  that  His  Majesty  expects  and  Lquire,  ,1 

keeper,,  Hone  Jockey,    &  I„dT.„  .    1  ^         "''*'""  "'  '"*''«"  I""" 

.re  a  ..ct  copj  ofX-    oi^tn^t:.!,;':  ^  ^'"  ""'^^  '^^  ' 
*  gathering  from  the  scum  of  the  wo«t  TJl  7  ""*'•  "  ""^  »« 

wrought  them^Ives  up.  Tnto      pa'ck  a  ^e"^'  '"    "'^  ^''""•^'  *""  "- 
Correspondence  I.  p.  34,     A  ^rt  if,   "";  ''?.  """"^  ''^  !"'''«"»"    Pitt 

behavior  of  «.n.eJfLXvind;^tllt  ''''""'"  '''^'"  «""'"-'l«<'  «"« 

•'Iwa,cxtreamIyang,yrrnd^J'Z,"hT'  "^  °'  '"'  ^''"«^''- 

«ar  in  their  «tLt  ^m  whinr'^  I  l  ""*  ''"""''*  "'^  "'"''^''^  ">«'> 

troops  were  n.a,ti;:.rci.t1ZTf."  "'"^  "''"■^'""'  ''"'  "  «" 
for  to  do  Justice  I  L^  "™^L7k  *"  '?  '""'"'*' ''  ''^  '"^'^  '■«"»""«. 
ticulariy  tie  Mar^an'^^Th'  'ret'e;  „T  t '''  ""'"""'""  '»'- 
to  dUband  by  their  P,x.vin«  »  Pit,  r^Z  V.  ^'""'  '''''  ^'"«  '«^» 
xo.  I7S8,  Washington  wrT.eTo  Stll^      *""*""  ''  "  ^^'^    '^"  ^P"' 

Forbes  "as  a  peL„.  wrilrgTa^rr  "T"  :''"''''  '^™  '" 
from  the  c«^^,„,o,.J;^^'*^^^*^^^^^  -n  some  measure 

ley  herd  of  us."  Washi„VnX  .^^;;;";''7'-f /^^^^  -"  ^  •  cot- 
ton, however,  subsequently  ;ro.e  tha^  he  Lv  ^^  '•'  '  '''"'"■"'^■ 
•pplause  for  their  gallant  behavior  "!n  It  ^??  ''''""*'^  "''"y  «~» 

honor  to  be  publilly  com^L-VC^o  t  "'  "'^"  ""'"  "^ 
P  99;  f/  p.  102.  "yx-w^es  on  the  same  occasion,    /ftjrf. 


I 


^4 


1 


\. 


64  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 

the  several  Provinces,  is  the  Levying,  Cloathing  and  Pay  of 
the  Men  "  —  were  construed  by  some  of  the  colonies  to  mean 
that  they  were  exempt  from  furnishing  their  men  with  camp 
necessaries  and  utensils  as  they  had  formerly  done.  "But 
this,"  Abercromby  wrote,  "I  have  got  the  better  on."  ' 

The  high  mark  of  colonial  cooperation  was  reached  in  the 
campaign  of  1758.  In  1759  there  was  a  slight  falling  off, 
and  in  general  the  same  difficulties  were  encountered  as  in 
1758,  especially  in  the  Southern  colonics.*  Massachusetts,' 
Connecticut,*  and  New  York  again  showed  the  most  public 
spirit.*  For  1760  the  same  number  of  provincial  soldiers 
was  desired  as  in  the  two  preceding  campaigns.  Amherst, 
the  commander-in-chief,  did  not  anticipate  that  there  would 
be  any  difficulty  in  raising  the  required  number  of  men,' 
but  some  talk  of  a  probable  peace  with  France  delayed  the 
levying  of  troops.^  This  in  turn  interfered  with  the  military 
operations.    Amherst  wrote:   "The  Sloth  of  the  Colonies 

'  Abercromby  to  Pitt,  April  28, 1758.    Am.  and  W.I.  87. 
'  Stonwix  to  Pitt,  June  aa,  1759.    Am.  and  W.I.  91. 

•  Massachusetts  provided  for  6500  men.  Pownall  to  Pitt,  March  16  and 
April  19,  1759.    Am.  and  W.I.  7a. 

•  Connecticut  provided  for  4600  men.  Fitch  to  Pitt,  April  16  and  July  14, 
1759.        Ibid. 

•  New  Jersey  provided  for  1000  men,  aa  in  the  preceding  year  when  Aber- 
cromby criticised  this  action.  The  governor,  Francis  Bernard,  wrote  to  Pitt 
on  March  ao,  1759,  that  New  Jersey  showed  her  zeal  for  the  cause  in  voting 
1000  men,  as  her  population  was  only  70,000  to  80,000  and  as  she  was  spend- 
ing yearly  on  the  war  £70,000,  whereas  Pennsylvania,  which  was  five  times 
as  pf^pulous,  raised  only  ;(;ioo,ooo.  Am.  and  W.I.  72.  For  the  deUiU  of  the 
troops  provided  for  by  the  colonies  for  1759,  see  Cal.  Home  Office  Papers, 
1760-1765,  no.  93,  p.  24. 

•  Pitt  Correspondence  II,  p.  226.  '  Ibid.  II,  pp.  301,  302. 


THE  REQUISITION  SYSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR         «. 

in  mising  .heir  Troop.,  «d  «„di„g  .hem  ,o  thcir  Render   I 
vou,,  ™de  i.  impraccable  for  me  ,o  move  ,he  Tr^  "  oT 
«.  soon  M  I  could  have  wished."  '    ;„  „„,„,  .^       .     ' 
co.on.-e,  a«.i„  „ffo..ed  abou.  .he  sametlT  ;  XZ^H 

.hemas,i„.  ^J  "for ,  1"^  ""^  ""  '"  ""^ 
onfor^e.  „  ,•,  "  '°"" "'-,"'  ^-Uhcyhavc  shewn 
'    '•     "     King's  Service." «    Of  these 


•Co....  Vu'  ,, 

Mwsa.  .'lusc,,     ijf, , 
lA>uis)  -  .    ^n.'        V 
'Wo  I.    •   .in-i  'v    V  , . 
•ylvania  p  .,.1,'   . 
coniidenLle  diarn  I , .     , 

New  Hampahire 
Massachusetts 
Rhode  Island 

Connecticut 

New  York 

New  Jersey 

Pennsylvania 

Maryland 

Virginia 

North  Carolina 
South  Carolina 


tiJin 


» an, 

NU 


^    •  "1      me  at,  1760. 

'^     '         Pitt  Correspondence  II,  p.  „, 
-  -operand  above  those  in  g.rLn'i 

;     ^M.Up.,j6.    There  was.  however. 
„;  ;;3'^"  *°'l '''°«  •«"»%  in  the  field. 

o  SAiseo 

000 

1.000  ^'^^ 

5.000  «a 

S.680  ^'^97 

T.000  '-'« 

».7oo  ,  «5 
h3S0 


1,000 
Soo 


1,000 


r\    ir.     .  30.180 

On  Virginia  and  South  Carolina  see  *«rt      *    u      ,  '^•^' 


66 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


1        f 


Maryland  "had  failed  in  its  Duty  "  and  North  Carolina  was 
"extremely  wanting," 

In  1760  Montreal  fell,  and  with  it  Canada  became  virtually 
a  British  possession.  Hence  there  was  not  the  same  need 
for  colonial  troops,  and  the  Northern  colonies  were  asked  to 
raise  for  1761  only  two-thirds  of  their  previous  levies,  while 
the  delinquent  Southern  colonies  were  asked  to  raise  as  many 
men  as  was  possible.'  The  removal  of  the  danger  of  a  French 
invasion,  however,  lessened  the  ardor  of  the  colonies,  and 
their  responses  were  less  satisfactory  than  they  had  been  dur- 
ing the  preceding  years.'    In  1761,  Egremont,  then  secretary 

the  lieutenant-governor  of  South  Carolina,  that  colony  was  unable  to  raise 
men  for  service  under  Amherst,  as  its  strength  was  needed  to  cope  with  the 
Cherokees.  Pitt  Corresiwndence  II,  pp.  a86,  287,  420-425.  In  addition  to 
the  corps  of  500  "  rangers,"  South  Carolina  made  provision  for  raising  1000 
men  for  cotiperation  with  the  British  troops  under  Colonel  Montgomery 
against  the  Indians.  According  to  Amherst,  not  more  than  30  of  these  1000 
men  were  raised,  and  the  "rangers"  were  chiefly  employed  in  escorting  pro- 
visions to  the  army.  Niinutes  of  the  Provincial  Council  of  Pennsylvania  IX, 
p.  48.  In  1760  Virginia  had  1400  men  in  her  pay,  of  whom  1000  were  de- 
tached to  assist  South  Carolina  in  the  Cherokee  war,  thus  leaving  only  400 
for  service  under  General  Monckton.  Pitt  Corresix)ndencc  II,  pp.  415-416. 
These  1000  men  were  evidently  too  late  in  the  field  to  be  of  any  assistance  to 
Montgomery  in  South  Carolina.  See  Virginia  Committee  of  Correspondence, 
in  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography  XI,  pp.  17,  as,  34.  C/. 
McCrady,  South  Can)lina,  Royal  Govemmtnt,  p.  347. 

'  Pitt  Correspondence  II,  pp.  365-370. 

•Amherst  to  Pitt,  May  4,  1761:  "I  imagine,  the  former  apprehension  of 
the  Enemy  invading  the  Provinces  being  now  totally  ceased,  their  Confidence 
of  their  own  safety,  may  be  the  Occasion,  that  His  Majesty's  Requisition  for 
this  further  .\id,  has  not  been,  so  immediately  and  fully  complyed  with  as  ought 
to  have  been."  Pitt  Correspondence  II,  p.  426.  For  the  attitude  of  the  various 
colonies,  see  Ibid.  II,  pp.  415,  416,  419,  420-425,  et  passim.  Amherst's  cer- 
tificate gives  the  details: 


THE  REQUISITION  SVSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR         67 

Of  State,  censured  the  Southern  colonies  for  their  node., 
m  as  Pit.  had  censured  then,  the ,ear  before  "het™ 
numixrof  troop,  ™s  again  r.^„i,u,<,„^  ,„,  „^  ^^Z 
of  .?6.  ■  Maryland,  Pennsylvania,  and  North  CarS 
we..  th,s  year  es,«cially  rebuked  for  their  failure  to  ^ 

"avana,    and  it  was  intended  to  use 


New  Hampshire 
Massachusetts 
Rhode  Island 
Connecticut 
New  York 
New  Jersey 
Virginia 
North  Cait)hna 


M'HBn  OF  MEN 
VOTED 

534 

3.aao 

666 

1.787 

600 

i,ooo 

500 


\ 


10,607 


NPIIBE*  or  MEN 

■AISED 

4j8 

».6J7 

395 

3,000 

I.S47 

554 

1,000 

325 
8,796 


Correspondence  of  the  Colonial  Govern,  of  R.I.  „  p   ,,, 
'Egremont,  Dec.  la.  1761    to  th,  ^  ^^ 

dudtd  in  ihi,  „niu„.  '  "'     f"»»yl»«ni"  »«  not  io. 

vind.1  ,™,p.  „  „^„™:"'„,  "'7"''  •"  '™'™™<'  .0 ..... .w  p,.: 


ii 


68 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1734-1765 


them  also  in  the  proposed  expedition  against  Louisiana, 
which,  however,  had  to  be  abandoned  on  account  of  the 
inadequate  force  available.' 

From  this  survey  of  events  during  the  war  it  will  be  appar- 
ent that  the  requisition  system  was  largely  a  failure.  The 
most  active  and  energetic  colonics  were  Massachusetts, 
Connecticut,  and  New  York,  which  together  furnished  nearly 
seven-tenths  of  all  the  colonial  troops,  while  their  population 
was  only  about  one-third  of  the  total  number  of  whites  in  the 
continental  colonies.'  In  addition  to  the  troops  raised  for 
the  army,  Massachusetts  supported  forts  and  garrisons,  and 
had  scouts  on  the  frontier.  Moreover,  though  suffering 
from  an  economic  depression,  this  colony  kept  two  armed 
vessels  at  sea.*    The  least  public-spirited  colonics  were  North 

treated  with  all  such  proper  Attention  and  Humanity,  that  They  may  not 
return  Home  disgusted  with  the  Service,  but,  on  the  Contrary,  may  be  in- 
duced  readily  and  chearfully  to  Act  in  conjunction  with  Our  Regular  Forces 
on  any  future  Occasions."  Secret  Instructions  to  Albemarle,  §§  7  and  8  d 
passim,  in  Colonial  Correspondence,  Havana  I. 

'  It  was  intended  to  attack  Louisiana  after  the  expedition  against  Havana 
had  Its  issue.  Amherst  was  instructed  to  send  4000  men  to  assist  Albemarle 
agamst  Havana,  as..,  on  the  fall  of  that  city,  these  troops  were  to  be  returned 
to  him.  Then  with  8000  men  he  was  to  attack  Louisiana.  The  great  mor- 
tality among  the  English  troops  in  Cuba,  due  to  sickness,  prevented  All*mar!e 
from  returning  these  troops  to  Amherst,  and  the  Louisiana  enterprise  had  to  Ix; 
abandoned.  Egremont  to  Amherst,  Jan.  13,  July  10,  Sept.  11,  1767.  VVm 
and  VV.I.  77.  Amherst  to  Egremont,  May  i»,  ,76a.  Am.  and  W.I  07 
Secret  Instructions  to  Alhemarie.  Colonial  Correspondence,  Havana  I. 
Albemarle  to  Egremont,  Aug.  ai,  1762,  and  Oct.  7,  176a.     Ibid. 

'Board  of  Trade's  estimate,  A-.g.  ag.  175.5.     Am.  and  VV.L  605;   N  J 
Col.  Doc,  VTII,  Part  II,  p.  13a;  NY.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  p.  993. 

•Powna!!  to  Admiralty,  Sept.  12.  ,757.     Adm.  Sec.  In-Lct<ers  3818.     In 
1753  Massachusetts  had  a  twenty  gun  ship.     Pownall  to  Pitt.  Sept.  ,0,  1758 


H 


THE  REQUISITION  SVSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR  g, 

Carolina,  Maryland,  and  Pennsylvania     In  Norfh  r      v 
the  enthusiasm  of  Governor  DnhK  ^"/•^''th  Carohna 

colony  fro.  its  indrrTnce^o  the"' T     '' ^^  """  ^'^ 
its  own  Vita,  interests  Z  ttatTCt  '\^? 

-ween  theT:\lt:rt  ;^^^^^^^^^^ 

elected,  the  other  appointed  bv  t  '  ""'  ^'^^'^^''^ 

at  this  inopportune'^irth  '\t:r^^^^^    ''T'' 
sought  to  bring  to  an  issue  H.A  I         Pennsylvania 

proprietary  estates.   IZ^^ZTL^'''  ^^  '''  ''' 

had  passed  the  lower  house      Conlrl        T^  ''"^^  '"  "^"^  '"""  '"  '^hich  i. 
-."  .hat  .o.   seve.;:;ause?  „Tr  rt';r'"r  ^-  ^'-''^ 

'ntention  of  ,he  house  .hich  passed  i.  L  V      T     '"  '"'"  ''"''  "''^   ^^'^ 
;he  province  ra.her  than  to  XTssislTt    r"  '"^  '^°^""'"-'  "f 

a^a-n  pre.sented  the  objcctionaF.Ie  Z  toll  T  ''"  '"""  ''""^  ''^^'^ 

ConcurrenceJ.ut  conceiving  that  twud  ha       "r       """'   "^'""^   '^- 
'"  Vote  Supphes  &  then  p^pos^   o    ai '  ',      '"  •""'"^""«  '^  'f-- 

-uld...iected,,hana.rnceTd  :"7h;l^  ''  ^  /^'"  "'"■^'^  '"'^y  -^"ew 
any  Money  for  His  MaJestVs  Servces  "''::'! """'-  "'^^  '°  ««"""« 
a  ^faio^ity  of  ,heir  Constituent  r„  ''"'* '''''^^'^  ■!  am  convinced  that 
nan,er)are.al.yavej.  : Cb"r  h"'""'  '"^'"^^'^•"  ^^  f- 
VV.'.  7.  The  sincerity  of  t^/e.^XlT.  ,"  ,"'  "^^  "''^^'^^  "  ^^  ^'^ 
question.    See  W.  R.  Shepherd  S^V'^^^  '^  »'^"  "f-"  '"  -n'ous 

^y'vania.  pp.  ^s  e,  seg.  and  „  1     gT       u  "''"'  «-ernn,ent  in  Penn 
9    nap.  469.    Governor  Hamilton  wrote  to  Pitt,  May,. 


Jij 


70 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-176$ 


merits  of  these  controversies,  it  is  apparent  that  a  system 
which  allowed  a  colony  to  evade  in  whole  or  in  part  the  per- 
formance of  its  obligations  as  a  part  of  the  Empire  was  in- 
herently vicious.    Each  colony  was  intent  on  seeing  what 
the  others  were  doing,  and  the  action  of  the  least  zealous 
tended  to  become  the  standard  by  which  the  others  regulated 
themselves.'    The  system  was  an  unfair  one.    It  threw  a 
relatively  larger  share  of  the  burden  on  public-spirited  colo- 
nies, whose  activity  was  thus  penalized,  while  at  the  same 
time  a  premium  was  placed  on  neglect  of  duty.    It  dimin- 
ished the  potential  military  strength  of  the  colonies  during  the 
greatest  crisis  of  their  existence,  forcing  the  mother  country 
to  make  up,  in  part  at  least,  the  deficiency  thus  created.     It 
also  limited  the  extent  of  the  operations  themselves;  for,  had 

,  1761:  "I  cannot  help  being  of  Opinion,  that  they  never  did  intend,  from 
the  beginninR,  to  comply  with  liis  Majesty's  requisitions  in  the  smallest  degree, 
but  at  the  price  of  obtaining  for  themselves  Powers  and  Avlvantages,  which 
must  have  render'd  the  Government  so  weak  and  impotent,  as  to  te  unable 
at  any  future  time,  to  contend  with  them,  however  necessary  it  might  be." 
Pitt  Correspondence  11,  pp.  432  435-  On  Nov.  27,  ,762,  Egremont  wrote 
to  Hamilton,  expressing  "His  Majesty's  high  Disapprobation"  at  Pennsyl- 
vania's evasion  of  the  requisitions;  for  though  with  seeming  cheerfulness  they 
voted  to  raise  locxs  men,  yet  his  Majesty  cannot  but  consider  their  insistence  on 
the  clauses  in  the  supply  bill,  that  had  already  been  disappmved  of,  "as 
proceeding  from  a  predeterminated  Resolution  not  to  afTord  any  Assistance  to 
the  Service  in  General."     Pa.  Arch.,  4th  Series,  III. 

'  Loudoun  to  Pitt,  Feb.  14,  1 758.  "The  Precedent,  of  one  Province  break- 
ing oflf  and  not  furnishing  in  Conjunction  with  the  others,  may  have  very 
bad  Effects,  as  the  Universal  plan  in  this  Country  is,  to  throw  all  Expences 
off  themselves  and  lay  it  on  the  Mother  Country;  therffore  the  Danger  is 
others  will  follow  the  Example."  Pitt  Correspondence  I,  p.  187.  In  1755, 
Governor  Belcher  of  New  Jersey  wrote  that  his  colony  was  well  spirited! 
"altho  Pennsylvania  sets  them  so  viJe  an  Example."  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  VIII 
Part  II,  p.  169. 


THE  REQUISITION  SYSTEM  DURING  THE  WAR         7, 

as  well.  ,he  system  wasd'fi^n,     t1^  ""'"""  ^'^"'""■■« 

.he  co„d,no„s  and  duration  of  service  were  Cl, 
h  was  never  exactly  known  how  many  troops  th.  ^ 
would  p„vide  and  ccasionally  theirCreL  „  atvl: 
f  r  scrv,ce  unduly  delayed  an  expedition.    In  al     h"!  ^ 

":r  aXre„:'Xr"°-  Hampered,  anit 
.  cuiciency  ol  the  army  impa  red      Thi.«    tu^ 

n^inlim  T"^^^  "'"■"'■  "'""•'^ "*"--" 'Hecolo- 

cau^  of  .he,r  lack  of  ,mio„,  and  also  that  they  could  no,  be 
rehed  upon  as  a  whole  to  provide  voluntarily  for  their  due 
proportion  of  the  necessary  military  establishment 

'  C/.  P..  A„4.,  H.>.„1  s.rt„,  m,  pp.  „,,  ,,5.,,, 


I  11 


f 


CHAPTER  V 
THE  REGULATION  OF  TRADE  DURING  WAR 

While  events  during  the  war  were  demonstrating  the 
necessity  of  a  more  efficient  system  of  defence,  the  trade  of 
the  colonies  with  the  enemy  directed  attention  to  defects 
in  the  administration  of  the  laws  of  trade  and  to  the  necessity 
of  reforms  therein.  In  accordance  with  the  clearly  defined 
and  unequivocal  principle  of  British  law,  all  commercial  inter- 
course  with  the  enemy  was  absolutely  prohibited  in  time  of 
war.'  Naturally  great  difficulty  has  always  been  encoun- 
tered in  enforcing  such  a  prohibition,  especially  when  the 
belligerents  are  mutually  dependent  in  their  economic 
interests.' 

Throughout  the  eighteenth  century,  the  British  government 
had  found  it  almost  impossible  to  prevent  the  English  colonies 

'  In  1799,  in  the  rase  of  the  "Hoop,"  Sir  William  Scott,  later  Lord  Stowell, 
•aid:  "There  exists  such  a  general  rule  in  the  maritime  jurisprudence  of  this 
country,  by  which  all  trading  with  the  public  enemy,  unless  with  the  per- 
mission of  the  sovereign,  is  interdicted."  Robinson  (Philadelphia,  1800)  I, 
p.  167,  and  J.  B.  Scott,  Cases  on  International  Law,  pp.  521,  523.  See 
F.  de  Martens,  Trait<?  de  Droit  International  (trans  by  .\.  Leo)  IFI,  pp.  aeo. 
aoi ;  T.  A.  Walker,  A  Manual  of  Public  International  Uw,  p  i  ji. 

'  Even  in  so  bitter  a  struggle  as  the  .American  Civil  War,  there  was  con 
•idcrabie  trade  between  the  belligerents,     J.  C.  Schwab,  The  Confederate 
States  of  America,  pp.  359  »66;  J.  F   Rhodes,  History  of  United  States,  FlI. 
PP  549.  550;  V,  pp   274,  275. 

7J 


THE  KECULATION  OK  TRADE  DUR.NO  WAR 

from  trading  «i(h  the  Icmporary  cncmv  r„  »  ■ 
War  of  the  Spanish  Succ«^ioT TC  ,  ?""■  '"  "«= 
on  with  the  French  ,„h  c  J  ^"  '""''•'  *™^  ""W 
Spanish  Ajral^i^^r  "^T'  '"^  "^'  -«> 
allies  that,  owing  to  l'^^  J^""-*  ,'"  '"^  I>-ch 
classes,  Great  liricin  ,    ^  "^"K'"""  ""cantilc 

•".l.0War„fthe'Aus,n'an  riilT  th""''"^'  '""'"^"'■" 
tions  of  the  British  colonic.  "rrV  T'"'"'""  ""- 
wereofsoevtensivean  ,        T  ""'^  "'"^l  '"'lies' 

.^e.  h.  re.r  :„r  ~fi„t;;ir?""-«' 

in  the  Caribbean  Sea  <  "'  °P<^""i»"s 

In  ^at*:\:':::"'"'  ^ '""' '" "" '"'""--  --. 

.l-e  French  vLZic'  T^"  "'""""  "'^''"«  •-'"- 
Tl-e  French  irnrrrnjtl^ft'""''"'"'^' "'""••- 

'W  6,  „o.  ,0^    So.  .ISO  6  A»...  ',t„ii  -^^  ■""■  """  "■■  '  """""■  "•! 
Al  »  l».ring  U(,,„  ,he  B,.„|  „,  t„,|:  , "  n      . 

.I"  "  T.  Plan,.  Gen.  ,j  ,,  ,j        «•  <"  ""«       »   1.  Journals  58,    s™ 


74 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


Cape  Breton  depended  to  some  extent  also  on  the  English 
colonies.    At  the  same  time,  Ireland  was  a  large  exporter 
of  provisions,    especially  of  pork   and  beef,  and  it  was 
with  supplies  purchased  in  this  market  that  French  fleets 
and  armies  were  in  part  at  least  provisioned  and  the  West 
Indies  fed.    Thus  two  great  sources  of  provisions,  on  which 
France  depended,  were  in  British  hands.    At  the  outbreak 
of  difficulties  with  France  in  1754,  the  British  government 
clearly  recognized  the  immense  advantage  arising  therefrom. 
Without  Irish  and  American  provisions,  the  French  West 
Indies  would  suffer  severely,  and  at  the  same  time,  France 
would  be  unable  to  refit  her  men-of-war  in  America  and  un- 
dertake privateering  expeditions.    It  is  interesting  and  im- 
portant to  see  how  Great  Britain  used  this  economic  weapon 
against  the  French,  and  to  what  extent  the  colonics  aided  or 
hampered  the  policy  adopted  by  the  mother  country. 

Early  in  1755,  Dinwiddie  wrote  from  Virginia  to  the  Board 
of  Trade  that  the  French  forces  in  Canada  were  chiefly 
supplied  from  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  and  the  Northern 
colonies;  that  flour,  beef,  pork,  and  other  provisions  were 
taken  to  Cape  Breton,  where  they  were  exchanged  for  French 
rum,  sugar,  and  molasses.  From  Louisburg  these  provisions 
were  sent  to  Quebec,  and  thence  to  the  Ohio  Valley.  He 
suggested  as  a  remedy  for  this  "unjustifiable  trade,"  which 
supfx)rted  the  French  Ohio  expedition,  that  colonial  provi- 
sions be  put  in  the  "enumerated  list,"  thus  prohibiting  their 
exportation  to  foreign  parts,  and  also  that  Irish  provisions 
be  placed  under  the  same  regulations.  Such  steps,  he 
pointed  out,  would  paralyze  the  military  schemes  of  the 


THE  REGULATION  Or  TRADE  DURINO  WAR  „ 

French  and  would  prevent  their  fitting  out  .  Beet '  At .... 
n.eet,ng  of  the  B«.,d  of  Tn«ie  on  April  ,,  .^\JL^ 
^n,  Dinwidd.  was  read.-    ,V,r  withU'c  'h^  We^ 

emy.    On  the  other  hand,  the  Board  of  Trari„  k  ^    . 

Treaty  of  Neutrahty  of  x686  between  France  and  England^ 
Th,s  treaty  guaranteed  to  each  power  an  exclusive  trade  "hh 
Its  colonies,  and  allowed  the  French  ^JTvuT' 

-p-».y  to  .i.  .hips  of  .h^^iVnifatip*^,:;:: 

nv  de  h,s  monopoly.    The  Board  of  Trade's  inteZ  1^ 
f  the  treat,  was  clearly  an  untenable  one,  and!  ^ 
■e  had  led  to  some  difficulties,  chiefly  in  the  Bermudas  'i, 
W  not  been  insist.,  upon.-    On  receipt  of  D::Sdie.: 

■J  L''".„'d  z.[\  '%s:>riT"i\'^'"'  ■"""■»«»■  >"■  »• 

B  T.  N,y.  3,  Kk  «..  °  "  ""'"^  ">  °"*'«1'.  Au,.  ft  1,55. 

'  B.  T.  Journals  63. 
•  B.  T.  Bermuda  32,  p.  330.    Cy.  B  T  X  J  i,  d 

B-  T.  Bermuda  la  L  r»    .,    ,,    «   ^ 

'84.  a;.,.  ,78;  /W.  vol.  6^'  '       ^'"""'    ''"  ''"'^  '''  ^-  ^'''  "<«•  '79. 

in«  .0  the  difficulty Ses^llfr""  '"  '^^'  '"''^«''  »-^  ^--^er  add 
trade  and  navigation  *        "'""  "^  ""^  ^■'"'''"«"  "^  '^e  law,  of 


7« 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


despatch,  the  Lords  of  Trade  again  reverted  to  this  inter- 
pretation  of  the  treaty  of  168O,  but  as  they  were  in  doubt, 
the  opinion  of  VV  illiam  Murray,"  the  attorney-general,  was 
asked.     He  correctly  said,  that  '•  it  was  not  the  Intent  of  the 
Treaty  to  provide,  nor  could  it  be  provided,  that  cither  of 
the  Contracting  Powers  should  seize  the  Ships  or  Goods  of 
their  own  Subjects  for  contravening  the  said  articles,"  and 
that  consequently  the  trade  in  question  was  not  iUegal  and 
could  not  be  stopped  except  by  some  positive  law.»    Hence, 
until  the  outbreak  of  formal  war  with  France,  when  the 
prohibition  of  all  trade  with  the  enemy  would  automati- 
cally take  effect,  or  until  Parliament  had  passed  sonic  law 
governing   the   matter,  nothing  could  be  done  to  prevent 
a  patently  injurious  commerce,  unless  the  colonics  of  their 
own  accord  legislated  against  it,  or  unless  recourse  were  had 
to  arbitrary  military  authority. 

Already  toward  the  end  of  1754,  the  naval  and  military 
commanders  had  been  instructed  to  put  a  stop  to  "the  illegal 
correspondence"  between  the  French  and  English  colonics, 
to  prevent  such  "dangerous  Practices,"  which  supplieci  the 
French  with  provisions  and  warlike  stores.'  These  instruc- 
tions were  enforced,*  and  were  renewed  the  following  year 
a  few  days  after  Murray  had  given  his  opinion  that  the  trade 

'  Better  known  as  Lord  Mansfield. 
»B.  T.  Journals  6j,  April  11,  1755. 

'Commodore  Keppel's  Instructions.  Nov.  a6,  ,754,  and  Art.  10  of  Brad- 
dock  s  Instructions.     Am.  and  W.I.  74. 

«  B.  T.  Nova  Scotia  15  H  257  give,  a  detailed  and  interesting  account  of  the 
seizure  of  a  Boston  «ssel  by  a  man-of-war  for  illicit  trade  with  the  French 
at  Louisburg  in  1754. 


I..E  KEGULATION  O,  TRADE  UUKmc  WAK  „ 

wa.  no.  illegal.    B„^.„,„  ^,,^^ 
trade,'  and  .he  sccrelary  of  sto.c  wrole  ,o  Braddoek  .,?  , 
paniculaHy  .his  ela„«>  i„  hi,  inMrue-ionltlialt'"'" 
ga^s  .he  i„habi.a„.s  of  Pennsylvania  and  TJZ.Z 

ne,  had  themselves  adopted  measures  to  prevent  the  F  Jnrh 
from  bcM-ng  supphc^  with  provisions.  "''^ 

A  cessation  of  trade  with   *u^   r 

vidual   an^r  T'"™'  '"  ^™''''  '^"™'««'  ^--n^  indi- 
viduals and  he  colun.es  as  a  whole,  i.  .ended  in  .he  end  .o 

~r-  .h'"^r°"^ '■""'' '•■'-"•""^^^^^^^^^ 
great,  on  .he  other  s.UI  greater  was  .he  danger  in  slrenwh 

^fadt.,""      "• '"  '  ■^'•"^  ^•''™'  ""  "-■-"•"  initia- 
and  war  •      ?  '"'"■"■™'  "'"»l«"a.ion  of  supplies 

a™ : ';  :r '"  •'"  '""^''- '"  ■"'•  ^'-^-ii'' 'ad 

.«  Z2"  ""r'"'""'  '"  ^'^K'"".  -i^-ly  as  an  example 
the  other  colonies,  no  supplies  being  exported  from  tha. 

•Sir  Tl»„,„  R<,ti,^„  „  j„j^^^  ^^^.|  _^^  __^^         ^^ 


t 


MiaOCOPV  HSOIUTION  TBT  CHART 

(ANSI  and  ISO  TEST  CHART  No.  2) 


^      /1PPLIED    IM/C3E      Inc 

Rochetter.   N«w  York        U609       USA 
(716)   482  -  OMO  -  Phon« 
(716)  28g  -  5989  -  Fo. 


78 


BRITISH   COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


,1 


•v' 


colony  to  the  French.*  Similarly,  in  the  same  year,  Pennsyl- 
vania prohibited  the  sailing  of  any  vessel  with  provisions 
unless  bond  had  been  given  to  carry  them  to  a  British  port.' 
Massachusetts  likewise  passed  several  acts  of  this  nature.' 
In  i755>  New  York  interdicted  the  exportation  of  provisions, 
naval  or  warlike  stores  to  Cape  Breton  or  to  any  other  French 
possession,*  and  Maryland  passed  a  law  forbidding  all  trade 
with  the  French  and  their  allies."  These  and  other  colonial 
laws,  together  with  the  embargo  that  was  laid  in  Ireland, 
Shirley  wrote,  "have  greatly  distress'd  the  French  at  Louis- 
bourg,  &  the  Effects  must  be  soon  felt  in  all  their  Settlements 
in  North  America."  • 

In  the  following  year,  on  the  declaration  of  war  with 
France,  all  trade  with  the  French  colonics  became  by  this 
very  fact  illegal,  and  ships  engaged  therein  were,  together 
with  their  cargoes,  liable  to  seizure  and  confiscation.  In 
June,  1756,  full  instructions  to  this  effect  were  sent  to  the 
colonies.^  As  pointed  out,  a  number  of  them  had  already 
passed  laws  forbidding  this  trade ;  these  laws  were  continued 
and  strengthened,  and  in  general  similar  measures  were 
adopted  by  the  other  colonies.*    By  a  perpetual  law,  New 

'  B.  T.  Va.  25  W  170.  » B.  T.  Proprieties  19  V  155. 

•  Mass.  Laws,  18  Geo.  II,  c.  3,  c.  4,  and  c.  8  in  B.  T.  Mass.  74.  See  also 
Mass.  Acts  and  Resolves. 

« B.  T.  N.Y.  32  Kk  62. 

•  Sharpe  to  Henry  Fox,  July  17,  1756.     Am.  and  W.I.  70. 

•Shirley  to  Robinson,  June  20,  1755.  Am.  and  W.I.  68.  This  is  con- 
finned  by  DeLancey.  B.  T.  N.Y.  32  Kk  62.  See  also  Shirley  to  Robinson, 
Aug.  15,  I7SS-     Am.  and  W.L  82. 

'  B.  T.  Journals  64,  May  20  and  June  i,  1756;  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  15  O  146. 

•B.  T.  Journals  64,  Aug.  5,  1756;  Dobbs  to  Henry  Fox,  July  12,  1756. 


THE  REGULATION  OF  TRADE  DURING  WAR  79 

Hampshire  imposed  a  death  penalty  on  all  guilty  of  trading 
with  the  French.' 

The  prohibition  of  all  direct  trade   with   the   French 
could    not,    however,    give    Great    Britain    any    marked 
advantage  over  the  enemy,  as  provisions  could   still   be 
legally  shipped   from   Ireland    and    from    the    American 
colonies  to  the  islands  of  the  neutral  powers  in  the  West 
Indies,   whence  they  could   be  transported  to  the  French 
colonies.     This  trade  centred  in  the  Dutch  commercial 
emporia,  Curaf oa  and  St.  Eustatius,  and  tended  to  neutralize 
the  advantage  derived  from  the  control  of  the  sources  of 
supply    in    Ireland    and    America.     Connecticut    officially 
informed  the  secretary  of  state  that  it  was  probable  the 
French  would  be  supplied  from  Ireland  by  way  of  St. 
Eustatius.=»    The  governor  of  New  York,  Sir  Charles  Hardy, 
gave  more  specific  information  regarding  this  trade,'  and 
at  the  same  time  sought  to  induce  the  neighboring  colonies 
to  desist  from  engaging  therein.    He   took  measures  to 
prevent  the  direct  or  indirect  exportation  of  provisions  and 
warlike  stores  from  New  York  to  the  French,  but  he  was 

Am.  and  W.I.  70;  Fitch  to  Henry  Fox,  Sept.  29,  1756.  Ibid.;  B.  T.  Jour- 
nals 67,  p.  86.  On  March  13,  1756,  Henry  Fox  addressed  a  circular  letter 
to  the  colonial  governors  stating  that  "the  King  would  have  you  recommend  it 
in  the  strongest  manner  to  your  Council  and  Assembly,  to  pass  effectual  Laws 
for  prohibiting  all  Trade  and  Commerce  with  the  French,  and  for  preventing 
the  Exportation  of  Provisions  of  al!  kinds  to  any  of  their  Islands  or  Colonies  " 
N.J.  Col.  Doc.  VIII,  Part  II,  pp.  an,  axa;    N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  76 

'  B.  T.  New  Hampshire  4  C  3.    Cf.  Wentworth  to  Fox,  Sept.  2,  1 756.    Am 
and  W.I.  70  and  B.  T.  New  Hampshire  3  B  86. 

'  Fitch  to  Fox,  Sept.  29, 1756.    Am.  and  W.I.  70. 

•  B.  T.  Journals  64,  Aug.  5,  1756, 


'   \\ 


8o 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


I 


unable  to  persuade  the  governors  of  the  other  colonies  to 
adopt  the  same  expedients.    This,  as  he  pointed  out,  was 
fatal  to  his  purpose,  for  it  was  useless  to  enforce  such  a  pro- 
hibition in  New  York  if  its  neighbors  were  not  placed  under 
the   same   restrictions.'    This   vitally   important   question 
seriously  engaged  the  attention  of  the  British  government.* 
On  receipt  of  the  information,  the  Board  of  Trade  imparted 
it  to  the  secretary  of  state.'    The  Lords  of  the  Admiralty 
also  wrote  to  Fox  that  preparations  were  being  made  to  ship 
large  quantities  of  supplies  from  Ireland  to  France  in  neutral 
ships  in  order  to  provision  her  navy  and  the  French  West 
Indies,  and  they  suggested  as  a  remedy  that  an  embargo  be 
laid  in  Ireland.*    The  military  situation  was  a  most  critical 
one,  and  the  government  could  not  afford  to  abandon  any  ad- 
vantage that  Great  Britain  had  in  the  struggle  with  France. 
The  expressed  intention  of  the  government  was  to  distress 
"the  French,  particularly  in  North  America  by  a  Want  of 


'Hardy,  Oct.  13,  1756.     B.  T.  N.Y.  33  U  55.    Cf.  also  Fox  to  Hardy, 
Aug.  14,  1756.    Am.  and  W.L  75. 
'B.  T.  N.Y.  33  LI  ss. 

•  Board  of  Trade  to  Henry  Fox,  Aug.  5, 1756.  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  15  O  143. 
On  Aug.  14,  1756,  Henry  Fox  wrote  to  Hardy  that  the  shipping  of  provisions 
from  Ireland  to  the  Dutch  West  Indies,  to  which  Hardy  had  called  attention, 
would  be  looked  into,  and  would  be  discouraged  as  much  as  was  possible,  but 
that  it  would  be  difficult  to  act  in  this  particular,  "and  perhaps  be  found  im- 
practicable."   Am.  and  W.I.  75. 

*  Admiralty  to  Henry  Fox,  Sept.  15, 1756:  In  order  that  this  measure  may  be 
attended  with  as  little  inconvenience  as  is  possible,  "we  humbly  propose  that 
the  king  will  allow  us  to  direct  the  commissioners  for  victualling  to  contract  in 
Ireland  for  provisions  fpr  victualling  the  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean."  B.  T. 
Plant.  Gen.  15  O  143. 


THE  REGULATION  OF  TRADE  DURING  WAR  gl 

Provisions";'  in  order  to  attain  this  end,  the  exportation 
of  provisions  from  Ireland  and  the  American  colonics  to  the 
Dutch  possessions  in  the  West  Indies  had  to  be  stopped 
Accordingly,  Fox  instructed  the  Duke  of  Devonshire,  then 
Lord-Lieutenant  of  Ireland,  to  lay  an  embargo  on  all  ships 
and  vessels  bound  with  provisions  from  Ireland  to  neutral 
ports,  and  at  the  same  time  he  forwarded  to  the  Com- 
missioners of  Trade  the  king's  commands  that  they  should 
send  similar  instructions  to  the  colonial  governors  in  Amer- 
ica.'   On  October  9,  1756,  the  Board  of  Trade  sent  a  cir- 
cular letter  to   the  colonial  governors    instructing    them 
to  lay  an  embargo  on  all  ships  and  vessels  clearing  with 
provisions  from  any  place  in  the  colonies,  unless  they  were 
bound  for  some  British  colony.    In  that  case  bonds  were 
to  be  demanded  obligating  these  vessels  to  go  to  the  desti- 
nation indicated  in  their  papers.'    This  action  supplemented 
that  of  the  commander-in-chief  in  America,  Loudoun,  who 
had  already,  on  August  20,  1756,  written  to  the  colonial 
governors  requiring  them  "in  Consequence  of  his  Majesty's 
Positive  Orders"  to  prohibit  the  exportation  of  provisions. 
because  the  French  might  be  supplied  thereby,  and  because,' 
in  addition,  the  possibly  ensuing  scarcity  on  the  continent 
might  hamper  British  military  operations.^ 

These   instructions   received    the   cordial   support   of  a 
number  of  the  colonies.     Connecticut  had,  even  before  the 

•Henry  Fox  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  Oct.  2,  1756.     B.  T.  Plant    Gen 
IS  O  144- 

.'  I  ^"  ^IT'  ^'""  '^  ^  '^^=  °-  '^-  J""™*^  <54,  Oct.  I  and  8, 1736. 
B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  44,  p.  123.  .  Am.  and  W.I.  83. 

a 


82 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


I 


receipt  of  the  Board  of  Trade's  letter,  passed  an  act  obliging 
all  masters  of  vessels  to  give  bond  not  to  land  provisions 
except  in  a  British  port,  and  had  in  addition  laid  an  embargo 
on  all  shipping  in  that  province.'  The  colonies  were, 
however,  not  a  unit  in  obeying  these  orders.  Thus,  despite 
the  protest  of  the  governor,  the  Pennsylvania  legislature 
adhered  to  a  bill  "confining  the  Restraint  &  Prohibition  to 
America  only,  leaving  Vessels  at  Liberty  to  sail  to  any 
Neutral  Ports  in  Europe." '  Violations  of  the  instructions 
were  frequent,  and  as  in  addition  the  embargo  in  Ireland 
was  not  effective,*  the  French  continued  to  be  supplied  with 
food-stuffs.  Thus,  in  the  summer  of  1757,  there  was  a  scar- 
city of  provisions  in  the  Leeward  Islands  due,  on  the  one 
hand  to  the  embargo  in  the  continental  colonies,  and  on  the 
other  to  the  fact  that  these  colonies  had  sold  their  supplies 
to  the  French  by  way  of  St.  Eustatius.*  Hardy  reported  that 
a  cargo  of  flour  and  provisions  was  shipped  from  Antigua 
to  Curagoa,  the  flour  being  concealed  in  claret  casks.*    Such 

•  B.  T.  Prop.  20  W  2.  For  the  attitude  of  Maryland,  see  B.  T.  Prop. 
19  V  195 ;  for  New  York,  B.  T.  N.  Y.  33  LI  83,  and  B.  T.  Journals  65,  Feb.  15, 
1757;  for  New  Hampshire,  B.  T.  N.H.  3  B  86;  for  Massachusetts,  Spencer 
Phips  to  Henry  Fox,  Dec.  ax,  1756.    Am.  and  W.L  70. 

'William  Denny  to  Thomas  Penn,  April  8,  1757.  Am.  and  W.I.  71. 
See  also  B.  T.  Prop.  20  W  3.  The  assembly  claimed  that  a  cessation  of  this 
trade  would  ruin  Pennsylvania. 

'  O"  J"'y  20,  1757,  Admiral  Frankland  wrote  to  Governor  Thomas  of  the 
Leeward  Islands:  "It  is  Notorious  that  in  the  last  Cork  Fleet  Eight  Vessels 
Laden  with  Provisions  dropped  the  Convoy  and  went  into  that  Island 
(St.  Eustatius)  for  the  French  Market."     B.  T.  Leeward  Isles  32  Cc  6. 

*Ibid. 

•  Sir  Charles  Hardy  to  Pitt,  March  11,  1757.  Am.  and  W.I.  71.  See  also 
B.  T.  Journals  65,  April  20, 1757,  and  B.  T.  N.Y.  33  L!  97. 


(  1 


THE   REGULATION  OF  TRADE   DURING  WAR  83 

Violations  were,  however,  more  frequent  in  the  continental 
cobnies  •    Rhode  Island  especially  paid  no  respect  to  the 
orders  from  England.'     Loudoun  wrote  to  Pitt  that  the 
traders  m  this  colony  were  "a  lawless  set  of  smuglers  who 
contmually  Suply  the  Enemy  with  what  Provisions' they 
want,  and  bring  back  their  Goods  in  Barter  for  them  "  » 
^   The  Board  of  Trade  had  evidently  anticipated  that  these 
ms trucuons.  even  though  issued  expressly  on  the  authority 
of  the  Crown,  would  not  be  sufficient.    At  their  meeting  on 
January  12,  1757,  the  Commissioners  discussed  this  matter 
and  agreed  on  the  necessity  of  an  act  of  Parliament  that' 
should  proh.b.t  the  exportation  of   all  food-stuffs  (except 
fish  and  nee)  from  the  British  colonies  in  America.^     James 
Oswald,  a  member  of  the  Board  and  also  of  Parliament,  was 
instructed  to  bring  this  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  House 
of  Commons.'    The  suggestion  met  with  the  approval  of 

'  Hardy  to  Board  of  Trade,  June  14,  lyc,     B   T  N  V        vr     »     o 
also  affidavits, /6,rf.  Mm  9-ia  "'"    ^- ^- ^Y- 34  Mm  8.    See 

;  DeLancey  to  Board  of  Trade,  June  3,  1757-    Ibid.  Mm  3 

May  30,  1757.    Am.  and  W.I.  85. 
^The  subject  was  naturally  considered  of  utmost  Importance     Thu,  o„ 
Feb.  4,  1757,  the  Board  of  Trade  wrote  to  rharl«  p Tir  u  '    " 

Barbados-  "Th»  «       ^     .         .  '°  Charles  Pmfold,  the  governor  of 

Kreat  Mischief  «nH  T  ^''"''J^''^  °^  '""'^''  complamt  and  the  source  of 

great  Mischief  and  Inconvenience,  to  remedy  which  a  Bill  is  now  under  th. 
Con^deration  of  Parliament,  which  We  hope  wi„  prove  effectul. '      B    T 

Abercromby,  Dec.  30,  1757.    Am.  and  W.I.  75.  "' 

•B-  T.  Journals  65,  Jan.  12,  1757. 


84 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


Parliament,  which  in  1757  passed  an  act  prohibiting,  during 
the  war  with  France,  the  exportation  of  all  provisions  (except 
fish  and  roots,  and  rice  under  the  already  existing  restrictions)' 
from  the  colonies  to  any  place  but  Great  Britain,  Ireland, 
or  some  British  colony.  The  penalties  for  violating  this  law 
were  confiscation  of  the  ship  and  cargo,  heavy  fines,  and 
also  possible  imprisonment  for  the  master  of  the  ship.' 

In  order  to  make  this  policy  of  distressing  the  French  more 
effective,  Parliament  in  the  same  session  also  prohibited 
for  a  limited  time  the  exportation  of  grain '  and  its  manu- 
factured products  from  Great  Britain  and  Ireland  except 
to  the  British  colonies.*  This  restraint  on  the  English 
producer  did  not,  however,  imply  the  same  economic  sac- 
rifice as  did  that  laid  on  the  colonies,  because  England  was 
becoming  a  less  and  less  important  factor  in  the  grain  export 
trade.     In  fact,  Parliament  *  at  this  very  time  sought  even 

'  Rice  could  be  exported  directly  only  to  Great  Britain  and  her  colonies 
and  to  ports  in  Europe  south  of  Cape  Finisterre. 

'  A  fine  of  twenty  shillings  for  every  bushel  of  grain  and  every  pound  of  beef, 
pork,  and  other  victual,  "which  said  penalties  and  forfeitures  shall  be  re- 
covered in  She  high  court  of  admiralty,  or  any  other  chief  court  of  civil  or 
criminal  jurisdiction,  in  such  respective  colonies  or  plantations."  The  master 
knowingly  guilty  could  be  imprisoned  for  three  months.  Bonds  had  to  be 
given,  in  treble  the  value  of  the  cargo,  that  it  would  be  taken  to  its  declared 
destination.  30  Geo.  II,  c.  9.  As  England  was  anxious  to  secure  the  neu- 
trality of  Spain  during  the  war,  on  Aug.  9,  1757,  an  order  in  council  was 
issued  allowing  the  inhabitants  of  New  York,  during  the  Crown's  pleasure, 
to  export  provisions  to  St.  Augustine.     B.  T.  Journals  66,  Nov.  3,  1 758. 

'  Corn,  malt,  meat,  flour,  bread,  biscuit,  and  starch. 

•  30  Geo.  II,  c.  I,  continued  to  Dec.  24,  1758  by  31  Geo.  II,  c.  i. 

•30  Geo.  II,  c.  7,  continued  to  Dec.  24,  1758  by  31  Geo.  II,  c.  i.  See 
also  30  Geo.  II,  c.  14.  The  import  duties  on  com  and  flour  were  discontinued 
for  a  limited  time;  in  addition  the  Navigation  Act  was  relaxed,  allowing  com 


\\ 


k 


THE  REGULATION  OF  TRADE  DURING   WAR  85 

to  encourage  the  importation  of   food-stuflfs  into  Great 
Britain. 

In  addition  to  the  general  rule  forbidding  all  trade  with 
the  enemy  and  the  act  of  Parliament  of  1757  forbidding  the 
exportation  of  food-stuflFs  from  the  colonies  to  foreign  ports 
temporary  general  embargoes  were  at  various  times  laid  in 
the  colonies,  partly  with  the  object  of  preventing  the  French 
from  being  supplied,  and  partly  for  military  purposes.     In 
1757  Loudoun  laid  such  an  embargo,  which,  however,  had 
to  be  raised  on  account  of  the  failure  of  the  crops  in  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland,  and  the  consequent  need  of  provisions 
there.«    The  following  year  also,  Abercromby,  acting  on  in- 
structions from  Pitt,  adopted  the  same  expedient,  prepara- 
tory  to  the  Louisburg  expedition.* 

As  the  act  of  Parliament  of  1757  did  not  prohibit  the  ex- 
portation of  beef  and  pork  from  Ireland  to  neutral  ports,  and 
as  these  were  the  chief  food-stuffs  in  that  kingdom,  at  various 
times  also  recourse  was  taken  to  embargoes  there.' 

r!*!o'TT';""Ti'"'r-    ^°^-"'-9,§xiv;  B.T. Plant.  Gen.  44. 
P-  130;  B.  T.  Journals  65,  March  2,  1757.  ^' 

'Holdernessc  to  Loudoun  and  to  colonial  governed,  both  May  2  17c, 
Am.  and  W.L  75;  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  VIII.  Part  II.  p.  .48.  In  futu Jsuch  L 
ba^oes  wer.  not  to  apply  to  ships  bound  for  G.at  Britain  and  Sand 
E.ght  sh.ps  of  Snell  &  Co.  had  been  held  at  New  York  and  Philadelph,"  a„d 
we.  not  anowed  to  proceed  to  Inland  with  their  cargoes  of  wheat  a'd  C 
Z  7"  ,  "'■  ^.'"'  ^4'  P  '34  and  Ihid.  ,5  O  153.  This  embargo  was  laid 
by  Loudoun  mam  y  with  the  object  of  obtaining  suir.cient  transports  to  mo^e 
h.s  troops  to  Halifax.  Sir  Charles  Hardy  to  John  Clevland,  May  3.  Z7S7 
Adm.  Sec.  In-Letters.  Bundle  481.  ^      '"' 

PitiMav^'^'^TTv!;'-^'""''^^'-  Am.  and  W.L  76.  Abercmmby  to 
'r  H?  J  n'  "^^  ''•  ^'^  '''"  '""'■  7'  f "'""''  ^-'  B.  T.  Mass.  76  li  47 
Bedford  Correspondence  II,  p.  369;  Pitt  Correspondence  II.  p.  L  CaN 

endar  Ho.e  Office  Papers.  ,76o-x765.  nos.  484,  493^".  5^6.  5;'  55^  Z 


'     j 


CHAPTER   VI 


;1 


hi 


I'f 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY,    1 756-1 763 

These  various  measures  to  prevent  France  from  getting 
Irish  and  American  provisions  were  by  no  means  fully  ef- 
fective. In  1757,  a  number  of  vessels  that  had  sailed  from 
Ireland  with  provisions  for  the  West  Indies  parted  from  the 
convoy,  and  took  a  large  quantity  of  beef  to  St.  Eustatius. 
This  was  immediately  sent  to  the  French  in  Martinique 
and  Santo  Domingo,  and  enabled  them  to  fit  out  their 
vessels.'  In  1758  it  was  stated  that  no  less  than  fifty  to 
sixty  thousand  barrels  of  provisions  had  gone  or  were  going 
from  Ireland  to  this  Dutch  colony,'  their  ultimate  destina- 
tion being  the  French  West  Indies.* 

*  William  Wood  (Commissioners  of  Customs)  to  John  Clevland  (Lords  of 
Admiralty),  Oct.  a8,  1757.  Adm.  Sec.  In-Letters,  Bundle  3866.  These  were 
14  ships  with  30,000  barrels  of  beef. 

» An  intercepted  letter  from  Waterford,  Ireland,  dated  Jan.  a6, 1 758.  B.  T. 
Leeward  Isles  32  Cc  24. 

•Governor  Thomas  to  Board  of  Trade,  May  18,  1758.  B.  T.  Leeward 
Isles  32  Cc  22.  On  Jan.  7, 1758,  Governor  Pinfold  of  Barbados  wrote  to  the 
Board  of  Trade,  that  the  French  obtained  provisions  from  Ireland  and  St. 
Eustatius.  He  also  added :  "  I  have  good  Intelligence  that  in  Cork  Numbere  of 
Dutch  Vessels  lade  with  Beef  &  puWickly  declare  it  is  to  be  crried  to  the 
West  Indies,  all  of  which  is  destined  for  the  Frwich  Islands."  B.  T.  Barba- 
dos 35  Ee  16. 

86 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY  J/ 

In  .he   British   colonics,  bolh  in  ,hc  West  Indies  and 
on  the  contment,  sin,ilar  p«c.iccs  ptevailed.    The     Lpt 
..onto  engage  in  this  trade  was  very  great     In  ti2   , 
peace  the  foreign  West  Indies  fumish^'aTa^cl  ^ fc 
.he  surplus  agricultural  products  of  the  Bri.il  con  inen  a 
coIon.es,   and    also  provided  them  with  cheap  mlC 

f"   :  'inte"fiT'""'  '"'"  """■  "^  "  --   ^Por.-; 
actor  m  the  fisheries,  m  the  s:ave  trade,  and  in  the  f„r 

mde  w,,h  the  Indians.     In  time  of  war  this    nZa^ 

profitable     trade     became     even     m«r„     i         •  ^ 

_       ,   .  "t^-aiiic     even     more     lucrative     Th«. 

French  West  Indies  suffered  from  a  scarcity  of  p  ovisio^/ 
and    ence  were  willing  to  pay  high  prices  f'r  then,.'     O^' 

n  n,a,ket,„g  ,h      p^„„,  ,„^^  ,^  ^^^^  ^^^  _^  y 

and  hence  were  forced  to  sell  then,  at  moderate  prices  ^ 

These  cond,.,„ns  were  the  direct  results  of  British  sea 

power,wh,chseriouslyi„terferedwith.hecommunicationsS 
.ween  the  me.™polisand  .hecolony.    Francecould  no,  end 

prov.s,ons.o.he  Wes.  Indies,and  they,  in  turn,could  no     „d 

.he,r  produce  to  the  European  markets.    To  a  large  extent 

he  colomes  neutralised  the  advantages  arising  from  Bri  ,"h 

naval  acfv.ty,  both  supplying  ,he  French  colonies  with  the 


8a 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


W 


t 
i 


!         I 


■    I 


sorely  needed  provisions/  and  also  furnishing  a  market  for 
their  produce. 

In  the  opening  years  of  the  war  the  colonies  carried 
on  this  trade  in  two  ways,  either  directly  'h  the 
French,  or  indirectly  with  them  through  some  neutral  port 
in  the  West  Indies.'  The  direct  trade  was  carried  on  with 
the  connivance  of  the  French  officials,  as  it  furnished  them 
with  otherwise  unobtainable  supplies.  The  colonial  ships  en- 
gaged in  it  were  not  seized  by  the  French  cruisers  and  priva- 
teers, because  in  general,  they  had  "  Lycenccs  from  the  French 
Governors  who  refused  them  to  none  that  applied  for  them."  * 

'  A  letter  from  the  French  West  Indies  in  1758,  which  had  been  Uken  in 
a  French  prize,  clearly  shows  this:  "Nous  sommes  tous  les  jours  h  la  veille  de 
manquer,  sans  le  secours  de  nos  Ennemis  nous  serons  obligez  de  vivre  comme 
vous  nous  I'annoncez  avec  ce  que  nous  foumit  la  colonie.  La  Condition  est 
dure,  et  Ton  n'y  resisteroit  pas;  nous  sgavons  bien  qu'il  est  impossible  au  Com- 
merce de  France  de  nous  secourir,  tout  est  abandonn^  et  La  Cour  ne  penae 
pas  ii  nous."    B.  T.  Va.  a6  X  41. 

'  On  April  18, 1757,  Governor  William  Popple  of  the  Bermudas  wrote  to  the 
Board  of  Trade,  that  a  great  many  sloops  built  in  the  Bermudas  were  sold  to 
the  Dutch  West  Indies,  and  that  the  British  register  was  transferred  with  the 
vessel.  Thus  the  Dutch  would  be  able  to  get  provisions  in  the  British  colonies 
for  the  French.  "Even  now,  thd  Bond  is  given  to  Land  Provisions  at  some 
English  Settlement,  the  Dutch  can  go  to  Each  English  Settlement  for  once, 
give  in  Bond,  and  never  return  there  again."  B.  T.  Bermuda  19  O  51.  An 
act  of  Parliament,  15  Geo.  II,  c.  31,  §  i,  was  directed  against  such  practices, 
yet  there  may  hav  ■  been  some  evasion  of  this  law,  with  the  result  pointed  out 
by  Popple  as  probible. 

'Sharpe  to  Pitt,  Feb.  37,  1761.  Am.  and  W.L  73.  Also  in  Sharpe  Cor- 
respondence II,  pp.  490,  491,  and  Pitt  Correspondence  II,  p.  401.  In  1739 
Admiral  Cotes  pointed  out  that  there  was  some  danger  in  this  trade,  as  a 
French  frigate,  newly  arrived  from  F.urope  and  unacquainted  with  iU  nature, 
had  buifit  nine  North  American  vessels.  The  captain  of  this  frigate  was  cen- 
sured by  the  governor  of  Cape  Francois  for  stopping  the  only  channel  by 
which  they  were  regularly  supplied  with  provisions.     B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  16  P  20. 


- 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY  gg 

In  addition,  a  large  number  of  British  colonial  vessels 
engaged  in  this  trade  v.cre  protected  by  passes  from  the  gov- 
ernors, authorizing  them  to  go  to  the  French  colonies  os- 
tensibly for  the  purpose  of  effecting  an  exchange  of  prisoners. 
Such  vessels  were  popularly  known  as  "flags  of  truce  " 

The  British  West  Indian  colonies  participated '  in  this 
trade,  though  naturally  to  a  less  extent  than  did  the  conti- 
nental colonics,  where  the  provisions  were  originally  pro- 
duced.   In  1757  Barbados  passed  a  law  making  it  high 
treason  to  trade  with  the  French,'  and  in  the  following  year 
the  Governor  of  the  colony  wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade 
thac  every  care  and  precaution  had  been  taken  to  prevent 
the  enemy  from  being  supplied.'     Despite  these  measures 
Commodore  Moore  discovered,  in  1759,  that  St.  Vincent,  one 
of  the  neutral  islands,  which  had  become  completely  French 
was  constantly  supplied  with  provisions  from  Barbados' 
and  that   this   trade  helped  to  support  the  other  French 
Islands.*    A  number  of  ships  engaged  in  this  trade  were 
seized  by  the  navy,  and  measures  were  also  taken  to  punish 
those  guilty  of  violating  the  law."    These  vigorous  steps 
seem  to  have  been  effective  in  checking  such  practices  in  the 
West  Indian  colonies.' 

'  Wentworth,  New  Hampshire,  Nov.  13,  ,757,  to  Board  of  Trade.     B  T 

"i  T  "p't  5  ^  "^^  "^""^  '^•'^  ''  "^^  '■'  «  T.  N.Y.  34  Mm  X3.      ' 

•  B.  1 .  Barbados  35  Ee  5,  6.  J  J 

•  Ibid.  35  Ee  16.     Pinfold  to  Bc.rd  of  Trade,  Jan.  7  1758 
'Moore  to  Pitt,  October,  1759.    Am.  and  W.I.  ,00' 

T^aT/'  °"'''^^'°"f*'  ^'^  '^'  '739.  to  Pitt.   IbiJ.    Pinfold  to  Board  of 
Trade,  May  29,  1 760.     B.  T.  Barbados  36  Ff  i 

of  ZJlSrlf  r/!r  ""*  ""'""'""  '"  ^'""'''°'-    ^"  ^"S  a  "a^  of  tmce- 
of  that  aland,  loaded  up  to  the  hatches,  was  seized  by  a  privateer     B  T 


90 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


3 


I 


In  the  continental  colonies,  this  direct  trade  with  the 
enemy  was   extensively  carried   on,  especially  by  Rhode 
Island  and  Pennsylvania,  though  it  was  by  no  means  con- 
fined  to  them.    In  many  instances  the  colonial  vessels 
were  protected  from  seizure  by  commissions  or  other  docu- 
ments in  the  nature  of  passes  issued  by  the  governors,  con- 
stituting them  "flags  of  truce,"  for  the  ostensible  purpose 
of  effecting  an  exchange  of  prisoners.    Although  at  the  be- 
ginning these  passes  may  have  been  used  for  the  legitimate 
purpose  of  exchangi.ig  prisoners,*  their  issue  soon  became 
a  crying  evil.    All  pretence  of  legitimacy  was  abandoned, 
and,  as  in  the  previous  war,  colonial  merchants  eagerly 
sought  to  obtain  from  the  governors  these  documents,  under 
cover  of  which,  with  one  or  two  French  prisoners  on  board, 
they  could  with  safety  to  themselves  carry  on  a  lucrative 
trade  with  the  enemy.    The  Lieutenant-Governor  of  Virginia 
reported  that  he  was  offered  four  hundred  guineas,  if  he 
"would  license  a  Flag  of  Truce." '    The  most  scandalous 
conditions    prevailed    in    Pennsylvania,    where    Governor 
Denny  openly  sold  such  passes.    When  bringing  these  facts 

Va.  a6  X  41.  See  also  the  first  memorial  enclosed  in  Holmes  to  Pitt,  Jan.  4, 
1 761,  which  states  that  Jamaica  sent  money  to  the  enemy,  while  the  Northern' 
colonies  sent  [.revisions,  and  that  the  navy  had  entirely  stop,x!d  this  flag  of 
truce  trade  from  Jamaica.  Col.  Corr.  Jam.  II.  Robert  Melvill,  the  Lieutenant- 
Governor  of  Guadeloupe,  wrote  to  Pitt,  Dec.  15, 1760,  that  he  had  made  two 
seizures  in  frustrating  attempts  to  send  provisions  from  that  island  to  Mar- 
tinique.   Am.  and  W.L  100. 

'  Cf.  Hopkins,  governor  of  Rhode  Island,  to  Pitt,  Dec.  20,  1760.    Am  and 
W.I.  73. 

'Fauquier  to  Pitt,  Oct.  a8,  1760.    Am.  and  W.L  7,.    Cf.  also  Bumaby 
Travels  (ed.  R.  R.  Wilson),  p.  129  n. 


r! 
11 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY  «, 

to  Pitt's  attention  in  .„,,  Thomas  Penn  •  said  tl,at  the 
Delaware  R.ver  a.  Philadelphia  swarmed  "„i,h  shallops 
unloading  these  illegal  cargoes,  brought  at  their  return,  and 
cheatmg  the  King  of  his  dutys,=  teides  carrying  provisions 
and  ready  money  to  the  Enemy."    At  first  Denny  sold  these 
hcenses  m  small  numbers,  and  under  the  pretence  of  trans- 
^nmg  French  prisoners,  though  all  such  prisoners  could 
have  been  embarked  in  one  or  two  vessels  at  the  most.    A, 
the  outset  also  the  governor  received  large  sums  for  these 
passes  but  as  the  number  issued  increased  their  value  t2 
and   finally  "he  scn,pled  not  to  se,  his  name  to,  &  dt' 
P-  of  great  numbers  of  blank  flags  of  Truce,  a,  the  low 
pnce  of  twenty  pounds  sterling  or  under,  some  of  which  " 

f^m  hand  to  hand  at  advanced  prices."    In  .;;,  and 

Ph^d  rj'"^  '™'  '^"  °'  ""=  P™"'«"  Merchants"  of 
Ph.ladelph,a  were  engaged  in  this  trade  with  the  French 

refused  to  ,ssue  flags  of  truce.  Fauquier  in  Virginia  •  and 
Wentwo„h  in  New  Hampshire'  did  not  issue  4,  and 
•hough  Pownall  in  Massachusetts  granted  two,  they  were 

'  Sept.  12,  1759.    Am.  and  W.I.  yj 

'  The  duties  were  those  imposed  by  the  Molasses  Act  of ,,» 
'Hamilton  to  Pitt,  Nov.  ,,x76o.    Am.  and  W I  „      In  f    •    .    , 
from  Philadelphia,  December  T,cn  ,u         .  !'  ^  *  P"^*^*'  '«="" 

an^ongussome'wh^rhZX"^  H     "'  ^"'  '^'''  ''''"^  ^'^ 

profitably..    B.  T.  Plant.  Oe„ ''^  J^  ""^ """"""  P"'^*'" '' 

^^M^auquierto.itt.Oct.,8.,760.    Am.andW.1.7.    C/ also  B.  T.  Va 

-^=;::d'^-^--i--^^^^ 


92 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


^;l^ 


I 


t  i- 


I 


{^ 


for  the  legitimate  exchange  of  prisoners.*    Connecticut  also 
asserted  its  freedom  from  participation  in  such  practices.' 
Rhode  Island,  on  the  other  hand,  was  deeply  implicated. 
In  1757  Rhode  Island  traded  directly  with  the  French  in 
Santo  Domingo,'  and  in  the  following  year  it  was  asserted 
that  a  regular  trade  h  provisions  was  carried  on  from  that 
colony  to  the  French  West  Indies  by  means  of  "cartel 
ships,"  carrying  a  few  prisoners  and  protected  by  flags  of 
truce.*     Stephen  Hopkins,"  the  colonial  governor,  in  the 
course  of  a  detailed  exculpatory  despatch  to  Pitt,  said  that  in 
the  first  four  years  of  the  war  thirty-two  Rhode  Island  vessels 
had  sailed  to  the  French  colonies  for  the  purpose  of  exchang- 
ing prisoners.    A  colonial  law  authorized  the  governor  to 
issue  commissions  for  this  purpose,  but  expressly  forbade 
the  exportation  of  provisions  and  warlike  stores.    Hopkins 
asserted  that  the  colonial  officials  had  not  connived  at  any 
violations  of  this  law,  but  he  frankly  admitted  that  these 
Rhode  Island  "flags  of  truce"  took  lumber  and  "  Dry  Goods 
of  British  Manufacture"  to  the  French  colonies,  bringing 
back  molasses  and  some  sugar.    Hopkins  finally  added :  "It 
must  be  confessed  'tis  highly  probable,  that  some  Vessels 
from  this  Colony  as  well  as  from  others,  have  taken  in  Cargoes 
under  Pretence  of  being  bound  to  Jamaica,"  and  have  then 

'  Bernard  to  Pitt,  Nov.  8,  1760.    Am.  and  W.L  72. 

'  Thomas  Fitch  to  Pitt,  Nov.  26,  1760,  and  April  25,  1761.    Am.  and  W.I. 
73- 

'  B.  T.  N.Y.  34  Mm  14. 

•  Fauquier  to  Board  of  Trade,  Sept.  23,  1758. 
Journals  66,  Dec.  12,  175S. 

•Dec.  20,  1760.    Am.  and  W.L  73. 


B.  T.  Va.  26X41;  B.  T. 


I       ! 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY  93 

sold  them  to  the  French  in  Santo  Domingo.  At  the  time  it 
was  generally  asserted  that  this  direct  trade  with  the  enemy 
was  openly  carried  on  by  Rhode  Island.* 

In  addition  to  this  direct  trade  with  the  enemy,  carried 
on  under  cover  of  flags  of  truce  or  with  the  connivance  of 
the  French  authorities,  the  colonies,  and  Ireland  as  well 
exported  large  quantities  of  provisions  to  the  neutral  ports 
m  the  West  Indies.  St.  Eustatius  was  the  chief  centre  of 
this  trade  and  became  an  important  source  of  supply  for 
the  French.^  ^^  ^ 

According  to  British  law,  provisions  were  in  general 
deemed  contraband  of  war,  and  especially  so  in  a  case  like 
this,  because  they  enabled  the  French  to  fit  out  their  fleets 
and  privateers,  and  because,  in  addition,  they  relieved 
settlements  which  were  in  continual  danger  of  being  forced 
to  surrender  through  starvation."    Besides,  in  a  number  of 

'SharpetoPitt,Feb.,7.i76i.    Am.and  W.I.  73.    On  May  9,  x  761  Francis 

of  wh,chatpr.sent.t.snomoreapart  than  the  Bahama  Islands  were  wh^n 
they  were  inhabited  by  the  Buccanneere."    B.  T.  Mass  78  LI  16 

'The  Dutch  purchasers  of  these  provisions  in  St.  Eustatius  furnished  the 

used  .0  cancel  the  l^nds  given  in  the  British  colonies  not  to  taice  their  cargoes 
to  a  foreign  port.     B.  T.  N.Y.  34  Mm  14.  ^ 

and  ^1"  'K'^"  T'"^  "'^'^  ^°""  "^  ^''""■'^'^y  '^^^'"•^d  '^^'  "provisions  are 

T^^^7Lor:^     :T''''''''''''''''''"    ^•TP-«.LawofContn.ba„" 
of  War  (London,  1856),  p.  93.    Cf.  also  the  Judgment  of  Sir  Wilham  ScoU  in 

Co  J7:.TT^:.:'  '"^-    ""■  ^*'""""'  ^'^^^  °f  C-«  -  the  High 
Court  of  Admiralty  (Philadelphia.  ,800).  I,  p.  ,63.     Holland  did  not  admit  this 

d    n.,on  of  contj^band.  which  was  opposed  to  the  treaties  she  had  condu 
with  England.    See  Am.  and  W.L  54,  no.  124. 


li 


94 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


s 


instances,  the  Dutch  vessels  went  to  the  French  colonies 
under  convoy  of  French  men-of-war.    Thus  on  November 
30,  1758,  Governor  Thomas  of  the  Leeward  Islands  wrote 
to  the  Board  of  Trade,  that  three  fleets  of  Dutch  .   .'-Is 
had  in  the  last  four  months  gone  in  this  manner  to  Marti- 
nique, and  he  claimed,  that  without  them  the  French  would 
have  been  reduced  to  great  distress  and  could  not  have  fitted 
out  their  privateers.'    Furthermore,  in  return  for  provisions, 
the  Dutch  took  French  produce  which  they  carried  to  Europe.' 
In  normal  times,  France  did  not  as  a  rule  allow  foreign- 
ers to  trade  with  her  colonies.    During  the  war,  French 
colonial  trade  was  for  the  time  being  opened   to  Dutch 
vessels,  owing  to  the  supremacy  of  Great  Britain  at  sea. 
This  measure  was  not  one  "of  French  councils,  but  of 
5r.;-'-  force."    The  British  prize  courts  proceeded  to  con- 
den--  Jl  such  vessels  engaged  in  this  trade,  contending  that 
a  neutral  power  could  not  engage  in  a  trade  which  was  opened 
to  them  only  by  "the  pressure  of  war."    This  general  doc- 
trine is  known  as  the  "Rule  of  1 756."  »    Proceeding  on  these 

'  B.  T.  Leeward  Islands  3a  Ct  35.  In  an  intercepted  letter  from  the  Gov- 
ernor of  St.  Eustatius  to  the  Governor  of  Martinique,  March  14, 1758,  we  read: 
"Je  me  flatte  d'ailleurs,  Messieurs,  que  dans  un  cas  un  peu  douteux,  vous 
voudr^s  bien  avoir  Egard  4  la  fagon  dont  je  me  suis  port^  k  foumir  des  vivres 
6.  Vos  Colonies,  dans  le  terns  - :  ou  les  AngloU  insultoient  le  plus  notre 
pavilion."     Ibid.  Cc  23.    ;  .modore  Moore's  despatch  to  Pitt  from 

Guadeloupe,  March  6,  1759,  to  tne  effect  that,  as  the  Dutch  were  very  assid- 
uous in  assisting  the  enemy,  he  had  sent  ships  to  cruise  off  St.  Eustatius  to 
pre%ent  provisions  being  sent  thence  to  Guadeloupe,  whose  complete  con- 
quest had  not  yet  been  effected.    Am.  and  W.I.  100 

'  Ibid.  Cc.  6. 

•This  rule  was  based  on  legitimate  considerations,  which  are  admirablv 
expounded  in  a  judgment  of  the  famous  jurist,  Sir  WiUiam  Scott,  in  the  cas^ 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY  95 

general  principles,  the  British  navy  in  the  West  Indies  seized 
Dutch  vessels  carrying  provisions  to  the  French  colonies 
and  also  Dutch  vessels  taking  produce  away  from  them  • 
These  se.zures  created  a  great  deal  of  friction  between  the 
Enghsh  and  the  Dutch.*  Their  general  effect,  however, 
was  to  break  up  the  Dutch  trade  with  the  French  colonies, 
of  the  "I„,™a„uel,"  ,;„:  ..r,  eannot  be  contended  .0  be  a  ri,h,  of  neutnib' 

h.s  system;  that  change  is  the  d...ct  and  unavoidable  consequen  e  of  The 
con,puIs.on  of  war.  it  is  a  .easun.  not  of  French  councils,  but  TsrZ  fo  c  " 
Robinson  (Am.  ed.)  II,  pp.  ,67,  168.  "• 

M  .H   I  „  7'      '  >  '"""'•  ^  '^  <■'  "«  ""'*  Ship  cLld.,^ 

(3d  td.  London,  ,,5,),  p.  ,.    Mairiolt  ,„  „  ,  !,„,  <h,,  i„,L.  „(  ,k    ^ 

n.ir.r.y  conn.    See  also  Tbe  Annual  Regis,.,  ,„ ,  „!  ,*  ^  ll^dol  ^' 

ZzZ":T^'°  ""^'^ '""-'"  —  "cLr: 

Jrc:;rr.rorsr'v^°rnd':L" """"  "•" "--- 

•  .     J  "uii^a  vessels  bound  with  provisions  to  the  Fn-nrh 

glands  was  contrary  to  the  treaties  subsisting  between  Great  Bn  afn  and 
Holland.  Governor  Thomas  of  the  Leeward  Islands  replied,  that  if  the  con 

Council.     B.  T.  Leeward  Islands  3,  Cc  «.    The  documents  regarding  this 
matter  were  sent  to  Pitt  by  the  Board  of  Trade.  July  ,6.  :„/    S  ,7 
pp.  x*4.  »S,  130.     For  the  activity  of  the  British  fleet,  see ^^^^  Cc  35     Cu! 
.,oa  was  less  con«med  in  this  trade  than  was  St.  Eus.atius.    Up  to  a  short 
tme  before  the  end  of  the  war.  only  seven  vessels  from  Cun.,o^  had  ten 


96 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1734-1765 


•i      *l 


and  with  it  the  exportation  of  provisions  from  Ireland  and 
the  British  colonies  to  Dutch  ports.  Being  deprived  of 
their  Dutch  market,'  the  continental  colonies  sought  access 
to  the  French  by  other  means,  and  in  the  years  1759  and 
1760  there  developed  an  important  trade  with  Monte 
Cristi,  a  Spanish  settlement  in  the  island  of  Hispaniola  or 
Santo  Domingo.* 

Both  France  and  Spain  had  colonies  in  this  island.  Monte 
Cristi  is  situated  on  its  north  shore  in  the  Spanish  part, 
contiguous  to  the  French  boundary.  Prior  to  the  war,  this 
commercially  insignificant  place  had  been  closed  to  foreign- 
ers, but  su'  sequently  it  was  made  a  free  port,'  for  the  purpose 

condemned  in  Jamaica  for  trading  with  the  French  West  Indies.  Col.  Corr. 
>m.  II,  May  10, 1 762.  For  the  decisions  on  appeal  in  England  in  these  cases, 
see  Grenville  Papers  I,  pp.  270,  283,  284,  296. 

'  ^"  March  28, 1759,  Lieutenant-Governor  Henry  Moore  of  Jamaica  wrote 
to  the  Board  of  Trade  that  the  squadron  had  put  an  end  to  the  commerce 
between  the  French  and  the  Dutch,  and  that  this  branch  of  trade  was  then 
taken  up  by  the  Northern  colonies.  B.  T.  Jam.  34  Z  43.  t-he  trade  through 
the  Dutch  channel,  however,  did  not  cease  entirely.  See  Bradley  to  Amherst, 
Dec.  5,  1760.    Am.  and  W.L  73  and  95. 

» The  first  mention  of  this  trade  is  in  DeLancey's  despatch  to  the  Board 
ofTrade,  June3,  1757.  B.  T.  N.Y.  34  Mm  3.  Nothing  further  was  heard 
until  two  years  later,  when  the  Board  of  Trade  said  that  its  firet  information 
regarding  this  trade  came  f»  m  a  despatch  from  the  Lieutenant-Governor  of 
Jamaica,  March  23,  1759.  B.  T.  Journals  67,  p.  231.  See  also  B.  T.  Plant. 
Gen.  44,  p.  179;  B.  T.  Jam.  34  Z  43.  Colebrooke's  report  of  Feb.  18,  1760, 
says  that  this  trade  had  been  carried  on  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but 
in  no  proportion  to  what  it  was  in  1759  and  1760.  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  i6  P  17. 
•Shiriey,  in  his  despatch  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  March  29,  1760,  says  it 
was  a  new  Spanish  settlement.  Am.  and  W.I.  454.  The  second  memorial 
enclosed  in  Holmes  to  Pitt,  Jan.  4,  1761,  says:  "There  is  here  No  City,  No 
Town,  No  Port,"  only  a  few  huts;  the  place  has  no  trade  of  its  own,  and  "the 
Newly  established  free  Port  of  Monto  Christi .  .  .  exists  no  where,  but  in  the 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY  97 

Of  facilitating  the  trade  between  the  British  and  French 
colonies.    Nothing  was  produced  here  that  the  English 
colonies  wanted,'  nor  did  th.  few  Spaniards  residing  at  the 
place  afford  a  market  for  provisions.    The  exports  from 
Monte  Cristi  were  all  French  produce,'  and  its  imports  all 
went  immediately  to  the  adjoining  French  colony.     The 
Spanish  governor  collected  fees  from  the  vessels,  gave  them 
clearances,  and  charged  duties  on  the  sugar  and  molasses 
exported.'    But  the  trade  was  essentially  a  direct  one  with 
the  French.^    In  many  instances  the  French  produce  was 
not  even  landed  in  Spanish  territory,  but  was  transferred 
from  small  French  boats  directly  to  the  British  vessels  in 
the  harbor."    The  products  brought  to  Monte  Cristi  were 
provisions,  warlike  stores,  British  manufactures  and  money.' 

ainr  Regions  of  Imagination."  Col.  Corr.  Jam.  XL  It  should,  however,  be 
noted  that  already  ,n  1562  John  Hawkins  sailed  "to  Monte  Christi  another 
port  on  the  North  side  of  Hispaniola."     Hakluyt  X,  p.  8. 

•The  only  Spanish  produce  that  could  be  obtained" here  was  tobacco  and 

Tt  "'"'""'^"'^  ^'^P"" '"  Holmes  to  Pitt,  May  31.  1761.    Col.  Corr.  Jam.  II 

"B.  T.  Jam.  34ZS9. 

•  K  T.  Bahamas  7  E  3 ;  Hinxman's  report  in  Holmes  to  Pitt,  May  31. 1761 
Col.  Corr.  Jam.  II.  '       j  o  >    /"i- 

'See  Memorial  of  Edward  Long,  Dec.  3, 1760.  Col.  Corr.  Jam.  IL  Long 
was  Judge  of  the  Vice-Admiralty  Court  of  Jamaica,  and  is  the  author  of  the 
well-known  history  of  that  island. 

•  B.  T.  Jam.  34  Z  59.  Cf.  also  second  Memorial  in  Holmes  to  Pitt  Tan  4. 
X76t.  m  Col.  Corr.  Jam.  II,  and  Holmes  to  Pitt,  May  31,  1 76,,  ibid.  Holmes^ 
despatch  to  the  admiralty  regarding  this  subject  was  likewise  sent  to  Pitt 
Cal.  Home  Office  Papers,  1760-1765,  p.  4. 

•B  T.Bahama6D87,7Ei;  B.T.  Plant.  Gen.  16  P  ,7.  It  was  said  that 
the  colon,es  were  drained  of  money  by  this  trade,  as  a  cargo  of  sugar  was  more 
valuable  than  a  cargo  of  provisions.  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  16  P  20.  The  North 
American  vessels  also  brought  horses,  lumber,  and  fish.     B.  T.  Jam  34  Z  59 


'  V' 


98 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


h 


The  commodities  exported  were  chiefly  sugar  and    mo- 
lasses.' 

This  trade  at  Monte  Cristi  was  carried  on  mainly  by  the 
New  England  and  Middle  colonies,'  but  it  was  by  no  means 

The  average  annual  value  of  the  importations  from  the  North  American  colo- 
nies  into  Jamaica  during  the  five  year,  1758  to  1762  was  £aoo,ooo  Jamaica 
cunency.  The  exports  from  Jamaica  to  these  colonies  amounted  to  only 
£50,000  yearly,  the  balance  being  paid  in  money  or  in  bilb  of  exchange,  which 
the  cont.,.ental  colonies  used  to  purchase  French  produce  at  Monte  Cristi. 
«.  r.  Jam.  37  Cc  19.  In  1761  £10,000  Jamaica  currency  was  equivalent  to 
£7x41  sterling.    IM.  Bb  4..  •  B.  T.  Jam.  34  Z  44  and  59. 

Accordmg  to  a  list  of  ships  spoken  by  H.  M.'s  sloop  Ki^  in  Monte 
Cnst.  harbor,  Feb.  5,  .7S9.  28  of  the  29  ships  there,  ranging  from  30  to  ,50 
tons  m  burden,  belonged  to  the  North  American  colonies,  and  had  cleared 
from  them.    They  belonged  to  the  following  colonies:  New  York,  7;  Rhode 
bland  8;  Connecticut,  4;  Massachusetts,  8;  Virginia,  r-  and  Bermuda,  i. 
i  be  Virginia  ship  had  put  in  on  account  of  stress  of  weather.    B.  T.  Jam  34 
Z  44-    The  success  of  the  trade  attracted  others.    On  Oct.  25  1760  H  M  S 
Defiance  anchored  at  Monte  Cristi  and  remained  there  eight' or  nine  days" 
The  commander  reported  that  there  were  always  fifty  vesseU  in  the  harbor,  and 
that  even,  day  some  left  and  some  arrived.    These  vesseU  belonged  to  Eng- 
land  Ireland,  Gibraltar,  and  the  colonies,  and  in  addition,  mention  is  made 
of  three  vesseU  under  the  Danish  flag.    Second  Memorial  in  Holmes  to  Pitt 
Jan.  5,  ,761.    Col.  Corr.  Jam.  II.    The  trial  of  a  North  American  vessel  en- 
gaged in  this  tmde  showed  that  Messrs.  Greg  and  Cunningham  of  New  York 
and  Messrs.  Hugh  White  and  Co.  of  Dublin  were  heavily  interested  in  it 
HolmestoP.tt,nodatebutmarkedasreceivedMayi3.,76i.    Ibid.    Captain 
Hinxrnan,  who  had  been  sent  by  Holmes  to  investigate,  reported  that  on  his 
arrival  at  Monte  Cristi  he  found  in  the  port  42  British  vessels  and  that  8  had 
arrived  subsequent  to  his  anchoring.     Of  these  50  vessels,  36  belonged  to  the 
North  American  colonies:  Massachusetts,  15;  Rhode  Island,  10;  New  York 
9;   Connecticut,  i;   North  Carolina,  i.    The  balance  belonged  to  the  Wesi 
Indian  colonies  and  to  various  places,  such  as  London,  5 ;  Edinburgh    i  •  Ire- 
land, i;   Gibraltar,  i.     The  colonial  vessels  brought  prov-v.ons,  the  British 
manufactures;  both  took  in  return  Fn^nch  products  such  as  sugar  and  indigo. 
Holmes  to  Pi„.  May  31,  ,76,.    Ibid.    For  Danish  ships  carrving  French 
colonial  products  to  market,  see  Cal.  Home  Office  Papers,  1760-1765,  pp  69 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY  99 

unknown  in  Virginia  •  and  in  the  West  Indies.'    In  addition 
British  subjects  in  England,  Scotland,  and  Ireland  were 
implicated  in  it,  though  to  a  minor  extent.*     The  trade 
assumed  large  proportions  in   1759  and   1760.    At  times 
during  these  two  years,  over  one  hundred  North  American 
vessels  were  at  this  port.*    In  1760  it  was  estimated  that 
in  that  one  year  four  to  five  hundred  vessels  had  taken  in 
cargoes  of  French  sugar  and  molasses.»    In  order  to  facili- 
tate  the  trade,    North  American   subjects  of  the  Crown 
resided  at  Monte  Cristi.* 

-Fauquier  to  Pitt.  Oct.  ,8.  ,760.    Am.  and  W.L  7,.    ct.  B   T  Va  a, 

of  WTTt  T'^'^i  T  '''  "'""  ''''''  «^™  '°  "--•-y^d  '^    act' 
of  1757     B.T.  Prop.  a,X8.     Cf.  ibid.  20  W  26  ;ind  37 

One  Allen  Popham  of  St.  KitU  was  extensively  engaged  in  this  trade  of 

«nd.ng  provisions  fro.  Inland  and  New  Vork  to^t.'^^tatiu^^  S    C^i  ' 

W.I  ;rand ::  '""'°''-  '"''"^' '° ^"'^"'  °"-  '•  '^'^'  ^^  -^ 

•Colebrooke's   report  of  ,760  says:    "Policies  of  Insurance  have  been 
opened  pubhckly  in  London  to  cover  their  risque,  and  at  such  high  oZl^Z 

Z.    VI        ?        ^"'7<^' »««»»"  quantity  of  merchandise  was  entered 
Kecord  Office),  Ledgers  of  Imports  and  Exports,  vol.  61 
J^Govemor  George  Haldane  of  Jamaica  to  Board  of  Trade,  June  o  17.0 

^any.ahund.dsuchvesselsh^:drnLl'atottiLttLrrT'^C 
Gen.  .6  P  x,     T/ also  Shirley  to  B.  T..  March  2,.  .760.  in  Am.  and  W.I    54 
B.  T.  Bahamas  6  D  87 ;  B.  T.  Journals  68  p.  1 75  ^^ ' 

— •-■  -d  It?"  '  ^  ;  "'J-     ''""'"'  ^•''"  ^"'^  ''•*'  '"°-  '»'-  ^ 
d  Uken  cargoes  from  Monte  Cristi 


Pao. 


759-    B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  16 


'B.T.  Jam.  34ZS9. 


too 


BRITISH   COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


I  :ii 


In  New  York,  where  this  trade  to  Monte  Cristi  was  exten- 
sively' carried  on,  it  monopolized  much  of  the  time  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  as   it   interfered  with   the  vict- 
ualling of  the   forces.'     The   lieutenant-governor  of  this 
colony,  James  DcLanccy,  was  ver>-  active  in  suppressing 
the  illegal  exportation  of  provisions.     "  Quantities  of  Flour," 
he  wrote,  "were  clandestinely  Exported  to  foreign  Markets, 
particularly  to  Monti  Christi,  thence  to  Supply  the  French." 
Some  of  the  offenders  were  discovered ;  whereupon  Amherst 
wrote  that  this  was  "a  secret  Satisfaction"  to  him,  and  that 
he  hoped  they  would  be  punished  as  they  deserved.    Despite 
DeLancey's  efforts  and  the  detection  of  some  of  those  con- 
cerned "in  this  shamcfull  abuse,"  Amherst  again  received 
complaints  of  its  being  carried  on  to  a  very  great  extent; 
so  much  so  that  he  feared  that  nothing  but  an  embargo 
would  put  a  stop  to  it.    He  was,  however,  opposed  to  such 
a  step  if  it  could  possibly  be  avoided  without  making  the 
army  suffer  from  want  of  flour,  and  he  urged  the  Governor 
to  punish  all  delinquents  most  severely.    While  his  eflForts 
to  do  so  were  at  least  in  part  frustrated,'  DeLancey's  en- 

•  George  Spencer  to  Amherst,  Dec.  17,  1760,  with  a  list  of  46  New  York 
vessels  that  had  taken  provisions  to  Monte  Cristi  and  other  foreign  ports,  and 
had  returned  to  New  York  with  French  sugar  which  was  entered  on 'ficti- 
tious clearances.  Augustus  Bradley  to  Amherst,  Dec.  18,  1 760,  with  a  similar 
hst  of  39  vessels.    Am.  and  W.I.  95. 

'See  DeLancey  to  Amherst,  Aug.  24.  Oct.  «,  Nov.  5. 1759;  and  Amherst 
to  DeLancey,  Oct.  2,  7,  29,  1759.  Am.  and  W.L  91  and  92.  In  New  York 
the  fraudulent  flag  of  truce  trade  was  not  practised,  as  neither  Hardy  nor  De 
Lancey  would  countenance  it. 

'DeLancey  to  Amherst,  Nov.  5, 1759:  "My  Proclamation  against  Heysham, 
I  believe,  gave  some  Check  to  the  Exportation  of  Provisions;  but  De  Peyster 


'     it 


f! 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY       ,oi 

ei:getic  action  succeeded  in  cherk5n.»  f»,«  ♦    j      .. 
««m.al  an  article  as  flour.    DcLancey's  fears  a,  m  .h. 

.hauhe  Ne„  V„r,  .erc.LrC^'  I^ It  ^ 

:^:?.:err:::rz:;-^^^^ 

French  «,,h  prov,s,„„s  and  afforded  them  a  market  for  their 

.^-ti^c'i rr  ?.■•  ;t:r  ;:r '"°  -'  •" '---  -  -^ 

Colden  to  Pitt,  Oct.  a;  1760     Am       H  vv  t' 
'•ng  on  this  trade  in  New  York  was  to  ,l,';  ■    ^''    '^'"'  "'"'"'''  "'  «^''"^- 

New  England  governments.  ''fT^^l^^'T  '"  '"^'^  '^"^"""'^^  '«  '^« 
of  Parliament  directed.  xLese  Jnds  ' 'l  ?  ''  ''"  ''"'''"  ''  ""=  ''^ 
tificates  from  New  England     The     "  """"'^'  '^  '''"'""«  -- 

French,  and  French  sugaTwe^^rourrTr^  ''"  "P^^*^'^  *«  »"« 
^y.  whence  in  turn  thTy  w're  imZ  h  x  ''*^"  ''"^'"^'^ ''' '«  '^'^-  Je- 

the  effect  that  they  had  Ln  1 T  '"'?  "•'"  ''"'''  ""''  "^-''^'^"  to 
^e  had  no  dou.t  fhattti^^^eCd  ^T'  T'  "^  '^^' 
no  customs  officers.  See  al«,  Colden  .0  pTnw  Tr'  ''S  ;«l"/'"' "'"^ 
the  custom-house  accounts  illustmfin.  ,u  '  '76o(/A«rf.),  enclosing 

This  method  imphed  g,.^'  ^ulTfhf  7        "'  "^""'^  ''^  ""'^  '-'»- 

aUhedoorofthe'officeL-nl^LXandTrLT;'  T'  '^"^"  '^'•'^ 
him  a  copy  of  a  letter  from  »fi    •'^'^>/"'l  New  England.    One  Bradlev  sent 


I 


loa 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7J4-I7«5 


iil: 


III 


produce,'  thus  to  a  great  extent  frustrating  the  poh'cy  of  the 
mother  country.    In  fact,  according  to  Shirley,  who  had 
been   transferred    from    Massachusetts   to   the   Bahamas, 
provisions  were  more  plentiful  and  cheaper  in  the  French 
settlements  than  in  the  English  West  Indies,  and  in  addition, 
the  prices  for  French  sugars  rose  violently  on  account  of 
the  broad  market  offered  at  Monte  Cristi.'     Not  only  did 
the  enemy  secure  an  otherwise  unobtainable  market  for 
his  produce,  but  in  addition,  the  sugars  purchased  at  Monte 
Cristi  were  shipped  from  the  Morth  American  colonies  to 
London  and  entered  there  as  British  sugars,'  thus  vitiating 
the  preferential  system  which  gave  the  products  of  the  Brit- 
ish West  Indies  a  monopoly  of  the  home  market.     Further- 
Spanish  and  Portuguese  wine  islands  off  Southern  Europe  and  Africa.    This, 
though  illegal,  he  contended  did  no  harm,  as  all  provisions  thus  exported  were 
purely  for  local  consumption  in  these  islands.     Golden  to  Pitt,  Dec.  37, 
1 760.    C/.  also  B.  T.  Va.  27  Y  14.    New  Jersey,  whose  foreign  trade  was  un- 
important, apparently  did  not  engage  directly  in  this  trade,  at  least  not  to  a 
marked  degree      Boone  to  Pitt,  Aug.  33,  1760.     Am.  and  VV.I.  72 
'  B.  T  Jam.  34  Z  44. 

'White  sugar  had  risen  from  ids.  to  36s.  a  cwt.,  muscovado  from  jis.  to 
17^  6d.  a  cwt.  Shirley  to  Board  of  Trade,  Aug.  i,  1760.  B.  T.  Bahamas 
7  E  I .  Governor  Lyttelton  said  that  on  account  of  this  trade  provisions  during 
the  war  were  scarce  and  dear  in  Jamaica.  B.  T.  Jam.  37  Cc  19.  However, 
on  Jan.  7,  1758,  Governor  Pinfold  wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade  that  Barba- 
dos was  plentifully  supplied  with  provisions,  the  trade  with  the  Northern 
colonies  being  kept  open  by  the  activity  of  the  privateers.  B.  T.  Barbados 
35  Ee  16. 

'  These  sugars  were  "entered  as  the  produce  of  the  island  of  Guardaloup," 
which  had  been  captured  in  1 7S9.  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  16  P  17  French  sugars 
were  imported  into  New  York  under  "the  denomination  of  pr.zc  sugars  & 
British  Sugars  from  Guardaloup."  Golden  to  Pitt,  Nov.  11,  1760.  Am.  and 
W.I.  72.  Shirley  pointed  out  that  in  addition  to  the  other  advantages  result- 
ing from  this  trade,  France  derived  a  revenue  from  the  export  duties  in  Santo 


I-  f 
«■  I 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY 


M 


result 


103 


more  as  a  .„uu  o.  mis  trade,  the  price  of  provisions  rose 
rapidly  in  the  North  American  colonies,  especially  in  New 
York,  so  tha*  at  times  it  would  have  been  cheaper  to  purchase 
m  England  the  flour  and  bread  needed  for  the  troops  em- 
ployed in  the  colonics.'  ^ 

Of  minor  importance,  but  by  no  means  insignificant  was 
another  branch  of  this  illegal  trade :  that  carried  on  with  the 
Flinch  in  Florida  and  Louisiana.    New  York  and  Penn- 
sylvania did  not,  apparently,  engage  in  this    commerce 
Which,  to   a  great  extent,  centred  in  New  England  '     A 
small  number  of  colonial  sloops  constantly  traded' with 
New  Orleans.'    In  addition,  so.    trade,  especially  in  Indian 
l^nXTT""'"^  "  '^  '"^^"^  ^'  ^^^  ^P^"'«h  -'th  the 
what  invo  vcd  therein,  but  the  chief  offender  was  Rhode 
Island.     According  to  William   Bull,   the  lieutenant-gov- 
Domingo,  while  the  duties  that  were  imDoaed  hv  .h-  a^  , 

N^":,'*;;:  'iz.'^-  "•  "^-  ^-  -o  ^^  ^ «-".«.  -» «... 

•  In  1761  a  sloop  was  seized  at  Boston  for  trading  at  New  Orle«n«     tk 

nies,  especially  bvle  Rhl  t7  /    ^"  """P"'^  ''^  ''"  ^°«'''"''  «"«■ 
peaaiiy  by  the  Rhode  Island  traders,  who.  being  interrupted  in  their 


m 


I 


f 


!        1 


i    I 


!  I 


104 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


ernor  of  that  colony,  it  was  the  Indian  goods  thus  ac- 
quired that  enabled  the  French  to  keep  their  promises  to  the 
Indians,  which,  in  turn,  tended  to  encourage  the  Cherokees 
to  keep  up  their  war  with  the  English  and  almost  brought 
the  Creeks  to  an  open  rupture.' 

The  military  and  naval  commanders  were  naturally  in- 
dignant at  a  trade  which  they  considered  "traiterous," 
and  which  interfered  with  the  success  of  their  operations. 
Toward  the  end  of  1759  General  Crump  wrote  to  Pitt  that 
the  French  islands  subsisted  entirely  by  this  trade  and  by 
the  prizes  which  they  took,  and  that,  during  the  last  eight 
months,  not  a  single  vessel  had  arrived  from  Europe  with  pro- 
visions for  them.  If  these  practices  were  stopped,  he  added, 
it  would  facilitate  any  military  designs  on  the  colonies  of  the 
enemy.^  Admiral  Cotes  called  the  trade  iniquitous,'  and 
Tommodore  Moore  stigmatized  those  engaged  in  it  as 
"Traitors  to  their  Country."  *  It  was  claimed  by  those  in 
the  best  position  to  judge  of  such  matters,  that  this  trade 
enabled  the  French  to  equip  privateers,  which  inflicted  much 
suffering,  and  that  it  prevented  the  capture  of  the  French 
West  Indies.' 

traffic  at  Monte  Cristi,  "have  found  out  a  new,  and  more  pernicious  Channel 
for  the  Industry,  by  carrying  Goods  proper  for  Indians  to  I'ensacola,  or  other 
parts,  where  the  French  at  Louisiana  can  get  them."     B.  T.  So.Ca.  so  M  7. 

'  Bull  to  Pitt,  Feb.  18,  1761.  Am.  and  W.I.  73.  With  a  view  to  obviating 
this  result,  Bull  induced  South  Carolina  to  pass  a  temporary  law  regulating  the 
exportation  of  goods  needed  for  the  Indian  trade. 

'  Byam  Crump,  Guadeloupe,  Dec.  a6, 1759,  to  Pitt.    Am.  and  W.I.  100. 

*  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  16  P  20. 

*  Moore  to  Pitt,  October,  1759.    Am.  and  W.L  100. 

*  B.  T.  Jam.  34  Z  43.    Henry  Moore,  March  28,  1759. 


.1  -I 

'  1: 1  f 
vhit 
11  Hi 


■* 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY  105 

Full  reports  were  forwarded  to  Pitt,  who  characteristi- 
cally expressed  his  sentiments  in  no  uncertain  terms.    On 
August  23,  1760/  he  addressed  a  circular  despatch  to  the 
colonial  governors,  stating  that  he  had  received  repeated 
and  certain  information  "of  an   illegal  and  most  perni- 
cious  Trade,  carried  on  by  the  King's  Subjects,  in  North 
America,  and   the  West   Indies,   as  well   to   the   French 
Islands,  as  to  the  French  Settlements"  on  the  continent 
of  America,  by  means  of  which  the  enemy  is  supplied  with 
provisions  and  other  necessaries,  in  consequence  of  which 
France  is  "principally,  if  not  alone,  enabled  to  sustain, 
and  protract,  this  long  and  expensive  War."     Pitt  instructed 
the  governors  to  make  strict  inquiries  into  "the  State  of  this 
dangerous  and   ignominious  Trade,"  to  bring  "all  such 
heinous  Offenders  .  .  .  to  the  most  exemplary  and  condign 
Punishment,"  and  in  general  to  put  a  stop  to  "such  flagi- 
tious Practices."     Pitt  waj  unquestionably  indignant,  and 
this  feeling  was  intensified  by  the  fact  that,  as  a  result  of  the 
victories  of  Hawke  and  Boscawen,  French  sea  power  had 
been  utterly  shattered.    The   French   West   Indies   were*' 
absolutely  helpless,  and  relief  from  France  was  impossible. 
Guadeloupe  had  already  fallen  into  English  hands,  and 
Martinique,  Dominica,  and   the  other   "neutral   islands" 
would  inevitably  fall  when  wanted,  unless  aided  directly 
or  indirectly  by  the  En^'lish  colonies. 
The  chief  instrument  used  to  break  up  this  trade  with  the 

'Am.  and  W.I.  78.  On  Nov.  i,  1760,  Governor  Hamilton  of  Pennsyl- 
vama  wrote  to  Pitt  that  trading  with  the  enemy  must  "from  the  very  nature 
01  War,  be  a  very  high  offence."     Am.  and  W.I.  72. 


io6 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLIC      1754-1765 


I 


I 


!  ;• 


i      t  ( 


enemy  was  the  royal  navy.*  Frequent  seizures  virtually 
put  an  end  to  the  fraudulent  flag  of  truce  trade » and  to  the 
direct  trade  with  the  enemy.'  The  indirect  intercourse  by 
means  of  the  Dutch  colonies  was  also  checked  by  the  con- 
demnation of  the  Dutch  vessels  engaged  in  trading  with  the 
French  colonies.  This  indirect  trade  was  then  diverted  to 
Monte  Cristi.  As  this  was  a  Spanish  port,  some  legal  diffi- 
culties were  encountered  in  seizing  vessels  trading  there.  It 
was  practically  impossible  to  condemn  colonial  vessels  carry- 
ing provisions  to  a  foreign  port  in  violation  of  the  act  of 
1757,  because  their  papers  were  always  in  order  and  indi- 
cated as  their  destination  some  British  port.  Nor,  according 
to  a  strict  interpretation  of  the  "Rule  of  1756,"  could  colonial 
vessels  trading  at  a  neutral  port,  such  as  Monte  Cristi, 
be  condemned. 

At  the  outset,  in  1759,  the  navy  proceeded  to  seize  ships 
engaged  in  the  Monte  Cristi  trade,  but  was  deterred  in 
this  activity  by  the  legal  difficulties  encountered  in  procuring 
their  condemnation.*    The  Admiralty  Co-irt  in   England 

'  In  1757,  Sir  Charles  Hardy,  who  was  both  governor  of  New  York  and  a 
Rear-Admiral,  advised  the  employment  of  cruiser.n  to  "intercept  any  Smug- 
gling Trade  that  might  attempt  going  to  the  Neutral  Islands"  with  provisions. 
Hardy  to  Pitt,  April  10,  1757.  Am.  and  W.I.  71.  At  that  time  he  seized  a 
Salem  vessel  returning  trom  St.  Eustatius,  and  took  it  to  Halifax  where  it 
was  condemned  in  the  Admiralty  Court.     B.  T.  N.Y.  34  Mm  13. 

'  B.  T.  Va.  26  X  41 ;  Second  Memorial  enclosed  in  Holmes  to  Pitt,  Jan.  4, 
1 761.     Col.  Corr.  Jam.  IL 

•Hamilton  to  Pitt,  Nov.  i,  1760.  Am.  and  W.I.  72.  Sharpe  to  Pitt, 
Feb.  27,  1761.  Ibid.  73.  First  Memorial  enclosed  in  Holmes  to  Pitt,  Jan.  4, 
1 761.    Col.  Corr.  Jam.  n.     Bernard  to  Pitt,  Nov.  8,  1 760.    Am.  and  W.I.  72! 

♦  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  16  P  20;  B.  T.  Jam.  34  Z  59  and  60. 


•  *  ■ 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY  107 

held  that  "British  Subjects  have  no  Undoubted  right  of 
Trading  at  Monte  Christi,  provided  they  carry  on  their 
Trade  B(md  Fide  with  the  Spaniards  only."  »    The  Judge 
of  the  Vice-Admiralty  court  of  Jamaica  contended,   how- 
ever, that  the  trade  was  not  bona  fide,  that  the  Spaniards 
produced  no  sugar,  molasses  or  rum;   that  the  trade  was 
virtually  a  direct  one  with  the  French;  and  that  it  certainly 
violated  the  spirit  of  the  law.^    The  naval  authorities  sup- 
ported  fv  s   view.    On    January  4,    1761,   Rear-Admiral 
Charles  Holmes,'  the  commander  at  the  Jamaica  station 
wrote  to  Pitt,  that  on  his  arrival  he  had  instructed  the  ships 
of  Ins  squadron  to  break  up  this  trade,  as  well  as  that  carried 
on  by  flags  of  truce,  but  that  he  now  found  that  many  douh 
had  arisen  in  England  concerning  the  legality  of  seizing 
and   condemning   the  ships  coming  from   Monte  Cristi 
"Shall  others,"  he  asked  Pitt,  "the  subjects  of  Great  Britain 
concerned  in  this  Trade,  and  Swearing  with  Halters  about 
their  Necks,  if  they  bear  witness  to  the  Truth  and  Declare 
that  they  keep  Correspondence  with  the  Enemy  and  not 
only  Nourish  and  Support  his  Subjects  in  their  Wants 
but  cover  and  carry  on  their  Trade  in  a  most  prosperous  and 
Successful   Manner;    Compeat  with,  or  be  opposed  and 
Overthrow,  the  Certain  Knowledge  of  His  Majesty's  Squad- 
ron, that  there  is  Neither  Port  nor  Commerce  belonging  to 
Spam,  at  Monte  Christi,   that  the  Commerce  is  wholly 
French;  and  that  the  Spaniards  are  only  the  Porters  of  this 
Trade,  not  into  a  Port,  but  into  an  open  Bay  and  bare  Road- 

'Ibid  ^'^*"*^  ^'"'^'  ^'^  ^'  ^^^'   ^°'"  ^''"-  ^'""-  "• 

•  Col.  Corr.  Jam.  II. 


s 


f  ^ 


if 


I  I 


il. 


io8 


BRITISH   COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


Stead?"  Holmes  added  that  he  would  obey  whatever  in- 
structions he  might  receive,  but  he  pointed  out  that  "the 
Enemy  Cannot  be  hurt  here,  if  the  Trade  of  Monte  Christi, 
under  any  Colour  or  pretext  whatever,  be  sustained  as  Legal " '; 
that  this  trade  was  even  worse  than  the  flag  of  truce  trade, 
for  if  British  subjects  were,  by  other  means,  forced  to  aban- 
don it,  the  Dutch  would  take  it  up.  He  therefore  hoped 
that  his  action  in  seizing  the  enemy's  produce,  wherever 
he  could  lay  hold  of  it,  would  be  approved.  These  argu- 
ments lead  to  the  extension  of  the  "Rule  of  1756"  to  the 
Monte  Cristi  trade.* 

The  West  Indian  Vice-Admiralty  courts  proceeded  to 
condemn  these  vessels,  and  ultimately  their  action  was  up- 
held in  England.  The  question  of  the  legitimacy  of  such 
seizures  once  settled,  great  zeal  was  displayed  in  breaking 
up  the  trade.  Toward  the  end  of  1760,  the  governor  of 
New  Jersey  informed  Pitt  that  the  activity  of  the 
cruisers  in  the  West  Indies  and  "the  Kind  of  Civil  War 
that  has  been  waged  by  Privateers  on  these  Traders  belong- 
ing to  different  Provinces"  had  made  this  intercourse  so 
hazardous  that  it  cannot  be  pursued  "so  universally  or  suc- 
cessfully as  formerly."*  Early  in  1761,  Admiral  Holmes 
was  able  to  inform  Pitt  that  he  had  brolien  up  ihis  trade.' 

'  Robinson  (Am.  ed.)  11,  pp.  lai,  laa. 

'Boone  to  Pitt,  Oct.  23.  1760.  Am.  and  W.I.  7,.  C/  Colden  to  Pitt. 
N.  Y.,  Oct.  27,  1760,  to  effect  that  the  navy  had  stopped  this  trade.  Ibid  • 
Wentworth  to  Pitt,  Dec.  9, 1 760.    Ibul  ■  Hopkins  to  Pitt,  Dec.  20, 1 760.    Ibid 

'Col.  Corr.  Jam.  U.  Not  dated  but  marked  received  May  1.  1761 
Holmes  added  that  an  attempt  was  then  made  to  carry  French  produce'to  mar- 
ket  in  Spanish  ships  from  Spanish  Hispaniola.  The  action  of  Holmes  in 
seizing  these  Spanish  vessels  within  gunshot  of  their  ports  was  not  approved 


'4 


-^ 


COLONIAL  TRADE  V7ITH   THE  ENEMY  ,09 

His  report  was,  however,  too  sanguine  if  taken  literally. 
The  navy  seriously  interfered  with  this  trade  and  greatly  di- 
minished it,  but  at  no  time  succeeded  in  entirely  eradicating 
it.    Many  and  tortuous  were  the  methods  employed  to  escape 
the  vigilance  of  the  men-of-war.    Thus  in  1761  vessels  from 
Jamaica  and  the  continental  colonies  used  Spanish  crews 
and  sailed  under  the  Spanish  flag  from  Santo  Domingo  with 
French  produce.*    The  navy  was  able  to  fathom  this  sub- 
terfuge,^ but  there  were  apparently  other  devices,  which 
taken  in  connection  with  the  fact  that  the  navy  was  not 
ubiquitous,  account  for  the  continuance  of  this  trade,  though 
on  a  greatly  diminished  scale.    At  no  subsequent  time  did 
It  attain  the  large  proportions  that  it  had  in  1759  and  1760. 
In  1762,  after  Spain  had  joined  forces  with  France,  there  was, 
however,  a  revival  on  so  extensive  a  scale,  that  even  the 
normally   imperturbable  Commander-in-Chief  was  roused 
to  indignation. 

On  May  10,  1762,  Amherst  wrote  to  the  Earl  of  Egremont 
that  he  had  lately  discovered  a  most  iniquitous  crade,  by 

by  the  British  government,  whose  chief  aim,  after  Pitt's  resignation  in  1761 
was  to  keep  peace  with  Spain.  Cal.  Home  Office  Papers,  ,76a-x76,,  nos.  397.' 
401.  On  March  29,  1760.  Shirley  wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade  that  recently 
the  Vice-Admiralty  Court  of  New  Providence  had  condemned  the  cargoes  of 
eight  Spanish  vessels  belonging  to  Monte  Cristi.  These  vessels  had  been 
captured  by  a  privateer  from  the  Bahamas,  and  were  laden  with  French  sugara 
and  n.oiasscs.     Am.  and  W.I.  454. 

•Holmes  to  Pitt,  June  16,1761.  Col.  Corr.  Jam.  H.  See  also  Cal.  Home 
Uflice  Papers,  1760-1765,  pp.  60,  61,  for  some  further  details  about  the  trade 
between  the  French  and  Spanish  in  Santo  Domingo. 

'The  attack  of  Holmes  on  this  trade  led  to  considerable  ill-feeling  in 
Jamaica.  See  complaint  against  Holmes.  Oct.  i,  176T.  Col.  Corr.  Jam  II- 
and  Holmes  to  Pitt.  Oct.  .7,1761.    Ibid.  111.     Cf.  passim  this  yoluL         ' 


if 


no 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


* 


'  f 


I 

'i: 


*  I 


il 


i  i 


means  of  which  the  enemy  was  supplied  with  provisions  and 
stores  from  many  ports  on  the  continent  of  America,  the 
colonial  vessels  sailing  directly  to  the  French  colonies;  and 
that  he  had  written  to  the  governors  and  customs  officials  to 
put  a  stop  "  to  this  pernicious  and  destructive  Trade."  '    In 
his  circular  letter  to  the  colonial  governors,*  Amherst  stated 
that  he  had  unquestionable  proof  that  the  enemy  was  being 
supplied  with  provisions  from  almost  every  port  in  the  con- 
tinental colonies,  and  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to 
stop  the  trade  as  the  army  needed  these  supplies.    In  his 
letters  to  the  Surveyors-General  of  the  Customs,'  Amherst 
showed  that  colonial  vessels,  which  had  cleared  for  British 
ports  and  had  instead  gone  to  the  enemy's  colonies,  were  yet 
able  to  procure  landing  certificates  from  the  alleged  British 
port  of  destination.    Such  certificates,  he  pointed  out,  could 
be  obtained  only  by  the  dishonest  connivance  of  the  custom- 
house officials.    He  enclosed  a  list  of  such  vessels  that  had 
gone  directly  to  the  enemy's  ports,  though  clearing  for  Con- 
necticut, Pennsylvania,  and  North  Carolina. 

To  the  colonies  most  implicated,  Amherst  wTote  separately 
and  in  great  detail.    To  Colden,^  the  lieutenant-governor 
of  New  York,  he  sent  complete  evidence  of  the  colony's 
'  Am.  and  W.I.  97. 

'DatedApril  15, 1762.  The  governor,  of  Nova  Scotia  and  of  Georgia  were 
notmcuded.  An,  and  W.I.  97.  To  put  "a  stop  to  such  infamous  practices. 
part.cu  arly  at  a  t.me  when  there  is  the  greatest  demand  for  prolons  to 
supply  the  Kmg's  troops."    Col.  Rec.  of  R.L  VI,  pp  311  31, 

'To  Peter  Randolph,  Southern  district,  and  John  Temple.  Northern  dis- 
trict, dated  April  24,  176a.    Am.  and  W.I.  97. 

•  Amherst  to  Colden,  April  16,  and  May  6, 176a.   Ibid. 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY 


III 


i 


participation  in  this  trade,  such  as :  a  French  passport  found 
on  board  a  New  York  vessel,  allowing  it  to  trade  in  French 
ports;  an  invoice  of  sugar  shipped  on  a  New  York  vessel  in 
French  Hispaniola,  with  an  account  of  the  cargo  sold  there  by 
this  ship.    Among  the  number  of  instances  iientioned  by  Am- 
herst, one  deserves  citation.    A  New  York  vessel  met  a  Fiench 
ship  that  concealed  its  nationality  by  hoisting  the  British 
colors.    Thereupon  the  colonial  captain  hid  his  French  pass 
On  the  New  York  vessel  being  seized,  the  true  nationality 
of  the  capturing  vessel  was  made  evident,  and  the  hidden 
passport  was  produced.'    It  is  not  surprising  that  Amherst 
wrote  that  "such  Infamous  practices  at  any  time  ought  to 
be  suppressed,"  but  especially  then,  when  Great  Britain  was 
at  war  with  Spain  as  well  as  with  France,  and  when  "there 
IS  the  greatest  Reason  imaginable,  to  think  that  without 
Supplys  from  this  Continent  the  Enemy  could  not  Subsist 
their  Fleets  in  the  West  Indies."    Golden  fully  admitted 
the  truth  of  these  charges,  and  said  that  the  New  York 
traders  "consider  nothing  but  their  private  profit,"  and  that 
he  would  try  to  punish  those  engaged  in  this  "most  pe-nicious 
trade.  "^ 


French  ^' "^'"'''l^'^  "'^^K^^d  '"  '^is  trade.  This  trade  even  extenfed  to 
F^nch  Gu.ana.  On  Nov.  3.  X76,.  William  Popple.  Governor  of  the  Ber- 
th tta'dr^  '^  V"''''  ""'  '''  ^'^""■"'"^  '^^-^-^  ^  N-  Vork  v^l 
vl  r  T^  ^"  '^'^'■"^  "^^  ^^y^""^-     ""  °"'--d  cargo  from  New 

York  was  lumber,  provisions,  and  horses,  and  the  return  cargo  was  cocoa 

havTt'  Bat  r?;""  ^^"  ^""^  ^^^  ""-'' ''-  ^-^--  ^^^^ 
have  been  Barbados.    Adm.  Sec.  In-Lettere  3819. 

'  B.  T.  N.Y.  36  Oo  67:  Golden  to  B.  T..  May  n,  1762. 


113 


'ill 


ii'£ 


fell 


il:y 


:tl 


u 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island  also  called  forth  Amherst's 
indignation.  On  May  5,  1762,  he  wrote  to  Fitch,  the  gov- 
ernor of  the  former  colony,  complaining  that  this  trade  was 
still  continued  in  Connecticut,  and  that  vessels  daily  left 
the  colony  with  provisions  destined  for  the  enemy.'  Rhode 
Island  also  was  actively  engaged  in  this  commerce,  which 
centred  in  Newport.' 

In  this  entire  correspondence,  Amherst  emphasized  two 
points :  first,  that  the  trade  helped  the  enemy ;  second,  that 
it  interfered  with  military  operations  by  depriving  the  army 
of  the  necessary  provisions.  Despite  the  fact  that  the 
colonies  produced  a  large  surplus  of  food-stuffs,  the  troops 
had  in  part  to  be  supplied  from  Europe.'    This  was  to  a 

'  Am.  and  W.I.  97. 

•Amherst  to  Hopkins,  May  7,  1763.  Am.  and  W.I.  97,  and  Col.  Rec.  of 
R.L  VI,  pp.  317,  318.  For  the  seizure  of  a  Rhode  Island  schooner,  which 
had  gone  to  Hispaniola  with  a  cargo  of  flour,  see  Peter  Blake  to  Egremont, 
Charleston,  Nov.  27,  1762.     Am.  and  W.I.  223. 

•  Even  under  normal  conditions,  it  is  probable  that  some  provisions  for  the 
army  would  have  bee  •.  sent  from  Ireland.  See  Pitt  Correspondence  II,  pp.  79, 
109,  no.  C/.  also  Brit.  Mus.  Add.  MSS.  35909  (Hardwicke  Papers  DLXI). 
In  th-  opening  years  of  the  war,  wheat  was  sent  to  England  from  the  colonies, 
while  in  the  closing  years  the  movement  was  reversed.  Among  the  imports 
of  wheat  and  flour  into  England  in  the  year  from  Michaelmas,  1756,  to  the 
same  date  1757  are  the  following  items:  from  New  York,  7  quarters;  from 
Pennsylvania,  1988  quarters;  from  Virginia  and  Maryland,  4827  quarters. 
For  the  subsequent  year  the  corresponding  flgures  are  688,  1275,  and  2855. 
Among  the  exports  of  wheat  from  England  in  1762  are  the  following  items:— 


To  the  West  Indian  colonies 
To  Quebec 
To  Newfoundland 
To  New  York 
Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  Bundle  80. 


743S  quarters 

6602  quarters 

720  quarters 

1557  quarters 


COLONIAL  TRADE  WITH  THE  ENEMY 


"3 


great  extent  due  to  the  trade  in  question,  which  enhanced  to 
an  abnormal  degree  the  cost  of  provisions  in  the  colonics.  In 
consequence  of  the  ensuing  scarcity,  the  Commander-in-Chief 
at  this  time  was  forced  to  order  an  embargo  laid  in  the  Mid- 
dle and  Northern  colonies.'  "I  see  no  other  way,"  he  wrote, 
"of  preventing  those  whose  Sole  Views  seem  to  be  to  get 
Money  without  the  least  regard  for  the  good  of  their  Cf^untry 
from  accomplishing  their  Designs."'  Amherst  took  this 
step  most  reluctantly,  as  it  punished  both  the  innocent  and 
the  guilty ; '  consequently  on  receipt  of  advices  that  a  quantity 
of  provisions  for  the  army  was  coming  from  England,  he 
allowed  the  embargo  to  be  raised,  at  the  same  time  express- 
ing the  hope  that  no  more  attempts  would  be  made  to 
supp:y  the  enemy.*  For  his  activity  in  breaking  up  this 
trade,  Amherst  was  duly  praised  by  the  government.* 

•  B.  T.  N.Y.  36  Oo  67.  Amherst,  May  5,  176s,  to  Fitch;  May  7,  1762,  to 
Hamilton;  same  date  to  Hopkins;  etc.    Am.  and  W.I.  97. 

•Amherst  to  Governor  Hamilton  of  Pennsylvania,  May  7,  1762.    Ibid. 

'  Governor  Bernard  of  Massachusetts  complained  that  the  embargo  entailed 
some  suffering  in  that  colony,  as  fish  could  not  be  sent  to  the  British  West 
Indies,  nor  provisions  to  Quebec  and  Nova  Scotia.  On  May  6,  1 762,  Amherst 
in  reply  wiote  to  Bernard,  that  this  illegal  trade  had  been  carried  on  in  a  most 
systematic  and  wholesale  manner,  and  that  iU  suppression  was  a  matter  of  the 
highest  importance.  He  would  allow  Bernard  to  relax  the  embargo  as  far  as 
Nova  Scotia  was  concerned  provided  that  satisfactory  bonds  were  given.    Ibid. 

•  Amherst,  June  13.  1762,  to  governors  of  Rhode  Isla..  Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  and  Massachusetts.    Ibid. 

•  On  July  10,  1762,  Egremont  wrote  to  him,  that  "the  indefatigable  Pains 
You  have  taken  to  discover  &  trace  out  all  the  Arts  used  to  cover  the  most 
scandalous  ilUcit  Trade,  carried  on  with  the  Enemy,  have  justly  met"  with  high 
approbation.    Am.  and  W.I.  77. 


M 


i1i 


1: 


i 


B    IB  > 

n 

if  ^i\ 

4 1 

It 


ft 

If 

i 


ij 


CHAPTER  VII 

MEANS  ADOPTED  TO  CHECK  THIS  INTERCOURSE  WITH 

THE  ENEMY 

The  chief  instrument  used  to  put  a  stop  to  this  intercourse 
with  the  enemy  was  the  royal  navy.  There  was,  however,  at 
hand  another  effective  weapon.  It  has  already  been  pointed 
out,  that  in  1733  Parliament  had  imposed  virtually  prohibi- 
tive duties  on  foreign  rum,  sugar,  and  molasses  imported  into 
the  British  colonies.  This  law,  generally  known  as  the 
Molasses  Act,  had  never  been  enforced,'  but  as  these  com- 
modities, predominantly  the  two  last,  constituted  the  chief 
returns  from  the  enemy,  it  was  obvious  that  the  duties  thereon 
could  be  used  as  a  potent  check  on  this  trade.  Thus,  William 
Bull,  the  popular  lieutenant-governor  of  South  Carolina,  a 
colonial  by  birth  and  education,  wrote  to  Pitt:  "I  humbly 
offer  it  as  my  Opinion  that,  until  some  new  Laws  are  made  by 
the  Wisdom  of  our  Mother  Country  to  remedy  this  Evil,  If 
the  Duties  upon  Foreign  Spirits,  panels  (sugar)  and  Molasses 
by  6  G  II  were  rigorously  exacted  by  the  Officers  of  His 
Majesty's  Customs,  and  the  Clandestine  Landing  of  them 
discouraged,"  the  effect  would  be  to  stop  this  intercourse 

•  The  fact  that  this  law  was  virtually  a  dead  letter  was  brought  out  clearly 
at  the  detailed  hearing  before  the  Board  of  Trade  in  1750-1751.  B.  T. 
Journals,  58,  Oct.  18,  Nov.  13,  20;  Dec.  6,  7,  10,  in  1750.  Ibid.  59,  pp.  6, 
a»,  57.    Also  in  Am.  and  W.I.  687. 

"4 


MEANS  ADOPTED  TO  CHECK  THIS  INTERCOURSE  115 
with  the  French.'  This  conclusion  was  also  reached  by 
others,'  and  consequently  during  the  war,  the  Molasses 
Act  was  enforced  to  an  extent  unknown  theretofore. 

The  more  effectual  enforcement  of  the  Molasses  Act  can 
be  seen  best  in  the  returns  of  the  revenue  derived  therefrom. 
The  aggregate  amount  of  duties  paid  on  molasses  in  the 
years  from  1734  to  1764  was  ;Ci3,702,  of  which  only  ;C5686 
was  collected  in  the  aventy-two  years  from  1734  to  1755; 
that  is,  at  the  average  rate  of  ;C259-    In  the  seven  years' 

'  Feb.  ,8.  ,761.  Am.  and  W.I.  7,5.  Bull  pointed  out  that  a  large  quantity 
of  molasses  was  smuggled  into  the  Northern  colonies,  and  that  this  fact  would 
become  apparent  if  the  offinal  importations  of  molasses  were  compared  with 

hesis  that  the  laws  of  trade  were  the  underlying  cause  of  the  American  Revolu- 
^on  the  recommendation  is  interesting  as  coming  from  this  source  The 
Molasses  Act.  while  not  an  integral  part  of  the  old  colonial  system,  was  probably 
he  only  trade  law  whose  enforcement  at  this  time  would  have  seriously  inter- 
fcr.  w,ththeeconomicpr«sperityofthecontinentalcolonies.  The  historian  of 
South  Carolma.  McCrady.  accepts  the  statement  in  Joseph  Johnson's  Tra- 
ditions  and  Reminiscences,  that  had  Bull  been  invested  with  supreme  power 
as  governor,  there  might  have  been  no  revolution  in  that  colony.  Thus  we 
reach  the  somewhat  paradoxical  conclusion  that  the  cause  of  a  movement 
was  the  enforcement  of  a  law.  while  the  bestowal  of  further  honors  on  the  man 
recommendmgthisaction  might  haveaverted  the  movement  in  South  Carolina 
McCrady,  South  Carolina  under  the  Royal  Government,  pp.  345,  ,,,  ,^ 

'On  Dec.  ,8. 1 760.  Henry  Moore,  the  lieutenant-governor  of  JamaiiTrote 
to  the  secretary  of  state  enclosing  a  letter  that  he  had  received  fn,m  James 
DeLancey  the  lieutenant-governor  of  New  York.  DeLancey  wrote  that  he 
had  consulted  with  Kennedy,  the  New  York  collector  of  the  customs,  as  to 
the  Monte  Cristi  trade.  Kennedy  said  that  he  could  not  legally  refuse  to  give 
ckaiances  for  that  port,  though  it  was  known  that  the  Spanish  grew  no  sugar 
there  and  that  the  trade  there  was  directly  with  the  French;  but  that  he 
would  t,>-  to  stop  this  trade,  and  with  such  end  in  view  "he  would  make  them 
pay  the  duties  imposed  by  Law  on  foreign  Sugars."    Col.  Corr  Jam    II 


ill 


116 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


I 


4l- 


1756  to  1762,  ;C437S  was  collected,  the  average  being  £625. 
In  1760  and  1761,  when  especial  efforts  were  made  to  stop 
the  trade  with  the  enemy,  the  respective  amounts  were 
£1170  and  ;(Jii8g.' 
This  partial  enforcement  of    the  Molasses  Act  led    to 

'  An  account  of  the  duties  collected  on  Molasses  under  6  Geo.  II;  — 


1756 

»7S7 
>7S8 
1759 
1760 

£»1.^  I4*. 

95    0 

S«0    8 

446  16 

1 1 70    3 

od. 

0 

0 

6 

6 

1761 

I7ft3 

•763 
1764 

Total 

£ll<'0   I'it 
717  iS 

»54«    5 
aioo    1 

0 
C) 
0 

£8016      35. 

bJ. 

Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  Bundle  80.  The  .same  results  can  he 
obtained  from  an  examination  of  the  revenue  from  all  the  duties  under  this 
act.  The  total  payments  for  the  sixteen  years  from  1 73 ?  to  1 740  were  £13,910, 
of  which  £4013  was  collected  in  the  Bahamas  and  the  Bermudas,  and  the  Lai- 
ance  in  the  continental  colonies.  Only  £n66  of  .s  total  amount  was  col- 
lected in  the  five  years  preceding  the  war  of  1730.  During  the  war,  1739  to 
1748,  the  amount  rose  rapidly  for  the  same  reasons  as  in  the  following  war. 
The  average  yearly  amount  collected  for  the  entire  period  was  £826.  .*  ^r  ai  1 
W.I.  687.     Appendices  4  and  5  to  hearing  of  1 750-1 751. 

No  accounts  of  the  exact  amount  collected  in  the  following  years  are  avail- 
able. The  treasury  lx>oks,  however,  give  the  net  and  gross  produce  of  all 
branches  of  the  revenue  under  the  management  of  the  Commissioners  of  the 
Customs.  The  payments  into  the  exchequer  on  account  01  the  act  of  1733 
indicate  clearly  the  great  increase  in  revenue  from  this  source  during  the  wcr 


1758 

£10.742 

176a 

£  430 

>759 

2729 

i7''3 

.^079 

1760 

6398 

1764 

4169 

1761 

US' 

Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  50  and  59. 

These  amounts  are  all  net  payments  into  the  exchequer,  and  do  not  corre- 
spond with  either  the  gross  amounts  or  the  dates  of  the  actunl  collection.  It 
should  also  be  noted  that  in  these  accounts  there  appears  no  item  on  account 
of  the  Mola.sses  Act,  prior  to  1758,  indicating  either  that  the  customs  officials 
in  the  colonies  had  not  fully  accounted  for  the  amounts  collected,  or  that  the 


I 


s 


I 


MEANS  ADOPTED  TO  CHECK  THIS  INTERCOURSE      n; 

considerable  friction,  especially  in  New  York  and  Massa- 
chusetts.   The  West  Indian  trade  was  mainly  carried  on  in 
small  sloops,  which  brought  the  French  products  to  the 
British  continental  colonies.    There  they  were  in  part  con- 
sumed, but  in  the  case  of  sugar  the  bulk  was  again  reex- 
ported in  larger  vessels  better  adapted  to  the  ICuropean 
voyage.     In  New  York,  the  ofTicers  of  the  customs  adhered 
strictly  to  the  letter  of  the  law,  and  insisted  on  the  payment 
of  the  duties  on  the  sugars  thus  trans-shipi)ed.     Their  object 
in  so  doing  was  to  break  up  the  trade  with  the  enemy,  but 
as  the  officials  in  the  neighboring  colonies  pursued  a  dif- 
ferent course,  some  ill-feeling  resulted.' 

Massachusetts  was  not  seriously  implicated  in  the  direct 
trade  with  the  enemy,'  but  was  deeply  interested  in  the 
Monte  Cristi  trade.'  Large  quantities  of  French  West 
Indian  products  were  imported  into  Massachusetts,  where 
the  customs  offi  ials  tried  to  rollcct  the  duties  h-iposed  by 
the  act  of   1733/    In   the  neighljoring  charter  colonies. 

revenue  was  use.l  for  their  salaries.  It  would  seem,  however,  that  in  1758  a 
considerable  j)ortion.  if  not  the  whole,  of  such  arrears  was  remitted  to  EnRJand 
as  the  amount  paid  into  the  exchequer  in  that  vear  is  disproportionately  lar™' 
See  also  Brit.  Mus.  Addit.  MSB.  33030  (Newcastle  Papers  CCC.XLV,  p   1,) 

'  Golden  to  Pitt.  Dec.  27,  ,760,  and  enclosures,  GeorRe  Spencer  to  Am- 
herst,  Nov.  29,  1760;  Augustus  Bradley  to  Amheret.  Dec  5,  1760;  Report 
of  Council  of  New  York.  Dec.  24.  1760.  Am.  and  W.I.  73.  See  also  Wiil- 
lam  Smith's  Histor>-  of  New  York  (cd.  1829),  H,  pp.  286,  287. 

'Bernard  to  Pitt,  Nov.  8,  1760,  and  May  5,  1761. '  Am  and  W.I  71 
and  72.  ' 

•  B.  T.  Mass.  78  LI  67,  68. 

•West  Indian  products  imported  into  Massachusetts:  (B.  T.  Mass.  78 
LI  56.  This  account  was  prepared  for  Governor  Bernard  by  the  provincial 
revenue  officer,  who,  however,  did  not  distinguish  between  British  and  foreign 


i'ii 


i'i 


i 


!! 


ll  i 


^1} 


Ii8 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


Connecticut  and  Rhode  Island,  the  custom-house  officials 
had  but  little  authority,  and  did  virtually  nothing  to  enforce 
the  law.  In  especial,  the  profitable  trade  carried  on  with 
the  enemy  by  Rhode  Island  produced  ill  feeling  and  jealousy 
in  M'vssachusetts,  and  in  1761  led  to  the  attempt  to  declare 
"writs  of  assistance"  illegal,  anr'  to  the  attacks  on  the  Vice- 
Admiralty  Court  by  means  of  the  common  law  courts.  This 
was  an  organized  movement  on  the  part  of  some  Boston 
merchants  to  engage  in  this  trade  as  freely  as  did  their 
fellows  in  the  neighboring  colony.'  One  of  the  men  sup- 
porting these  suits  told  Governor  Bernard  that  they  would 
keep  up  the  agitation  until  the  Ministry  was  forced  to  change 
or  to  repeal  the  Molasses  Act,  and  until  Rhode  Island  and 
Connecticut  were  placed  under  the  same  restraints  as  was 
Massachusetts.* 


products.     It  is  to  be  presumed  that  a  good  part  was  foreign  in  origin. 
Ibid.  78  Ll  38  and  55.) 


See 


Ruy 

: 

SUCAK 

Molasses 

Yeak 

I 

Hogsheads 

Tierces 

Barrels 

6 

Hogshead.^ 

Tierces 

Barrels 
"54 

Hogsheads 

Tierces 

Barrels 

I7SS     • 

1030 

19 

428 

329 

8505 

197 

59 

1756     . 

1056 

42 

10 

617 

146 

613 

9708 

199 

103 

I7S7     • 

196s 

39 

18 

897 

389 

500 

9273 

119 

10 

1758     . 

670 

52 

56 

554 

317 

346 

6172 

85 

93 

1 759     • 

1 143 

33 

89 

1075 

281 

302 

1      6633 

249 

13 

1760     . 

103s 

29 

33 

983 

114 

201 

7614 

127 

96 

1 761 

2187 

49 

16 

1329 

I2I0 

268 

9918 

266 

32 

176a 

1242 

49 

45 

2298 

207 

28s 

11,062 

48S 

59 

'  Bernard  to  Halifax,  Oct.  25  and  Dec.  34,  1763.    Am.  and  W.I.  167. 
'  B.  T.  Mass.  78  Ll  21.     Bernard  wrote:  "In  regard  to  both  these  pt)' 
if  they  were  sollicited  in  another  Manner,  there  would  be  much  to  be  saii 


MEANS  ADOPTED  TO  CHECK   THIS   INTERCOURSE     ,19 

In  this  attempt   there  were  instituted  frequent  actions 
at  common   law  concernir     h..sine.ss  determined   in  the 
Vice-Admiralty  Court,  and    by  th.  ..   stom-house  officials 
In    1761,    when    Bern d    sent    thi ,    information    to   the 
Board    of   Trade,    there    ^.'.re    .five   suits   of   this  nature 
before  the  courts.'    Three  of  these  actions  were  instituted 
by  Barons,  the  collector  at  Boston,  who  had   been  sus- 
pended by  the  Surveyor-  General  of  the  Customs.     Obviously 
the    entire   imperial    administrative    system    was    threat- 
ened, if  the  provincial  courts,  in  v-hich  the  juries  were  ex- 
tremely prejudiced,  admitted  actions  for  damages  brought 
by  a  dismissed  official  against    his  siiperior.='    These   three 
actions,  however,  were  ultimately  not    brought  to  trial.' 
Another  case  arose  from  the  fact  that  the  Molasses  Act 
prov-ded  that  the  Crown's  share  of  all  forfeitures  under  this 
statute  should  go  to  the  colony  in  which  the  seizure  was  con- 
demned.   The  expenses  of  these  trials  were  very  heavy, 
and  in  a  number  of  instances  they  were  charged  by  the 
Vice-Admiralty  Court  on  the  colony's  share,  because   if 
charged  on  those  of  the  governor  and  of  the  customs  officials, 

their  behalf."    According  ,0  Bernard,  this  agitation  was  confined  to  Boston, 
the  Assembly  as  a  whole  not  approvine  of  it 
'  Ibid. 

'  Barons  had  Lechmere,  the  Surveyor-General  of  the  Northern  district  ar- 
rested m  an  acfon  for  £7500  damages,  .nd  the  court  held  Lechmere  on  bail 
Ibul.  and  LI  «.  Barons  also  sued  Cradock.  who  had  been  appointed  to  the 
formers  pos.t.on  during  his  suspension,  pending  the  decision  of  the  Com- 
n>-ss,oner.  of  the  Customs.  /6«f.  and  LI  a^.  He  likewise  brought  an  action 
agamst  another  customs  official,  Paxton,  whose  complaints  to  Lechme,^  had 
led  to  his  suspension.  Ibid,  and  LI  34. 
'  Quincy,  op.  cit.  p.  425. 


II  ^^ 

f 


130 


BRITISH   COLONIAL  POLICY,    1754-1765 


SO  little  would  remain  to  them,  that  there  would  be  but  slight 
encouragement  to  make  seizures.  Massachusetts  sued  in  the 
provincial  courts  for  the  recovery  of  these  charges,  but  was 
unsuccessful.'  Of  these  cases,  the  most  important  was  that 
of  Erwing^  vs.  Cradock.  The  latter,  one  of  the  custom- 
house oflicials,  had  seized  a  vessel  belonging  to  Erwing  on 
the  ground  of  contraband  trade.  Erwing  admitted  the 
truth  of  the  charge,  and  prayed  for  leave  to  compound,  that 
is,  for  the  release  of  the  seizure  on  payment  of  one-half  of  its 
value.  The  Vice- Admiralty  Court  assented  to  his  petition, 
and,  on  payment  of  ;^5oo,  Erwing  secured  his  vessel.  He 
then  brought  suit  against  Cradock  in  the  common  law  courts, 
and  was  awarded  nearly  £600  damages.  An  appeal  was 
naturally  taken  from  this  verdict.  If  upheld,  Bernard  wrote 
to  the  Board  of  Trade:  "It  will  be  concluded  that  whatever 
Sum  a  Man  pays  into  the  Court  01  Admiralty,  tho'  decreed 

'  Bernard  pointed  out  that  if  this  suit  were  successful,  it  followed  that 
money  paid  in  pur^jance  of  a  decree  of  the  Admiralty  Court,  from  which  no 
appeal  had  been  taken,  could  be  recovered  in  a  court  of  common  law  by  per- 
sons not  parties  to  the  suit.  B.  T.  Mass.  78  LI  21.  There  were  two  suits, 
of  this  nature,  Gray  vs.  Paxton,  and  Province  of  Massachusetts  vs.  Paxton. 
Bernard  referred  to  the  former.  In  both  cases,  the  Superior  Court  of  Massa- 
chusetts, on  appeal,  reversed  the  decision  of  the  inferior  court  in  favor  of  the 
plaintiff.  Quincy,  op.  cil.  pp.  541  to  552.  At  the  same  time,  a  similar  suit 
was  pending  in  Rhode  Island,  where  one  of  the  common  law  judges  issued  a 
writ  of  prohibition  against  a  decree  of  the  Admiralty  Court.  John  Andrews, 
the  V'ice-.Admiralty  Judge  in  that  colony,  declared  that,  as  a  result  of  this  in- 
terference, "all  proceedings  of  said  vice  admiralty  court,  not  only  in  this,  but 
in  all  other  causes,  have  been  stopped,  although  there  are  now  causes  of  great 
consequence  pending  before  said  vice  admiralty  court,  unfinished."  Col.  Rec. 
of  R.I.  VL  J..  371. 

'OrErving.  He  was  closely  related  by  marriage  to  Shirley.  Nova  Scotia 
Arch.  (Halifax,  1S69),  P-  399- 


MEANS  A  .OPTED   TO  CHECK   THIS  INTERCOURSE     121 

in  pursuance  of  his  own  petition,  may  be  recovered  again 
at  common  Law  with  damages.    The  Consequences  of 
this  in  regard  to  the  Execution  of  the  Laws  of  Trade  are 
obvious."    If    Erwing    were    successful,    Bernard    added, 
a  large  number  of  similar  actions  would  be  brought,  and 
their  general  effect  would  be  to  destroy  the  Vice-Admiralty 
Court.'    On  appeal,  this  case  came  before  the  Massac^^u- 
setts  Superior  Court.     In  summing  up,  the  judges  were  all 
of  the  opinion   that   while   Cradock,  by  means  of  some 
irregularity,  might  have  been  guilty  of  trespass,  yet  it  was 
wholly  purged  by  the  composition  confirmed  by  the  Court 
of  Admiralty,  "the  decrees  of  which  were  of  equal  force 
with  a  Judgement  at  Common  Law.     It  was  urged  by  the 
Chief  Justice  that  the  Court  of  Admiralty  was  part  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  Province,  it  being  expressly  provided 
for  by  the  Charter."    Consequently,  the  jury  was  strongly 
charged  by  the  court  to  find  for  the  defendant,  yet  they 
brought  in  a  verdict  of  over  ;^55o  for  Enving.^    As  Bernaru 
said  in  this  connection,  a  custom-house  official  had  no  chance 
with  a  jury.     From  this  judgment  an  appeal  was  taken  to 
England;   before  it  was  decided,  however,  the  matter  was 
settled  in  the  colony  itself  in  a  manner  upholding  the  au- 
thority of  the  Vice-Admiralty  Court.' 

•  B.  T.  Mass.  78  LI  21. 

'  Ibid.  U  J5.    £740  Massachusetts  currency,  which  was  equal  to  about  /ece 
sterling.    Quincy,  op.  cil.  pp.  553-556. 

'  Bernard  advised  the  British  government  to  assume  the  expense  of  these 

'Z^\  ^'  '^-  ^'^-  ^^  ^'  "■  '^^''  '•''^  '^''"^  '"  "'^  '^^  °f  this  appeal. 
md.U.  67  and  Quincy,  op.  cil.  p.  557.  On  March  25, 1762,  E.wingacknowl- 
edged  on  the  record  of  the  Superior  Court  that  he  had  received  "full  satis- 


i 


'•  V 


.''I 


122 


BRITISH   COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


^1 


Closely  connected  with  this  attack  on  the  Vice-Admiralty 
Court,*  and  proceeding  from  similar  motives,  was  the  at- 
tempt made  at  the  same  time  to  have  "writs  of  assistance" 
declared  illegal.  These  writs  were  used  by  the  officers  of 
the  customs  chiefly  to  prevent  the  illegal  importation  of 
French  products,  the  returns  of  the  intercourse  with  the 
enemy.  The  English  statutes  regarding  frauds  in  the  customs 
gave  the  revenue  officers  e.xtensive  p)ovvers  of  search,'  which 
were  subsequently  extended  to  the  officers  in  the  colonies.* 
On  the  strength  of  their  commissions,  these  officers  were  ac- 
customed to  enter,  by  force  if  necessary,  warehouses  and 
other  places  on  information  that  contraband  goods  were 
concealed  therein.*  Massachusetts  was  also  accustomed 
to  grant  similar  extensive  powers  of  search  to  the  provincial 
revenue  officers."  Some  opposition  to  this  broad  right  of 
search  developed,  for  the  system  was  unquestionably  open 
to  legitimate  criticism.  Accordingly,  in  1 756,  Massachusetts 
limited  the  powers  of  the  provincial  officers.'    On  the  other 

faction  of  this  Judgment."  Ibid.  pp.  553-556.  It  appears,  however,  from 
Bernard's  letter  to  Lord  Harrington,  Feb.  27,  1762,  that  Erwing  discharged 
this  judgment  to  prevent  his  answering  the  appeal,  so  that,  as  Bernard  wrote, 
"the  King's  authcrity  is  now  triumphant  in  every  instance."    Ibid.  p.  557. 

'  The  same  people  supported  this  movement  and  the  action  Gray  vs. 
Paxton.    Quincy,  op.  cil.  pp.  541-547. 

'  12  Ch.  II,  c.  19;  13  and  14  Ch.  II,  c.  11  §  v;  i  Anne  stat.  i,  c.  13  §  ii; 
9  Anne  c.  6,  J  ii ;  3  Geo.  I,  c.  7. 

'  7  and  8  Will.  Ill,  c.  22  §  vi.  *  Hutchinson,  Mass.  Ill,  p.  92. 

•  Such  officers  were  empowered  to  search  in  all  suspected  places  for  goods 
on  which  the  Massachusetts  duties  had  not  been  paid.  B.  T.  Mass.  73  Gg  37. 
See  Mass.  Acts  and  Resolves,  III,  pp.  471,  522,  581,  622,  701,  762,  845. 

'  Application  had  to  be  made  to  a  jastice  of  the  peace  for  a  special  search 
warrant.    Ibid.  Ill,  p.  1006.    For  subsequent  years,  see  IV,  pp.  186,  303,  411. 


MEANS  ADOPTED  TO  CHECK  THIS  INTERCOURSE 


123 


hand,  the  British  customs  officials  began,  at  about  the 
same  time,  to  apply  to  the  governor  for  general  warrants 
further  to  strengthen  the  authority  derived  from  their  com- 
missions. These  warrants  were  technically  known  as  "writs 
of  assistance,"  and  had  not  been  used  in  the  colo  .ies  prior 
to  this.*  Shirley  used  such  warrants  in  1755  to  prevent  the 
exportation  of  provisions  to  the  French  in  Cape  Breton  and 
Canada.^  They  were  subsequently  during  the  war,  and  to 
a  great  extent  as  a  war-measure,  issued  quite  frequently  , 
by  the  Superior  Court  of  Massachusetts.'  In  1761  the 
legality  of  these  writs  was  questioned,  but  the  justices  of 
this  court  "were  unanimously  of  Opinion  that  this  Writ 
might  be  granted."  * 

The  serious  friction  between  the  British  custom-house 
officials  in  the  colony  and  Massachusetts  dates  from  this 
period,  and  was  a  direct  result  of  the  stricter  enforcement 
of  the  Molasses  Act  with  the  object  of  checking  the  trade 
with  the  enemy.  This  trade  of  the  colonies  called  attention 
to  illegal  trade  in  general,  with  which  it  was  intimately 
associated.  Thus,  in  his  circular  despatch  of  August  23, 
1760,  Pitt  wrote  that  it  further  appears  that  large  sums  of 
money  are  sent  to  the  enemy,  in  return  for  which  commodities 
are  taken  that  interfere  with  "the  Produce  of  the  British 
Colonies  themselves,  in  open  Contempt  of  the  Authority  of 
the  Mother  Country,  as  well  as  to  the  most  manifest  Prejudice 
of  the  Manufactures  and  trade  of  Great  Britain." "    The 

•  Quincy,  op.  cit.  pp.  51,  52.  1  ji^d.  pp.  401-406. 

'Ibid.  p.  401.  «  Paxton's  Case.    Ibid.  p.  57. 

•Am.  and  W.I.  78. 


U 


J  i 


u 


f  ( 


I    ! 


124 


BRITISH   COLONIAL  POLICY,   1734-1765 


* 

h- 


(I 


'is 


■■-■ 

i 


I 


instructions  to  break  up  this  trade  led  necessarily  to  a  stricter 
enforcement  of  the  entire  commercial  system.'  There  was 
a  tendency  to  bulk  together  in  one  category  all  violations  of 
these  laws,  and  to  include  therein  those  pertaining  to  trading 
with  the  enemy.^  The  chief  evasions  were  connected  with 
the  Molasses  Act;  but  in  addition  it  became  apparent  that 
the  trade  with  the  enemy  was  also  to  some  extent  connected 
with  the  direct  importation  of  European  goods  from  foreign 
countries.  During  the  war,  colonial  ships  frequently  carried 
French  colonial  products  to  European  markets,  whence  there 
was  some  temptation  to  import  prohibited  goods.'  One 
of  the  Massachusetts  law-suits  in  1761  arose  directly  from  a 
violation  of  the  act  making  Great  Britain  the  colonial  staple 
for  European  goods.*  Information  was  also  received  that 
this  law  was  not  strictly  obeyed  in  other  colonics,  especially 
in  Xcw  York.*    It  naturally  followed  that  the  method  found 

'  Cf.  B.  T.  So.  Ca.  20  M  103. 

'See  Governor  Dalrvmple  to  Pitt,  July  15,  1761,  in  answer  to  the  circular 
despatch  of  August  23,  1760,  with  details  of  illegal  trade  hetween  Guadeloupe 
and  Martinique.  Am.  and  W.I.  100.  Cf.  al.so  same  to  Egremont,  Feb.  16, 
1762.  Ihid.  loi.  On  Nov.  9,  1758,  and  Jan.  17,  1759,  the  Board  of 
Trade  considered  i..e  entire  subject  of  illegal  trade  in  the  colonies,  and 
prepared  a  letter  to  the  customs  board  on  this  subject.     B.  T.  Journals  66, 67. 

'  Cf.  N.  J.  Col.  Doc.  IX,  pp.  300-302. 

♦  Erwing  vs.  Craddock.  Quincy,  op.  cit.  p.  554.  The  statute  that  was 
violated  was  15  Ch.  II,  c.  7. 

•  In  1757  such  a  complaint  was  lodged  with  the  Board  of  Trade.  B.  T. 
Journals,  April  27,  1757.  The  inform- tion  was  contained  in  a  letter  from 
Ireland  to  the  Earl  of  Halifax,  and  was  to  the  effect  that  in  Philadelphia 
"there  was  a  very  Considerable  Import  &  Export  of  Goods  to  &  from  Europe 
&  all  other  European  Settlements  in  America."  The  informant  gave  spe- 
cific details  about  two  vessels  owned  in  Ireland,  which  were  accustomed  to 
sail  to  France  where  they  took  in  cargoes  of  sugar,  and  of  French  and  Eas; 


'I 


MEANS  ADOPTED  TO  CHECK   THIS   INTERCOURSE     125 

successful  in  checking  one  branch  of  this  trade  would  be 
used  to  cope  with  the  other  as  well.    The  comparative  success 
of  the  navy  in  preventing  trade  with  the  enemy  naturally 
suggested  the  use  of  the  same  instrument  to  check  smuggling 
in  general.     After  the  peace  of  1763  this  became  a  marked 
feature  of  the  administrative  reforms  inaugurated  at  that 
tiiTie.    But  as  early  as  1757  DeLanccy  suggested  the  em- 
ployment of  ships  to  prevent  the  direct  importation  of  foreign 
European  and  Asiatic  products  into  New  York,'  and  in  the 
following  year  a  vessel  engaged  in  this  illegal  trade  was 
seized  by  a  ship  of  the  royal  navy.* 

Thus  the  intercourse  with  the  enemy  directed  the  attention 
of  the  British  government  to  the  broader  subject  of  illegal 
trade  in  general,  and  led  to  a  stricter  enforcement  of  the 
laws  of  trade,  especially  of  the  Molasses  Act,  which  was  the 
statute  chiefly  violated.  The  experience  gained  in  breaking 
up  this  trade  also  suggested  the  use  of  the  navy  as  a  normal 
instrument  in  the  administration  of  the  commercial  system. 
At  the  same  time  it  revealed  radical  defects  in  the  adminis- 
trative methods.    As  has  already  been  pointed  out,  this  trade 

Indian  goods  for  Philadelphia.  The  sugar,  which  was  evidently  the  main 
cargo,  was  repacked  after  being  smuggled  into  the  colony,  and  was  then 
resh.pped  to  England  as  British  sugar.  B.  T.  Com.  Series  I,  45  Ff  44.  In 
the  same  year,  Sir  Charies  Hardy  informed  the  Board  of  Trade  that  tea,  can- 
vas, gunpowder,  as  well  as  other  articles  were  imported  in  New  Vork  directly 
from  Holland.  On  his  breaking  up  this  trade,  it  was  carried  on  via  Connec- 
ticut. B.  T.  N.Y.  34  Mm  13.  Similar  information  came  from  DeLanccy 
in  this  and  in  the  following  year.  Ibid.  34  Mm  14,  40. 
•  B.  T.  N.Y.  34  Mm  14. 

'  Ibid.  42.    The  officers  of  the  customs  agreed  to  give  up  their  share  of  the 
seizure. 


i 


126 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1734-1765 


was  to  some  extent  carried  on  with  the  connivance  of  British 
officials,  who  provided  fraudulent  papers  for  the  colonial 
vessels.  At  the  same  time  these  officials  were  deterred  from 
doing  their  duty  by  the  damage  suits  instituted  against  them 
in  hostile  courts.  The  necessity  of  a  reform  of  the  customs 
service  in  the  colonics  was  thus  made  patent.  Similarly, 
defects  were  revealed  in  the  system  of  vice-admiralty  courts. 
Some  of  these  courts  were  strongly  influenced  by  local 
feeling  and  refused  to  condemn  vessels  for  trading  with 
the  enemy.  Thus  the  Vice-Admiralty  Court  in  South  Caro- 
lina, it  was  said  in  1762,  would  not  condemn  a  vessel  for 
trading  with  the  enemy,  though  the  evidence  was  clear  on 
the  point  at  issue.'  Furthermore  it  was  claimed  that  both 
the  common  law  and  admiralty  courts  at  New  York  were 
prejudiced  in  favor  of  this  trade.*  The  Vice- Admiralty 
Court  at  New  York,  on  a  pure  technicality,  dismissed  a  suit 
arising  out  of  a  violation  of  the  act  of  1757,  claiming  that 
it  had  no  jurisdiction.'  In  addition  James  Hamilton,  the  gov- 
ernor of  Pennsylvania,  reportal  to  Pitt  in  1760  *  that  the  most 
eminent  lawyers  in  his  government  were  retained  in  favor 

'  Peter  Blake  to  Egremont,  Charleston,  Nov.  27,  1762.  Am.  and  W.L  223. 
William  Bull  wrote  to  Pitt,  Feb.  18,  1761,  that  the  courts  would  not  condemn 
vessels  coming  from  Spanish  ports  with  French  produce.    Am.  and  W  L  73. 

'  George  Spencer  to  Amherst,  Nov.  29,  1760.    Am.  and  W.I.  73  and  95. 

'  George  Spencer  to  Amherst,  Dec.  17,  1760.  Am.  and  W.I.  95.  The  act 
of  '757.  30  Geo.  II,  c.  9,  says  that  the  penalties  shall  l)e  recovered  "in  the  high 
court  of  admiralty,  or  any  chief  court  of  civil  or  criminal  juridisction,  in  such 
respective  colonies  or  plantations."  The  judge  dismissed  the  case  on  the 
ground  that  the  New  York  court  was  one  of  vice-adm,iralty  and  not  a  high 
court  of  admiralty. 

*  Nov.  1, 1760.    Am.  and  W.I.  7a, 


iilif 


fi 


MEANS  ADOPTED  TO  CHECK   THIS  INTERCO'JRSE      ,27 

of  this  <' unjustifiable  Commerce,"  that  the  Admiralty  Judge 
had  decreed  in  its  favor  in  two  instances,  the  Court  holding 
that  the  title  of  the  goods  had  passed  from  the  French 
before  their  seizure,  and  that  no  act  of  Parliament  existed 
makmg  such  goods  lawful   prize.     As  a  result  of  these 
decisions,  several  "flags  of  truce,"  laden  with  French  prod- 
uce, taken  by  British  cruisers  and  brought  to  Philadelphia 
were  liberatal  by  the  captors,  as  they  saw  that  it  was  im' 
possible  to  procure  their  condemnation.    In  the  Bahamas 
Shirley  was  forced  to  remove  Samuel  Gambicr-his  own 
appointee  during  a  vacancy -from  the  position  of  Judge 
of  the  Vice-Admiralty  Court.     Gambler  encouraged   the 
trade,  was  himself  engaged  in  it,  and  had  in  fact  originally 
come   to   New   Providence  under  a   retainer  from   some 
Philadelphia  merchants  to  aid  in  securing  the  release  of 
such  vessels  as  might   be  brought   there  as  prizes     He 
maintained  that  the  trade  was  legal  until  Parliament  had  leg- 
islated against  it,  and  that  the  Crown's  declaration  of  war 
was  not  sufTicient  for  this  purpose.'    It  was  inevitable  that 
on  the  return  of  peace,  the  British  government  would  try 
to  remedy  some  of  these  patent  evils. 

This  trade  of  the  colonics  revealed  the  loose  character 
of  the  Empire's  organization  and  the  inadequacy  of  the 
organs  of  imperial  control.  The  intercourse  with  the 
enemy  was  never  entirely  suppressed.  To  a  great  extent 
It  frustrated  the  policy  of  the  British  government,  and 

act  ofxTcf!!"^^  '  \^  '"'^ ' '"  ''■    ^"  '''^'^'*""'  ^^'"^'"  ^l^'-^d  that  the 
g.ve  men-of-war  or  pnvateers  any  authority  to  make  seizures 


1/ 


128 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1734-176$ 


prolonged  the  war;  it  aroused  intense  indignation  and  was 
unquestionably  a  potent  factor  in  the  subsequent  alienation. 
British  statesmen,  administrators,  admirals,  and  generals 
condemned  these  practices  in  unqualified  terms.'  William 
Bull,  a  South  Carolinian  by  birth  and  education,  who  en- 
joyed to  the  full  the  confidence  of  his  native  colony,  went 
further  and  thought  those  engaged  in  this  trade  guilty  of 
treason. =*  In  the  colonies,  on  the  other  hand,  the  wholesale 
seizure  of  the  vessels  trading  with  the  enemy  was  bitterly 
resented.  It  was  said  that  some  merchants  in  New  York 
had  been  entirely  ruined  in  consequence.' 

The  West  Indian  trade  was  to  a  great  extent  the  basis  of 
industry  in  the  northern  continental  colonies.  These  colo- 
nics produced  a  i  .rge  surplus  quantity  of  lumber,  fish,  and 
provisions,  which  greatly  exceeded  the  requirements  of  the 
British  West  Indies.  At  the  same  time,  those  British  colo- 
nies could  not  furnish  an  adequate  supply  of  molasses. 
Molasses,  especially  when  distilled  into  rum,  was  absolutely 

'  On  May  30,  1761,  Joseph  Sherwood,  the  agent  of  Rhode  Island,  wrote  to 
Governor  Hopkins:  "Some  of  our  Leading  Men  have  taken  great  Disgast  at 
the  Trade  with  the  French  ment*.  in  thy  Letter  and  said  to  be  carried  on  by 
the  Northern  Colonies."  Correspondence  of  the  Colonial  Governors  of  Rhode 
Island  (ed.  G.  S.  Kimball),  II,  p.  320. 

'On  Feb.  18,  1761,  Bull  wrote  to  Pitt  to  the  effect  that  a  vessel  had  been 
seized  for  trading  at  Monte  Cristi,  but  that  the  evidence  was  not  sufficient  to 
convict  "either  of  High  Treason  or  any  illicit  Trade;  For  I  had  determined  if 
there  had  Ix-en  sufficient  Evidence  of  their  having  supplied  His  Majesty's 
Ennemies  with  any  Aid  within  the  Statute  of  the  25th.  of  Edward  the  3"?,  to 
have  sent  tl.  »  Prisoners  to  Great  Britain,  in  order  to  receive  their  Tryal  for 
that  Offence  in  Westminster  Hall."  Am.  and  W.I.  73;  Pitt  Correspondence 
II>  P-  395-    The  reference  is  to  the  Statute  of  Treasons  of  135a. 

•  Colden  to  Pitt,  Oct.  27,  1760.    Am.  and  W.I.  72. 


j  I 


MEANS  ADOPTED  TO  CHECK  THIS  INTERCOURSE   129 

essential  for  the  fisheries,  the  Indian  trade,  and  the  Rhode 
Island  slave-trade,  on  which  in  varying  degrees  the  pros- 
perity of  North  America  depended.     In  ultimate  analysis,  it 
was  the  ^^'est  Indian   trade  that  enabled   the  continental 
colonies   .0   pay  for   the   British   manufactures   that  they 
imported.'    As  Governor  Stephen  Hopkins  of  Rhode  Island 
wrote,'  a  cessation  of  this  trade  would  revolutionize  in- 
dustry in  the  colonies;   "compelled   by  Necessity,   (they) 
must  set  about  making  those  Things  they  cannot  live  with- 
out."   In  normal  times  it  was  undoubtedly  a  wise  policy 
to  leave  this  West  Indian  trade  free  and  unrestricted.     Such 
it  had  virtually  been  prior  to  the  war,  as  the  Molasses  Act 
was  all  but  a  dead  letter. 

Obviously  the  total  cessation  of  this  trade  on  the  outbreak 
of  war  would  have  created  some  distress  in  the  North  Ameri- 
can colonies.  Though  the  French  colonies  were  dependent 
upon  them  for  their  food-stuffs,  they  in  turn  relied  on  this 
market  for  their  surplus  produce.  Economic  dependence  is 
usually  mutual ;  the  seller  is,  as  a  rule,  as  much  distressed 
by  the  want  of  a  market  as  is  the  purchaser  by  a  lack  of 
supplies.'  On  the  other  hand,  conditions  were  created  by 
the  war  itself,  which  to  a  great  extent  would  have  compen- 

•  Golden  to  Pitt,  Dec.  27,  1760.    Am.  and  W.I.  73. 

'  Dec.  20,  1760  to  Pitt.     Ibid. 

'  It  would  appear  that  the  current  popular  notion  alx,ut  the  military  weakness 
of  agnculturally  non-selfsupporting  nations  should  l.e  somewhat  modified  by 
the  experiences  during  these  years.  Though  Great  Britain  was  supreme  at 
sea,  the  French  st.ll  managed  to  get  provisions,  and  though  at  times  there  was  a 
scarcity,  this  economic  dependence  does  not  seem  to  have  l.een  a  decisive  mili- 
tary factor. 


m 


a 


130 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


sated  for  this  deprivation  of  the  normal  market.    The  large 
body  of  tnmps  collected  in  America,  and  the  presence  of  the 
ships  of  the  navy  created  an  unusually  heavy  demand  for  the 
products  of  the  continental  colonies.     In  addition,  Guade- 
loupe, one  of  tlic  richest  of  the  French  colonics,  was  captured 
in  1759,  and  afforded  a  valuable  and  rapidly  growing  mar- 
ket.   Thus  during  the  war  access  to  the  French  West  Indies 
was  by  no  means  so  essential  as  in  normal    times.    An 
absolutely  rigid  enforcement  of  British  law  would  have  pro- 
duced some  hardship,  possibly  even  to  an  e.xtent  out  of  propor- 
tion to  the  resultant  advantages.    There  is,  however,  a  mean 
between  absolute  non-intercourse  and  the  systematic  and 
wholesale  supply  of  the  enemy  with  stores.     It  was  the  ex- 
tensive nature  of  the  trade  that  aroused  indignation.    While 
the  French  W\'st  Indies  were  well  supplied,  there  was  at 
times  scarcity  in  the  neighboring  British  colonies.    It  was 
I  especially  galling  to  the  Commander-in-Chief  to  fmd  that 
the  colonies,  which  he  was  sent  to  protect,  were  selling  to 
the  enemy  provisions  that  his  army  needed,  and  for  which 
in  consequence  exorbitant  prices  had  to  be  paid.    Similarly, 
the  naval  commanders  were  bitter  against  a  trade  which 
prolonged  the  resistance  of  the  French  and  enabled  them 
to  fit  out  their  ships.    The  trade  was  carried  on  so  immod- 
erately that  it  brought  considerable  wealth  to  the  colonial 
merchants  engaged  in  it.      Burnaby,  an  English  traveller 
who  was  in  America  during  the  war,  reported  that  New 
York  had  "acquired  great  riches"  in  this  manner.' 
The  immoderate  extent  of  this  trade  was  due  to  the  temp- 

'  Burnahy,  TraveU  (ed.  R.  R.  Wilson),  p.  1,8;  r/  pp.  128,  129  n. 


MLANS    ADOPTED   TO  CHECK  THIS  INTERCOURSE     131 
tations  ofTercd  by  the  large  profits,  together  with  the  absence 
of  a  strong  imperial  sentiment  to  counteract  the  promptings 
of  self  interest.     As  was  said  at  the  time.'  in  connection 
with  these  practices  in  Jamaica  and  in  the  North  American 
colonies:   "Here  it  is  an  Island  Interest.     There  it  is  the 
Interest  of  the  Colonics;    What  opposes  this  Interest  is,  of 
all  other  Things  the  most  obnoxious  to  them.  For  the  I'ublic 
or  National  Interest  is  out  of  the  Question  with  l>,th."     At 
the  outset  the  continental  colonies  suj)i)orted  this  jwlicy 
of  non-intercourse-,  as  their  own  immediate  interests  were 
concretely  involved  in  repelling  the  French  advance.     In 
1758  the  tide  turned,  and  in  the  following  year,  with  the  fall 
of  QueUc.  the  i)ower  of  France  on  the  continent  was  broken. 
It  is  signiikant  that  this  trade  with  the  enemy  reached  its 
high  mark  in  1760,  when  France  was  no  longer  a  source  of 
danger  to  the  continental  colonies.     In  the  eyes  of  the  British 
government,  then  under  the  guidance  of  the  great  imperialist 
Pitt,  France  was  the  enemy,  whether  in  India,  Africa,  Germany, 
North  America,  or  the  West  Indies.     It  would  seem,  that  to 
many  in  the  colonies.  France  on  the  continent  of  America 
was  the    reeminent  source  of  danger,  but  that  France  in  the 
West  Ino--^  arai-  mertiy  an  unfailing  source  of  wealth.     The 
marked  -Trm-nEriiiisin  of  the  colonies  blinded  them  to  the  fact 
ihat  airr  ^arnorr  jn^en  to  France  in  the  Caribbean  strength- 
ened ne-  in  Cisada      What  was  in  its  essence  a  world-wide 
snisrk^  :^xv^ssr  Great  Britain  and  France  —  between  two 
(S^m-  TDi^  .H    crrilization  —  contracted   in   the   narrow 
^^<m   n  tfe  roiorsKS  to  the  dimensions  of  a  local  conflict. 

'  First  Aananal  m  Beimes  to  Pin.  Jan.  4,  1761.     Co!!.  Corr.  Jam.  II. 


,    ! 


2  ._ 


CHAPTER   VIII 

TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION 

The  course  of  events  during  the  Seven  Years'  War,  and 
the  terms  of  the  treaty  that  restored  peace  in  1763  are  typi- 
cally characteristic  of  Great  Britain,  whose  wars,  as  a  rule, 
are  marked  at  the  outset  by  unreadiness,  and  at  the  conclu- 
sion by  an  inadequate  treaty.'    Toward  the  end  of  the  con- 
flict, British  arms  were  successful  in  all  parts  of  the  world. 
Canada  and  all  the  French  West  Indies,  except  Santo  Do- 
mingo, the  richest  of  French  colonies,  were  in  English  hands. 
Havana,  the  key  of  the  West  Indies,  had  been  taken,  and  so 
had  Manila  in  the  Far  East.     In  East  India,  the  power  of 
France  had  been  crushed ;  and  in  West  Africa,  Senegal  and 
Goree  were  under  the  British  flag.    Under  these  conditions, 
England  had  to  some  extent  a  choice  as  to  the  direction  of 
her  future  expansion  in  America.      In  1762  seemingly  any 
terms  could  have  been  exacted,  but  George  III  and  Bute 
were  anxious  to  have  the  war  off  their  hands  in  order 
to  break  the  power  of  the  great  Whig  houses,  and  conse- 
quently the  treaty  of  peace  was  inadequate  in  many  points. 
In  1 761,  when  Pitt  was  still  at  the  helm,  and  was  nego- 
tiating terms  of  peace  with  France,  the  position  of  England 

'  "It  is  an  old  Observation,  that  we  have  generally  lost  by  our  Heads  what 
we  acquired  by  our  Swords."  The  Advantages  of  the  Difinitive  Treatv  (Lon- 
don, 1 749),  p.  3 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION       ,33 
was  not  so  strong.    Spain  was  then  only  an  unfriendly 
neutral,  not  a  belligerent,  and   though  Guadeloupe  and 
Dommica  had  been  taken,  Martinique  was  still  in  French 
hands.    Pitt  recognized  that  he  could  not  retain  all  the 
English  conquests,  and  the  question  then  came  up  for  de- 
cision, whether  England  should  retain  all  Canada,  or  should 
keep  Guadeloupe  instead.    On  this  point  there  was  a  most 
active  and  interesting  discussion,  which  revealed  an  impor- 
tant  change  in  the  economic  theory  of  colonization 

Theory  and  policy  are  the  direct  result  of  fundamental 
«>c.al  conditions.     The  present  colonial  policy  of  Great 
Britain  is  largely  based  on  the  avowed  desirability  of  find- 
ing homes  within  the  Empire  for  British  subjects,  -  "  breath- 
>ng  spaces"  for  an  expanding  population,  whose  offshoots 
would  otherwise  be  lost  to  the  flag.    This  idea  was  alien  to 
the  spirit  of  the  old  Empire.    The  eighteenth  century  colo- 
nies were  not  looked  upon  as  homes  for  a  surplus  population 
simply  because  England  was  not  overpopulated.    The  small 
population  of  Great  Britain  in  comparison  with  that  of  her 
nval,  France,  emphasized  the  need  for  an  increase  in  num- 
bers.   Hence,  emigration  was  not  encouraged,  and  there 
was  no  surer  way  to  condemn  a  colony  than  to  show  that  it 
tended  to  diminish  the  population  of  the  mother  country.' 

•See,  e.g..  Political  Considerations  (2d  ed.  London,  1762),  p   „     This 
pamphlets  attributed  to  Ja.es  Mamott.     In  the  ca«s  ^f  Georgfa  ad  NovT 

sClttSnT'''"'^  """^'^'^^  '"'"^  ''P'-^'''-'  ••'-«''•"  ^'^    - 
on  the  ™n  P^'  ;""'7'=  ™''"^«  ^^'  >'«'  a  factor,  naturally  mon.  so.  however 

general  m  all  the  coIon.es.  sped.!  efforts  were  made  to  build  up  their  population 


f 


f« 


134 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


Consequently  colonies  were  esteemed  in  the  main  solely 
for  commercial  purposes.    The  ideal  colony  was  that  which 
furnished  commodities  which  Great  Britain  could  not  her- 
self produce,  and  which  did  not  in  any  way  compete  with 
the  industry  of  the  mother  country.*    In  their  economic 
pursuits,  mother  country  and  colony  were  to  be  mutually 
complementary;   the  aim  was  to  create  self-sufficient  com- 
mercial Empire,  which,  while  independent  of  competing 
European  powers,  would  be  able  to  make  them  economically 
dependent  on  it.    To  this  ideal  type  of  colony,  the  West 
Indies  conformed  more  closely  than  did  the  continental 
colonies,  with  the  exception  of  Georgia,  South  Carolina. 
Virginia,  and    Maryland.    Newfoundland    was   merely   a 
fishing  establishment,  and  was  highly  esteemed  on  account 
of  the  fishery,  which  was  a  nursery  of  seamen,  and  hence  a 
source  of  naval  strength.    The  North  American  colonies 
between  Maryland  and  Nova  Scotia  were  not  looked  upon 
with  favor,  as  they  competed  with  the  metropolis  in  a  num- 
ber of  industries,  especially  in  the  production  of  food-stuffs. 


<\\ 


by  encouraging  immigration  from  continental  Europe.  See  6  Geo.  11,  c.  aj 
§  vii.and  Declared  Accounts,  Audit  Office,  Bundle  2131,  Roll  2:  Sir  ]'.  Dick 
for  transporting  foreign  Protestants  from  Holland  to  Nova  Scotia. 

'  Josiah  Tucker,  in  one  of  his  earlier  books,  "A  Brief  Essay  on  the  Advan- 
tages and  Disadvantages  which  respectively  attend  France  and  Great  Britain 
with  regard  to  Trade"  (ad  ed.  London,  1750),  pp.  9,-95,  supported  this  view. 
To  divert  the  colonies  from  manufacturing,  he  favored  the  policy  of  encourag- 
ing them  to  produce  iron,  naval  stores,  hemp,  flax,  silk,  indigo,  etc.  See  also 
The  Laws  and  Policy  of  England  Relating  to  Trade  (London,  1765),  pp. 
33,  34,  wherein  it  was  held  that  colonies  should  produce  commodities  that 
England  could  not  raise,  such  as  silk,  hemp,  pitch,  tar,  rosin,  turpentine, 
masts,  sugar,  tobacco,  cotton,  rice,  and  indigo. 


i  t 


X 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION        ,35 

in  the  fisheries,  in   the  ship-building  and  carrying-trades 
At  the  same  time,  they  had  but  h'ttle  to  export  to  the  mother 
country,  which  was  still  largely  agricultural.    According  to 
this  theory  of  colonization,  the  essential  thing  was  that  the 
cdony  produced  commodities  that  the  mother  country  would 
otherwise  have   to   buy  from   foreigners.    Hence  greater 
stress  was  laid  on  colonies  as  sources  of  supply,  than  as 
markets   for   British   manufactures.    The   importance   of 
the  cobny  as  a  market  was  not  entirely  ignored,  but  was 
regarded  as  the  natural  corollary  to  the  more  vital  fact  that 
the  colony  furnished  the  mother  country  with  raw  ma- 
termls  not  produced   in   Great   Britain   or  with   tropical 
products.  ^ 

This  was  the  general  standard  by  which  the  value  of  colo- 
nies was  gauged  until  about  1 745.    According  to  it,  the  New 
England  and  Middle  colonies  were  found  wanting,  while 
those  m  the  West  Indies  stood  the  test  best.    Hence  far 
more  attention  was  paid  to  the  island  colonies  than  to  those 
on  the  mainland.    The  former  were  considered  preeminently 
the  valuable  colonies.    The  sugar  trade  occupied  in  foreign 
^mmerce  a  somewhat  similar  position  to  the  woollen  trade 
bemg  populariy  considered  a  pivotal  industry.    In  addition, 
the  West  Indian  mterest  was  strongly  represented  in  England 

cTnies.  ''''    ''"""'"'  "^"''''  '^'""^  '''''''  ''^'^^^^ 

the  Jives  oZ  ^tTT7  '"  *'"  "''"*  ''  ^'"""'^"^  "^'^  «=''her  by 
trade  .n^Zf^'        ^  If"  '^  ~"'*™^  '"  ''"^  P^«  °'  °'^"  °^  the  Sugar 

w.fe  of  the  chacf  member  of  the  Board  of  Tmde.  Martin  Bladen,  had  an 


i    i 


V 


It     ( 

I      ; 
i 


136 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754->76S 


m 


There  was,  however,  some  opposition  to  this  method  of 
estimating  the  value  of  colonies  primarily  by  the  products 
with  which  they  supplied  the  mother  country.  This  objec- 
tion gained  ground,  as  England  was  becoming  less  and  less  an 
agricultural  country,  and  more  and  more  an  industrial  one. 
At  the  time  of  the  peace  of  Paris,  England  was  ceasing  to  be 
a  regular  exporter  of  wheat.  The  manufacturer  was  becom- 
ing of  ever  increasing  importance,  and  he  emphasized  the 
more  modem  view  that  colonies  should  primarily  furnish  a 
market  for  the  mother  country's  manufactures.'  It  was  ob- 
vious that  the  West  Indies,  whose  population  was  necessarily 

estate  in  the  West  Indies.  Pari.  Hist.  13,  p.  639.  In  1760  it  was  said  that, 
"Many  Gentlemen  of  the  West  Indies  have  Seafa  in  the  British  House  of  Com- 
mons." Remarks  on  the  Letter  Address'd  to  Two  Great  Men  (London,  1 760), 
pp.  46,  47. 

'  The  author  of  a  pamphlet  criticising  the  peace  of  1 748,  especially  the  failure 
to  acquire  Canada,  exclaims:  "Good  God!  what  an  immense  Profit  would  it 
have  been  to  us  to  have  supply'd  all  North  America  with  British  Manufactures, 
and  in  return  to  have  received  their  rich  Furs?"  The  Advantages  of  the 
Difiniti'  e  Treaty  (London,  1749),  p.  27.  Th's  transition  is  well  illustrated  in 
Sir  William  Keith's  thought.  Occasionally,  he  said,  the  balance  of  trade  may 
turn  against  a  nation,  and  workmen  being  out  of  employment  are  forced  to 
seek  it  elsewhere.  Then  the  wisdom  of  states  haa  found  it  advisable  to  send 
such  of  their  people  as  could  be  spared  to  settle  in  various  climates  where  some 
new  species  of  products  might  be  raised  and  sent  home  to  revive  commerce  and 
to  assist  in  restoring  the  lost  balance  of  trade.  This  was  the  original  intention, 
"  and  the  only  justifiable  Reason  "  for  founding  colonies.  "  The  Design  of  those 
Settlements  (was)  to  raise  new  and  Different  kinds  of  Merchandize  for  the  Eu- 
ropean Market,"  in  return  for  which  British  manufactures  were  exported. 
The  History  of  the  British  Plantations  in  America,  Part  I,  Virginia  (London, 
1738),  pp.  10,  II.  "To  support  Navigation,  and  to  provide  a  continual  and 
sufficient  Supply  of  Materials  for  carrying  on  a  general  Commerce  to  and  from 
all  Parts  of  the  Worid,  make  Colonies  in  America  equally  useful  and  necessary 
to  every  Maritime  Sute.    But  they  are  of  a  further  and  special  advantage  to 


Il 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION        137 

increasing  slowly,  would  not  afford  so  large  a  market  for 
British  manufactures  as  the  continental  colonies  with  their 
rapidly  expanding  numbers.  Up  to  nearly  the  middle 
of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  exports  from  England  to  the 
continental  colonies  and  the  West  Indies  were  about  equal. 
A  great  change  then  set  in.'  The  exports  to  the  West 
Indies  increased  but  slowly,  from  ;C704,ooo  in  1751-1752 
to  £777.000  in   1756-1757,  and  to  ^^1,060,000  a  decade 

Great-Britain,  by  securing  a  certain  and  constant  Vent  to  the  Home  Product 
and  Manufactures  of  that  Country,  independent  of  the  Conduct  and  Practice 
of  other  Nations."  Ibid.  p.  34.  Thomas  Pownall  in  "The  Administration  of 
the  Colonies"  (ad  ed.  London,  1765,  pp.  35, 26),  laid  especial  stress  on  the  value 
of  the  colonies  as  customers  of  the  mother  country. 
'Exports  from  England  to: 

NORTHERN  COLONIES 

1744-1748,  s  years'  total  £3,486,268 

1754-1758,  S  years'  total  £lA^4,0S1 

These  figures  are  given  by  Franklin  in  his  pamphlet  "The  Interest  cf  Great 
Britain  Considered"  (London,  1760),  p.  57.  They  were  frequently  copied  in 
the  controversial  literature  of  the  following  years:  Writings  of  John  Dickinson 
(ed.  P.  L.  Ford)  I,  p.  222;  An  Essay  on  the  Trade  of  the  Northern  Colonies 
(London,  1764),  pp.  36,  37.  Franklin  correctly  pointed  out  that  this  increase 
in  the  exports  to  the  continental  colonies  was  in  part  due  to  the  presence  of  the 
army  and  the  navy  in  North  America.  Colden  also  pointed  this  out,  and,  in 
addition,  that  the  increase  was  also  partly  due  to  the  colonial  trade  with  the 
enemy,  as  the  colonies  sent  some  British  manufactures  to  the  French  islands. 
Colden  to  Pitt,  Dec.  27,  1760.  Am.  and  W.I.  73.  Colden  made  the  same 
statement  in  1 765.  N.  Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  799.  On  this  exportation  of  manu- 
factures from  the  British  colonies  to  the  French,  see  also  Sharpe  Correspondence 
n,  p.  44a-  It  should  be  noted  that  the  exports  from  England  to  the  continental 
colonies  fell  off  to  a  marked  extent  in  the  latter  years  of  the  war.  Sir  Charies 
Whitworth,  State  of  the  Trade  of  England  (London,  1776),  gives  full  details. 
It  should  also  be  mentioned  that  among  the  entries  for  the  West  Indie ^ !"  gen- 
eral were  items  exported  to  the  continental  colonies  and  also  coram  ties 
destined  for  Spanish  America. 


WEST   INDIES 

£3.363.337 
£3,767,841 


f 


n       \ 


138 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-176$ 


i 


Ml 


later.'  On  the  other  hand,  the  exports  to  the  continental 
colonies  increased  rapidly.  In  1 746-1 747  they  were  only 
;£783,ooo;  in  1751-1752  they  had  reached  ;^i, 218,000.  In 
1 761-1 762  they  were  ;^i, 441, 000,  and  in  1 766-1 767;^2,oi6,ooo.' 
'  Exports  from  F  d  from  Christmas  to  the  same  date  the  following  year  to: 


Antigua  . 
Barbados . 
Bermudas 
Jamaica  . 
Montserrat 
Nevis  .  . 
New  Providence 
St.  Christopher  . 
West  Indies  in 
general  .  . 
Dominica  .  . 
Tortola  .  .  . 
St.  Vincent  .  . 
Grenada  .  .  . 
Guadeloupe  .  . 
Havana  .  .  . 
Martinique    .     . 


1746-1747    1751-175S   17S6-1757   1781-176S   1766-1767 


-£44,487 

95. 107 

3.891 

aiS.283 

1.650 

583 

27.743 

345.348 


Z  734.09* 


;£68,i8s 

173,823 

11,767 

3SI.47S 

S.307 

10,442 

83,917 


;£  703.915 


;£  1 13.308 

156.932 

2.890 

352,797 

18,069 

15,420 

1.013 

"6,549 


304 


;£776,882 


;£«  25.323 

213,177 

7,786 

460,631 

23.895 
9,066 

103,637 


2,052 


119 
170,226 
116,777 
166,196 


£119,740 
145,083 

",133 
467,681 

23,071 

11,87s 

14.986 

106,163 

763 
30.863 
37,010 
14,823 
89,767 


£1,397,875^1,059,956 


B.  T.  Com.  Scries  II,  414. 

'  Exports  from  England  from  Christmas  to  the  same  date  the  following  year  to: 


1746-1747 

1761-1762 

1766-1757 

1761-1762 

1766-1767 

Newfoundland  . 

£49.021 

£46,995 

£23.537 

£34,387 

£53,550 

Carolina  .     .     . 

95.529 

150.777 

213.949 

194.170 

244,093 

Hudson's  Bay    . 

2.994 

3.380 

4.033 

4,122 

4,981 

New  England    . 

210,640 

273.340 

363,404 

247,385 

406,081 

New  York     .     . 

137.984 

194,030 

353,311 

288,046 

417,957 

Pennsylvania     . 

82,404 

301,666 

268,426 

306,199 

371,830 

Virginia    and 

Maryland 

200,088 

325,151 

426,687 

417,599 

437,628 

Georgia    .    .    . 

24 

3.163 

2,571 

23,761 

23.334 

Nova  Scotia .    . 

4,408 

19.310 

70,600 

25.071 

25,094 

Florida     .    .    . 

30,963 

£783,092 

£1,217,812 

£1,726.518 

£  1,440,740 

£2.015,511 

Xi 


TROPICAL  AND  C0NT1N£NTAL  COLONIZAT'.ON        139 

This  rapid  increase  in  the  exports  to  the  continental 
colonies  provided  a  powerful  argument  to  those  who  looked 
upon  colonies  mainly  as  a  market  for  the  surplus  manu- 
factures of  Great  Britain.    This  view  was  also  si  engthened 
by  the  fact  that  the  European  outlet  for  English  woollens, 
the  most  important  of  the  mother  country's  manufacturing 
industries,  was  threatened  by  the  endeavors  of  nearly  every 
European  state  to  supply  itself  with  these  products.*    On 
account  of  its  climate.  North  America  furnished  a  much 
larger  market  for  woollens   than  did   the   tropical  West 
Indies,  and  in  addition  a  market  that  was  rapidly  expand- 
ing.   In  that  age  of  keen  international  commercial  rivalry, 
the  value  of  such  an  outlet  for  England's  chief  industry 
was  especially  patent.'    The  landed  classes  were  in  general 
greatly  interested  in  the  woollen  industry,  and  hence  were 
in  alliance  with  the  manufacturers  as  opposed  to  the  trading 
and  commercial  interests.    They  were  able  to  impress  this 
view  in  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  1 763.    This  treaty 
marks  a  turning-point  in  British  colonial  policy  in  so  far 
that  thereafter  greater  stress  was  laid  on  colonies  as  markets 
for  British  produce  than  on  colonies  as  sources  of  supply. 

B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  414;  Whitworth,  op.  cit.  pp.  51,  56,  61,  66,  71. 
Part  II  of  this  latter  work  gives  the  exports  to  New  York  in  1 766-1 767  as 
£48»,93o  and  not  as  £417,957. 

'Proposals  for  Carrying  on  the  War  with  Vigour  (London,  1757), 
PP-  49-54- 

'  The  State  of  Trade  in  the  Northern  Colonies,  by  Otis  Little  (London, 
1748),  pp.  35,  40,  41,  emphasizes  the  fact  that  the  Northern  colonies  consumed 
so  large  a  quantity  of  British  manufactures,  of  which  a  large  proportion  was 
woollens.  His  estimate  of  their  per  capita  consumption  in  New  England  and 
New  York  is,  however,  grossly  exaggerated. 


pi 


140 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


i  i 


This  change  in  viewpoint  was  of  extreme  importance.*  To 
the  extent  that  the  matter  depended  solely  on  Great  Britain's 
volition,  and  not  on  the  desires  of  France  and  Spain,  it  led 
directly  to  the  choice  of  Canada  and  Florida,  instead  of  the 
French  West  Indies  and  Porto  Rico,'  as  that  portion  of  the 
English  conquests  in  America  to  be  retained  as  parts  of  the 
Empire.  It  is  interesting  to  follow  some  of  the  contempo- 
rary thought  leading  '"^  to  this  changed  attitude. 

The  broader  political  arguments  in  favor  of  colonization 
on  the  continent,  as  well  as  the  narrower  economic  ones,  are 
expounded  with  great  ability  by  William  Shirley,  a  statesman 
whose  influence  on  the  history  of  the  Empire  has  been  most 
inadequately  recognized.  In  1745,  when  Governor  of 
Massachusetts,  he  wrote  to  the  Duke  of  Newcastle  strongly 
advising  the  reduction  of  all  Canada.'  Among  the  resultant 
economic  advantages  would  be  the  control  of  the  fur  trade 
and  of  the  fisheries.  Shirley  then  adds :  "From  the  Health- 
fullness of  the  Climates  on  this  Continent  and  the  Surprizing 
Growth  of  it's  Inhabitants  within  the  last  Century  it  may 


'  The  following  passage  emphasizes  the  essential  difference  in  standpoint  tow- 
ard the  West  Indies  and  North  America:  "The  Benefit  which  accrues  to  the 
Mother-Country  from  a  Colony  on  the  Continent,  principally  depends  on  the 
Number  of  its  Inhabitants;  that  of  a  Plantation  in  the  Islands  arises  from  the 
Richness  of  its  Commodities :  We  rely  on  the  former  chiefly  for  the  Consumption 
of  our  Manufactures :  We  expect  more  from  the  Produce  of  the  latter,  for  our 
own  Consumption  and  for  Exportation."  The  Regulations  Lately  Made  (Lon- 
don, 1765),  pp.  s-6. 

'  On  Porto  Rico,  see  Bedford  Correspondence  III,  pp.  96, 119, 139;  J.  Almon, 
Biographical,  Literary,  and  Political  Anecdotes  (London,  1797)  II,  pp.  7a,  73. 
Porto  Rico  had  not  been  conquered,  but  there  was  some  talk  of  exchanging  it 
for  Cuba.  •  Am.  and  W.I.  3,  no.  235. 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION        141 

be  expected  that  in  one  or  two  more  Centuries  there  will  be 
such  an  addition  from  hence  to  the  Subjects  of  the  Crown 
of  Great  Britain,  as  may  make  'em  vye  for  Numbers  with 
the  Subjects  of  France,  and  lay  a  foundation  for  a  Superiority 
of  British  Power  upon  the  Continent  of  Europe,  at  the  Same 
time  that  it  Secures  that  which  the  Royal  Navy  of  Great 
Britain  has  already  at  Sea."  *  He  then  claimed  that  the 
West  Indian  colonics  diminished  the  population  of  the 
mother  country,  while  the  contrary  was  true  of  the  continental 
colonies ;  ^  and  that  the  increase  in  population  on  the  main- 
land meant  a  large  outlet  for  British  woollens  and  other  Euro- 
pean commodities.  Shirley's  ardent  desire  for  the  conquest 
of  Canada  *  was  not  gratified  at  the  time.  At  the  opening 
of  the  following  war,  ten  years  lator,  he  again  wrote  to  the 
secretary  of  state,  then  Sir  Thomas  Robinson,  urging  at 
length  and  wUh  great  ability  the  necessity  of  driving  France 
out  of  America.*  Among  the  benefits,  besides  those  of  a 
political  and  military  nature,  would  be  the  increase  of  the 
fur  trade  and  the  fisheries,  and  the  enlarged  consumption  of 

'  The  same  idea  is  also  present  in  a  memorial  of  the  Canadian  governor, 
Galissonitre.  He  pointed  out  that  France  must  retain  Canada  as  a  barrier 
against  English  ambition,  even  though  it  had  alwaj-s  proven  a  burden;  "for 
if  we  suffer  our  enemies  to  become  masters  in  America,  their  trade  and  naval 
power  will  grow  to  vast  proportions,  and  they  will  draw  from  their  colonies  a 
wealth  that  will  make  them  preponderant  in  Europe."  Parkman,  Montcalm 
and  Wolfe  I,  p.  37. 

'  This  was  frequently  asserted,  and  was  apparently  based  on  the  fact  that  a 
large  number  of  colonial  ships  were  sold  in  England,  the  crews  remaining  with 
the  vessels. 

•V.  H.  Paltsits,  Scheme  for  the  Conquest  of  Canada  in  1746.  American 
Antiquarian  Society,  April,  1905. 

*  Shiriey  to  Robinson,  Aug.  15, 1755.    Am.  and  W.I.  8a. 


1 

V 

M 

'r 

143 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


F 
V 


IAJ! 


British  manufactures.  In  addition  Shirley  wrote:  "The 
growing  Advantages,  w'-''  would  accrue  to  the  Nation  must 
be  immense;  The  State  of  Security,  which  the  Settlers  in 
North  America  would  be  put  into,  by  the  Removal  of  the 
French ;  The  extensive  Trade  with  the  Indians,  the  Increase 
of  the  Fishery,  the  Rich  vacant  Country  for  new  Settlements, 
and  the  quick  Growth  of  their  Estates  would  make  the  Inhab- 
itants increase  if  not  in  a  Duplicate  proportion  to  what  they 
have  hitherto  done,  yet  in  a  much  greater  degree."  He 
pointed  out  that  the  population  of  these  colonies  doubled 
every  twenty  years,  even  under  existing  conditions,  and  that 
the  increase  of  exports  from  England  to  North  America 
corresponded  with  the  growth  of  population.  Consequently 
it  followed  inevitably  that  the  conquest  of  Canada  would 
result  in  a  large  increase  in  British  exports.' 

In  1 760,  in  connection  with  some  talk  of  peace,  the  question 
arose  whether  Great  Britain  should  retain  Canada  or  Guade- 
loupe, both  of  which  had  been  conquered.  The  subject 
aroused  keen  interest.  Pitt  said  in  the  House  of  Commons: 
"Some  are  for  keeping  Canada;  some  Guadeloupe;  who 
will  tell  me  which  I  shall  be  hanged  for  not  keeping?"  '  At 
the  time  there  appeared  a  number  of  pamphlets,  in  which  this 
matter  was  discussed  with  both  warmth  and  ability.  The 
first  pamphlet  of  importance  is  supposed  by  many  to 
be  the  work  of  the  aged   Earl  of  Bath,  better  known  as 

'  Shirley  estimated  the  white  population  of  the  continental  colonies  at 
1,200,000,  and  the  exports  from  England  to  those  colonies  at  one  million  sterling, 
of  which  70  per  cent  consisted  of  British  manufactures,  and  30  per  cent  of  for- 
eign goods  reexported  from  England. 

'  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III,  vol.  I,  p.  26. 


M 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION        143 

Pulteney,  -  the  famous  leader  of  the  Opposition  against 
Walpole.'    Herein  it  was  urged  that  the  conquests  on  the 
continent   must  be  retained   as   the  essential   basis  of  a 
durable  peace.'    "You  must  keep  Canada,  othcrways  you 
lay  the  Foundation  of  another  War." «    The  restoration 
of  peace  should  not  be  made  conditional  on  the  retention 
of   the   West   Indian   and   African  conquests/  for  these 
possessions  arc  insignificant   in  comparison  with  the   fact 
that  the  removal  of  France  from  Canada  will  give  security 
to  the  continental  colonies.    These  colonies  have  a  large 
population  and   consequently  afford  a  desirable    market, 
"mostly  supplied  with  the  Manufactures  of  Great  Britain."' 
On  this  economic  fact  the  Eari  of  Bath  laid  chief  stress, 
though  he  did   not   ignore  the  other  advantages  arising 
from  the  continent  of  America,  such  as  the  important  trade 
carried  on  with  it  and  the  large  number  of  ships  engaged 
therein,  the  importation  thence  of  iron,  indigo  and  naval 
stores,  and  the  fact  that  these  colonies  fed  the  West  Indies. 
This  pamphlet  called  forth  a  reply,  which  is  generally 
attributed  to  William  Burke,  a  friend  and  kinsman  of  the 
famous  philosophical   statesman   of  the   same   surname.* 
Burke  advised  the  return  of  Canada  to  France,  Great  Britain 
retaining  only  the  "  hinteriand  "  of  the  American  colonies  and 

'  A  Letter  Addressed  to  Two  Great  Men.  London,  1760.  John  Douglas, 
later  Bishop  of  Salisbury,  is  supposed  to  have  collaborated  in  this  publication' 
and  It  is  even  possible  that  he  may  have  been  its  main  author.  See  Franklin 
Writings  (ed.  Smjlh)  I,  p.  145.  ' 

Vr^l''-  'Ibid,  p., O.      C/.P.3X. 

^*'^P-33-  •/*«/.  p.  34. 

•  Remarks  on  the  Letter  Addrcss'd  to  Two  Great  Men.    London,  1760. 


144 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1705 


Nova  Scotia  with  its  boundaries  determined  in  accordance 
with  the  British  claims  prior  to  the  war.'  Under  such  condi- 
tions, he  claimed,  the  continental  colonies  would  be  safe  from 
France.  Burke  then  accused  the  Earl  of  Bath  of  showing 
little  regard  to  the  interests  of  the  West  Indies.  He  said : 
"Our  Carribbce  Islands  must  be  ever  infinitely  in  greater 
Danger  from  Guadaloupe,  than  our  North  American  Colonies 
can  be  from  Canada,  circumscribed  as  it  ought,  and  as  it  is 
presumed  it  will  be."  '  "If,  as  it  has  been  shewn,  we  may 
beyond  any  rational  Fear  secure  ourselves  without  the  intire 
Possession  of  Canada,"  then  the  only  question  remains,  is 
Guadeloupe  or  Canada  more  likely  to  repay  us  for  the  ex- 
pense of  the  war  ? '  On  this  point,  Burke  decided  in  favor 
of  Guadeloupe  and  her  dependencies,  showing  that  the 
British  West  Indies  just  produced  enough  sugar  for  the 
mother  country's  consumption,  and  that  France  was  sup- 
plying all  Europe  with  this  commodity,  as  Great  Britain  had 
formerly  done.  Canada,  he  claimed,  would  not  be  a  valuable 
exchange  for  Guadeloupe,  as  it  "produces  no  Commodity, 
except  Furs  and  Skins,"  which  can  be  exchanged  for  Euro- 
pean goods,  and  as  it  has  "little  Returns  to  make  the  English 
Merchant."  *  Besides,  even  if  Canada  is  restored,  by  hold- 
ing the  territory  in  back  of  the  colonies,  England  can 
gain  the  fur  trade.'  On  the  other  hand,  Guadeloupe  makes 
more  sugar  than  any  of  the  British  islands  except  Jamaica,' 

"  Remarks  on  the  Letter  Address'd  to  Two  Great  Men.     London,  1760, 
pp.  20,  38. 

•  Ibid.  p.  a8.  •  Ibid.  p.  ag.  *  Ibid.  p.  36.  •  Ibid.  p.  37. 

*  Ibid.  p.  40.    The  imports  into  England,  Christmas,  1761,  to  Christmas, 
1762,  were  from: 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION         145 

and  this  entire  crop  will  be  reexported  from  the  metropolis, 
"and  will  consequently  be  so  much  clear  Money  to  Great 
Britain."  • 

Burke  then  discussed  the  relative  value  of  the  two  groups 
of  colonics,  those  in  the  Caribbean  and  those  on  the  mainland, 
and  reached  the  conclusion  that  "an  Island  Colony  is  always 
more  advantageous  than  a  Continental  one  for  the  Mother 
Country.'"  "The  West  India  Islands  lie  ir  a  Climate 
different  totally  from  ours.  The  natural  Produce  there- 
fore interferes  in  no  respect  with  that  of  England,"  and  if 
our  colonics  there  did  not  supply  us  "we  must  purchase  from 
Strangers." »  On  the  other  hand,  the  continental  colonies 
produce,  in  general,  the  same  things  as  England,  and  there- 
fore "except  for  a  few  Naval  Stores,  there  is  very  little  Trade 
from  thence  directly  to  England."  Besides,  in  these  colonies 
there  is  a  strong  tendency  to  set  up  manufactures,  "and  as 
they  increase  daily  in  People  and  in  Industry,  the  Necessity 
of  a  Connection  with  England,  with  which  they  have  no  nat- 
ural Intercourse  by  a  Reciprocation  of  Wants,  will  continu- 
ally diminish."  Referring  to  the  much-discussed  question 
of  the  future  independence  of  these  colonies,*  Burke  added : 


£S»3.»44 
8sa.777 
254,860 

249,367 
246,360 


Guadeloupe 

Jamaica 

Barbados 

Antigua 

St.  Kitts 
B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  414,  p.  26. 

'  Ibid.  pp.  40,  41.     In  addition   to  sugar,  Guadeloupe  produced  coffee, 
indij,'o,  cotton,  and  ginger.  '  Ibid.  p.  46.  •  Ibid.  p.  47. 

*  Otis  Little  in  "The  State  of  Trade  in  the  Northern  Coloni-  "  (London, 
1748),  pp.  13-17.  refers  to  the  jealousy  frequently  exhibited  in  En^j-and  at  the 

L 


iff 


I,  \ 


u    ■ 


ul 


Hi' 


1 1 


146 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-1765 


"By  eagerly  grasping  at  extensive  Territory,  we  may  run 
the  risque,  and  that  perhaps  in  no  very  distant  Period  of 
losing  what  we  now  possess."  Canada  in  French  hands 
binds  the  North  American  colonies  to  Great  Britain;  it  is 
not  necessary  to  us,  and  its  retention  may  be  dangerous. 
He  added  significantly:  "A  Neighbour  that  keeps  us  in 
some  Awe,  is  not  always  the  worst  of  Neighbours."  * 

This  discussion  attracted  wide  attention,*  and  called  forth 
a  skilful,  if  notawhollydisingenuous  pamphlet  from  Benjamin 
Franklin,  who  was  in  London  at  the  time.*  Franklin  an- 
swered Burke  in  detail,  maintaining  that  the  removal  of 
France  from  the  continent  was  absolutely  essential  to  the 
security  of  the  British  colonies.*    He  pointed  out  that  the 

growth  of  the  North  American  colonies,  and  to  the  fact  that  some  people  also 
insinuated  that  "great  Care  ought  to  be  taken,  lest  those  Colonies  grow  too 
powerful,  and  set  up  a  Government  of  their  own."  Little  says  that  there  was 
no  justification  for  this  apprehension.  The  colonies  are  not  discontented; 
they  are  not  taxed  and  are  dependent  on  England  for  manufactures. 
'  Remarks  on  the  Letter  Address'd  to  Two  Great  Men,  p.  50. 

•  On  Feb.  16, 1762,  Governor  Dalrymple  of  Guadeloupe  wrote  to  Egivmont, 
that  he  had  seen  the  party  pamphlets  on  this  subject,  and  that  both  sides  had 
exaggerated.  In  his  opinion,  however,  Guadeloupe  would  lie  a  most  valuable 
acquisition,  its  trade  having  greatly  increased  since  the  English  conquest. 
Am.  and  W.I.  loi.  Joseph  Massie,  a  prolific  and  able  economist,  referred 
to  this  controversy,  and  said  that  the  return  of  the  West  Indies  to  France  and 
granting  that  country  permission  to  fish  ..t  Newfoundland  would  be  ruinous. 
Brief  Observations  Concerning  the  Management  of  the  W'ar  (London,  1761), 
p.  8. 

'The  Interest  of  Great  Britain  Considered.  London,  1760.  This  pam- 
phlet is  also  printed  in  Smyth's  edition  of  Franklin's  Writings,  vol.  IV.  In 
writing  it,  Franklin  was  assisted  by  Richard  Jackson.  Ibid.  I,  p.  138,  and 
P.  L.  Ford,  Franklin  Bibliography,  p.  117. 

•  Pamphlet,  pp.  8,  9;  Writings  IV,  pp.  34,  35. 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION         147 

increased  area  of  the  Empire  resulting  from  the  conquest 
of    Canada  meant  cheap  land,  and  that  owing  to  this  fact 
America  would  necessarily  remain  a  non-manufacturing  agri- 
cultural country.'    He  then  drew  attention  to  the  rapidly 
increasing  population  of  the  continental  colonies  and  to  the 
ensuing  large  exports  from  England  to  them,  emphasizing 
the  importance  of  North  America  as  a  market  for  British 
manufactures.^      Franklin    rejected    Burke's    claim    that 
the  retention  of  Canada  meant  the  independence  of  the 
continental  colonics,  laying  stress  not  so  much  on  their  loyalty 
to  the  mother  country,  as  on  their  particularism  and  on  their 
reciprocal  jealousies  and  enmities.    He  claimed   that   they 
loved  the  mother  cou-     y  more  than  they  did  one  another, 
that  a  union  of  the  colonies  was  an  impossibility,'  and  that 
without  such  a  union  an  effort  on  the  part  of  some  of  the 
colonics  to  gain  independence  would  be  madness. 

Franklin  was,  however,  not  allowed  to  hold  the  field  un- 
answered. In  1762,  a  remarkable  pamphlet  was  published, 
traversing  his  arguments  and  facts,  and  upholding  the  value 
of  tropical  colonies.^  The  reputed  author  of  this  publication, 
William  Burke,*  started  from  the  premise  that  purely  politi- 

'  Pamphlet,  pp.  17,  18;  Writings  IV,  p.  49. 

•  Pamphlet,  p.  36;  Writings  IV,  p.  67.  The  same  views  were  expressed  by 
Frankhn  in  his  letters  to  Lord  Kames.  Writings  IV,  pp.  4,  8,  99.  On  Oct 
19.  X760,  Governor  Wentworth  of  New  Hampshire  wrote  to  Pitt,  congratulating 
him  on  the  fall  of  Montreal,  and  pointing  out  that  Canada  would  be  of  in- 
estimable value  to  Great  Britain  as  a  market  for  manufactures,  especially  for 
coarse  woollens  and  every  sjiecies  of  ironware.    Am.  and  W.I.  7s. 

'  I.e.  unless  the  colonies  were  driven  to  it  by  tyranny. 

'An  Examination  of  the  Commercial  Principles  of  the  late  Negotiation 
I^ndon,  1 75a.  .  p.  l.  Ford,  Fninklin  Bibliography,  p.  i ,  7. 


148 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4-I76S 


I ; 


cal  advantages  gained  by  a  treaty  of  peace  are  illusory. 
"There  is  no  Situation  in  which  Wealth  is  not  Strength, 
and  in  which  Commerce  is  not  Wealth.  If  Commerce  is  our 
Object,  we  know,  and  in  all  other  Cases  we  can  at  best  only 
guess  what  we  acquire."  '  The  negotiations  for  peace  in 
1 761,  he  pointed  out,  were  conducted  solely  with  the  idea 
of  retaining  Canada;  no  attempt  was  made  to  retain  the 
West  Indies,  and  thus  British  interests  in  that  region  were 
slighted.  Great  Britain  had  entirely  lost  the  foreign  market 
for  sugar,  while  the  European  sugar  trade  was  the  most 
valuable  branch  of  French  commerce.  This  situation,  he  in- 
sisted should  have  been  considered,  as  by  retaining  the 
French  islands  the  conditions  could  be  reversed.* 

Burke  then  drew  attention  to  the  fact  that  in  1759  the 
imports  from  the  West  Indies  amounted  to  ;^i, 833,648,  while 
those  from  New  England,  New  York,  and  Pennsylvania  were 
only  ^^70,074,  and  those  from  all  the  continental  colonies 
aggregated  only  about  £600,000.'  The  West  Indies  need 
British,  Irish,  and  colonial  products,  and  are  thus  economi- 
cally dependent  on  the  Empire.  In  addition,  the  lucrative 
African  slave-trade  is  closely  connected  with  their  pros- 
j)erity,  while  in  turn,  the  continental  colonies  rely  on  these 
islands  for  a  market  for  their  surplus  products,  and  hence 
also  for  their  ability  to  purchase  British  goods.  He  thus 
reached  the  conclusion  that  the  African  and  North  American 
trades  both  depended  upon  the  West  Indies.  Burke  then 
proceeded  to  attack  Franklin  for  omitting  to  give  the  statis- 
tics of  colonial  imports  into  England,  claiming  that  the  rela- 

'  An  Examination,  pp.  3,  4.  *Ibid.  pp.  16-18.  'Ibid.,  p.  20. 


•I 

i 


a 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION         1^9 

tive  value  of  the  two  groups  of  colonies  could  not  be  estimated 
solely  from  the  English  export  statistics.  In  faUing  to  con- 
sider the  colonial  imports  into  England,  he  asserted  that 
Franklin  was  deceiving  the  ignorant,'  because  as  a  matter 
of  fact  the  total  trade  of  England  with  the  West  Indies 
exceeded  that  with  North  America.' 

Discussing  more  particularly  the  question  of  Guadeloupe, 
Burke  then  pointed  out  that  in  1761  this  island's  exports  to 
England  amounted  to  £603,269,  of  which  two-thirds  were 
sugar,  and  ;£i  12,792  cotton,'  the  latter  an  important  prod- 
uct which  was  not  grown  extensively  in  the  other  British 
islands.*  On  the  other  hand,  Canada's  exports  to  England 
in  the  same  year  amounted  to  only  ;Ci4,ois,  consisting  princi- 
pally of  furs.  Burke  thus  reached  the  conclusion  that  from 
the  viewpoint  of  British  commercial  interests  the  retention  of 
Guadeloupe  was  of  far  greater  importance  than  that  of 
Canada.' 

Continuing  the  argument,  Burke  noted  that  the  continental 
colonies  were  of  two  distinct  classes.  Those  north  of  Mary- 
land, he  said,  have  very  little  direct  trade  with  Great  Britain. 
"I  mean  they  have  nothing  with  which  they  can  repay  us  for 
the  Commodities  they  draw  from  hence."  They  trade 
only  circuitously  with  us,  and  they  are  our  competitors  In 

'  An  Examination,  p.  ag. 

'Year  1758: 
Exports  from  England  lO  ConUnental  Colonies  £1  g,,  q^ 

Corresponding  Imports  '648.'^ 

Exports  from  England  to  West  Indies  r  877  tj. 

Corresponding  ImporU  ^  8        6 

IM.  p.  ,7.         .jbid.  p.  36.  'Ibid.  pp.  38-40.  ./W^.  I'  5^°^ 


1*1 


150  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  i7S4-i76j 

foreign  markets.    We  consequently  interfere  with  and  hurt 
one  another.'    On  the  other  hand,  the  southern  continental 
colonies,  Maryland,  Virginia  and   South  Carolina,  bear  a 
close  resemblance  to  the  West  IndieF     They  produce  com- 
modities not  grown  in  England,  such  as  rice,  tobacco,  and 
indigo,  and  their  exports  to  England  are  large'    Conse- 
quently he  concluded  that  it  would  be  absurd  to  think  of 
adding  Canada  to  the   Empire,  and   not   of   increasing 
the  British  interest  in  the  West  Indies.    The  argument 
advanced  by  his  opponents  that  the  vast  inland  tracts  on 
the  Ohio  could  produce  commodides  that  are  needed  in 
England,  he  said,  may  or  may  not  be  true;  at  all  events, 
if  we  retain  Guadeloupe  and  not  Canada,  we  shall  not 
sacrifice  a  present,  real,  and  tangible  advantage  to  a  remote 
contingency.' 

This  view  of  the  relative  economic  value  of  the  tropical 
and  continental  colonics  was  also  supported  by  a  memorial 
emanating  from  Barbados.'    According  to  the  writer  thereof. 


*  An  Examination,  pp.  64,  65. 
'Imports  into  England  from: 


New  England 
New  York 
Pennsylvania 
Virginia  and  Maryland 
Carolina 


1 761 

21,684 

22,404 

357,228 

»6,S34 


176a 

£41.733 
58,882 

38,091 
415,709 
181,695 


1757 
£27,556 
19,168 
14,190 
418,881 
130,889 
Ibid.  p.  66,  and  Whitworth,  op.  cU.  61,  66.  The  preponderance  in  f.vor  of 
the  Southern  colonies  would  be  much  more  accentuated  if  the  import  statistics 
of  Scotland  were  included.  '  '*'''  P  68. 

♦  Reflections  on  the  True  Interest  of  Great  Britain.  By  a  planter  in  Bar- 
bados. Col.  Corr.  Barbados  I.  See  also  a  memorial  from  St.  Christopher, 
Feb.  27,  1760,    Am.  and  W.L  73. 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION        151 

colonies  "were  originally  design'd  to  contribute  to  her  (the 
mother  country's)  Wealth  and  Power,  and  the  continual 
Protection  which  they  require,  and  which  they  receive, 
renders  their  Dependence  a  just  and  necessary  Duty."' 
The  West  Indies  have  answered  this  purpose.    They  supply 
what  cannot  be  raised  at  home,  and  consume  English  manu- 
factures, they  support  the  African  trade  and  create  an  ex- 
tensive navigation.    Therefore  "to  settle  the  Neutral  Islands, 
and  to  retain  all  our  Conquests  in  the  Caribbees  becomes  in 
this  View  a  Capital  Point  for  the  Advantage  of  the  Nation." 
Shortly  before  the  preliminaries  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris  were 
signed,  there  appeared  a  noteworthy  pamphlet  in  favor  of  the 
general  terms  of  the  peace.^    Its  author  strongly  favored 
retention  of  Canada,  as  against  those  who  said  that  "one 
white  man  in  the  West  Indies  is  worth,  to  the  Trade  of  his 
Mother  Country  about  Eight  in  North  America."'    He 
opposed  the  view,  "that  we  should  make  the  Increase  of  our 
Possessions  between  the  Tropicks  the  primary  and  leading 
Object  of  our  Policy  " »;  and  emphasized  this  point  by  show- 
ing that  England  exported  far  more  to  North  America  than 
to  the  West  Indies.* 

'  The  Comparative  Importance  of  our  Acquisitions  from  France  in  America. 
London,  176a.     See  also  the  memorial  of  April  ,3,  1761,  in  favor  of  Canada 

?r^VT"v  ^"''''''•'"P^-    «"'•  M""-  Ad«iit.  MSS.  33030  (Newcastle  Papers, 
CCCXLV,  pp.  I  et  seq.).  '^ 

'/6irf.pp.a<^a6.  'IhidviT 

*  EXPORTS  TO  THE   WEST   INDIES  EXPORTS   TO   NORTH   AMERICA 


1       \ 


rd^ 


,52  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4-I765 

The  general  discussion  can  be  summarized  briefly.    The 
West  Indian  interest  claimed  that  the  tropical  possessions 
were   the   ideal  colonies,  and  laid  stress  on  them  mainly 
as  sources  of  supply  and  as  non-competitive  economic  units. 
The  continental  argument  was  that  the  removal  of  France,  by 
giving  full  security  to  the  North  American  colonies,  would 
leadtoarapid  growthof  their  population,  and  consequently  to  a 
corresponding  increase  in  the  exports  of  Great  Britain.    One 
argument  laid  stress  on  colonies  as  purveyors  of  tropical  prod- 
ucts and  of  raw  materials  for  British  manufactures,  which 
would  otherwise  have  to   be  purchased  from  foreigners. 
The  other  argument  ignored   this  factor,  and  estimated 
the  colonies  according  to  the  extent  that  they  furnished 
a  market  for  British  manufactures.    The  older,  and  per- 
haps more  typically  mercantile,  view  claimed  that  the  con- 
tinental colonies  would   become  independent;    the   newer 
school  asserted  that  disunion  among  them  would  prevent 
such  a  contingency.  ^ 

In  the  abortive  peace  negotiations  with  France  in  1761, 
Pitt  adopted  the  newer  view.    His  chief  purpose  was  to  break 
beyond  hope  of  resuscitation  the  naval  power  of  France, 
and  with  this  object  in  view,  he  favored  the  retention  of 
Canada,  with  the  total  exclusion  of  France  from  the  New- 

'  The  chief  diplomatic  correspondence  in  connection  with  these  negotiations 
has  been  published  in  Thackeray's  Life  of  Chatham,  vol.  II,  append.x  and 
passim  in  the  text,  and  in  Pari.  Hist.  15.  PP-  'oiS-ioyr  Alfred  Bourguet, 
"Le  Due  de  Choiseul  et  I'Angleterre"  (Revue  Historique,  vol.  71  and  m  h.s 
Etudes  sur  la  Politique  ftrangire  du  Due  de  Choiseul),  gives  a  number  of  the 
French  documenu.  For  the  best  modem  account,  see  Ruv.lle,  PiU,  vol.  II, 
ch.  15. 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION        153 


J 


foundland  fisheries.*  On  the  latter  point  Pitt  was  forced 
to  yield,  owing  to  pressure  exerted  within  the  ranks  of  the 
British  government  itself.'  In  selecting  Canada  instead 
of  Guadeloupe,  which  was  the  crucial  point  in  the  nego- 
tiations,* Pitt  was  probably  little  influenced  by  the  purely 
economic  argument.  To  his  large  imagination,  the  pros- 
pect of  a  vast  territorial  increase  of  the  Empire's  area  ap- 
pealed strongly.  Although  these  negotiations  of  1761  came 
to  naught,  they  furnished  the  basis  on  which  the  final  treaty 
of  peace  was  concluded  a  year  later.  The  Treaty  of  Paris 
of  1763  gave  Florida,  Canada,  and  all  French  territory  east 
of  the  Mississippi,  except  New  Orleans,  to  Great  Britain. 
Martinique  and  Guadeloupe  were  returned,  while  St.  Lucia, 
then  esteemed  the  most  valuable  of  the  neutral  islands,  was 


'  Pitt  to  Stanley,  June  26, 1761.    Thackeray,  op.  cU.  I,  pp.  545-546. 

'  Walpole,  Memoirs  of  George  III,  vol.  I,  p.  77. 

'  During  the  preliminary  discussions  about  the  proposed  peace,  Choiseul 
told  Hans  Stanley,  the  British  representative,  that  there  was  a  diversity  of 
opinion  in  France  as  to  the  relative  importance  of  the  territories  conquered  by 
England.  The  French  minister  said:  "Some  persons  consider  Canada  as  a 
barren  desert,  and  look  on  Guadaloupe  as  a  most  important  source  of  our 
national  riches:  while  others  as  strenuously  maintain,  that  without  the  former 
province  and  without  the  fisheries,  the  naval  power  of  France  is  irretrievably 
lost  for  ever."  In  reply,  Stanley  pointed  out  that  there  were  the  same  differ- 
ences of  opinion  in  England,  as  was  manifest  from  the  pamphlet  literature,  and 
added  that  he  was  totally  uninstructed  on  this  point.  In  reporting  this  prelimi- 
nary skirmish  to  Pitt,  Stanley  said :  "  The  Duke,  in  holding  the  discourse  above 
mentioned,  upon  the  preference  given  by  some  of  his  countrymen  to  Guadaloupe, 
and  by  others  to  Canada,  fixed  his  utmost  attention  upon  my  countenance, 
aiming  at  the  same  time  by  signs,  by  pauses,  by  half  words,  and  by  every  other 
subtility  to  penetrate  my  thoughts  upon  the  alternative :  I  did  not,  I  am  sure, 
by  a  single  syllable  or  gesture  afford  him  any  foundation  for  the  most  remote 
suspicion."    Stanley  to  Pitt,  June  12, 1761.    Thackeray,  op.  cit.  I,  pp.  529-531. 


f 

il 


^1 


;!! 


154 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  I7S4-I76S 


iJh 


ceded  to  France.  In  the  West  Indies,  Great  Britain  received 
the  comparatively  unimportant  islands  of  Grenada,  St. 
Vincent,  Dominica,  and  Tobago. 

To  many  in  England  the  peace  was  not  satisfactory,  and 
not  a  few  voiced  the  opinion  of  the  Earl  of  Hardwicke  that 
it  was  inadequate,  and  that  incomplete  advantage  had  been 
taken  of  the  British  victories.*  In  the  House  of  Commons 
Pitt  led  the  able,  if  not  numerically  strong,  opposition  to  the 
treaty,  claiming  that  France  was  chiefly,  if  not  solely,  to  be 
dreaded  by  Great  Britain  in  the  light  of  a  maritime  and  com- 
mercial power,  and  that  "  therefore,  by  restoring  to  her  all  the 
valuable  West-India  islands,  and  by  our  concessions  in  the 
Newfoundland  fishery,  we  had  given  to  her  the  means  of 
recovering  her  prodigious  losses,  and  of  becoming  once  more 
formidable  to  us  at  sea." ' 

Those  who  supported  the  peace  in  Parliament  asserted  that 
the  original  object  of  the  war  had  been  the  security  of  the 
continental  colonies,  and  they  insisted  that  this  object  had 
been  attained.  This  security  from  any  possible  future 
conflict  with  the  French  meant  the  rapid  growth  of  these 
colonies,  and  consequently  an  enormous  market  for  British 
manufactures.  This  party  claimed  that  the  value  of  the 
North  American  conquests  "ought  not  to  be  estimated  by 
the   present   produce,   but   by   their  probable   increase." 

•  Pari.  Hist.  IS,  pp.  1251  «/  seq. 

'  Ibid.  p.  1366.  After  the  fall  of  Quebec  and  Montreal  it  was  said  in  a  cur- 
rent pamphlet:  "Martinico,  th"  "lost  important  conquest  of  all  the  possessions 
of  France  in  America,  is  our  own ;  by  which  France  is  wounded  in  the  lenderest 
part  of  her  commerce."  " Political  Considerations,"  attributed  to  James  Mar- 
riott (ad  ed.  London,  1763),  p.  47. 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION        155 

"Neither  ought  the  value  of  any  country  to  be  so.  ly  tried 
on  its  commercial  advantages ;  that  extent  of  territory  and  a 
number  of  subjects  are  matters  of  as  much  Consideration 
to  a  state  attentive  to  the  sources  of  real  grandeur  as  the 
mere  advantages  of  traffic."  '  These  arguments  were  no 
answer  to  Pitt's  contention  that  the  treaty  was  inadequate, 
but  they  were  the  general  basis  on  which  the  statesmen  of 
the  day  justified  their  choice  of  territorial  acquisitions  on  the 
continent  in  preference  to  tropical  expansion.  Unquestion- 
ably the  immediate  advantage  of  British  commerce  was 
sacrificed  to  some  future  benefits.  A  broad  policy  resting 
on  possible  future  advantages  triumphed  over  a  narrow 
policy  of  actual  and  immediate  profits. 

The  treaty  thus  embodied  the  change  in  the  economic 
theory  of  colonization,  that  had  been  gradually  wrought  by 
the  phenomenon  of  the  population  of  the  North  American 
colonies  doubling  every  two  decades  and  hence  emphasizing 
the  importance  of  these  colonies  to  the  mother  country  as 
markets  for  her  manufactures.  This  change  in  attitude 
inevitably  led  to  the  devotion  of  greater  attention  and 
interest  to  the  continental  colonies  than  had  hitherto  been 
customary.  Naturally  as  colonies  in  general  were  valued 
chiefly  from  a  commercial  standpoint,  and  as  these  colo- 
nies in  particular  were  valuable  mainly  as  consumers  of 
British  products,  efforts  were  made  in  the  years  after  the 
peace  to  secure  to  the  mother  country  the  full  benefit  of  the 
North  American  market.  This  attempt  can  be  traced  in 
the  legislation  of  1764,  and  also  in  the  efforts  made  at  the 
'  Pari,  Hist.  15,  pp.  1271,  1272. 


156 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  i754-»76$ 


in 

(I  If 


1 1 


in 


same  time  to  uproot  illegal  trading  in  the  colonies.  Simul- 
taneously, the  universal  success  of  British  arms  had  created 
in  England  a  feeling  of  self-confidence,  and  a  keen  interest 
in  the  dominions  beyond  the  sea.  There  arose  a  strong 
wave  of  imperial  sentiment,  which  directed  increasing  at- 
tention to  colonial  affairs  and  to  abuses  therein.  The  years 
of  war  were  inevitably  followed  by  a  period  of  readjustment 
and  of  reform,  and  the  direction  of  this  movement  was, 
to  a  great  extent,  conditioned  on  abuses  that  had  become 
patent  during  the  war,  and  on  the  adoption  of  the  more 
modern  view  of  the  value  of  colonies.  Coincident  with  the 
embodiment  of  this  changed  theory  of  colonization  in  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  there  began  a  counter- 
movement  in  favor  of  the  development  of  the  West  Indian 
colonies. 

As  already  pointed  out,  in  restoring  the  French  West 
Indies,  the  peace  meant  an  immediate  sacrifice  on  the  part 
of  British  commercial  interests.  An  extensive  and  valuable 
trade  with  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe  was  entirely  cut  off. 
In  opposing  the  treaty,  Pitt  pointed  out  that  the  trade  to 
Canada  was  of  little  importance  in  comparison  with  that  to 
the  West  Indian  islands,  which  had  been  restored  to  the 
arch-enemy.  St.  Lucia,  he  said,  should  not  have  been 
ceded,  nor  should  Guadeloupe  and  Martinique  have  been 
returned  to  France,  for  all  that  England  gains  by  the  West 
Indies  "is  made  four-fold  to  us  by  the  loss  which  ensues  to 
France.  But  our  conquests  in  North  America  are  of  very 
little  detriment  to  the  commerce  of  France."  '  Pitt's  views 
'Pari.  Hist.  15,  p.  1266. 


TROPICAL   AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION 


157 


exp'jsscd  the  opinion  generally  prevalent  in  England  that 
the  peace  had  sacrificed  British  interests,  and  that  the  con- 
tinental colonies  were  the  chief  beneficiaries  '  of  a  war  carried 
on  mainly  at  the  expense  of  the  mother  country.  At  the 
same  time  it  was  recognized  that  the  hereditary  enemy, 
France,  by  receiving  back  Guadeloupe  and  Martinique 
would,  in  the  not  distant  future,  again  be  in  a  position  to 
challenge  British  maritime  supremacy.  Hence  arose  an 
attempt  to  stimulate  the  development  of  the  old  and  the  newly 
acquired  West  Indian  colonics,  both  in  order  to  make  some 
compensation  for  the  loss  inflicted  on  British  trade  by  the 
treaty  of  1763,  and  also  at  the  same  time  in  order  to  injure 
French  commerce.  A  similar  attempt  had  been  made  thirty 
years  before  this.  The  Molasses  Act  of  1 733,  which  aimed  at 
preventing  the  continental  colonies  from  buying  French  West 
Indian  produce,  was  based  on  the  ideal  of  a  self-sufficient 


*  For  this  point,  see  Remarks  on  the  Letter  Ad.lress'd  to  Two  Great  Men 
(London,  1760),  and  Franklin's  answer  in  the  same  year,  The  Interest  of  Great 
Britain  Considered.  The  general  opinion  in  England  is  well  expressed  in 
a  private  letter  dated  Nov.  18,  1768:  "  It  is  a  most  lamentable  consideration 
to  this  kingdom  that  there  should  be  almost  open  war  between  one  part  and 
another.  The  colonists  object  to  every  mode  of  taxation,  without  ever  propos- 
ing how  much  they  will  raise  in  their  own  way  towards  the  millions  of  debt 
England  is  loaded  with,  and  taxe  I  to  the  very  teeth  to  pay  the  interest  of,  and 
which  was  actually  expended  in  the  sole  defence  and  support  of  the  colonies." 
MSS.  of  Shrewsbury,  etc.,  Hist.  MSS.  Com.  i8qo,  p.  9S-  During  the  con- 
troversies in  1764  and  1765,  the  colonial  writers  denied  vigorously,  though  not 
convincingly,  that  they  had  reaped  the  chief  advantages  from  the  protracted 
war.  Oxenhridge  Thacher,  The  Sentiments  of  a  British  American  (Boston, 
1764)1  P-  7;  James  Oiis,  The  Rights  of  The  British  Colonists  (Boston,  1764), 
p.  43;  Stephen  Hopkins,  The  Rights  of  the  Colonies  (Providence,  1765), 
p.  ai. 


IS« 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  i7$4-«76$ 


liJ 


(  ! 


Empire,  and  was  a  measure  of  economic  warfare  against 
France.'    This  policy  had  not  been  successful ;  its  revival  in 
1764  was  in  part  based  on  the  broad  grounds  just  outlined. 
Incidentally,  also,  such  a  measure  would  be  of  great  advantage 
to  the  West  Indian  planters,  who  weic  still  very  influential  in 
British  political  circles.'   This  interest  had  opposcvi  the  acqui- 
sition of  Guadeloupe,'  unless  preferential  treatment   were 
granted  to  the  old  West  Indian  colonies.*    They  dreaded  the 
prospect  of  having  to  compete  with  the  conquered  French 
islands,  which  were  able  to  produce  sugar  more  cheaply.    The 
West  Indies,  however,  felt  slighted  at  the  insignificance  of  the 
acquisitions  in  the  Caribbean  after  the  most  successful  war 
in  British  annals.    Thus,  the  Barbados  Assembly  showed 
its  dissatisfaction  with  the  terms  of  the  treaty  by  refusing 
to  join  in  an  address  from  the  Governor  and  Council  to  the 
King  congratulating  him  on  the  peace.'    This  specific  and 
the  more  general  dissatisfaction  with  the  ♦'»rms  of  the 

'  Pari.  Hist.  8,  pp.  99a  et  seq. 

'  M»ny  of  the  planters  resided  in  England.  An  Examination  of  the  Com- 
mercial Principles  of  the  late  NegoUations  (London,  1763),  p.  a8.  On  April 
30, 1764,  Franklin  wrote  to  CoUinson :  "For  Interest  with  you  we  have  but  lit- 
tle. The  West  Indians  vutly  outweigh  us  of  the  Northern  Colonies."  Frank- 
lin, Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  IV,  p.  243-  In  1764  Jasper  Mauduit  said  that  the 
West  Indies  have  "a  very  formidable  number  of  votes  in  the  House  of  Com- 
mons."   Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Coll.  Series  I,  vol.  VI,  p.  193- 

•Thus  on  July  9,  1761,  Bedford  wrote  to  Bute  in  connection  with  Pitt's 
plan  to  Uke  Martinique:  "I  suppose  the  sugar  planters  will  no  more  desire 
(it)  should  be  retained  by  us  than  they  did  in  relation  to  Guadaloupe."  Bed- 
ford Correspondence  III,  p-  aS- 

•  Reflections  on  the  Tr.ic  Interest  of  Great  BriUin.  Col.  Corr.  Barba- 
dos!. 

•  Charles  Pinfold  to  Egremont  July  16, 1763.    Ibid. 


TROPICAL  AND  CONTINENTAL  COLONIZATION        159 

treaty,  combined  with  the  desire  to  injure  French  commerce, 
led  directly  to  the  revival  of  the  policy  of  the  "  Molasses 
Act "  of  1733,  and  to  the  enactment  of  the  "  Sugar  Bill "  of 
1764,  in  so  far  as  it  was  designed  to  regulate  trade,  and  not 
to  raise  a  revenue.' 

'  In  this  connection  it  should  be  noted  that  Geor|te      ci     Ik ,  who  was  the 
father  of  the  act  of  1764,  in  176a  opposed  the  cessir    ,1  s*   uuci?  an'         'Ut. 
loupe  to  France,  and  insisted  on  an  equivalent  be  .     ask    \  j  .1  ihc    ^..■ 
Havana.    GienviUe  Papen  I,  p.  45a 


CHAPTER   IX 

THE  PEACE  OF   PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


I        I 

-.V. 


ft 


In  the  history  of  any  state,  periods  of  external  activity 
and  growth  alternate  with  periods  of  internal  development 
and  readjustment.    The  strenuous  seven  years  of  war  were 
inevitably  followed  by  a  movement  of  reform.    In  so  far 
as  British  colonial  policy  was  concerned,  this  movement 
took  the  shape  of  an  attempt  to  reform  the  system  of  im- 
perial defence;   of  efforts  to  uproot  those  evils  in  the  ad- 
ministrative system  that  had  been  exposed  by  the  colonial 
trade  with  the  enemy;   of  legislation  tending  to  secure  to 
the  mother  country  the  full  advantages  of  the  North  Ameri- 
can market ;  of  a  revival  of  the  policy  of  checking  the  trade 
of  the  continental  colonies  to  the  foreign  West  Indies  with 
a  view  to  developing  the  British  interest  in  the  Caribbean  Sea 
at  the  expense  of  French  commerce;  and,  finally,  of  a  re- 
adjustment of  the  laws  of  trade  to  the  new  conditions  that  the 
vast  territorial  acquisitions  secured  by  the  treaty  of  1 763  had 
created.     In  general,  this  policy  meant  a  tightening  of  the 
imperial  tie,  a  stiffening  of  the  imperial  structure,  which  was 
to  this  extent  ill-timed,  in  that  it  coincided  with  a  diametri- 
cally opposite  movement  in  the  continental  colonics.    To 
these  colonics  the  removal  of  France  from  Canada  was  of 
utmost   importance.     The  French  danger  was  the  chief 

ite 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


I6l 


Utilitarian  tic  attaching  the  colonies  to  the  metropolis,  and  *- 
its  elimination  allowed  full  play  to  those  marked  forces  that 
tended  toward  a  disintegration  of  the  Empire. 

The  movement  toward  independence  dates  from  the  very 
foundation  of  the  colonics.  The  settlement  of  New  England 
was  not  the  result  of  a  normal  expansion  of  the  state,  but 
was  rather  of  the  nature  of  a  schism  therein  or  of  a  secession 
therefrom.  This  tendency  in  the  direction  of  political  sepa- 
ration from  the  mother  country  was  due  in  great  part  to 
the  extreme  individualism  of  the  immigrants,  whether  they 
came  from  England,  Scotland,  Ireland,  or  from  continental 
Europe.  This  original  characteristic  was  in  turn  strength- 
ened by  the  isolation  of  the  colonists  in  a  remote  portion 
of  the  world,  cut  off  not  only  from  their  fellows  in  Great 
Britain,  but  also  from  those  in  the  other  British  colonies 
by  the  enormous  distances  that  steam  and  electricity  have 
since  so  immeasurably  shortened.  In  part  also  this  lack 
of  cohesion  in  the  Empire  was  due  to  the  jxilicy  of  England, 
which  granted  to  the  colonies  large  powers  of  local  self- 
government.  In  this  resjMxt  the  old  Empire  fell  little  short 
of  the  modern  one.  The  degree  of  self-government  in  the  ^ 
charter  and  even  in  the  proprietary  colonies  was  only  some- 
what less  than  that  now  exercised  by  Canada  and  Australia. 
On  th.e  other  hand,  the  mother  country  erected  legislatures 
in  all  the  colonies,  even  in  those  sup|)orted  by  the  British  » 
tax-payer,'  and  uniformly  granted  them  far  greater  powers 
than  are  enjoyed  to-day  by  a  large  number  of  the  crown 
colonies.    Thus,  in  the  eighteenth  century,   Jamaica  gov- 

'  The  first  Assembly  of  Nova  Scotia  met  in  1 758.   Nova  Scotia  Arch.,  p.  728. 


.1      j 


1 63 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  i7S4-«76s 


ii 


erned  itself  to  a  much  greater  extent  than  it  does  at  the 
present  time. 

In  the  royal  colonies,  the  Crown  appointed  the  governor 
and  the  council;  the  latter  also  acted  as  the  upper  branch 
of  the  legislature,  the  lower  house  being  popularly  elected. 
The  system  is  now  known  as  the  "representative"  one  in 
contradistinction  to  the  system  of "  responsible  government," 
that  at  present  prevails  in  colonies  like  Canada.  The  idea 
was  that  the  governor  and  council  should  be  a  check  on  the 
popular  branch  of  the  legislature,  and  should  be  independent 
of  it.  In  practice,  however,  owing  to  the  fact  that  as  a  rule 
the  lower  house  had  gained  complete  control  of  the  local 
finances,  the  governor  became  dependent  on  the  legislature, 
which  was  often  in  a  position  to  withhold  his  salary  in  case 
he  refused  to  comply  with  its  wishes.  There  was  full  justifi- 
cation for  Soame  Jenyns's  contention  that  the  governors 
could  get  their  salaries  from  the  colonial  legislatures  only  by 
violating  the  instructions  that  they  had  received  from  the 
home  government.' 

Thus  the  course  of  constitutional  development  in  the 
colonies  proceeded  from  the  presidential  system,  or  that  of 
mere  "representative  government,"  in  the  direction  of  the 
parliamentary  system,  or  that  of  "responsible  government." 
Through  its  control  of  the  purse,  the  lower  house  of  the  pro- 
vincial legislatures  had  become  the  dominating  factor  in 
American  political  life.  This  development  had  taken  place 
in  the  West  Indies  as  well  as  on  the  continent,  though  in 

'  Soame  Jcnyns,  The  Objections  to  the  Taxation  of  our  American  Colonies 
(ad  ed.  London,  1765),  pp.  13,  14. 


.ii 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


163 


general  to  a  less  marked  extent.  In  1742  the  Governor  of 
Barbados  said  that  some  people  in  the  colony  have  the  idea 
"that  the  King  has  no  prerogative  here,  and  that  Governors 
should  be  solely  dependent,  on  the  people."  '  In  1753  the 
Jamaica  A.sscmbly  passed  the  following  resolution:  "That 
it  is  the  inherent  and  undoubted  Right  of  the  Representa- 
tives of  the  People  to  raise  and  apply  Monies  for  the  Service 
and  Exigencies  of  Government,  and  to  appoint  such  Person 
or  Persons  for  the  receiving  and  issuing  thereof,  as  they  shall 
think  proper."  This  claim  of  the  Jamaica  Assembly 
attracted  the  attention  of  the  House  of  Commons,  which  in 
1757  voted  that  this  resolution  in  "so  far  as  the  same  imports 
a  Claim  of  Right  in  the  said  Assembly  to  raise  and  apply 
public  Money,  wifh  the  Consent  of  the  Governor  and 
Council,  is  illegal,  iv^agnant  to  the  Terms  of  his  Majesty's 
Commission  to  the  Governor  of  the  said  island,  and  derog- 
atory of  the  Rights  of  the  Crown  and  People  of  Great 
Brilain." ' 

•Am.  and  W.I.  37,  no.  a.    Robinson  to  Newcastle,  Aug.  aq,  174a. 

'  May  a.?,  1 757.  Commons  Journal  a7,  pp.  910,  91 1.  At  this  time  also  the 
House  of  Commons  passed  two  other  resolutions,  one  again.st  the  claim  of 
the  Jamaica  As.sembly  to  apfwint  a  person  for  receiving  and  issuinj?  money, 
the  other  upholding  the  necessity  of  the  instruction  to  the  colonial  governors 
not  to  pass  laws  affecting  the  Crown's  prerogative  or  the  trade  of  Great  Uriuin, 
unless  their  execution  were  suspended  until  the  Crown's  pleasure  could  be  as- 
certained. The  Jamaica  Assembly  had  objected  to  this  instruction.  On 
Oct.  13,  1762,  Governor  \V.  H.  Lyttclton  of  Jamaica  wrote  to  the  Hoard  of 
Trade,  though  "there  are  strong  assurances  given  by  the  people  of  their  Loy- 
ally  &  dutifull  attachments  to  His  Majesty,  there  Ls  nevertheless,  as  far  as  I 
am  able  to  judge,  such  an  eager  desire  to  be  freed  from  those  restraints,  which 
the  Wisdom  of  His  Majesty's  Councils  have  put  them  under  in  common  with 
the  rest  of  His  Colonies  in  the  great  point  of  Legislation,  &  such  an  aspiring 


h  ^ 


i64 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I754->76S 


ill;  n 


These  resolutions,  though  passed  in  connection  with  the 
claims  of  the  Jamaica  Assembly,  were  meant  to  apply  to  all 
the  colonial  legislatures.  They  were  ineffectual  in  stopping 
the  trend  of  constitutional  development.  Thus  the  Lieu- 
tenant Governor  of  New  Jersey,  to  whom  a  copy  of  these 
resolutions  had  been  sent,  wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade  that 
they  could  be  of  no  avail  unless  followed  by  an  act  of  Parlia- 
ment, and  that  "under  the  situation  that  His  Majesty's 
Governors  are  at  present,  the  Bringing  any  of  the  Crown's 
Rights  into  Dispute  with  the  People  is  the  sure  Way  to  lose 
them."  '  The  general  tendency  was  toward  virtual  auton- 
omy; the  imperial  tie  was  continually  being  loosened,  and 
all  political  life  in  the  colonies  centred  in  the  vigorous  local 

endeavour  to  acquire  in  their  Assemblies  &  within  the  sphere  of  their  activity 
the  same  Power  and  Priveleges  as  are  enjoy'd  by  a  British  House  of  Com- 
mons, a-s,  I  humbly  conceive,  may  well  deserve  the  consideration  of  Mis  Maj- 
esty's Ministers."  B.  T.  Jam.  36  Bb  65,  A  few  days  later,  Lyttelton  again 
wrote,  that  the  Jamaica  Assembly  has  "for  some  years  last  past  considered  the 
House  of  Commons  of  Oreat  Britain  as  their  Model  &  have  assum'd  &  ex- 
ercis'd  the  powers  thereof  as  nearly  as  the  circumstances  of  this  Country  cou'd 
allow  of.  apprehending  themselves  to  have  an  inherent  Right  so  to  do  as  Eng- 
lish subjects,  cnlit'led  to  the  use  &  t)cnefit  of  the  Laws  of  England  of  which  the 
Custom  of  Parliament  makes  a  i>art,  rather  than  by  virtue  of  Mis  Majesty's 
Commission  to  His  Governor;  &  the  pretension  of  the  Council  to  exercise  the 
power  of  the  House  of  Lords  is  built  upon  the  same  found.Ttion."  Lyttleton 
added:  "And  now  my  Lords  I  intreat  your  Lordshi)*  to  rellect  how  extremely 
difficult  it  is  for  the  King's  Governor  to  supjjort  His  Majesty's  Authority  in  this 
Island  with  a  Cuuncil  a.ssuming  the  Powers  of  the  House  of  Lords,  &  an  As 
sembly  those  of  the  House  of  Commons  of  Great  Hrit.iin.  Ibid.  Bb  66.  ( )n 
the  difliculties  of  the  governor  with  the  Jamaica  .^.sscmbly  in  1764  and  1765, 
see  Cal.  Home  Oflice  Papers,  1760  1765,  nos.  1650,  167S. 

'N.J.  Col.  Doc.  »X,  pp.  I,  3  Thomas  Pownall,  Sept.  j.^,  1757.  These 
resolutions  of  the  House  of  Commons  were  sent  by  the  Board  of  Trade  to  all 
the  colonial  governors.     (/  Pa.  Arch  ,  4th  Scries  II,  p.  873. 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE  165 

legislatures.  Thus  there  grew  up  in  America  a  class  of  men 
both  eager  and  in  general  competent  to  direct  the  affairs 
of  the  communities  to  which  they  belonged. 

The  British  government  had  striven  in  vain  against  this  de- 
velopment.  The  Board  of  Trade  knew  of  no  remedy.    Rec- 
ognizing the  justice  of  the  complaints  of  those  governors  who 
had  objected  to  the  encroachments  of  the  local  assemblies,  it 
had  repeatedly  written  to  them,  asking  for  suggestions  to  al- 
leviate the  difficulty.    The  only  remedy  that  suggested  itself 
was  the  creation  by  act  of  Parliament  of  a  colonial  revenue 
out  of  which  the  Crown  officials  should  receive  their  salaries, 
and  thus  become  independent  of  the  colonial  legislatures. 
This  proposal  had  not  commended  itself.    Nor  was  the  idea 
of  paying  these  otiicials  out  of  British  funds  seriously  en- 
tertained.    This   would   have  done  away  with   the  chief 
purpose  for  which  the  local  legislatures  had  been  established, 
and  to  which  they  devoted  their  main  attention,  namely, 
to  provide  for  the  cost  of  their  own  public  affairs. 

The  general  effect  o^  this  constitutional  development  was  to 
lessen  the  political  dependence  of  the  colonies  on  the  Empire 
and  to  create  a  tendency  toward  political  st-paration.  That 
this  would  be  the  ultimate  future  of  the  colonies  had  been 
[winted  out  already  in  1656  by  James  Harrington.  In  his 
"Oceana,"  '  this  famous  and  in*l'iential  thinker  said  :  "That 
national  or  independent  Empire,  of  wliat  kind  soever,  is  to 
be  excrcis'd  by  them  that  have  the  proper  balance  of  Domin- 
ion in  the  Nation ;  wherfore  provincial  or  dependent  Empire 
is  not  to  be  exercis'd  by  them  that  have  the  balance  of  Do- 
•  London  ed.  of  1747,  pp.  42,  43. 


!i«ii 


II 


i66 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,   1754-1765 


!l 


minion  in  the  Province,  because  that  would  bring  the  Gov- 
ernment from  Provincial  and  Dependent,  to  National  and 
Independent."  Starting  from  this  premise,  Harrington 
reached  the  conclusion  that  "the  Colonys  in  the  Indies,  they 
are  yet  Babes  that  cannot  live  without  sucking  the  breasts 
of  their  Mother  Citys,  but  such  as  I  mistake,  if  when  they 
com  of  age  they  do  not  wean  themselves :  which  causes  me 
to  wonder  at  Princes  that  delight  to  be  exhausted  in  that 
way."  *  Harrington  showed  keen  insight  and  his  conclusion 
was  sound,  for  under  the  conditions  prevailing  prior  to  the 
inventions  that  have  so  extensively  facilitated  the  means 
of  comr  jnication,  it  was  impossible  to  create  a  loosely 
organi  empire  with  sufficient  social  solidarity  to  make 
its  i-  members  one  coherent  whole. 

I  _ . :  :;ton's  theoretical  conclusion  was  borne  out  by  thede- 
vel  pm  within  the  Empire.'  Thus  in  171 1,  Robert  Hunter, 
th  1  g<  mor  of  New  York,  one  of  the  most  public-spirited 
col<  adn  nistrators,  wrote  to  the  secretary  of  state  ' 
t  th(  prev  d  in  the  colonies  a  spirit  of  absolute  inde- 
j  ndenic  '-^  t  management  of  their  affairs.  The  New 
York  Asscmhiy,  he  said,  claimed  "all  ye  previledges  of  a 

'  Londnn  C(!  oi  1747,  p.  44.  John  Adams  quoted  this  passage  in  his  "  No- 
vanglus."  Works  (ed.  C.  F.  Adams)  IV,  p.  104.  On  Harrington's  influence  on 
American  thought,  see  T.  W.  Dwight  in  Pol.  Science  Quar.  11,  pp.  i  el  srq. 

»  Filed  among  the  British  state  papers  for  1 733-1 748  is  an  undated  memorial 
on  the  colonies,  which  states  that  care  must  he  taken  "so  to  regulate  them  that 
they  may  answer  the  End  of  Settlements,  and  deserve  the  Protection  given  to 
them  from  hence :  For  unless  some  Care  be  taken,  the  People  bom  there,  are 
too  apt  to  imbibe  Notions  of  Independency  of  their  Mother  Kingdom."  Am 
and  W  I.  603. 

•  Am.  and  W.I.  6,  nos.  87,  94;  Ibid.  Bundle  «;8a,  Sept.  is,  1711. 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


167 


House  of  Commons,  and  Stretching  them  even  beyond  what 
they  were  ever  Imagined  to  be  there,  should  the  Counsill 
by  ye  same  Rule  lay  Claime  to  ye  rights  and  priviledges  of  a 
house  of  Peers,  here  is  a  body  politik  Coordinate  with  ( & 
claiming  equal  powers)  and  Consequently  Independant  of 
ye  Great  Counsill  of  the  Realme."  Hunter  then  quoted 
with  approval,  as  "a  Reflexion  that  deserves  some  Considera- 
tion," Harrington's  remarks  and  prediction  about  the  future 
destiny  of  the  colonics.' 

In  fact,  the  entire  governmental  machinery  worked 
with  so  much  friction  *  at  every  point  where  the  local 
and  imperial  authorities  came  into  contact,  that  it  was  " 
apparent  to  many  that  the  Empire  was  in  a  posi- 
tion of  most  unstable  political  equilibrium.  The  Crown 
officials  were  continually  writing  to  the  government  about 
this  tendency  toward  independence.  In  1709,  one  of  the 
admiralty  judges  informed  the  Eari  of  Nottingham  that  ^ 
Rhode  Island  behaved  as  if  it  were  an  independent  state, 
and  that  in  Massachusetts  "some  of  the  leading  men  already 
begin  to  talke  of  shaking  off  their  subjection  to  the  Crown  of 

'At  this  time  the  New  York  Assembly  claimed  an  "inherent  right"  of 
legislating  apart  from  the  Crown's  instructions  to  the  governor  to  call  together 
the  legislature.  This  claim  was  subsequently  generally  advanced  by  the 
colonies. 

'  On  Jan.  i,  171  a,  Robert  Hunter  wrote  to  the  .secretary  of  state  :  "In  the 
Infancy  of  the  Colonies  the  Crown  was  lavish  of  priviledges  as  necessary  for 
their  nurseing,  but  a  full  grown  boy  makes  commonly  but  Indifferent  use  of 
that  Indulgence  requisite  toward  a  Child;"  in  New  York  the  Council  is 
"vilified  and  Insulted  and  the  officers  of  Government  Look'd  upon  as  the  '' 
Common  Enemy's  and  marks  of  their  Malice  and  all  this  without  the  least 
provocation  or  Colour  of  ReMon."    Am.  and  W.I.  583. 


W 


1 


iF,    i 


ill 


I  ' 


i68 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4-I7«! 


England." '  Twenty  years  later,  another  official  informed 
the  British  government  that  in  New  England  there  were  fre- 
quent instances  of  people  disowning  the  King's  sovereignty; 
"I  have  heard  one  say  in  publique  Company  that  he  was  a 
Subject  of  this  Country,  &  not  to  the  King." »  Then  again, 
some  decades  later,  the  proprietary  governor  of  Pennsylvania, 
a  colonial  in  interests,  wrote  of  the  people  whose  executive 
head  he  was:  "I  cannot  indeed  accuse  them  of  disaffection 
to  the  Royal  Family  now  upon  the  Throne,  but  they  are  Cer- 
tainly disaffected  to  Government  itself,  and  Consequently 
^  to  his  Majesty's  Office  and  Authority  tho'  not  to  his  Person 
or  Family."  *  William  Knox,  who  at  a  later  date  was 
prominent  in  British  official  life,  came  to  the  colonies  in 

'  Am.  and  W.I.  6,  no.  la.    Roger  Mompewon,  July  4,  1709. 

•Am.  and  W.I.  1,  no.  177.    David  Dunbar. 

'  Robert  Hunter  Morris  to  Penn,  Oct.  27,  1755.  Am.  and  W.I.  69.  At  a 
hearing  before  the  Board  of  Trade  in  1760  concerning  some  laws  passed  in 
Pennsylvania,  the  Attorney-General  opened  the  ca.se,  "stating  the  general 
Tendency  and  Disposition  of  the  House  of  Assembly  of  the  Province  at  all 
times  to  encroach  upon  the  Rights  of  the  Proprietaries,  the  Prerogative  of  the 
Crown,  and  the  sovereign  Government  of  the  Mother  Country,  by  their  as- 
serting that  the  Lieutenant  Governor  was  not  the  Governor  of  the  Crown;  — 
by  their  almost  rebellious  Declarations  with  respect  to  the  Instruction  con- 
cerning Paper  Currency  founded  upon  an  Address  of  Parliament ;— by 
denying  the  Right  of  the  Proprietaries  to  instruct  their  Gov'  and  other  Acts 
of  avowed  Democracy  "  B.  T.  Journals  6S,  p.  139.  In  1723,  a  somewhat 
intemperate  and  partisan  writer  wrote  concerning  Boston:  "Speaking  of 
treason,  of  which  I  have  heard  more  here  in  one  day,  than  in  all  my  life  before, 
such  as  his  Ma'r  has  no  business  in  this  countn-,  he  is  our  nominal  king,  but  has 
^  not  one  foot  of  ground  among  us,  neither  he  or  his  Di-putys  or  Govrmours  have 
anything  to  doe  here,  the  country  is  oura  not  his,  weel  try  his  title  by  Law 
as  we  have  nothing  to  do  with  their  country  so  they  have  nothing  to  due  with 
ours,  &  weel  have  a  fair  tryal  for  it.  ..."        n-  and  W.I.  1,  no.  87. 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


169 


1757,  and  found  that  "a  general  disposition  to  independence 
of  this  country  prevailed  throughout  the  whole."  • 

If  loyalty  be  conceived  as  a  sentiment  implying  duties  and 
sacrifices,  and  not  merely  utilitarian  allegiance,  there  was 
in  the  colonies,  broadly  speaking,  little  loyalty  to  Great 
Britain.  Colonial  public  spirit  was  predominantly  provincial. 
Except  in  so  far  as  the  mother  country  was  a  shield  against 
France  or  Spain,  she  represented  in  general  merely  an  outside 
force  that  interfered  with  their  attaining  complete  self- 
government.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  was  there  any  national 
or  American  spirit  in  the  continental  colonies.  Reciprocal 
jealousies  culminating  in  discriminatory  legislation,  boun- 
dary disputes,  quarrels  over  the  Indian  trade,  show  as  clearly 
as  did  the  failure  of  the  plan  of  union  of  1 754  that  the  crea- 
tion of  a  united  nation  was  still  in  the  distant  future.'  Thus 
each  colony  stood  by  itself,  intent  on  its  own  political 
disputes,  and  in  turn  each  colony  relied  on  the  mother 
country  for  protection.  These  two  factors,  especially  the 
latter,  counteracted  the  disintegrating  tendencies  within  the 
Empire. 

That  under  such  conditions  independence  was  a  political 
impossibility  was  recognized  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
Empire's  history.  At  that  time,  and  virtually  until  the  con- 
quest of  Canada,  independence  from  Great  Britain  would 
have  meant  only  conquest  and  absorption  by  some  other  of 
the  European  colonizing  powers.  Thus  in  1633.  Downing, 
the  brother-in-law  of  John  Winthrop,  wrote  to  Secretary 

•  Knox,  Extra  Official  State  Papers  (London,  1789)  II,  p.  ii. 
'  CJ.  Bumaby,  Travels,  \i\>.  152,  153. 


I-  t 


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}   ji  f 


170 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,   l7S4-l76s 


Coke,  "it  is  a  causeless  fear  without  precedent  that  a  colony 
planted  in  a  strange  land  was  ever  so  foolishly  besotted  as  to 
reject  the  protection  of  their  natural  prince.  ...  It  is 
not  an  easy  thing  to  force  or  comjKJ  a  colony  planted  in  a 
strange  land  to  forsake  their  allegiance  and  protection  of 
their  natural  prince,  or  to  leave  their  commerce  with  their 
friends  and  allies  in  their  native  country,  whom  they  may 
safely  trust,  and  so  rest  upon  strangers  for  protection  and 
commerce,  in  whom  they  can  put  no  confidence.  Surely 
they  would  be  counted  a  foolish  and  mad  people  that  should, 
without  constraint,  take  their  stocks  out  of  their  friends' 
and  kinsmens'  hands  to  venture  and  hazard  the  same  in  mens' 
hands  in  whom  they  have  had  no  experience." '  The  entire 
course  of  English  colonial  history  up  to  1 763  shows  that  the 
closeness  or  looseness  of  the  imperial  tie  depended  upon  the 
extent  of  the  danger  from  Spain  or  France.  The  fact  that 
Great  Britain  protected  the  colonies  in  peace  and  in  war  was 
the  main  bond  securing  the  colonies  to  the  mother  country. 
So  apparent  was  this  that  a  Swedish  scientist,  who  toward  the 
middle  of  the  eighteenth  century  travelled  extensively  in  the 
colonies,  questioned  whether  England  had  ever  seriously 
intended  to  conquer  Canada,  as  the  proximity  of  the  French 
deterred  the  colonies  from  seceding.* 

Similarly  it  was  recognized  that  the  disunion  of  the  col- 
onies was  a  potent  factor  in   retaining  them  within   the 

'  Coke  MSS.,  owned  by  Lord  Walter  T.  Kerr,  and  located  at  Melbourne 
Hall,  Derbyshire,  England.  The  spelling  and  punctuation  of  the  extract  have 
U'cn  modernized. 

•  Peter  Kalm,  En  Resa  Til  Norra  .America  (Stockholm,  1756)  II,  pp.  371 
,1  seq.;  English  translation  (Warrington,  1770)  II,  p.  264. 


I 


THE   PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPtRE 


171 


imperial  fold.'  Shiriey  thought  that  their  clashing  interests 
would  prevent  a  union  without  which  independence  was 
impossible.*  In  the  discussions  during  the  war  as  to 
the  advisability  of  retaining  Canada,  it  was  pointed  out 
that  the  removal  of  the  French  would  lead  to  a  movement 
for   independence  on   the  part  of    the  continental   colo- 

'  Both  ideas  arc  contained  in  an  address  of  the  New  York  Assembly  of  1 741 
answering  the  Governor's  speech  in  which  he  Mid  that  some  in  England  thought 
the  colonies  were  anxious  for  independence:  "We  dare  Vijuch  That  not  one 
single  Person  in  it  has  any  such  Thoughts  or  Desire,  fur  under  what  Govern- 
ment can  we  be  Ijetter  Protected,  or  our  Liberties  and  Properties  so  well 
secured  ?"    Am.  and  W.I.  9,  no.  93. 

•  Shirley  was  ardently  in  favor  of  conquering  Canada,  and  hence  tended  to 
belittle  the  effect  of  such  an  event  on  the  unity  of  the  Empire.  In  1745,  he 
wrote  to  Newcastle  urging  his  favorite  scheme,  and  pointing  out  that  if  the 
colonies  became  restless  and  wanted  independence,  Louisburg  would  be  a  very 
important  check  to  such  a  movement.  He  also  added,  this  contingency  "seems 
to  me  from  the  observation  I  have  been  able  to  make  ujKin  the  Spot,  at  the  Dis- 
tance of  some  Centuries  farther  off  than,  I  have  heard,  it  does  to  Some  Ctentle- 
men  at  home."  Am.  and  W.I.  3,  no.  197.  In  1755,  also,  Shirley  wrote  to  Sir 
Thomas  Robinson  advising  the  conquest  of  Canada  and  adding:  "Apprehen- 
sions have  been  entertain'd,  that  they  (the  colonies)  will  in  time  unite  to  throw 
off  their  Dependency  upon  their  Mother  Countr)',  &  set  up  one  General  Gov- 
ernment among  themselves;  But  if  it  is  consider'd,  Sir,  how  different  the  pres- 
ent Constitutions  of  their  respective  Governments  are  from  each  other;  how 
much  the  Interests  of  some  of  them  clash,  &  how  opposite  their  Tempera  are  ; 
such  a  Coalition  among  them  will  seem  highly  improbable,  at  all  Events,  they 
could  not  maintain  such  an  Independency,  without  a  Strong  Naval  Force, 
which  it  must  forever  be  in  the  Power  of  Great  Britain  to  hinder  them  from 
having."  Am.  and  W.I.  83.  Jeremiah  Dummcr  in  his  "  Defence  of  the  New 
England  Charters"  (London,  1721),  likewise  maintained  that  the  colonies 
were  "so  distinct  from  one  another  in  their  Forms  of  Government,  in  their 
Religious  Rites,  in  their  Emulation  of  Trade,  and  consequently  in  their  Affec- 
tions, that  they  can  never  be  suppos'd  to  unite  in  so  dangerous  an  Enterprize," 
as  tr)'ing  to  gain  independence.  Pownall  {op.  cil.,  pp.  28, 63, 64)  also  advanced 
the  same  argument. 


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172 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


;■      I 


nies."  Such  unquestionably  was  the  result.  The  conquest 
of  Canada  severed  the  chief  material  bond  attaching  these 
colonies  to  Great  Britain,  and  made  their  independence  a 

'  In  1777  there  were  published  by  J.  Almon  some  letters  purporting  to  have 
been  written  by  Montcalm  in  the  years  1 757, ,  758,  and  1 759.    (Lettres  de  M. 
le  Marquis  de  Montcalm,  London,  1777.)     At  the  very  time   of  publica- 
tion, their  authenticity  was  questioned,  Shclbume  affirming  that  they  werj 
forgeries  and  Lord  Mansfield  insisting  that  they  were  not  spurious.    (Ahnon, 
Parliamentary  Register,  House  of  Lords,  VH,  pp.  12a,  ia6,  127.)    Their  pub- 
hsher  was  himself  in  doubt  as  to  their  authenticity.    (Almon,  Biographical 
Anecdotes  U,  p.  99.)    Since  then  this  question  has  been  frequently  discussed 
e.g.,  by:  Parkman  in  Mass.  HUt.  Soc.  Proc.  1869-1870,  pp.  118  et  scg.  and  in 
Montcalm  and  Wolfe  II,  pp.  325, 326;  Justin  Winsor  in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Proc. 
1886-1887,  P-  202;   Henry  Stevens,  Bibliotheca  HUtorica,  1870,  pp.  114-117. 
Subsequent  to  these  discussions,  manuscript  copies  of  the  letters  have  come  to 
light  in  the  Dartmouth  collection  and  in  that  of  the  Marquess  of  Lothian.    It 
also  appears  that  other  manuscript  copies  of  these  and  other  letters  of  Montcalm 
are  in  the  Cheltenham  Collection  (Doughty,  Siege  of  Quebec  VI,  pp.  243, 257), 
as  well  as  in  the  Montcalm  papers  and  in  the  Public  Record  Office  (Am.  and 
W.I.  48s).    Obviously  the  dispute  as  to  their  authenticity  cannot  be  deter- 
mined without  a  careful  comparative  examination  of  these  manuscripts.    These 
letters  were  handed  to  the  British  government  by  one  Roubaud,  a  renegade 
Jesuit  missionary,  who  after  the  conquest  of  Canada  went  over  to  the  English 
His  own  testimony  is  contradictory,  and  is  to  a  great  extent  worthless  on  ac- 
count of  his  unreliable  character.    Yet  it  unquestionably  throws  a  serious  doubt 
on  the  genuineness  of  the  letters.    One  point  is,  however,  beyond  question,  that 
Roubaud  handed  copies  of  these  letters  to  Grenville  at  the  very  beginning  of  the 
American  troubles,  when  there  could  be  virtually  no  inducement  to  misrepre- 
sent conditions  in  the  colonies.    ("Mr.  Roubaud's  Deplorable  Case"  in  His- 
torical Magazine,  Series  II,  VIII,  p.  283;   Brymner,  Report  on  Can.  Arch., 
1885,  p.  cxxxviii  ;    Almon,   Biographical  Anecdotes  II,  p.  99;  Verreau  in 
Report  of  the  Minister  of  Agriculture  of  Canada,  1874,  p.  182.)    Apart  from 
the  question  of  their  authorship  by  Montcalm,  these  letters  in  general  describe 
accurately  conditions  in  the  colonies.    In  one  of  them  it  is  said  that  the  colo- 
nists "en  gfedral  ne  se  soucient  guferc  du  Roi  ni  du  Parlement  d'Angleterre- 
aussi  auraient-ils  d^  longtemps  secoud  le  joug,  si  la  crainte  de  la  France 
n'eut  ^t^  un  frein  pour  les  retenir,  chaque  Province  serait  devcnue  une  petite 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE  173 

political  possibility.'  It  was  a  most  fundamental  fact  in 
the  history  of  the  Empire ;  it  destroyed  the  equilibrium  of  the 
unstable  structure  and  allowed  full  scope  to  the  centrifugal 
forces  within  it.  It  had  little  effect  upon  the  West  Indian 
colonies ;  they  remained  as  heretofore  dependent  on  the  naval 
power  of  the  mother  country.  At  the  same  time  the  long 
years  of  joint  military  service  by  the  provincial  soldiers  tended 
to  bring  the  contmental  colonies  closer  together,  and  to 
emphasize  their  common  characteristics,  especially  when  con- 
trasted with  the  regular  soldiers  from  Europe.* 

While  thus  the  conquest  of  Canada  broke  the  main  link 
attaching  the  colonies  to  Great  Britain,  the  cooperation  of  the 
provincial  and  regular  forces  during  the  war  did  not  produce 

Republique."  MSS.  of  Marquess  of  Lothian  (Hist.  MSS.  Com.  1905),  p.  240. 
In  the  various  forms  in  which  these  letters  are  extant,  there  are  a  number  of 
verbal  differences  due  evidently  to  carelessness  on  the  part  of  Roubaud,  who 
made  a  number  of  copies  either  from  a  French  original  or,  as  some  suppose, 
from  an  English  one.  On  Roubaud,  see  espedally  Bryraner,  Report  on  Cana- 
dian Archives  for  1885,  and  also  Cal.  Home  Office  Papers,  1 760-x  765,  nos.  aoai 
2097. 

'Already,  in  1710-1711,  a  Frenchman  had  pointed  out  this  connection, 
Parkman,  Half  Century  of  Conflict  I,  p.  155. 

'  In  the  Montcalm  letters  mentioned  above  (Lettres  de  Montcalm,  pp.  2-10; 
Lothian  MSS.,  p.  239)  is  a  letter  purporting  to  have  been  written  to  Montcalm' 
from  Boston  and  subsequently  translated  by  Bougainville,  which  describes 
this  development.  "  Pendant  plus  d'un  si&cle  nos  diverscs  Colonies  ont  eu  UH 
peu  de  correspondence  entre  elles;  occuppdes  h  se  former  et  s'dtablir,  elles 
ne  visaient  qu'k  elles-mfimes.  Les  Gouvemements  d'ailieurs  sont  differents, 
les  loix,  la  Religion  souvent,  &  le  commerce  y  contrastent.  De  \h  leur  peu 
d'union:  elles  subsistaient  I'une  k  c6te  de  I'autre  sans  presque  se  connaltre. 
Mais  depuis  cette  guerre  les  colons  se  sont  rapprochds  de  mocure,  d'interfits 
&  de  sentiments;  obliges  de  foumir  leurs  contingents,  ils  se  sont  trouvds 
ranges  sous  le  mfime  pavilion ;  des  liaisons,  des  coi  respondences  :e  sont  form&s." 


i  p 

if 


i  I 


174 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


if 


a  cordial  feeling,  but  rather  served  to  accentuate  the  differ- 
ences between  the  two  branches  of  the  race.  It  emphasized 
what  were  to  a  great  extent  temporary  divergencies  created 
by  a  radically  different  social  and  economic  environment, 
and  it  led  to  many  misunderstandings.  Washington's 
scathing  criticism  of  the  regular  troops  under  Braddock* 
was  not  conducive  to  harmony,  nor  was  Wolfe's  even  more 
severe  condemnation  of  the  colonial  levies.*  The  prod- 
ucts of  a  more  highly  developed  and  complex  civilization 
were  prone  to  look  upon  the  rude  and  primitive  culture  of 
America  with  a  feeling  sometimes  bordering  on  contempt.' 
British  officers  were  apt  to  assert  a  superiority  which  was 

'  Washington,  Writings  (ed.  W.  C.  Ford)  I,  pp.  173-175.  Dinwiddie  sent 
a  copy  of  this  letter  to  England. 

'  In  1758,  on  hearing  of  the  defeat  of  Abercromby  at  Ticonderoga,  Wolfe 
wrote  to  Lord  George  Sackville:  "The  Americans  are  in  general  the  dirtiest 
most  contemptible  cowardly  dogs,  that  you  can  conceive.  There  is  no  depend- 
ing upon  'em  in  action.  They  fall  down  dead  in  their  own  dirt  and  desert  by 
battalions,  officers  and  all.  Such  rascals  as  those  are  rather  an  incumbrance 
than  any  real  strength  to  an  army."  Hist.  MSS.  Com.  9,  III,  p.  77  •.  Aber- 
cromby's  despatch  to  Pitt,  July  n,  1758,  gives  no  indication  that  there  was  any 
misbehavior  on  the  part  of  the  provincial  troops.  Am.  and  W.L  87.  On  Aug. 
22, 1758,  Pitv  himself  wrote  to  Grenville,  "the  troops  deserve  all  applause:  the 
provincials  share  the  honour  "  Grenville  Papers  I,  p.  262.  Coming  from  a 
man  of  such  lofty  character  as  was  Wolfe's,  these  criticisms  are  significant 
indications  of  the  alienation  between  the  mother  country  and  colonies.  Equally 
significant  are  the  criticisms  of  Forbes,  who  is  deservedly  recognized  as  one  of 
the  heroes  of  the  war.  These  have  been  quoted  elsewhere  in  this  essay.  For 
further  expressions  of  Forbes's  opinions,  see  Parkman,  Montcalm  and  Wolfe 
II,  p.  137. 

•  In  connection  with  the  handful  of  colonial  troops  that  participated  in  the 
reduction  of  Louisburg,  Wolfe  wrote  to  Lord  George  Sackville,  May  12,  1758: 
"About  500  Rangers  are  come,  which  to  appearance  are  little  better  than  ia 
canaille."    Doughty,  op.  cit.  VI,  p.  74. 


t  I: 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


175 


galling  to  the  pride  of  many  a  colonial.  In  a  number  of 
instances  this  feeling  was  justified  by  the  character  of  the 
colonial  levies.  Thus  a  cordial  friend  of  America  frankly 
admitted  that  the  two  regiments  enlisted  in  the  colonies  for 
service  in  1755  consisted  of  "the  very  scum  of  the  People, 
Who  will  be  of  as  little  service  planted  in  any  Colony  as  they 
are  in  the  Defence  of  it."  *  The  provincial  soldier  was 
also  unaccustomed  to  military  discipline  and  routine,  and 
was  of  far  less  value  in  open  operations '  than  in  backwoods 
fighting.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  regular  troops  and 
their  ofiicers  did  not  readily  adapt  themselves  to  the  condi- 
tions requisite  for  the  successful  conduct  of  a  war  in  America, 
and,  especially  in  the  first  few  years  of  the  war,  committed 
many  disastrous  blunders.'  Partly  for  this  reason  the  pro- 
vincial soldiers  were  loath  to  serve  under  British  officers. 

•  This  criticism  refers  to  the  two  regiments,  Shirley's  and  Pepperrell's, 
raised  in  America  at  the  expense  of  the  mother  country.  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  \Tn, 
Part  II,  p.  17;  Sharpe  Correspondence  I,  pp.  107,  108.  The  critic  quoted 
above  is  Denn)'s  (Dennis)  de  Berdt,  a  London  merchant  with  extensive  com- 
mercial connections  in  America.  At  a  later  date  he  was  agent  in  England  for 
the  Massachusetts  Assembly.  Appleton,  Cyclopaedia  of  American  Biography 
n,  p.  I  x8.  In  1 757  de  Berdt  prepared  a  scheme  for  carrying  on  the  war  which 
he  intended  for  the  consideration  of  Lord  Walpole,  but  on  that  statesman  being 
incapacitated  by  illness,  he  sent  it  to  Pitt,  Feb.  12, 1757.  Pringle  (Chatham) 
MSS.  in  Public  Record  Office,  vol.  XIX.    The  criticism  occurs  in  this  memorial. 

'  De  Berdt  said  that  a  large  nmber  of  regular  troops  was  necessary  "or  else 
in  an  open  Field  or  the  attacks  of  Forts  we  can  never  successfully  oppose  the 
Power  of  France  whose  Regular  Troops  are  exceeding  numerous." 

•Thus,  on  Dec.  i,  1758,  Jame;  Wolfe  wrote  to  his  friend  Rickson,  blaming 
Abercromby  for  his  "precipitate  attack  of  Ticonderago,"  disparaging  the  con- 
duct of  the  operations  against  Louisbutg,  saying  we  "blundered  from  the 
beginning  to  the  end  of  the  campaign."  Doughty,  op.  ct/.  VI,  p.  27.  On  May 
'4i  1758,  Wolfe  wrote  to  Sackville,  criticising  Loudoun  for  adhering  to  Euro- 


f 


176 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1734-1765 


As  De  Berdt  pointed  out  in  1757,  in  order  to  obtain  the  best 
men  in  the  colonies  they  must  be  commanded  by  "officers 
of  their  own  country."*  The  Americans  were  prone  to 
attribute  the  disasters  of  the  years  1755,  ^756,  and  1757  to  the 
inefficiency  of  the  British  military  commanders/  and  these 
in  turn  blamed  the  colonies  for  their  backwardness  in  pro- 
viding troops. 

One  of  the  most  troublesome  and  irritating  problems 
demanding  a  settlement  was  the  relative  rank  of  officers 
appointed  by  the  Crown  and  of  those  commissioned  by  the 
colonial  authorities.     This  led  to  many  disputes  and  dis- 
agreements.'   As  Great  Britain  undertook  the  responsibility 
of  the  war,  it  was  obviously  impossible  to  allow  the  regular 
to  be  outranked  by  the  colonial  officers,  as  in  this  way  the 
control  of  afifairs  might  pass  from  the  hands  of  the  mother 
country.    But  the  regulations  adopted  at  the  outset  were 
needlessly  stringent.    In  1754  it  was  ordered  that  all  troops 
serving  by  commission  from  the  Crown  or  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  should  outrank  all  colonial  troops;  that  all  provincial 
pean  methods  of  fighting.    ■'Hitherto  there  has  been  the  most  profound  ig- 
norance of  the  nature  of  the  war  upon  this  continent,"  a  condition  which  he 
hoped  Lord  Howe  would  remedy,  provided  he  outlived  the  campaign.    Ibid. 
P-77- 

•  Pringle  MSS.  XIX,  Feb.  la,  1757. 

'Ibid.  Dennys  de  Berdt  to  Pitt,  Jan.  16,  1758.  The  writer  added:  "Nor 
can  the  Provision  that  may  be  made  for  the  Nephews  or  youngest  Sons  of  Hon- 
ourable Families  by  giving  them  Command  in  America,  Compensate  for  hazard- 
ing the  loss  of  a  Country  which  acquired  by  our  Enemies  will  be  such  an 
accession  to  their  Power  as  wiU  enable  them  to  inslave  aU  Europe."  See  also 
Collections  of  Connecticut  Historical  Society  III,  pp.  334-336. 

•Parkman,  Montcalm  and  Wolfe  I,  pp.  152,  254,  390,  399,  400;  II, 
p.  118. 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


177 


general  and  field  officers  should  have  no  rank  when  serving 
with  similar  officers  appointed  by  the  Crown ;  and  that  all 
captains  and  other  inferior  officers  serving  under  commissions 
from  the  Crown  should  outrank  provincial  officers  of  like 
grade  regardless  of  the  date  of  their  commissions.'  In  1756 
these  regulations  were  altered  in  so  far  that  provincial  gen- 
eral and  field  officers  were  given  the  rank  of  eldest  captains 
"on  all  Detachments,  Cv^urts  Martial  or  other  Duty" 
wherein  they  may  be  employed  in  conjimction  with  the  regu- 
lar troops.'  Finally  in  1757,  Pitt  adopted  a  regulation  which, 
in  general,  proved  satisfactory.  It  provided  that  all  colonial 
officers,  from  the  rank  of  colonel  up,  should,  on  all  duties 
in  conjunction  with  the  regulars,  take  rank  after  all  colonels 
serving  by  commission  from  the  Crown,  and  that  all  inferior 

«  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  VIII,  Part  U,  pp.  29, 30 ;  Col.  Rec.  of  No.  Ca.  V,  p.  152. 
Sir  Thomas  Robinson,  Nov.  la,  1754. 

•  Henry  Fox,  May  12, 1736.  N.  J.  Col.  Do;:.  K,  pp.  19, 20,  and  Sharpe  Cor- 
respondence  I,  p.  413.  Some  of  the  difficulties  are  dearly  brought  out  in  a  letter 
that  Governor  Charles  Lawrence  wrote  to  Colonel  Monckton  in  connection  with 
the  troops  raised  in  New  England  for  the  Nova  Scotia  campaign  of  1 755.  On 
March  28, 1 755,  he  wrote :  "  The  Rank  of  a  Provincial  or  Irregular  Commission, 
which  is  no  more  than  Imaginary,  whither  of  a  Major  or  whatever  else  it  may 
be,  can  never  come  in  Competition  with  the  Rank  of  a  Commission  granted  by 
His  Majesty  how  inferior  soever  that  may  be:  Nevertheless  if  the  Provincial 
Officers  of  the  Irregulars  should  be  so  vainly  idle  as  to  Contend  with  the  other 
Officers  upon  a  point  that  appears  so  plainly  against  them,  I  should  hope  that 
the  Kings  Officers  will  even  acquiesce  for  the  sake  of  His  Majesties  Service 
in  an  affair  that  can  never  afterward  affect  their  Rank  as  Officers  in  the 
Army.  I  Should  recommend  it  strongly  at  the  same  time  to  seperate  as 
much  as  may  be  the  Regular  from  the  Provincial  Troops  in  order  to  pre- 
vent if  possible,  such  Ridiculous  differences,  as  some  vain  people  may  have 
a  propensity  to  Create."  Chalmers's  MSS.  (Lenox  Library)  Nova  Scotia, 
i74S-i8i7,pp.  8,  9. 


,■•■> 

!    ; 
i    . 


u 


178 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


coloniai  officers  should  take  rank  after  the  regular  officers 
of  the  like  grade.' 

In  the  later  and  successful  years  of  the  war,  after  Pitt 
had  inaugurated  the  compensation  system,'  the  relations 
between  the  colonial  and  regular  forces  were  more  harmoni- 
ous. Throughout  the  entire  war,  however,  it  was  realized 
that  the  colonies  as  a  whole  were  not  exerting  themselves 
to  the  utmost,  and  that  they  were  inclined  to  shift  the  burden 
of  the  war  upon  the  shoulders  of  the  British  tax-payer.  In 
their  dealings  with  the  provincial  authorities,  the  Commander- 
in-Chief  often  encountered  annoying  difficulties.'  In  vary- 
ing degrees  all  these  matters  produced  friction.  In  addi- 
tion there  was  some  suspicion  of  the  loyalty  of  the  colonies.* 


•  Dec.  13,  1757.    N.J.  Col.  Doc.  IX,  p.  20. 

'  In  1757  De  Berdt  advised  Pitt  that  the  enlisting  of  colonial  troops  for  a 
particular  service  "under  the  pay  of  Great  Brittain "  would  produce  satisfactory 
results.    Pringle  MSS.  XIX. 

•  Thus  on  May  21, 1759,  Amherst  wrote  to  Wolfe,  in  reply  for  the  tatter's  re- 
quest for  three  hundred  pioneers,  colonials  whom  he  needed  for  the  attack  on 
Quebec :  "  If  my  demands  on  this  occasion  have  not  the  weight  that  I  hope  they 
will  have,  I  can't  help  it;  the  difficulties  of  prevailing  on  any  of  the  Govern- 
ments to  the  Westward  of  Halifax,  to  go  out  of  the  common  road,  are  great." 
He  hopes  that  the  government  will  act  "without  waiting  for  provincial  Authori- 
ties &  Ceremonies,  by  which  half  the  Campaign  would  be  over  before  they  are 
resolved."    Doughty,  op.  cit.  VI,  p.  54. 

•  See  Secret  and  Miscellaneous  Papers,  1756-1761 :  Am.  and  W.I.  81.  The 
question  raised  in  these  papers  as  to  Shirley's  loyalty  is  ridiculous.  Cf. 
also  Dartmouth  MSS.,  Hist.  MSS.  Com.  XIV,  10,  p.  7.  One  of  the  Mont- 
calm letters  quoted  above  (Lettres  dc  Montcalm,  pp.  i  et  seq.;  Lothian  MSS., 
P-  *39 ;  Dartmouth  MSS.,  p.  545)  states  that  the  writer  was  in  continuous  corre- 
spondence with  the  English  colonies,  and  that  some  of  them  were  willing  to 
become  neutral  during  the  war.  See  also  Parkman,  Montcalm  and  Wolfe  I, 
P-  435- 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


179 


As  far  as  overt  treason  was  concerned,  there  seems  to  have 
been  little  basis  for  such  accusations.  To  many,  however, 
the  colonial  trade  with  the  enemy  appeared  closely  akin  to 
treason,  and  led  to  a  strong  feeling  of  resentment  in  Great 
Britain.  On  the  other  hand,  the  wholesale  seizure  of  colo- 
nial ships  engaged  in  this  trade  and  the  enforcement  of  the 
Molasses  Act  produced  considerable  ill-feeling  in  a  number 
of  the  colonies. 

During  the  war  also  there  arose  two  questions,  one  pri- 
marily affecting  Virginia,  the  other  New  York,  both  of 
which  led  to  steps  on  the  part  of  the  British  government 
which  tended  still  further  to  increase  the  mutual  feeling  of 
annoyance.  In  Virginia  the  question  concerned  the  most 
fundamental  imperial  relations,  and  brought  to  an  issue 
the  right  of  the  colonial  legislature  to  pass  acts  which,  how- 
ever free  they  may  have  been  of  such  an  intent,  had  the  di- 
rect result  of  scaling  down  debts  due  to  merchants  residing 
in  the  mother  country. 

In  1748  the  Virginia  Assembly  passed  a  law  that  judg- 
ments for  steriing  debts  could  be  settled  in  currency  at  25  per 
cent  advance.  As  exchange  fluctuated  and  was  at  times 
as  high  as  40  per  cent,  some  London,  Liverpool,  and  Bristol 
merchants  complained  about  this  act.*  In  the  meanwhile, 
partly  owing  to  the  carelessness  of  the  Board  of  Trade  and  its 
legal  advisers,  and  partly  because  of  the  remissness  of  the 
British  merchants  in  not  complaining  in  time,  this  law  had 
been  confirmed  by  an  order  in  council.  It  thus  obtained  the 
legal  validity  of  an  act  of  Pariiament,  and  could  not  be 
•  B.  T.  Va.  as  W  146.    1731. 


'i- 


m 


1 


i8o 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


repealed  either  by  the  colonial  legislature  or  by  the  Crown 
separately,  but  only  by  the  joint  action  of  both.'  In  1752, 
at  the  suggestion  of  the  Governor,  the  colonial  legislature 
was  seemingly  about  to  repeal  the  act  when  word  was  re- 
ceived of  the  royal  confirmation,  and  consequently  the 
matter  was  dropped.*  In  1754,  however,  the  British  govern- 
ment sent  instructions  to  the  Lieutenant-Governor  to  induce 
the  Assembly  to  modify  the  law.'  This  was  done  in  1755, 
when  the  Virginia  legislature  provided  that  in  actions  for 
the  recovery  of  sterling  debts  the  courts  should  fix  the  rate 
of  exchange  at  which  the  amount  due  could  be  paid  in  cur- 
rency.* This  arrangement  was  not  satisfactory  to  the  British 
merchants,  and  theii^ dissatisfaction  was  intensified  by  the 
fact  that  at  about  this  time  Virginia  began  to  issue  paper 
money,  making  it  a  legal  tender  for  debts. 

I"  i755>  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  money  in  the  colony  and 
the  necessity  of  providing  funds  for  purposes  of  defence,  Vir- 
ginia began  to  issue  paper  money."  The  amount  issued  in- 
creased rapidly,  and  despite  the  legal  tender  clause  and  the 
provisions  made  for  their  redemption,  these  notes  steadily 

'  In  1761  the  Virginia  Committee  of  Correspondence  said  of  such  a  law  that 
"no  power  on  Earth  can  alter  the  Force  of  it  less  than  our  Assembly  with  his 
Majesty's  Assent."  This  statement  ignores  the  power  of  the  British  Parlia- 
ment. Proceedings  of  the  Virginia  Committee  of  Correspondence,  1759- 
1767,  in  the  Virginia  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography  XI,  p.  20.  Future 
references  to  these  proceedings  will  be  given  in  the  following  abbreviated 
form:  Va.  Mag. 

» B.  T.  Va.  24  W  77. 

•  Ibid.  25  W  166. 

•  Hening  VI,  pp.  478,  479.    1755  Ch.  VII,  §§  i,  ii;    Va.  Mag.  X,  p.  345. 

•  B.  T.  Va.  25  W 198,  200. 


hW 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE  i8i 

depreciated  in  value.     In  1757  exchange  was  at  35  per 
cent,  in  1762  at  65  per  cent.'    In  1758,  the  London  and 
Bristol    merchants    presented    memorials'    against    these 
issues  of  legal  tender  paper,  whose  effect  was  to  scale  down 
the  large  outstanding  amounts  that  the  Virginia  planters 
owed  them.    Accordingly,  instructions  were   sent   to   the 
colony  to  stop  such  practices.*    These  instructions  were, 
however,  not  obeyed.*    The  Governor  was  forced  to  yield 
to  the  wishes  of  the  Assembly,  as  otherwise  funds  for  carr)'ing 
on  the  war  could  not  be  secured.    Francis  Fauquier,  then 
governor  of  Virginia,  an  economist  of  no  mean  ability,' 
said  that  Virginia  could  not  help  herself  in  any  other  way, 
and  that  the  English  merchants  havingVerling  debts  had  no 
cause  for  alarm,  as  paper  money  could  not  be  tendered  for 
such  accounts.'     Unfortunately  for  the  British  merchants, 
there  was  a  serious  doubt  as  to  the  validity  of  the  repeal  of  the 
law  of  1748  which  had  fixed  the  rate  of  exchange  at  25  per 
cent,^  and  in  addition,  they  claimed   that  the  determina- 
'  Va.  Mag.  XII,  pp.  1-4. 

'B.  T.  Va.  a6  X  31,  32;  B.  T.  Journals  66,  June  21.  i7«8 
•B.T.Va.  26X44.  ■ 

'Ibid.  27  ¥50,51. 

'  See  his  remarkable  pamphlet,  ".'Vn  Essay  on  Ways  and  Means  of  raUinu 
Money,"  London,  1756. 

»u  '  u'  T  ^*'  **^  ^  ^'^'  '"  ^''^^  ^^^  Virginia  burgesses  stoutly  asserted  that 
they  had  no  intention  of  defrauding  their  creditors,  and  that  the  merchants  had 
no  cause  for  complaint,  as  in  the  case  of  sterling  debts  the  courts  had  always 
fixed  the  rate  of  exchange  fairly.    Ibid.  27  Y  92. 

'  The  Engli-sh  merchants  claimed  that  the  law  of  1748  could  not  be  legally 
repealed  by  the  law  of  1755  until  the  latter  had  received  the  Crown's  confirma- 
tion, and  that  consequently  they  could  be  paid  in  depreciated  money.  B.  T. 
Va.  27  Y  51,  176a.    For  a  similar  protest  from  the  Glasgow  merchants,  see 


l83 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-17*5 


ftl' 


tion  of  the  rate  of  exchange  by  the  courts  under  the  law  of 
1755  was  unsatisfactory,  as  in  some  instances  exchange  had 
risen   5,   10,  and  even   15  per  cent   between   the  time  of 
the  orders  of  the  court  and  the  possibility  of  obtaining  a 
remittance.    Moreover,   the   Glasgow   merchants  claimed 
that  most  of  the  debts  of  the  British  merchants  were  in 
currency,  and  had  been  contracted  on  the  strength  of  the 
former  low  exchange.'   As  far  as  these  debts  were  concerned, 
the  action  of  Virginia  unquestionably  amounted  to  partial 
repudiation.    But  in  contradistinction  to  a  number  of  the 
other  colonics,  Virginia  was  to  a  great  extent  innocent  of 
any  such  intention.    The  initial  step  once  taken,  however, 
the  inevitable  results  followed,  as  in  similar  instances  in  the 
other  colonies,  —  depreciation  and  an  outflow  and  disap- 
pearance of  coin,'  —  which  in  turn  rendered  the  further  issue 
of  paper  money  seemingly  imperative.    It  was  a  vicious 
circle  into  which  was  drawn  not  only  the  colony  but  also  the 

ibid.  Y  55;  and  from  the  Liverpool  merchants,  see  ibid.  Y  56.  In  1763  the 
burgesses  answered  that  their  law  of  1755  repealed  that  of  1748,  even  though 
it  had  noi  /tt  received  the  royal  approbation,  and  that  if  the  merchanU  thought 
otherwise  they  should  not  present  petitions,  but  should  get  the  law  of  1755  con- 
firmed by  the  Crown.  Ibid.  Y  97.  For  Virginia's  defence  in  17S9  and  1763, 
see  Va.  Mig.  XI,  p.  a;  pp.  345-349- 

'B.  T.  /a.  37  Y  113, 114. 

'  These  Virginia  treasury  notes  were  legal  tender  in  payment  of  all  debts,  ex- 
cept the  Crown's  quit-rents.  Hening  VII,  pp.  336,351.  The  Deputy  Receiver- 
General  of  Virginia,  however,  pointed  out  to  the  Lords  of  the  Treasury  that  owing 
to  the  large  emissions,  gold  and  silver  had  left  the  country,  and  that  cMisequently 
he  was  forced  to  take  this  depreciated  money  in  payment  of  the  quit-rents, 
which  resulted  in  a  loss  to  the  Crown  of  35  per  cent.  B.  T.  Va.  27  Y  51 ;  B.  T. 
Journals  70,  p.  312.  Bumaby  (Travels,  pp.  60, 61)  pointed  out  that  "the  use 
of  paper  currency  in  this  colony  has  entirely  banished  from  it  gold  and  sihrer." 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE  ,83 

British  merchant.  The  latter  was  naturally  incensed  at 
what,  as  far  as  he  was  concerned,  amounted  to  a  scaling  down 
of  debts  owing  to  him.' 

In  addition  to  these  issues  of  paper  money,  Virginia  at  this 
time  also  embarked  on  another  policy,  which  had  similar 
results.    Tobacco  had,  ever  since  the  origin  of  the  colony, 
been  used  as  an  alternative  standard  of  value.    During  the 
war  tobacco  rose  violently  in  price,  due  partly  to  the  planting 
of  smaller  crops,  and  partly  to  the  depreciated  paper  money. 
Already  in  i7S5,»  Virginia  passed  an  act  giving  to  those 
owing  tobacco,  whether  on  debts,  contracts,  or  for  any  other 
reason,  the  alternative  of  discharging  their  oblitjations  dur- 
ing  the  following  ten  months  in  money  at  the  rate  of  twopence 
a  pound.    In  1 758,  owing  to  the  scarcity  of  tobacco,  a  similar 
act  was  passed,  which  was  to  be  in  force  for  a  year.*    This 
law,  familiarly  known  as  the  "Two-Penny  Act,"*  aroused 
intense  opposition,  both  on  the  part  of  the  clergy,*  as  well  as 
'  In  176a  the  merchants  trading  to  Virginia  asserted  that  they  had  suffered 
large  losses  as  they  "have  at  all  times  Urge  Sumes  of  money  due  to  them  there  " 
B.  T.  Va.  37  Y  51. 

•  Hening  VI,  pp.  568,  569.    1 755  Ch.  5. 

•  Ibid.  VII,  pp.  240,  »4i.    1758  Ch.  6. 

•  Moses  Coit  Tyler,  who  merely  considered  this  law  in  so  far  as  it  affected  the 
clergy,  wrote  somewhat  emphatically:  "Such,  then,  in  all  its  frtssh  and  un- 
•domed  rascality,  was  the  famous  'option  law.'  or  'two-penny  act,'  of  1758- 
an  act  firmly  opposed,  on  its  first  appearance  in  the  legislature,  by  a  noble 
minority  of  honorable  men;  an  act  clearly  indicating  among  a  portion  of  the 
people  of  Virginia  a  survival  of  the  old  robber  instincts  of  our  Norse  ancestors- 
M  act  having  there  the  sort  of  frantic  popularity  that  all  laws  are  likely  u> 
have  which  give  a  dishonest  advantage  to  the  debtor  class."  Patrick  Henrv 
PP-  37,  38-  '' 

•  B.  T.  Va.  36  X  49;  36  Y  aa;  Va.  Mag.  X,  p.  347;  Bumaby,  Travel.. 
PP-  4^sa. 


L^ 


u 


?  f 


i84 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  I7S4-I76S 


h  5 


on  that  of  the  British  merchant.    The  salaries  of  the  Vir- 
ginia clergy  had  been  fixed  in  1748  by  a  colonial  law  at  six- 
teen thousand  pounds  of  tobacco  yearly.*    As  tobacco  in 
1758  was  worth  considerably  more  than  twopence  a  pound, 
the  "parsons"  felt  that  they  had  been  defrauded  and  com- 
plained bitterly.  As  far  as  the  clergy  was  concerned,  the  mat- 
ter was  to  some  extent  merely  a  local  one,  but  as  far  as  the 
British  merchants  were  affected,  this  legislation  involved  fun- 
damental imperial  relations.    In  1 759  the  merchants  of  Lon- 
don trading  to  Virginia  presented  a  memorial  against  the  act 
of  1 758,*  pointing  out  that  they  had  large  quantities  of  tobacco 
owing  to  them  by  Virginians,  and  that  under  this  law,  in- 
stead of  delivering  the  merchandise,  the  planters  could  re- 
turn the  money  paid  for  it.    They  said  that  when  these  con- 
tracts were  made,  the  price  was  only  twopence  a  pound, 
as  there  was  then  a  large  crop  of  tobacco  on  hand.    Tobacco 
had,  however,  in  the  meanwhile  risen  from  165.  Sd.  a  hun- 
dred pounds  to  275.  and  as  a  result  of  the  law,  many  of  those 
signing  the  memorial  had  to  repurchase  at  the  higher  price 
in  order  to  load  their  vessels.'    In  other  words,  this  act, 
whatever  its  intent  may  have  been,  had  the  direct  result 
of  rescinding  contracts  which  had  turned  out  unfavorably 


,1* 


>HeningVI,  p.  88. 

» B.  T.  Va.  a6  X  67. 

•  In  the  "  Parson's  Cause  "  testimony  was  introduced  showing  that  the  price 
of  tobacco  in  1759  was  501.  a  hundred.  Maury,  Memoirs  of  a  Huguenot 
Family,  pp.  418-420.  See  also  Va.  Mag.  X,  p.  350.  This  was  in  currency. 
Exchange  at  the  time  was  45  per  cent.  Va.  Mag.  XII,  p.  a.  Hence  if  figured 
in  sterling,  the  price  would  be  considerably  less,  and  would  approximate  to 
that  mentioned  by  the  British  merchants. 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


185 


to  Virginians.  The  British  government,  which  was  spend- 
ing large  sums  on  the  defence  of  the  colonies,  naturally  could 
not  allow  those  who  bore  the  main  brunt  of  the  war  to  be 
thus  treated.  Consequently,  on  August  10,  1759,  an  order 
in  council  was  issued,  disallowing  this  Virginia  act,  as  well 
as  those  of  a  similar  nature  passed  prior  to  1758.* 

This  action  aroused  considerable  ill-feelin^j  in  the  colony. 
The  clergy  proceeded  to  bring  suits  to  recover  the  diflFerence 
between  the  market  price  of  tobacco  in  1 758-1 759,  and  two- 
pence a  pound.    In  one  of  these  cases,  in  which  the  legal 
point  at  issue  had  already  been  decided  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff 
and  in  which  there  remained  to  the  jury  only  the  duty  of  assess- 
ing the  amount  of  the  verdict,  a  young  Virginia  lawyer,  Patrick 
Henry,  appeared  for  the  defendant.    In  his  address  to  the 
jury,  Henry  contended  "that  the  act  of  1758  had  every  char- 
acteristic of  a  good  law;  that  it  was  a  law  of  general  utility, 
and  could  not,  consistently  with  what  he  called  the  original 
compact  between  King  and  people,  stipulating  protection 
on  the  one  hand  and  obedience  on  the  other,  be  annulled." 
From  this  he  inferred  "that  a  King,  by  disallowing  Acts  of 
this  salutary  nature,  from  being  the  father  of  his  people,  de- 
generated into  a  Tyrant,  and  forfeits  all  right  to  his  subjects' 
obedience."   This  appeal  was  successful  with  the  jury,  which 
returned  a  verdict  of  nominal  damages.'    This  fact  and  the 

'  B.  T.  Va.  26  X 103.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  act  of  r  748  regulating  the 
salaries  of  the  clergy  had  been  confirmed  by  the  Crown,  thus  acquiring  the  va- 
lidly of  an  act  of  Parliament.  Consequently,  on  this  ground,  the  legality  of  the 
"two-penny  act"  of  1758  was  in  itself  open  to  serious  question.  Va.  Mag. 
X,  pp.  349.  354- 

» Maury,  op.  cit.  pp.  419-433. 


fi 


•  t'l 


' 


I 


i86 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1 754-1 7^5 


subsequent  popularity  of  Henry  — he  frankly  admitted 
^  that  his  sole  aim  in  speaking  thus  was  to  make  himself  popu- 
lar —  show  how  greatly  the  imperial  tie  was  strained  and 
how  unwilling  the  colonies  were  to  submit  to  any  restraint 
interfering  with  their  complete  freedom  of  action. 

Throughout  ihe  entire  history  of  the  Empire,  the  mother 
country  had  difficulty  with  the  colonies  over  questions  of 
this  nature.  Thus  at  this  very  time,  objections  were  raised  to 
bankruptcy  laws  that  had  been  enacted  both  in  Virginia  *  and 
in  Massachusetts,' on  the  ground  that  they  gave  inadequate 
protection  to  British  creditors.  Similarly,  in  these  years,  Ja- 
maica '  also  sought  to  raise  unduly  the  value  of  its  currency. 
The  experience  with  Virginia  paper  money  during  the  war 
and  the  justifiable  complaints  of  the  British  merchants  *  in- 
duced the  imperial  government  to  take  steps  to  prevent  such 
evils  in  the  future.  At  various  times  prior  to  this,  similar  diffi- 
culties in  other  colonies  had  already  brought  this  entire  mat- 

'  B.  T.  Va.  a;  Y  8i.  In  1763  the  Glasgow  merchants  complained  about  this 
law.  Ibid.  Y  84.  For  other  complaints,  see  /Wd.  Y.  8s,  86.  In  1763  Vir- 
ginia repealed  this  law.  Ibid.  Y  95.  On  the  other  hand,  in  1 761  the  Virginia 
Committee  of  Correspondence  asserted  that  the  English  bankruptcy  law 
was  not  fair  to  the  colonists.  Va.  Mag.  XI,  p.  19.  Daniel  Dulany  also  claimed 
that,  if  on  the  one  hand  the  colonial  bankruptcy  laws  were  unjust  to  British 
merchants,  so  on  the  other  were  the  British  laws  to  colonial  creditors.  Con- 
siderations on  the  Propriety  of  Imposing  Taxes  (ad  ed.,  Annapolis,  176s), 
p.  37.  Obviously  as  the  colonists  were  heavily  in  debt  to  the  British  merchants, 
the  defects  in  the  colonial  laws  had  by  far  the  more  serious  results. 

'  B.  T.  Journals  66,  June  13, 1758;  B.  T.  Mass.  77  li,  no.  1. 

•  At  a  hearing  before  the  Board  of  Trade,  Feb.  ag,  1760,  Alderman  Beck- 
ford,  supported  by  others,  contended  that  this  Jamaica  act  of  1758  would 
greatly  injure  creditors.    B.  T.  Journals  68,  p.  59.    Cf.  p.  7a. 

♦  B.  T.  Journals  71,  p.  41- 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


187 


ter  to  the  attention  of  the  British  government.  The  former 
immoderate  issues  of  paper  money  by  New  England  had  had 
the  result  "that  many  fair  Creditors  and  other  persons  not  in 
debt  lost  half  or  three  fourths  of  what  was  due  to  them,  and 
of  their  personal  Estate."  *  So  great  had  the  evil  become  that 
in  1740  the  House  of  Commons  passed  a  resolution  condemn- 
ing such  practices.  This  resolution  had  little  effect,  espe- 
cially as  the  war  then  being  waged  gave  occasion  for  many 
fresh  issues.  In  1751,  however,  Parliament  passed  an  act 
regulating  the  issue  of  paper  money,  and  absolutely  forbidding 
the  New  England  governments  —where  this  evil  was  worst 
—  from  adding  a  legal  tender  clause  thereto.*  This  was  in 
the  nature  of  an  act  of  censure,  and  consequently  Parliament 
did  not  include  in  it  those  colonies  that  had  not  offended.  In 
1764,  however,  largely  owing  to  the  experience  with  Virginia, 
the  Board  of  Trade  reported  that  the  principle  of  this  bill 
was  applicable  to  the  other  colonies  as  well,  for  "  this  measure 
of  declaring  paper  bills  of  Credit  to  be  Legal  Tender  was  false 
in  it's  principles,  unjust  in  it's  foundation,  and  manifestly 
fraudulent  in  it's  operation ; "  '  and  advised  the  passage  of 
a  comprehensive  bill  affecting  all  the  colonies.  Parliament, 
accordingly,  in  1764,  forbade  the  issue  of  legal  tender  paper 
money  in  the  colonies.*  This  measure  was  absolutely  essen- 
tial in  view  of  the  bitter  experiences  of  the  British  merchants.' 

•  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  45,  pp.  343-366. 
'  34  Geo.  II,  c.  S3. 

•  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  45,  pp.  343-366. 

•  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  34. 

•  Thomas  Pownall  fully  realized  the  intricate  nature  of  the  cunency 
problem  in  the  colonies,  and  favored  the  issue  of  paper  money,  but  withoit  the 


U 


'  Mt 


!     W 


■V 


.  M 


1 88 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  i7S4->76s 


>  i 


n 


Yet  it  was  one  of  the  factors  in  the  subsequent  separation,' 
for  it  caused  some  of  the  suffering  that  inevitably  follows  in 
the  wake  of  an  unsound  monetary  policy  whose  onward 
course  is  suddenly  checked.' 

In  New  York  a  question  of  fundamentally  different  nature 
led  to  similar  consequences.  One  of  the  important  results 
of  the  English  constitutional  struggles  of  the  seventeenth 
century  was  the  independence  of  the  judiciary,  which  was 
secured  both  by  appointing  the  judges  during  good  behavior 
and  also  by  attaching  fixed  salaries  to  their  offices.  The 
British  bench  was  thus  free  from  undue  influences,  both  on 
the  part  of  the  Crown  and  on  that  of  Parliament ;  its  inde- 
pendence was  contingent  upon  one  condition  as  much  as  upon 
the  other.  In  the  colonies,  on  the  other  hand,  neither  condi- 
tii  1  obtained.  The  judges  were  appointed  during  the  pleas- 
ure of  the  Crown,  but  careful  provisions  were  made  to  prevent 
their  arbitrary  removal  from  office  by  the  governors.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  judges  were  dependent  for  their  salaries 
on  the  local  legislatures,  which  customarily  made  only  annual 

legal  tender  clause.  He  approved  of  this  act  of  Parliament,  and  condemned 
"the  outrageous  abtises  practised  by  some  of  those  legislatures  who  have  dealt 
in  the  manufacture  of  this  depreciating  currency."  The  Administration  of  the 
Colonies  (zded.,  London,  176^;),  pp.  iia,  113, 153, 153. 

'  In  his  examinat'or  '  .  ~  the  House  of  Commons  in  1766,  Franklin  men- 
tioned this  as  one  of  the .  ^uses  of  the  change  in  American  sentiment  toward 
Parliament.  Pari.  Hist.  16,  pp.  141,  143.  Cf.  also  the  "Late  Regulations 
respecting  the  British  Colonies"  in  Dickinson's  Writings  (ed.  P.  L.  Ford)  I, 

pp.  318,  337,  333. 

'  On  June  14,  1765,  Francis  Fauquier  wrote  to  the  British  government  that 
currency  had  grown  very  scarce  in  Virginia  because  the  Treasury  notes  were 
burnt  as  they  came  in  for  taxes;  "this  private  Distress  encreases  the  general 
Dissatisfaction  at  the  Stamp  Duties."    Am.  and  W.L  388. 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


189 


provisions  for  them.  This  general  rule  had  been  departed 
from  in  New  York  by  Governor  Clinton^,  who  appointed 
DeLancey  to  the  position  of  Chief  Justice  during  his  good 
behavior,  and  also  the  inferior  judges;  DeLancey,  in  turn, 
when  lieutenant-governor,  had  adopted  this  precedent." 
This  was  in  direct  violation  of  the  instructions  issued  to  all 
the  governors,  but  the  British  government  not  only  made 
no  objection,  but  even  gave  its  approval  to  Clinton's  action.* 
On  the  accession  of  George  III,  in  1760,  the  commissions  of 
the  New  York  judges  had  to  be  renewed.  Colden,  then  the 
executive  head  of  the  colony,  refused  to  issue  them  on  the 
old  terms,  unless  the  legislature  granted  the  judges  fixed 
compensations.  This  the  Assembly  refused  to  do,  thus 
frustrating  Colden's  object  of  obtaining  an  independent 
bench.'  It  was  unquestionably  advisable  to  free  the  judges 
from  their  dependence  on  the  Assembly.*  During  the  v/ar 
they  had  shown  a  distinct  partiality  to  those  engaged  in 
illegal  trade  with  the  enemy;  and  in  1761  Colden  reported 
to  the  Board  of  Trade  that  the  dependence  of  the  judges 
on  annual  salary  grants  "may  be  highly  prejudicial  to  the 
just  rights  of  the  Crown  &  the  Acts  of  Trade."  »    The  re- 

•  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI,  p.  792;  vn,  pp.  705,  796;  William  Smith,  Hist  of 
N.  Y.  II,  pp.  289  et  seq. 

»N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  pp.  467,  468. 

•  A.  M.  Keys,  Cadwallader  Colden,  pp.  272,  273. 

•  Pownall  (op.  ci .  p.  79)  called  attention  to  this  necessity.  Soame  Jenyns's 
statement  that  permanent  salaries  were  needed  for  the  judges  because  they 
were  so  dependent  on  the  assemblies  "that  they  can  obtain  a  Livelihood  no 
longer  than  quam  diu  se  male  gesserint"  is  somewhat  overdrawn.  The  Objec- 
tions to  the  Taxation  of  our  American  Colonies  (ad  ed.,  London,  1765),  p  14. 

•N.Y.  Col.  Doc  VII,  p.  467. 


1: 


I: 


190 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-I7«S 


!   >4  ■:, 


fusal  of  the  Assembly  to  grant  permanent  salaries,  according 
to  Colden,  meant  "undue  influence,  not  only  in  cases  where 
the  King's  rights  may  be  disputed,  but  likewise  in  private 
suits,  where  a  leading  man  in  an  Assembly  may  be  a  party."  ' 
This  matter  was  thus  brought  to  the  attention  of  the 
Commissioners  of  Trade,  who  on  November  ii,  1761,  re- 
ported thereon.'    They  correctly  pointed  out  that  the  situa- 
tion in  Great  Britain  was  quite  distinct  from  that  in  the  col- 
onies, and  remarked  that  of  late  years  the  colonial  judges 
had  become  too  frequently  "the  Partizans  of  a  factious 
Assembly  upon  whom  they  have  been  dependent  for  their 
sup^yort.  and  who  have  withheld  or  enlarged  that  support 
according  as  the  conduct  of  the  Judges  was  more  or  less 
favourable  to  their  Interests."    Therefore  the  Board  of 
Trade  concluded  that  to  appoint  judges  quant  diu  se  bene 
gesserint,  unless  permanent  salaries  were  granted,  would  be 
dangerous.    This  report  was  approved,  and  additional  in- 
structions to  appoint  judges  only  at  the  pleasure  of  the 
Crown  were  sent  to  the  colonial  governors."    In  New  York 
these  instructions  led  to  a  temporary  cessation  of  the  work 
of  the  courts.    The  old  judges  refused  to  serve  on  such  a 
tenure,*  and  th "  Assembly  refused  to  grant  a  salary  to  Benja- 
min Pratt  whom  the  Crown  had  appointed  Chief  Justice.' 
Accordingly,  the  Crown  granted  him  a  salary  out  of  the  royal 
quit-rent  revenue,  which  was  at  this  time  beginning  to  yield 

» N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  Vn,  p.  470. 

»/W«f.  pp.  474,  475 ;  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  17  Q  ar. 

•N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  pp.  476,  479;  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  K,  pp.  329,  330. 

♦  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  vn,  p.  797. 

*Ibtd.  pp.  483,  484;  cf.  pp.  500-505. 


THE  PEACE  OF  PARIS  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


191 


a  fair  surplus.'  Shortly  after  this  the  other  judges  also  sub- 
mitted, and  according  to  Golden,  "the  administrat"  went 
on  in  its  usual  trai-quility." ' 

Subordinate  in  importance  to  this  dispute  in  New  York, 
but  essentially  similar  in  nature,  was  that  in  New  Jersey. 
The  governors  in  this  colony  had  naturally  also  been  in- 
structed to  appoint  judges  only  during  the  pleasure  of  the 
Crown.'  Governor  Lewis  Morris  had,  however,  disregarded 
this  instruction,  and  had  appointed  Robert  Hunter  Morris  as 
Chief  Justice  of  New  Jersey  during  his  "good  behaviour,"  * 
and  a  similar  tenure  had  been  bestowed  on  the  judges  of  the 
inferior  courts.  On  the  arrival  of  Governor  Josiah  Hardy 
in  New  Jersey  in  1761,  he  found  that  there  was  a  total  stop- 
page of  justice,  as  the  commissions  had  not  been  renewed 
on  the  death  of  George  II.  Hardy  renewed  these  commis- 
sions in  their  existing  forms,  as  otherwise  the  Assembly  re- 
fused to  grant  any  salaries.*  In  doing  this,  he  violated  not 
only  his  general  instructions,  but  also  the  specific  ones 
sent  by  the  Board  of  Trade  in  1761.  His  action  incensed 
these  Commissioners,  especially  as  they  feared  its  possible 
effect  in  New  York,  where  the  dispute  was  of  a  more  serious 
nature;  and  accordingly,  they  immediately  recommended 
Hardy's  removal  from  office.'  William  Franklin,  the  son 
of  the  famous  scientist  and  statesman,  was  appointed  gov- 

•Am.  andW.I.  387,  foUoS. 

» N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  797. 

•  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  IX,  pp.39,  s8. 

*/Wi.  IX,  pp.  207-209,  231,  264.    March  17, 1738. 

•7Wrf.  pp.  345-349. 

*Ibid.  pp.  361,362. 


"I 


193 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


eraor  in  his  place,  and  as  in  New  York,  so  in  New  Jersey, 
the  judges  were  compelled  by  the  firmness  of  the  govern- 
ment to  accept  commissions  during  the  pleasure  of  the 
Crown.' 

This  dispute  *  served  still  further  to  increase  the  alienation 
between  the  two  branches  of  the  English  people.  In  New 
York,  especially,  it  aroused  considerable  ill-feeling.'  Here, 
as  elsewhere,  an  impasse  had  been  created.  The  British 
government  was  certainly  as  sincere  as  was  the  colony  in  its 
efforts  to  preserve  the  purity  of  the  bench.  Yet  the  only 
way  by  which  this  desirable  result  could  be  fully  obtained 
was  cut  off  by  mutual  lack  of  confidence. 

'NJ.  Col.  Docs.  IX.,  pp.  364,  368. 

*  A  few  years  later  a  great  deal  of  friction  was  also  created  in  New  York  by 
a  question  closely  akin  to  this,  involving  the  right  of  appeal  to  the  governor  from 
verdicts  given  by  a  jury.  See  A.  M.  Keys,  op.  cit.  pp.  300-308.  William 
Smith,  writing  to  George  Whitfield,  Dec.  6, 1765,  places  this  instruction  about 
appeals  among  the  three  acts  of  the  Britbh  government  that  caused  the  troubles 
in  America.    Dartmouth  MSS.,  Hist.  MSS.  Com.  XI,  5,  p.  331. 

•  Cf.  V/illiam  Smith,  Hist,  of  N.Y.  (cd.  1829)  II,  pp.  289  et  seq. 


CHAPTER  X 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE,   1763-176S 

Under  these  conditions,  when  the  imperial  tie  was  already 
severely  strained  by  a  number  of  important  controversies, 
and  when,  above  all,  the  political  equilibrium  of  the  Empire 
had  been  destroyed  by  the  removal  of  the  French  menace, 
the  British  government  embarked  upon  a  policy  of  vigorous 
reform.  This  movement  naturally  included  within  it  a 
readjustment  of  the  laws  of  trade  and  navigation  to  the  new 
conditions  created  by  the  territorial  gains  in  America. 

The  old  English  colonial  system  —  by  which  is  generally 
meant  the  various  provisions  regulating  the  trade  of  the 
Empire  —  was  one  of  great  complexity  and  intricacy.  It 
was  embodied  in  an  unwieldy  series  of  parliamentary  statutes, 
about  one  hundred  in  all.*  Extensive  governmental  control 
over  commerce  and  industry  was  the  current  practice,  and 
was  based  on  the  theory  that  the  economic  activity  of  the 
individual  should  be  wholly  subordinated  to  the  welfare  of 
the  community.  The  primary  object  of  the  colonial  system  v 
was  to  develop  the  wealth  and  power  of  the  Empire.  It  was 
considered  that  this  could  best  be  accomplished  by  making 

'  On  their  appointment,  in  addition  to  the  commissions  and  general  instruc- 
tions, the  governors  received  a  special  set  of  detailed  trade  instructions,  enu- 
merating the  various  statutes  with  which  they  had  to  be  conversant.  See 
e.g.  Trade  Instructions  to  John  Reynolds,  governor  of  Georgia,  Aug.  6, 1754. 
B.  T.  Ga.  14,  pp.  233-318. 

o  193 


if 


i 


Jill 


I 


194 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7$4-I76f 


it  a  self-sufficient  economic  unit,  independent  as  far  as  was 
possible  of  competing  national  groups.  As  Pownall  ex- 
pressed it,  the  aim  was  to  create  "one  great  commercial 
dominion."  *  In  this  commercial  Empire,  mother  country 
and  dependency  were  to  be  mutually  complementary,  one 
supplying,  as  far  as  was  possible,  the  manufactured  products 
consumed  in  the  colony,  and  the  other  the  tropical  products 
and  the  raw  materials  not  produced  by  Great  Britain.  All 
trade  within  the  Empire  was  to  be  carried  on  exclusively 
in  British  and  colonial  shipping,  with  the  object  of  increasin*; 
the  Empire's  naval  strength.  Great  stress  was  laid  on  this 
side  of  the  system,  for  the  statesmen  of  the  day  recognized 
to  its  fullest  extent  the  importance  of  "sea  power." 

In  accordance  with  this  system,  a  large  number  of  colonial 
products  received  especial  advantages  in  the  British  market 
by  a  system  of  preferential  duties,  by  direct  bounties,  or  by 
a  combination  of  both,  with  the  result  that  in  a  number  of 
instances  they  acquired  a  monopoly  thereof  at  the  expense 
of  foreign  goods,  with  which  under  normal  conditions  they 
could  not  compete.  On  the  other  hand  European  and 
Asiatic  products  could  be  imported  into  the  colonies  only 
from  Great  Britain.  There  were  important  exceptions  to 
this  general  rule,  and  in  addition  the  British  fiscal  system 
was  so  arranged  that  on  the  payment  of  slight  duties,  foreign 
products  could  be,  and  in  fact  were,  reexported  in  large  quan- 
tities from  Great  Britain  to  the  colonies.*    In  the  case  of 


m 


II 


'  Pownall,  op.  cit.  pp.  35,  aoa. 

'  The  total  exports  from  England  to  Pennsylvania  for  the  twenty-five  years 
from  Christmas,  1732,  to  Christmas,  1749,  amounted  to  £1,312,838,  of  which 


■  i 
(. 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE 


195 


I 


some  foreign  products,  however,  such  as  manufactured  iron 
and  steel,'  cordage,'  sail-cloth,'  and  paper,*  no  part  of  the 
British  duties  was  paid  back  on  their  reexportation,  and 
consequently  in  the  case  of  these  exceptional  instances 
the  system  tended  to  give  British  manufactures  a  mo- 
nopoly of  the  colonial  market.  In  this  connection,  how- 
ever, it  should  be  noted  that  Great  Britain  paid  bounties 
on  a  number  of  manufactures  when  exported  to  the  colonies, 
thus  decreasing  their  cost  to  the  colonial  consumer.'  The 
system  as  a  whole  was  thus  based  on  the  idea  of  the  mutual 
reciprocity  of  the  economic  interests  of  mother  country  and 
colony.  Its  predominant  characteristic  is  well  emphasized 
in  the  French  term  describing  it,  —  "/e  pacte  colonial." 

The  complex  system  erected  on  this  basis  natura'"  sne- 
fited  some  interests  at  the  expense  of  others.  .is  is 
inevitable  whenever  the  government  seeks  to  control  the 
course  of  economic  development  and   restrains   the   free 

£343)7^  consisted  of  foreign  goods  reexported  from  England.  Peter  Kalm, 
Traveb  into  North  America  (Warrington,  1770)  I,  p.  53. 

'  a  and  3  Anne  c  9  {  zii.    C/.B.  T.  Journals  35,  p.  370. 

'  6  Anne  c.  19. 

*  4  Geo.  II,  c.  37  {  iii. 

*  10  Geo.  II,  c.  37  {  iv. 

*Such  manufactures  were  especially  gunpowder,  sail-cloth,  and  British 
and  Irish  linens.  For  details,  see  Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  Bundles 
79  and  80.  Certain  classes  of  foreign  manufactured  silks,  technically  known  as 
"  lustrings  or  alamodes. "  were  not  entitled  to  any  drawback.  8  and  9  William 
in,  c.  36,  §  V.  On  the  other  hand,  it  must  be  remembered  that  Great  Britain 
was  trying  to  induce  the  colonies  to  produce  silk  and  was  spending  considerable 
money  on  this  scheme.  Besides,  bounties,  about  equivalent  to  the  import  du- 
ties on  raw  silk,  were  allowed  on  the  exportation  of  British  manufactured  silks. 
Under  these  conditions,  "respectable  quantities"  of  British  silks  were  sold  in 


196 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-176$ 


play  of  competition.  Some  of  the  interests  sacrificed  for 
the  good  of  the  Empire  were  British,  some  colonial.  Thus 
the  Navigation  Act  proper,  which  gave  British  and  colonial 
shipping  a  monopoly  of  the  carrying  trade  of  the  Empire, 
while  unquestionably  protecting  the  ship-building  and  carry- 
ing trades  of  both  old  and  New  England,  and  also  of  some  of 
the  other  colonics,  was  equally  unquestionably  at  the  outset 
burdensome  to  the  plantation  colonies,  such  as  Barbados 
and  Virginia.  Then  in  so  far  as  British  legislation  and  policy 
discouraged  manufacturing  in  the  colonies,  the  manufacturer 
in  the  mother  country  benefited. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  British  consumer  was  prevented 
from  obtaining  foreign  products  and  was  forced  to  smoke 
colonial  tobacco,  to  eat  colonial  sugar,  and  to  use  colonial 
tar,  all  of  which  enjoyed  a  monopoly  of  the  home  market. 
Furthermore,  in  the  interest  of  the  colonial  planter,  though 
also  partly  for  the  sake  of  revenue,  the  British  and  the  Irish 
farmers  were  prohibited  from  growing  tobacco.  There  is 
no  doubt  that  this  prohibition,  which  in  England  met  with 
violent  and  protracted  opposition  throughout  a  period  of 
over  fifty  years,'  entailed  far  greater  sacrifice  than  did  the 
British  restrictions  on  colonial  manufacturing.'    These  re- 


foreign  and  open  markets.    J.  Massie,  Reasons  .  .  .  against  .  .  .  further 
British  Duties  on  Wrought  Silks  (London,  1758),  p.  13. 

'  On  the  difficuhy  of  enforcing  the  law  and  the  use  of  troops  for  this  purpose 
during  the  reign  of  Charles  II,  see  Privy  Council  R   nster,  Charles  II,  4,  p.  117; 

5.  P-  377:  6,  PP-  6a.  507. 527.  Sa8. 53°.  53*.  539.  547.  SJo,  55',  S6i,  563-    These 
volumes  are  in  the  Privy  Council  Office,  Downing  St.,  London. 

'  The  author  of  a  proposal  to  prevent  the  colonies  from  manufacturing  Iron 
said:  "The  Restraining  of  our  Colonys  whom  we  protect  by  such  Penalties 


>f 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS    )F  TRADE  197 

strictions  were  to  a  great  extent  superfluous,  as  under  exist- 
ing conditions,  with  land  cheap  and  plentiful,  the  colonies 
had  no  inducement  to  manufacture  extensively  on  a  commer- 
cial  scale.'  From  the  economic  standpoint,  this  phase  of 
British  policy  in  itself  aroused  little  or  no  opposition  in  the 
colonies,  not  only  because  it  did  not  in  general  run  counter 
to  their  interests,  but  also  because  the  laws  were  to  a  great 
extent  necessarily  ignored,  as  the  imperial  authorities  had  no 
adequate  machinery  to  enforce  them.* 

As  far  as   there  was  any  opposition  at  all,  it  centred 
on  the  Iron    Act  of  1750.    The  main  object  and  primary 

from  Manufacturing  Iron  u  le  prejudice  of  their  Mother  Country  will  not 
be  a  greater  hardship  upon  uiem  than  the  Prohibition  of  the  Planting  of  To- 
b«xo  in  Great  Britain  is  to  us."    Brit.  Mus.  Lansdowne  MSS.  846  f.  246. 

'In  1751,  in  his  "Observations  concerning  the  Increase  of  Mankind," 
Franklin  said  that,  on  account  of  the  vast  quantity  of  unoccupied  land  in 
America,  the  danger  "of  these  Colonies  interfering  with  their  Mother  Country 
in  Trades  that  depend  on  Labour,  Manufactures,  &c.,  is  too  remote  to  require 
the  attention  of  Great-Britain."  He  therefore  concluded  that  the  mother 
country  "should  not  too  much  restrain  Manufactures  in  her  Colonies,"  such 
legUlation  not  being  necessary.  Franklin,  Writings  (ed.  Smjth)  III,  pp.  65, 66 
Nme  years  later,  in  his  "Canada  Pamphlet,"  Franklin  said:  "Manufactures 
are  founded  in  poverty.  It  is  the  multitude  without  land  in  a  country,  and  who 
must  work  for  others  at  low  wages  or  starve,  that  enables  undertaken  to  carry 
on  a  manufacture."  Such  conditions,  he  added,  did  not  prevail  in  America 
Ibid.  TV,  p.  49. 

» The  despatches  and  reports  of  the  colonial  governors,  though  full  of  details 
about  the  development  of  colonial  manufacturing,  contain  scarcely  any  refer- 
ences to  the  acts  regulating  the  woollen,  hat,  und  iron  industries.  In  1774 
John  Adams  said  that  the  hat  act  had  not  been  regarded,  and  that  the  iron  act 
had  not  been  executed  in  Massachusetts.  Novanglus,  in  Works  (ed.  C.  F.  Adams) 
IV,  p.  49.  The  contemporary  newspapers  contain  frequent  advertisements  of 
hat-makers.  Bumaby  (Travels,  pp.  93,  1,5,  136)  speaks  of  the  manufacture 
of  hats  m  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  and  Massachusetts. 


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BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


purpose  of  this  law  was  to  encourage  the  production 
of  bar  and  pig  iron  in  the  colonies,  by  removing  the 
British  customs  duties  thereon,  thus  enabling  them  to  com- 
pete with  Swedish  iron  on  which  these  duties  were  retained. 
There  was  great  opposition  to  this  measure  on  the  part 
of  influential  interests  in  England,'  and  it  was  seem- 
ingly in  order  to  overcome  this  opposition  and  at  the  same 
time  to  give  the  mother  country  some  compensation  for  the 
loss  in  revenue  involved  in  this  policy,  that  the  further  exten- 
sion in  the  colonies  of  the  iron  and  steel  manufacture  in  cer- 
tain of  its  more  highly  developed  grades  was  forbidden. 
Thus  this  act  had  a  tendency  to  benefit  some  colonies  and  to 
restrict  industry  in  others.  In  neither  phase  was  it  very 
effective ;  but  if  the  benefits  and  disadvantages  did  not  bal- 
ance one  another,  it  was  certainly  not  due  to  the  greater 
weight  of  the  latter.' 

'  Keith,  Virginia  (London,  1738),  p.  182;  Fleming  MSS.,  Hist.  MSS.  Com. 

XII,  7.  P-  357- 

'  According  to  the  act,  the  governors  were  required  to  send  to  Great  Britain 
certificates  giving  details  as  to  the  industry  in  each  colony.  These  certificates 
show  that  it  was  still  in  a  very  rudimentary  stage,  and  in  some  colonies  in  a 
declining  condition.  The  certificate  of  Governor  Hamilton  states  that  in 
Pennsylvania  and  Delaware  there  were  in  all  four  such  manufactories,  of  which 
one  had  not  been  in  use  for  nine  months.  B.  T.  Prop.  18  V  73.  The  certifi- 
cate of  the  Governor  of  New  York  is  to  the  effect  that  in  that  colony  there  was 
only  one  such  establishment,  and  this  apparently  an  insignificant  one.  B.  T. 
N.Y.  ag  Hh  13a.  It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  these  facts  with  Bumaby's  state- 
ment that  both  of  these  colonies,  more  specifically  New  York,  were  "exceed- 
ingly dissatisfied"  with  this  act.  Travels,  p.  115.  In  Massachusetts  there 
were  in  1 750  only  three  such  plants,  of  which  one  was  not  in  use.  B.  T.  Mass. 
73  Gg  34.  In  1758  there  were  only  two.  There  were  in  this  colony,  however, 
a  large  number  of  iron  factories  of  a  nature  not  affected  by  the  act  of  1750, — 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE  199 

In  addition,  some  colonial  products  could  be  shipped 
only  to  Great  Britain  or  to  some  other  British  colony. 
Such  commodities  were  those  not  produced  in  the  mother 
country,  and  which  either  were  needed  for  consumption 
there  or  which,  when  reexported  from  Great  Britain  to 
other  European  countries,'  served  to  rectify  a  possible  ad- 
verse balance  of  trade.  This  policy,  technically  known  as 
that  of  "enumeration,"  in  the  case  of  some  commodities, 
probably  resulted  in  a  lowering  of  the  price  to  the  colonial 
producer.  But  the  corollary  to  this  policy  was  preferential 
treatment  to  the  enumerated  product  in  the  British  markets. 
The  system  of  indirect  bounties  by  preferential  duties  in 
conjunction  with  the  direct  bounties  paid  on  colonial  prod- 
ucts probably  more  than  offset  the  restrictions  of  the 
enumeration  policy.  In  the  case  of  naval  stores,  these 
bounties  alone  enabled  colonial  pitch  and  tar  to  hold  the 
British  markets,  and  amounted  to  large  sums,  judged  from 
the  standpoint  of  the  day.' 

41  forges  and  14  furnaces.  Ibid.  76  li  59.  Stephen  Hopkins  (The  Rights  of 
the  Colonies  Examined,  Providence,  1765,  p.  24)  said  that  the  colonies  had 
carefully  avoided  "every  interdicted  manufacture."  It  should  be  noted  that 
Rhode  Island,  of  which  Hopkins  was  especially  writing,  was  not  at  all  affected 
by  this  act  of  1750,  as  there  was  no  mill  or  engine  for  slitting  or  rolling  iron, 
or  any  plating  forge  to  work  with  a  tilt-hammer,  or  any  furnace  for  making 
steel  in  the  colony.     B.  T.  Prop.  18  V  75;  Col.  Rec.  of  R.I.  V,  p.  314. 

•  See  Keith's  Memorial,  1728.    Am.  and  W.I.  602;  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen  10  L 

'In  172a  £6j,I44  was  paid;  in  1735  £29,^^^.  Admiralty,  Accountant 
General,  Treas.  Ledgers,  vols.  139  and  168.  In  1766  the  navy's  debt  in- 
cluded £4S.S9i  for  such  bounties.  Treas.  Misc.  Various,  Bundle  197  (Treas. 
Book  of  Payments,  1760-1769,  p.  31).  See  also  Admiralty,  Accountant  Gen- 
eral Misj.  Various  47,  and  Commons  Journal  29,  p.  418. 


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BRITISH  COLONIAL     OLICY,  I7S4-I76S 


The  imperial  character  of  the  system  was  strongly  em- 
phasized.' It  followed,  however,  from  the  very  fact  that 
Great  Britain  was  the  heart  of  the  Empire,  on  whose  well- 
being  the  prosperity  of  the  whole  primarily  depended,  — 
because  upon  the  mother  country  fell  virtually  the  entire 
heavy  burden  of  imperial  defence,  —  that  any  industrial 
development  in  the  colonies  which  tended  to  weaken  the 
mother  country  was  discouraged.  Hence  the  economic 
^  life  of  the  colonies  was  ^lubordinated  to  that  of  the  mother 
country,  and  was  directed  into  channels  that  did  not  run 
counter  to  the  welfare  of  Great  Britain.*  Any  other  policy 
would  have  been  deemed  suicidal.  Such  subordination 
did  not,  however,  imply  a  sacrifice  of  the  colonies,  for  their 

'Thus  we  read  in  a  pamphlet  published  in  1765,  that  the  Parliament  of 
Great  Britain  alone  can  "execute  such  Measures,  as  equally  relate  to  all. 
This  Power  it  has  at  all  time  exercised  with  impartial  Sway,  and  has  extended 
its  parental  Care  to  every  part  of  the  British  Dominions;  as  each  has  on  differ- 
ent Occasions  particularly  called  for  its  Attention.  No  Preference,  no  Privi- 
lege, no  Exemption  is  allowed  to  any,  not  even  to  Great  Britain,  when  her 
particular  Interests  seem  incompatible  with  th.a  greater  system."  The  Regu- 
lations Lately  Made  (London,  1765),  pp.  43,  44. 

'  In  1728  Keith  wrote  that  "all  advantageous  Projects,  or  Commercial  Gains 
in  any  Colony,  which  are  truly  prejudicial  to,  and  inconsistent  with,  the  In- 
terest of  the  Mother  State;  must  be  understood  to  be  illegal,  and  the  Practice 
of  them  unwarrantable,  because  they  contradict  the  End  for  which  the  Colony 
had  a  Being,  and  are  Incompatible  with  the  Terms  on  which  the  People 
Claim,  both  privilege  and  Protection."  When  a  colony  is  thus  regulated,  it 
"ought  to  be  carefully  Nourish'd  and  it's  just  Interests  well  guarded;  No 
little  Partial  Project  or  Party  Gain  shou'd  be  suffer'd  to  affect  it,  but  rather 
it  ought  to  be  considefd  &  weigh'd  in  the  General  Ballance  of  the  whole  State, 
as  an  usefuU  and  profitable  Member;  For  such  is  the  End  of  all  Colonies,  and 
if  this  use  cannot  be  made  of  them,  it  wou'd  be  much  better  for  the  State  to  be 
without  them."    Am.  and  W.I.  60a;  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  10  L  105. 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE  201 


economic  development  was  in  general  not  deflected  from  its 
normal  course.  Nor,  on  the  other  hand,  did  it  mean  absolute 
predominance  of  British  interests.  As  has  been  pointed  out, 
these  had  been  obliged,  in  a  number  of  instances,  to  yield  to 
the  welfare  of  the  Empire.  It  is  significant  that  Great  Britain 
denied  the  insistent  requests  of  English  ship-builders  for  pro- 
tection against  the  colonial  industry,  because  such  a  measure 
would  have  interfered  with  the  expansion  of  British  sea  power 
as  a  whole.  In  fact,  it  would  be  difficult  to  estimate  whether 
(  iony  or  metropolis  was  called  upon  to  bear  a  greater  pro- 
portion of  the  sacrifice  demanded  by  the  prevailing  ideal  of 
a  self-sufficient  commercial  Empire. 

History,  however,  is  to  a  great  extent  based  n  social 
psychology,  and  in  studying  the  dynamic  effects  of  u,  policy 
on  the  relations  of  two  social  groups,  it  is  frequently  far  more 
important  to  know  what  people  at  the  time  thought  were  the 
results,  rather  than  what  these  actually  were.  Naturally, 
those  interests,  whether  British  or  colonial,  that  were  called 
upon  to  bear  the  sacrifices  inevitably  involved  in  so  complex 
a  system  of  commercial  regulation  felt  aggrieved.  A  promi- 
nent British  complaint  was  that  nearly  all  the  duties  on 
foreign  products  shipped  from  Great  Britain  to  the  colc-ies 
were  repaid,  and  that  consequently  the  colonial  consumer 
obtained  these  commodities  at  a  lower  price  than  did  his 
fellow-subject  in  Great  Britain,  on  whom  fell  the  chief  bur- 
den of   imperial  defence.'    Then,   the    British  consumer 

'  The  well-known  economic  writer,  Joshua  Gee,  in  a  very  interesting  me- 
morial to  the  Board  of  Trade,  endorsed  as  received  on  Oct.  27,  1721,  opposed 
this  sj-stem,  saying,  "I  could  never  See  a  reason  why  the  Subjects  of  Great 


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BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-176$ 


opposed  the  monopoly  accorded  to  many  colonial  products. 
Similarly,  there  was  some  objection  to  the  colonial  planter 
receiving  bounties,  while  the  British  farmer  was  not  entitled 
to  them  though  he  paid  the  taxes  that  they  necessitated.' 
Joseph  Massie,  one  of  the  best  informed  of  contemporary 
publicists,  claimed  that  the  British  West  Indies  had  robbed 
the  nation  of  ten  million  pounds  sterling  through  the  exorbi- 
tant price  of  sugar.'  This  price  was  a  direct  result  of  the 
preferential  duties.  On  the  other  hand,  the  colonies  recog- 
nized that,  in  consequence  of  the  system,  they  paid  more 

Brittain,  who  have  all  along  paid  very  great  taxes  to  support  the  Government, 
and  have  been  at  the  expense  of  convoys  to  protect  the  Plantation  Trade, 
should  bear  So  much,  and  the  Plantations  who  have  never  paid  any  taxes, 
Should  not  pay  the  Comon  duties  of  Linnens  &c.  worn  in  England."  B.  T. 
Plant.  Gen.  10  L  24.  This  memorial  was  the  basis  of  Gee's  well-known 
book,  "The  Trade  and  Navigation  of  Great  Britain  Considered,"  published 
eight  years  thereafter.  Then,  in  173a,  the  philanthropi-.,  Thomas  Coram, 
in  a  memorial  addressed  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  advised  the  abolition  of 
these  drawbacks,  because  in  consequence  of  them  the  colonies  "have 
such  goods  much  Cheaper  than  the  Inhabitants  of  this  Kingdom  who  ever 
bear  the  Burden  &  Charge  of  Protecting  the  Plantations."  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen. 
II  M  31. 

'  An  English  writer  in  1766  commented  on  the  lot  of  the  British  consumer, 
who  had  to  buy  British  colonial  sugar,  tobacco,  rice,  pitch,  tar,  turpentine, 
indigo,  which  were  all  favored  by  heavy  duties  on  foreign  producU;  and  on  the 
fact  that  the  British  taxpayer  paid  bounties  or.  many  colonial  products,  though 
the  producer  of  the  same  commodities  in  the  mother  country  would  not  be 
entitled  to  them.  A  Letter  from  a  Merchant  in  London  .  .  .  relative  to  the 
Present  Posture  of  Affairs  in  the  Colonies  (London,  1766),  pp.  23-45. 

'  J.  Massie,  B.ief  Observations  concerning  the  Management  of  the  War 
(London,  1761),  pp.  8-9.  In  1753  a  petition  against  the  high  price  of  sugar 
was  presented  to  the  House  of  Commons.  The  British  West  Indies  contended 
at  the  time  that  "allowing  foreign  sugar  to  be  imported"  would  entirely  ruin 
them.    B.  T.  Journals  61,  April  3,  1753.    In  1757  Josiah  Tucker  said  that 


'.1  •- 

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READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE  JOJ 

for  some  European  manufactures  and  likewise  that  they 
received  for  some  of  their  products  less  than  would  have 
been  the  case  under  unrestricted  conditions.' 

Thus  there  were  complaints  from  both  interests  affected ; 
in  the  main,  however,  it  was  considered  that  the  system 
favored  the  mother  country.  In  the  first  place,  by  virtue 
of  it  Great  Britain  enjoyed  a  monopoly  of  the  colonial 
trade,  foreigners  being  entirely  excluded  therefrom  This 
was  of  course  not  an  absolute  monopoly,  but  one  in  which 
the  colonial  traders,  especially  those  of  New  England,  par- 
ticipated. Then,  while  the  mother  country  levied  import 
duties  on  colonial  products,  the  colonies  were  forbidden  to 
impose  similar  taxes  on  commodities  brought  from  Great 
Britain.*  At  the  time  there  prevailed  only  vague  and  indefi- 
nite ideas  as  to  the  real  incidence  of  such  taxes,  and  many  in 
the  colonies  thought  that  they,  and  not  the  British  consumer, 
paid  the  British  customs  duties.'    On  the  other  hand,  the 

French  sugars  "are  almost  Cent  per  Cent  cheaper  "than  the  British  West 
Indian  product.    Instructions  for  Travellers  (London,  1757),  p.  31. 

•  Franklin  to  Shirley,  Dec.  18,  1754.  Franklin,  Writings  III,  pp.  238-237. 
See  also  Lettres  de  Montcalm  (London,  1777),  pp.  3-10. 

'  See  Order  in  Council,  Aug.  22, 1724,  that  instructions  to  this  effect  be  sent 
to  the  governors.  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  10  L  53.  Cf.  also  Am.  and  W.I.  i,  no.  267; 
B.  T.  Journals  34,  pp.  126,  127. 

•  In  so  far  as  these  taxes  diminished  consumption  in  Great  Britain,  they  de- 
creased the  demand  for,  and  consequently  the  price  of  the  colonial  product 
In  1759  Pariiament  granted  an  extra  subsidy,  which  added  one  penny  a  pound 
to  the  British  duties  on  tobacco.  32  Geo.  II,  c.  10  §  i.  To  this  increase  there 
was  great  opposition  in  Virginia.  The  Virginia  Committee  of  Correspondence 
instructed  the  colony's  agent  in  London  to  oppose  this  step,  which  they  called 
"a  great  grievance  to  the  people."  The  new  duty  had,  however,  already  been 
passed.    Va.  Mag.  X,  pp.  339,  340,  342,  343.    An  Englishman  travelling  in 


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204 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


inability  to  impose  duties  on  imports  from  the  mother  coun- 
try limited  the  colony's  complete  freedom  of  action.*  It  was 
in  this  respect  that  the  system  was  least  satisfactory  to  men 
of  marked  individualism,  such  as  were  the  colonists.  With 
their  keen  desire  for  complete  self-government,  they  naturally 
to  some  extent  objected  to  a  system  by  which  their  foreign 
trade,  and  in  a  few  instances  even  industry  within  the 
colonies  themselves,  was  regulated  by  a  legislative  body  over 
which  they  had  no  control,  and  whose  power  was  unlimited.' 
Thus  neither  British  nor  colonial  interests  were  fully  satis- 
fied with  the  system,  and  on  the  whole  it  was  considered 
more  favorable  to  the  metropolis  than  to  the  colony.  This 
system,  however,  did  not  stand  by  itself,  but  was  integrally 
connected  with  that  of  imperial  defence.  What  Patrick 
Henry  called  tne  "original  compact  between  King  and  peo- 
ple, stipulating  protection  on  the  one  hand  and  obedience 
on  the  other,"  was  not  a  mere  empty  formula.    The  right  of 


(I  : 


Virginia  at  this  time,  said:  "They  consider  the  duties  upon  their  staple  as 
injurious  only  to  themselves;  and  it  is  utterly  impossible  to  persuade  them 
that  they  a£Fect  the  consumer  also."     Bumaby,  Travels,  pp.  56,  57. 

'  In  1754  Franklin  wrote:  "We  are  not  suffered  to  regulate  our  trade,  and 
restrain  the  importation  and  consumption  of  British  superfluities  (as  Britain 
can  the  consumption  of  foreign  superfluities)."  Writings  (ed.  Smyth)  III, 
p.  336.  For  a  similar  statement,  made  by  Franklin  in  1766,  see  Ibid.  IV, 
p.  40a. 

'  Hence  there  was  some  objection  to  all  inquiries  into  economic  conditions 
within  the  colonies,  because  the  scope  of  the  possibly  ensuing  legislation  could 
not  be  foreseen  or  controlled.  In  1758  the  British  government  instructed  the 
colonial  governors  to  furnish  it  with  details  as  to  the  iron  indus'ry  in  the  colo- 
nies. In  sending  the  desired  information,  Governor  Pownall  of  Massachusetts 
wrote:  "The  People  since  the  late  Act  restraining  e  Number  of  Slitting 
Mills  are  extreamly  jealous  of  these  kind  of  Inquiries."    B.  T.  Mass.  76  li  59. 


^  I- 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE 


205 


the  mother  country  to  regulate  imperial  trade,  and  the 
general  manner  in  which  this  right  was  exercised,  were  jus- 
tified in  the  eyes  of  nearly  all,  whether  British  or  colonial, 
by  the  fact  that  through  her  navy  Great  Britain  protected 
the  colonies  in  peace  and  in  war.  Thus,  in  1756,  in  connec- 
tion with  a  :Massachusetts  law  for  encouraging  the  manu- 
facture of  linen  in  that  colony,  the  Board  of  Tiade  wrote  to 
Shirley:  "The  passing  of  Laws  in  the  Plantations  for  en- 
couraging Manufactures,  which  any  ways  interfere  with  the 
manufacture  of  this  Kingdom,  has  always  been  thought 
improper,  &  has  ever  been  discouraged.  The  great  Ex- 
pence,  which  this  Country  has  been  and  is  still  at,  for  the 
defence  and  Protection  of  the  Colonies,  while  they  on  the 
other  hand  contribute  little  or  nothing  to  the  Taxes  with 
which  it  is  burthen'd,  gives  it  a  just  Claim  to  restrain  them 
in  such  Attempts."  '  The  same  idea  is  also  clearly  ex- 
pressed by  Arthur  Dobbs,  when  writing  to  the  Earl  of  Hali- 
fax that  he  would  do  his  utmost  to  stop  "all  such  pernicious 
Illicite  Trade  Carryed  on  with  foreigners  to  the  prejudice 
of  the  British  Trade  with  these  Colonies  after  the  Immense 
Expence  and  Debt  incurred  in  defence  of  our  Civil  and  Reli- 
gious Rights  and  Liberties  and  future  Safety  of  the  Exten- 
sive British  Empire  on  this  Continent  and  Islands:  and 
therefore  the  Confinement  of  our  Trade  for  the  benefit  of 
Britain  against  foreigners  is  a  Tribute  we  ought  to  pay  to 
our  protectors." '  As  Dobbs  was  an  able  student  of  eco- 
nomic conditions,  and  as  such  had  freely  criticised  on  a   Dme- 


n 


I 


» B.  T.  Mass.  84,  p.  328. 

'  Jan.  14,  1764.    Am.  and  W.I.  314. 


306 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


what  comprehensive  scale  certain  features  of  the  system,  his 
statement  is  all  the  more  significant. 

Thus  the  fact  that  the  mother  country  afforded  protection 
gave  an  equitable  basis  to  the  colonial  system,  and  justified 
it  in  the  eyes  of  those  to  whom  otherwise  it  would  have  ap- 
peared unfair  to  the  colonies.  During  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, up  to  the  controversies  at  the  beginning  of  the  revolu- 
tionary movement  in  1764  and  1765,  the  colonies  made  no 
complaint  against  the  trade  laws  as  a  whole.  During  these 
two  generations  there  were  many  acute  political  controver- 
sies, but  this  system  did  not  figure  in  them  at  all.'  The 
colonial  attitude  is  well  represented  by  Franklin,  who,  in  1754, 
after  enumerating  solely  those  regulations  that  restricted  colo- 
nial trade,  said :  "These  kind  of  secondary  taxes,  however, 
we  do  not  complain  of,  though  we  have  no  share  in  the  lay- 
ing, or  disposing  of  them."  '  As  Franklin  had  an  intellectual 
tendency  toward  those  laissez  faire  ideas  that  two  decades 
later  were  embodied  in  Adam  Smith's  monumental  work, 
this  is  certainly  not  a  prejudiced  statement.  Similarly,  in 
1 764,  James  Otis,  the  leader  of  the  revolutionary  movement 
in  its  earlier  phases,  after  calling  attention  to  the  fact  that 
the  colonies  were  "confined  in  their  imports  and  exports, 
to  the  good  of  the  metropolis,"  wrote:  "Very  well,  we  have 
submitted  to  this.  The  act  of  navigation  is  a  good  act,  so 
are  all  that  exclude  foreign  manufactures  from  the  planta- 
tions, and  every  honest  man  will  readily  subscribe  to  them."  ' 

'  Naturally,  the  Molasses  Act,  as  id  no  sense  an  integral  part  of  the  systeni, 
is  excepted  from  this  statement. 

•  Franklin,  Writings  III,  p.  236. 

•  James  Otis,  The  Rights  of  the  British  Colonists  Asserted  and  Proved 
(Boston,  1764),  pp.  54,  55.    Cf.  also  pp.  58,  76. 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE 


307 


It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  a  Swedish  scientist 
who  had  travelled  extensively  in  America,  and  had  care- 
fully observed  many  matters  of  interest,  stated  that  as  a 
result  of  the  pressure  of  this  system,  the  colonies  were 
less  warm  to  the  mother  country.*  This  in  itself  would 
not  be  surprising,  as  communities  have  always  shown  a 
tendency  to  dwell  on  the  disadvantages  and  to  ignore  the 
benefits  involved  in  a  system  of  this  nature.  The  accuracy 
of  this  observation  is,  however,  open  to  question.  The 
validity  of  the  general  doctrine  that  the  mother  country 
and  not  foreigners  should  supply  the  colonies,  "provided 
the  Mother  Country  can  &  does  supply  her  Plantations  with 
as  much  as  they  want"  was  admitted  in  1762  by  the  Vir- 
ginia Committee  of  Correspondence  in  a  letter  to  the  colony's 
agent  in  London.*  Furthermore,  men  enjoying  to  the  full 
the  confidence  of  the  colonies,  even  favored  a  more  restric- 


In 


f 


I' 


•"Genom  et  sadant  tryckande  sker,  at  Angelska  Inwanarena  uti  Norra 
America  aro  mindre  warme  mot  sit  Moderland."  Kalm,  En  Resa  Til  Norra 
America  (Stockholm,  1756)  II,  p.  371.  As  this  passage,  together  with  the 
unhistorical  habit  of  regarding  past  events  from  the  viewpoint  of  a  later  age, 
has  furnished  the  basis  for  the  current  thesis  that  the  old  colonial  system,  as 
it  existed  prior  to  1 763,  was  the  fundamental  cause  of  the  Ameriian  Revolution, 
it  is  advisable  to  give  the  context.  After  the  above  statement,  Kalm  says: 
"This  coldness  is  kept  up  by  the  many  foreigners  such  as  Germans,  Dutch,  and 
French  settled  here,  and  living  among  the  English,  who  commonly  have  no 
particular  attachment  to  Old  England;  add  to  i.  s  likewise  that  many  people 
can  never  be  contented  with  their  possessions,  though  they  be  ever  so  great, 
and  will  always  be  desirous  of  getting  more,  and  of  enjoying  the  pleasure  which 
arises  from  changing;  and  their  over  great  liberty,  and  their  lujtury  often  lead 
them  to  licentiousness."  Travels  into  North  America  (Warrington,  1770), 
II,  pp.  264,  265. 

'  Va.  Mag.  XI,  p.  137. 


til 

If 


308 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  17S4-1765 


y: 


tl  11 

if 

i'l 
I  f 


J  ! 

1H 


'H 


.{ 

I  -i! 

I 


tive  system  than  was  the  prevailing  one.  In  1723,  Francis 
Yonge,  then  the  agent  for  South  Carolina,  and  four  years 
prior  thereto  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  revolution  in  that 
colony,  presented  a  memorial  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  in  which 
he  advocated  a  more  stringent  regulation  of  colonial  trade.* 
Similarly,  in  1755,  William  Bollan,  when  agent  for  Massa- 
chusetts, presented  to  the  Board  of  Trade  a  detailed  memorial 
on  the  legal  defects  in  the  acts  ot  trade,  with  a  view  to  their 
remedy,  and  consequently  a  better  enforcement  of  the  system 
as  a  whole.  At  the  same  time  he  advised  the  placing  of  all 
kinds  of  colonial  naval  stores  in  the  "enumerated  list"' 
It  is  also  not  without  some  significance  that  Bollan  was  ap- 
pointed agent,  though  he  had  been  the  prosecuting  officer 
in  the  colonial  Vice-Admiralty  Court,  and,  as  such,  had  for 
years  been  engaged  in  punishing  violations  of  these  laws.' 
Similarly,  James  Otis  resigned  from  this  position  only  at  as 
late  a  date  as  1761,  in  order  to  attack  the  use  of  "writs  of 
assistance."  There  seems  to  be  no  adequate  reason  for  re- 
jecting Burke's  view  that  during  the  eighteenth  century,  prior 
y  to  1 764,  the  attitude  of  the  colonies  toward  the  system  was  one 
of  acquiescence.  "  The  act  of  navigation,"  he  said, "  attended 
the  colonies  from  their  infancy,  grew  with  their  growth,  and 
strengthened  with  their  strength.  They  were  confirmed  in 
obedience  to  it,  even  more  by  usage  than  by  law."  * 

•  B.  T.  So.  Ca.  I  A  86. 

*  B.  T.  Mass.  74  Hh  51,  53;  John  Chamberlayne,  Magnte  Britannix 
Notitia,  part  II,  p.  59. 

•  Lords  of  the  Admiralty  to  Sir  Henry  Penrice,  April  19,  174J,  ordering  the 
appointment  of  Bollan  as  advocate  of  the  Vice- Admiralty  Court  in  Massachu- 
setts.   Adm.  Sec.  Out-Letters,  1054. 

*  Burke's  Speeches  (ed.  1816)  I,  p.  303. 


I'i 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE     209 

It  would  even  appear  that  instead  of  being  a  disintegrating 
factor,  the  system  of  trade  regulation  tended  to  give  greater 
cohesion  to  the  Empire.    As  has  been  pointed  out,  British 
policy  had  never  been  consistently  directed  toward  creating 
a  closely  knit  political  empire.   The  aim  was  rather  to  create 
a  self-sufficient  economic  empire,  and,  in  the  main,  this  result 
had  been  attained.   The  West  Indian  colonies  were  absolutely 
dependent  on  the  monopoly  of  the   British  markets  that 
had  been  accorded  to  them.    Similarly,  the  prosperity  of 
the  continental  colonies  depended,  in  varying  degrees,  on 
the  one  hand  on  the  British  markets,  or  on  the  other  hand 
on  British  colonial  markets.    The  least  dependent  colonies 
were  those  producing  tobacco ;  for  through  the  long  period 
during  which  it  had  enjoyed  a  monopoly,  American  tobacco 
had  gained  a  firm  hold  on  the  British  consumer.    Hence  it 
is  not  surprising  to  find  that  at  this  time  there  was  some  ob- 
jection in  Virginia  to  the  "enumeration"  of  its  staple  crop.* 
South  Carolina,  though  absolutely  independent  in  so  far  as 
rice  was  concerned,  relied  upon  the  British  bounties  on  naval 
stores  and  indigo.    North  Carolina  was  similarly  affected  by 
thepremiumson  tarand  pitch.   The  middle  colonies  and  those 
of  New  England  were  especially  dependent  on  those  other 
British  colonies  that  in  the  event  of  political  independence 
would  probably  not  throw  in  their  lot  with  North  America. 
The  fisheries,  the  lumber  industry,  the  provision  trade,  de- 
manded free  access  to  the  British  West  Indies  as  well  as  to 
those  of  foreign  nations.    Then,  only  because  they  were 
British  colonies,  was  the  large  trade  to  Newfoundland  open 

'  Burnaby,  op.  cit.  p.  56. 


aio 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


to  them.  To  some  degree  also  these  colonics  relied  on  the 
naval-store  bounties.  In  addition,  the  prosperity  of  their 
ship-building  industry  depended  to  a  great  extent  on  the  sale 
of  vessels  to  Great  Britain,  and  on  the  large  carrying-trade 
between  various  parts  of  the  Empire.  Once  politically 
separated,  the  Navigation  Acts  would  automati-  "'y  shut  off 
the  sale  of  these  ships  and  also  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
carrying-trade.  Thus,  while  on  the  one  hand  political  sepa- 
ration meant  some  economic  advantages,  on  the  other  it 
meant  both  the  assumption  of  the  burden  of  naval  de'cnce, 
hitherto  borne  by  the  mother  country,  as  well  as  the  entire 
cost  of  purely  military  defence,  —  and  also  important  and 
concrete  economic  disadvantages.  To  those  in  the  colo- 
nies contemplating  such  a  ontingency,  the  risk?  must  have 
appeared  sufficiently  formidable  "to  give  them  pause." 
Hence,  as  far  as  this  was  realized,  the  system  tended  in  the 
direction  of  greater  imperial  cohesion,  and  .an  <  -inter  to  tl.e 
strongly  marked  tendency  toward  political  disintegration. 

Prior  to  1763,  the  general  attitude  of  the  colonies  toward 
the  laws  of  trade  and  navigation  was  one  of  acquiescence.  It 
should  not,  however,  be  inferred  from  this  that  complaints 
were  not  made  against  specific  features  of  the  system.' 

'  The  chief  alteration  desired  at  this  time  was  permission  to  import  salt  into 
the  Southern  colonies  directly  from  Europe.  The  Northern  colonies  were  al- 
lowed to  do  this  in  the  interest  of  the  fishery,  and  the  Southern  colonies  claimed 
that  Portuguese  salt  was  better  adapted  to  preserving  provisions  than  that 
of  England  or  that  of  the  West  Indies.  In  estimating  the  importance  of  this 
complaint,  it  should  be  noted  that  such  salt  could  easily  be  shipped  to  these 
colonies  via  those  north  of  Maryland.  Parliament  refused  to  grant  this  re- 
quest, fearing  that  it  would  lead  to  the  direct  importation  of  other  goods  from 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE  311 


Such  complaints  were  carefully,  though  rather  dclilxiratcly, 
examined,'  and  if  found  compatible  with  imperial  interests, 
were  then  rectified.  In  addition,  the  system  was  also  criti- 
cised, in  certain  of  its  broader  features,  by  men  who  had  no 
immediate  personal  interest  in  the  changes  that  they  advo- 
cated, but  who  recognized  that  some  provisions  could  be 
altered  to  the  advantage  of  the  Empire  as  a  whole.  Such  a 
critic  was  Arthur  Dobbs,  the  governor  of  North  Carolina, 
who  had  written  with  ability  on  the  trade  and  industry  of 
Ireland,  and  who  had  opposed  with  vigor  the  monopoly  of 
the  Hudson's  Bay  Company.'  In  1 755  he  wrote  to  the  Board 
of  Trade  advising  a  number  of  changes  in  the  commercial 
system.  As  an  Irishman,  he  especially  favored  the  relaxa- 
tion of  the  laws  so  as  to  allow  closer  commercial  relations 
between  Ireland  and  America,  but  in  addition  he  prc;>osed 
that  it  be  permitted  to  import  salt  directly  from  Europe  into 
all  the  colonies,  and  also  wines  from  Spain  and  Portugal.* 
Apart   from   the  merits  of   Dobbs's  specific  proposals, 

Europe.  Va.  Mag.  XI,  pp.  137-143;  Ibid.  XII,  pp.  6, 8;  B.  T.  Va.  37  Y  108; 
B.  T.  No.  Ca.  12  C  55, 86;  Ibid.  14  E  77;  B.  T.  Prop.  19  V 133;  B.  T.  So.  Ca. 
IS  I  SOf  57;  '*"'■  'It  pp.  »4S.  246;  Am.  and  W.I.  20,  nos.  9,  isi. 

'  Thtis  Keith  said  that  whenever  the  regulation  of  colonial  trade  was  con- 
sidered, it  was  customary  for  Parliament  or  the  Privy  Council  to  send  both  for 
those  representing  the  colonies  and  for  the  London  merchants,  "with  Intent, 
no  Doubt,  to  do  equal  Justice  between  them."  Keith,  Virginia,  p.  179.  The 
Board  of  Trade  Journals  contain  full  accounts  of  a  large  number  of  such 
hearings. 

'Dictionary  of  National  Biography  XV,  p.  132;  Palgrave,  Dictionary  of 
Political  Economy  I,  p.  610;  Cunningham,  Growth  of  English  Industry  and 
Commerce,  II,  p.  283. 

•  B.  T.  No.  Ca.  12  C  54, 69, 86.  Dobbs  repeated  this  adv''-  in  ijb^.  h.  t  at 
the  same  time  he  upheld  the  justice  of  the  system  as  a  whole.    Dobbs      i  ali- 


tf 


I 


■M 


im\ 


i 


212 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  17S4-I76S 


I 


i 


■  ■  t 


u 


it  is  obvious  that  so  complex  a  system  required  continual 
readjustment  to  the  changing  conditions.  It  is  equally 
patent,  however,  that  there  was  great  difficulty  and  even 
grave  danger  in  amending  i.  in  part.  Consequently  there 
was  a  tendency  to  leave  the  broader  features  of  the  system 
untouched,  so  long  a'  it  answered  its  main  purposes.  There 
is  a  peculiarly  modem  ring  in  the  Board  of  Trade's  answer  to 
Dobbs.  The  Commissioners  freely  admitted  that  the  proposed 
alterations  appeared  advisable  in  the  light  in  which  Dobbs 
put  them,  but  pointed  out  that  "there  is  such  a  variety  of  Cir- 
cumstances necessary  to  be  attended  to  in  the  consideration 
of  a  Question  of  this  kind,  that  We  dare  not  venture  to  give 
an  Opinion  upon  it,without  a  very  precise  and  thorough  Ex- 
amination of  the  Effect  and  Operation  of  the  Laws  of  Trade 
in  every  light  and  view  of  them.  We  are  sensible  of  a  great 
many  Errors  and  Defects  both  in  the  policy  and  frame  of 
those  Laws,  and  that  they  do  not  properly  consist  and  corre- 
spond v;ith  each  other,  but  We  cannot  but  think,  that  it 

fax,  Jan.  14,  1764.  Am.  and  W.I.  214.  Similarly,  in  the  san.e  year,  Thomas 
Pownall,  though  fully  approving  of  the  basic  principles  of  the  old  colonial 
system,  suggested  some  radical  changes.  He  proposed  that  all  colonial  products, 
except  such  as  were  raw  materials  for  British  manufactures,  should  be  allowed 
to  be  exported  directly  to  any  foreign  market  on  payment  of  the  British  duties; 
and  likewise  that  all  foreign  products,  except  such  as  interfered  with  British 
manufactures,  should  be  allowed  to  be  imported  directly  into  the  colonies  on 
payment  of  the  British  duties.  Such  direct  trade  with  foreign  countries,  how- 
ever, Pownall  said  should  be  confined  to  ports  where  British  merchant"  were 
permanently  established.  What  Pownall  objected  to,  and  what  he  prim.arily 
wished  to  abolish,  was  the  roundabout  voyage  via  Great  Britain  in  such  in- 
stances where  it  subserved  no  useful  purpose.  "It  can  never  be  right  policy," 
he  wrote,  "to  suffer  labour  in  vain  in  a  community."  Po-  '.1,  The  Admin- 
istration of  the  Colonies  (ad  cd.  London,  1765),  pp.  37, 181     .-•- 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE  213 

would  be  dangerous  to  enter  into  an  Examination  of  them 
with  a  View  to  op.  Inconveniency  only;  and  therefore  when- 
ever the  Circumstances,  of ''- j  limes  will  admit  of  a  Consid- 
eration of  t  ,s  Matter,  i  is  whole  must  be  entered  into 
together."  * 

The  conditions  created  by  the  peace  of  Paris,  especially  the 
territorial  acquisitions  on  the  continent  and  in  the  Caribbean, 
necessitated  such  a  readjustment.  One  of  the  chief  commer- 
cial advantages  accruing  to  Great  Britain,  as  a  result  of  the 
cession  of  Canada,  was  a  monopoly  of  the  fur  trade.  Hitherto 
this  trade  had  been  almost  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the 
French,^  except  in  so  far  as  it  was  carried  on  by  the  Hudson's 
Bay  Company,  and  to  "a  very  inconsiderable  Quantity 
thro'  the  province  of  New  York."  »  Of  these  furs,  by  far 
the  most  important  was  beaver.    In  1752  only  63,651  beaver 

•  B.  T.  No.  Ca.  22,  pp.  194,  195. 

'It  was  said  that  furs  to  the  value  of  £i35,oc»  were  yearly  imported  into 
France  from  Canada.  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  17  Q  37,  39,  40.  On  June  s,  1762, 
Governor  Murray  reported  from  Quebec  that  the  exports  of  fur,  according  to 
the  Canadian  custom-house  books,  fell  short  of  this  amount  because  a  good 
deal  was  smuggled  out.  He  added  that  there  was  "a  strong  Presumption, 
that  in  this,  as  indeed  in  every  other  Branch,  the  Publick  was  ill  served." 
Ibid.  17  Q  42. 

•  As  a  result  of  this  monopoly.  Great  Britain  was  also  in  a  position  to  supply 
the  Indians  with  all  the  manufactures  they  needed.  Even  tefore  the  con- 
quest of  Canada,  a  comparatively  large  quantity  of  British  manufactures  had 
been  sold  to  the  Indians,  mainly,  however,  indirectly  by  means  of  the  French 
traders.  Board  of  Trade's  Report,  1763,  in  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  45,  pp.  212-262. 
Among  other  advantages  resulting  from  the  war,  the  Board  of  Trade  called 
attention  to  the  great  increase  in  the  available  supply  of  masU  and  of  lumber, 
to  the  prospects  of  getting  silk  and  indigo  from  Florida  and  Georgia,  and  to 
the  probability  of  an  increase  m  the  supply  of  sugar  owing  to  the  gains  in  the 
West  Indies.    Though  not  germane  to  this  essay,  it  may  be  mentioned  that 


■it 


1 


II 


* 


^1 


214  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4-I76S 

skins  were  imported  into  England,  of  which  33,830  came 
from  Hudson's  Bay  and  27,451  from  New  York/  In  1762 
the  total  imports  had  risen  to  173,586  skins,  of  which  93,630 
came  from  Quebec,  50,499  from  Husdon's  Bay,  and  only 
14,912  from  New  York.* 

Beaver  was  an  enumerated  commodity,  and,  as  such,  could 
not  be  shipped  directly  from  the  colonies  to  foreign  countries. 
On  importation  into  Great  Britain,  it  paid  duties  which, 
however,  were  in  part  drawn  back  on  reexportation.'  A  large 
proportion  of  the  beaver  thus  imported  into  England  was 
again  reexported,*  and  consequently  the  foreign  manu- 
thc  acquisition  of  Senegal  in  West  Africa  broke  France's  monopoly  of  the 

gum  trade. 

»  B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  626  B  6. 

*Ibid.  B  7.  ,        ^ 

•Duty.  7  pence  A,  ?;  drawback,  4  pence  A.  H-    B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  4S. 

pp.  380-386. 

•  Beaver  Skins  Imported  into  and  Exported  from  England  from 

Christmas,  1749.  to  Christmas,  1763  


1750 
I7SX 
i7S» 
I7S3 
I7S4 
I7SS 
1756 
I7S7 
1758 
1759 
1760 
1761 
176a 
1763 


Imports 


6a,043 
S4.»04 
63,651 

74,9Sa 
43.023 
46,348 
36,070 

36,759 
3^604 
27,876 

46,49s 
101,011 
173.586 
128,492 

926,114 


Exports 


35.393 
32,540 
33.499 
21,502 
25.535 
16,373 
14,921 
9,670 

10,479 
27,610 

19,505 

39-893 

43.944 

129,801 

406,665 


Duty,  j£27,7ia 
B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  626  B  11. 


Drawback,  £8,331. 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE     21 5 

facturer  of  hats  obtained  this  ra\,  material  as  cheaply  as, 
if  not  more  so  than,  his  British  competitor.  The  English 
hat-makers  naturally  complained  of  this  disadvantage,  and 
urged  that  instead  of  repaying  part  of  the  duty  on  beaver 
reexported  from  Great  Britain,  an  export  duty  should  be 
imposed  thereon.'  In  this  connection,  the  Board  of  Trade 
reported  that  the  existing  conditions  gave  an  advantage 
to  foreign  manufactures,  "that  ought  in  Ju  tice  and  Policy 
to  be  thrown  into  the  other  Scale,  if  it  can  be  done  without 
prejudice  to  the  Trade  in  general."  * 

The  Hudson's  Bay  Company,  however,  opposed  the 
suggested  export  duties,  as  they  would  have  a  distinct 
tendency  to  lower  the  price  that  could  he  obtained  by 
the  company  for  its  beaver  skins.  Accordingly,  the 
Board  of  Trade  decided  on  a  compromise,  and  "com- 
mended the  abolition  of  the  British  import  duties  on 
beaver,'  it  being  a  raw  material,  and  in  lieu  thereof  the 
imposition  of  an  export  duty  of  seven  pence  a  si  in.*  In 
1764  Parliament  adopted  this  suggestion,  abolishing  the 
old  duties,  and  substituting  therefor  a  nominal  import  duty 
of  one  pence  a  skin,  and  an  export  duty  of  seven  pence.' 

The  increase  .  area  of  the  Empire  on  the  continent  of 
America  likewise  brought  up  again  the  question  of  producing 
hemp  in  the  colonies.    England  imported  large  quantities 

'  B.  T.  Com.  Series,  I,  49  li  33-35. 
'  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  45,  pp.  380-386. 
'  Except  only  a  small  duty  to  insure  regular  entries. 

*  And  X*.  6d.  a  pound  on  beaver  wool.    B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  45,  pp.  380-386. 

•  4  Geo.  Ill,  c  9,  5  ii-  The  import  duty  could  ljI  be  drawn  back.  Ibid. 
8  IV. 


m 


■l*fe 


'11^ 


Hi 


2l6 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  I7S4-I765 


of  hemp,  the  chief  source  of  supply  being  Russia,'  and  in 
turn  reexported  some  to  the  colonies."  Naturally,  from  the 
viewpoint  of  pure  mercantilism,  and  also  in  conformity  with 
the  ideal  of  a  self-sufficient  Empire,  it  would  be  highly 
desirable  if  freedom  from  this  dependence  on  Russia  could 
be  attained.  In  addition,  as  hemp  was  extensively  used  in 
the  navy,  an  adequate  British  supply  would  result  in  greater 
national  security.'  Accordingly,  early  in  the  eighteenth 
century.  Parliament  had  offered  large  bounties  to  encourage 
the  production  of  hemp  in  the  colonies.  This  policy  had 
been  a  complete  failure,*  and  hence  had  been  allowed  to 
lapse.  In  1763,  however,  a  number  of  London  merchants 
'  Imports  of  hemp  into  England  from  Christmas,  1758,  to  Christmas,  1762: 


1759 
1760 


544,286  cwt. 
220,861 


1761 
1762 


285,610  cwt. 
272,820 


Of  this  none  came  from  the  colonies  except  36  cwt.  from  Pennsylvania 

in  1760. 

B.  T.  Com.  Series  IT,  626  B  i. 

•Foreign  hemp  reexported  from  England: 

CHUSTMAS,    176J,  TO 


CBSISTUAS,  1763 


CHUSTMAS,  1763,  TO 
CHRISTMAS,    1764 


New  York 
New  England 
Pennsylvania 
Montserrat 


1,512  cwt. 
20,967 


12,900  cwt. 
460 

113  

B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  626,  Co  29. 

'In  1763  a  pamphlet  was  written  to  urge  the  colonists  to  raise  hemp  and 
flax,  with  a  view  to  strengthen  ing  British  naval  power  against "  those  sulky  Bar- 
barians, who  no  doubt  in  a  little  time  will  feel  their  own  Power,  and  from  the 
same  Inducement  (tho'  with  greater  Rapidity),  like  Goths  and  Vandals,  over- 
run all  Europe."  Considerations  on  the  Present  State  of  our  Northern  Colo- 
nies (London,  1763),  p.  12. 

♦During  the  period  from  Christmas,  1712,  to  Christmas,  1728,  the  entire 
quantity  of  hemp  imported  into  England  from  the  American  colonies  was 
only  316  cwt.,  2  quarters.    B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  15  P  14. 


in 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE 


217 


trading  to  North  America  petitioned  for  a  revival  of  these 
bounties.'  On  February  9,  1764,  the  Board  of  Trade  re- 
ported in  detail  on  this  suggestion,'  and  attributed  the  for- 
mer failure  of  this  policy,  on  the  one  hand  to  the  fact  that  those 
parts  of  America  best  suited  to  the  -rowing  of  hemp  had 
hitherto  remained  uninhabited,  and  on  the  other  hand  to  the 
fact  that  other  commodities  had  yielded  a  more  certain  profit. 
The  Board  of  Trade  added  that  at  this  time  different  condi- 
tions obtained,  especially  as  tobacco  and  rice  had  been  pushed 
to  their  utmost  limits.  This  report  then  pointed  out  that 
the  chief  obstacles  to  be  overcome  were  the  deamess  of  labor 
in  the  colonies  and  the  high  freight  rates  from  them.  In 
1756  the  price  of  Russian  hemp  in  England  was;^2i  to  ;^22 
a  ton,  while  American  hemp  could  not  be  supplied  for  less 
than  £2^.  To  counteract  this  difference  the  commissioners 
suggested  that  colonial  hemp  receive  a  bounty  of  £%  a  ton 
for  the  first  seven  years,  of  ;^6  for  the  subsequent  seven  years, 
and  of  ;^4  during  a  third  period  of  the  same  length.  In  1764 
Parliament  adopted  this  recommendation,  and  by  statute 
ordered  the  payment  of  the  bounties  proposed  by  the  Board 
of  Trade  on  hemp  and  undressed  flax  imported  into  Great 
Britain  from  the  American  colonies.* 

Though  these  bounties  did  not  accomplish  the  desired 
result,*  they,  as  well  as  other  measures  passed  at  the  time, 

•  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  19  R  i8;  45,  p.  32a. 
'  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  45,  pp.  366-379. 

•  4  Geo.  m,  c.  26. 

•  Sheffield,  Observations  on  the  Commerce  of  the  American  States  (London, 
1784),  p.  48.  During  the  year  from  Jan.  5,  1768,  to  Jan.  5, 1769,  the  follow- 
ing quantities  of  hemp  were  exported  from  America  to  Great  Britain:  from 


•'  i 


*:U«|S 


; 


fl 


3l8 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  i7S4-«765 


,;  1 


%  i 


show  the  desire  of  the  British  government  to  further  the 
economic  development  of  the  colonies,  and  its  willingness 
to  devote  British  funds  to  such  purposes  with  the  object 
of  increasing  the  self-sufficiency  of  the  Empire.  Thus 
in  1763  the  bounty  on  colonial  indigo  imported  into  Great 
Britain  was  continued,  but  was  reduced  to  an  amount  suffi- 
cient to  keep  the  industry  well  established.'  Under  this 
system,  Soi'th  Carolina  had  acquired  a  new  and  valuable 
crop,  and  even  in  their  reduced  form  the  bounties  constituted 
a  not  inconsiderable  charge  on  the  British  exchequer.' 

The  conquest  of  Canada  and  its  subsequent  cession  to 
Great  Britain  led  to  the  discovery  and  the  rapid  develop- 
ment of  the  whale  fishery  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence.' 
Parliament  had  passed  a  number  of  laws  with  the  design  to 
encourage  this  industry  in  the  waters  of  Greenland  and 
Davis's  Straits.*  Thus  whale-fins  caught  in  that  region 
were  freed  from  all  duties,'  and  in  addition,  in  1733  bounties 
were  granted  to  British  ships  proceeding  from  any  port  in 
Great  Britain  to  those  waters  for  the  purpose  of  catching 
whales.*  Subsequently,  these  bounties  were  extended  to 
colonial  shipping.'    The  aim  of  this  policy  was  to  increase 

Maryland,  9  tons  13  cwt. ;  from  Virginia,  388  tons  14  cwt. ;  from  North  Caro- 
lina, 9  tons  s  cwt.    Brit.  Mus.  Addit.  MSS.  TJ48S. 

'  3  Geo.  Ill,  c.  25  §1  i,  ii;  B.  T.  So.  Ca.  20  M  49;  B.  T.  Journals  70,  p.  257. 

'These  bounties  amounted  to  £9030  in  1764,  ;£7484  in  1765,  and  ;£68o8 
in  1766.    B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  626,  Pp  44. 

» B.  T.  Mass.  78  LI  67, 68. 

•  9  and  10  Wm.  Ill,  c.  45  §  iii;  i  Anne  stat.  i,  c.  16. 

•  10  Geo.  I,  c.  17;  12  Geo.  I,  c.  26  }  vii. 

•  6  Geo.  n,  c.  33. 

'  32  Geo.  II,  c.  45,  S§  V,  vi. 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE 


319 


the  supply  of  seamen  for  the  navy,  and  to  free  Great  Britain 
from  her  dependence  on  the  Dutch  whalers.  This  end  had 
been  partially  attained.  But  under  this  system,  whale-fins 
from  other  parts  of  America  not  only  had  to  pay  duties  in 
Grea^  Britain,  but  in  addition  had  to  compete  against  the 
bounties  given  to  the  Greenland  ships.  In  the  preceding 
two  decades,  it  is  true,  virtually  no  whale-fins  had  been  im- 
ported from  America ; '  the  discovery  of  the  fishery  in  the  St. 
Lawrence,  however,  altered  matters  materially.  Massa- 
chusetts engaged  extensively  in  this  industry,  and  her  agent 
set  about  securing  a  more  favorable  treatment  for  the  Ameri- 
can product.*    A  petition  was  presented,'  stating  that  in 

'  Whale-fins  imported  into  England  from  America: 

Average  of  7  years  1725-1732  3846  cwt 

Average  of  7  years  i73«-»739  433 

Average  of  9  years  1739-1748  36 

Average  of  7  years  1748-1755  15 

Average  of  7  years  1 755-1 76a  65 

Average  of  7  years  1762-1769  1078 

B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  626  Q  9.  For  the  statistics  for  1 704  and  1 705,  see  B.  T. 
Plant.  Gen.  37,  p.  125.  These  figures  dispose  of  the  assertion  made  in  1765 
that  at  the  time  of  the  removal  of  the  duties  on  the  product  of  the  Greenland 
fishery,  the  American  industry  was  "too  .nconsiderable  an  object  to  attract  the 
publick  Notice."  The  Regulations  Lately  Made  (London,  1 765),  p.  48.  In  this 
connection  also,  it  should  be  noted  that,  in  1732,  Thomas  Coram  advised  the 
Board  of  Trade  to  place  American  whale-fins  on  the  same  footing  as  those 
from  Greenland.    B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  11  M  31. 

'  On  Jan.  25,  1764,  Thomas  Whately,  Secretary  to  the  Lords  of  the 
Treasury,  sent  this  petition  to  the  Board  of  Trade.     B.  T.  Com.  Series  I,  49, 

1131- 

•  On  Dec.  30,  1763,  Jasper  Mauduit  wrote  from  London  to  the  Speaker  of 
the  Massachusetts  House  of  Representatives,  that  his  brother  Israel  had 
undertaken  this  matter,  and  that  after  having  talked  with  Grenville  and  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  he  had  drawn  up  a  petition  which  had  been  approved 


i' 


H 


230 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


'  t; 


1763  Massachusetts  had  fitted  out  eighty  vessels  for  this  St. 
Lawrence  whale  fishery;  that  a  large  quantity  of  whale-fins 
had  already  been  imported  thence  to  London ;  and  that  on 
them  a  duty  of  £31,  10s.  a  ton  was  demanded,  which  was 
very  high,  especially  as  the  value  of  whale-fins  had  fallen 
from  £550  to  £330  a  ton  since  the  opening  of  this  trade. 
After  referring  to  the  bounties  given  to  the  Greenland  fish- 
ery, the  petitioners  said  that  they  did  not  ask  for  similar 
favors,  but  only  that  the  duties  be  abolished.'  The  Board 
of  Trade  passed  favorably  on  this  petition,  pointing  out  that 
whale-fins  were  a  raw  material,  for  which  in  great  measure 
England  depended  on  foreign  nations,  and  recommended  to 
Parliament  the  removal  of  the  duties  complained  of.'  Par- 
liament adopted  this  suggestion,  and  in  1764  repealed  these 
duties,  with  the  exception  of  the  insignificant  ones  that  had 
been  imposed  in  1673.' 
The  immediate  effect  of  this  preferential   treatment  in 


1 


rr. 


by  the  Treasury  department  and  by  the  Board  of  Trade.    CoU.  Mass.  Hist. 
Soc.  Series  I,  vol.  VI,  p.  19s. 

•  Ibid.  li  32,  48. 

» B.  T.  Plant  Gen.  45,  pp.  386,  387. 

•  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  30.  The  duties  that  still  had  to  be  paid  amounted  to  less 
than  one  per  cent.  In  1673,  in  order  to  encourage  the  whaling  industry, 
especially  to  Greenland,  Parliament  imposed  comparatively  high  duties  on 
oil  and  whale-fins  caught  by  foreigners,  respectively  £g  and  £iS  a  ton.  If 
imported  and  caught  in  colonial  vessels,  these  respective  duties  were  6s.  and  505. ; 
if  caught  in  colonial  vessels,  but  imported  in  English  vessels,  35.  aad  25*. ;  if 
caught  and  imported  in  English  vessels,  no  duty  had  to  be  paid.  25  Car.  II, 
c.  7.  For  the  working  of  this  law  in  1729,  sec  B.  T.  Newfoundland  10, 0  46. 
This  is  one  of  the  very  few  cases  of  discrimination  against  colonial  shipping. 
Similar  cases,  but  of  more  serious  discrimination  against  British  shipping,  were 
not  infrequent  in  colonial  legislation. 


i 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE   LAWS  OF  TRADE 


221 


favor  of  the  colonial  product  was  to  drive  Dutch  whale- 
fins  completely  from  the  British  market.'  The  attitude 
oi  the  British  government  in  making  this  change  is  clearly 
expressed  in  a  pamphlet  which  was  certainly  written 
under  the  guidance  of  George  Grenville,  if  it  was  not,  as 
some  suppose  it  to  have  been,  the  work  of  his  pen.  This 
writer  says  that  these  duties  were  removed  with  the  full 
knowledge  that  the  result  would  be  the  ruin  of  the  Greenland 
industry,  and  he  adds:  "Tho'  we  resign  a  valuable  Branch 
of  Trade  in  their  (the  colonies')  Favour  ...  yet  the  Prefer- 
ence is  given  upon  truly  national  Considerations,  when  the 
(British)  Inhabitants  of  America  and  of  Europe  are  looked 
upon  as  one  People."  ' 

In  addition  to  these  regulations,  the  list  of  enumerated 
commodities  was  considerably  enlarged  in  1764.*  Thus 
coffee,  pimento,  and  cocoanuts,  which  were  being  produced 
in  the  newly  acquired  West  Indian  islands,  were  added  to 
the  list.    Of  these  the  most  important  was  coffee,  which  was 

'  An  account  of  the  quantity  of  whale-fins  imported  into  England: 

OK   NOKTB  AMERICA  FROM  HOLLAHD 

156a  CWt 

1696 

2500 

804 

923 

73 

I 

Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  Bundle  80.  According  to  the  memorial  of 
the  committee  of  American  merchants,  July  23, 1783,  colonial  whale-fins  paid 
only47«.  6d.  a  ton,  while  foreign  whale-fins  paid  £96-14;.    Am.  and  W.I.  448. 

*  The  Regulations  Lately  Made  (London,  1765),  pp.  49,  50. 

•  4  Geo.  Ill,  c,  15  §  xxvii. 


1759 

7  cwt 

1760 

18 

1 761 

27 

1762 

335 

1763 

1546 

1764 

1550 

176s 

? 

333 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


1 ;'. 


extensively  grown  in  Grenada.*  British  colonial  coffee  had 
for  some  time  been  given  preferential  treatment  in  the  mar- 
kets of  the  mother  country,*  but  this  policy  had  not  succeeded 
in  stimulating  its  production.  In  1765,  the  year  after  its 
enumeration,  this  preferential  reatment  of  coffee  was  further 
accentuated  by  means  of  still  greater  differential  duties.' 
Such  treatment,  it  was  held,  justified  the  restraints  imposed 
on  the  exportation  of  any  colonial  product  by  the  enumera- 
tion policy.  For  not  only  did  it  result  in  a  loss  to  the  Brit- 
ish revenue  that  the  taxpayer  in  the  mother  country  had  to 
make  good  in  some  other  way,  but  in  addition  it  increased 
the  price  that  the  colonial  planter  received  for  his  product. 
At  this  time  also  hides  and  skins  were  put  in  the  enumerated 
list.  Large  quantities  of  deerskins  were  exported  from  the 
colonics,  especially  from  South  Carolina.*  These  skins, 
though  hitherto  not  enumerated,  were  yet  sent  to  England, 
whence  in  greater  part  they  were  reshipped  to  other  countries, 
especially  to  Germany.'  Consequently,  their  enumeration 
was  of  slight  economic  importance.  Of  the  products  of  the 
continental  colonies,  besides  hides,  those  enumerated  in  1764 
were  whale-fins,  raw  silk,  potashes  and  pearlashes,  all  prod- 

'In  1765  it  was  said  that  this  island  produced  10,000  hogsheads  of  sugar 
and  3,500,000  lbs.  of  coffee.    The  Regulations  Lately  Made,  p.  37. 
'S  Geo.  II,  c.  34;  25  Geo.  II,  c.  35;  3a  Geo.  II,  c.  23  $  v. 

•  s  Geo.  Ill,  c.  45  i  xi. 

« B.  T.  So.  Ca.  15  1 46,  60;  16  K  31,  37;  Am.  and  W.L  ai  no.  105;  B.  T. 
Plant.  Gen.  19  R  74. 

•  A  vessel  could  not  with  safety  be  loaded  with  so  heavy  a  commodity  as  rice. 
Consequently,  in  order  to  be  able  to  fill  their  vessels,  ship-owners  were  willing 
to  take  indigo  and  deerskins  to  England  at  low  rates.  William  Knox,  Extra 
Official  State  Papers  (London,  1789),  II,  appendix,  p.  40. 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE 


333 


ucts  receiving  encouragement  at  the  expense  of  the  mother 
country.  The  treatment  of  whale-fins  has  already  been 
discussed.  On  the  experimental  production  of  silk  and 
potash  in  the  colonies,  Great  Britain  was  spending  con- 
siderable sums,  and  naturally  took  measures  to  prevent  for- 
eign nations  from  being  the  beneficiaries  of  these  attempts. 
In  1764,  also,  colonial  iron  and  lumber  were  enumerated, 
but  by  a  special  provision  their  direct  exportation  from  the 
colonies  to  any  place  in  America,  Africa,  or  Asia  was  allowed.' 
The  addition  of  these  products  to  the  enumerated  list  was 
by  far  the  most  important  change  made  therein  at  this  time, 
and  was  quickly  shown  to  have  been  ill-advised.  Colonial 
lumber  had  for  a  long  time  enjoyed  preferential  treatment 
in  the  British  market,'  and  in  1723  all  the  duties  thereon  were 
removed,  while  those  on  foreign  lumber  were  retained.* 
It  was  only  in  consequence  of  this  system  that  colonial  lum- 
ber could  at  all  compete  in  Great  Britain  with  that  from  the 
Baltic.  The  provision  of  1764  regarding  colonial  lumber 
immediately  called  forth  some  well-directed  criticisms.  A 
British  consular  official  *  pointed  out  that  Portugal  had  been 
accustomed  to  import  large  quantities  of  colonial  staves  for 
pipes,  hogsheads,  and  barrels,  but  that  in  consequence  of  the 
act  of  1764,  these  were  sent  to  the  Azores  and  to  Madeira, 

•  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  15  §  xxviii. 

'  3  William  and  Mary,  sess.  2,  c.  4. 

•8  Geo.  I,  c.  12  §  ii;  16  Geo.  II,  c.  26;  24  Geo.  II,  c.  57;  31  Geo.  II,  c. 
35.  Cf.  Charies  Carkesse,  The  Act  of  Tonnage  and  Poundage  (London,  1726), 
pp.  vi,  viii. 

*  Fr.  Ibbetson,  Deputy  Ccnsul  General  at  Lisbon  to  the  Board  of  Trade, 
1765.    B.  T.  Com.  Series  H,  579. 


^ 


i 


-:, 


1 


m 


■^u 


''A 


334 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


which  were  considered  parts  of  Africa.  Thence  they  were 
sent  in  foreign  bottoms  to  Portugal,  and  thus  the  result  of 
the  new  regulation  was  to  discourage  British  shipping,  and 
also  to  benefit  those  islands  which  had  already  acquired 
great  wealth  by  the  monopoly  of  the  American  wine  trade. 
Similarly,  some  Cork  merchants  complained  that  the  enu- 
meration of  lumber  would  be  -lighly  prejudicial  to  Ireland, 
as  the  casks  in  which  they  packed  their  provisions  had,  as  a 
rule,  been  made  out  of  staves  imported  directly  from  America.' 
As  a  result  of  these  criticisms,  Parliament  took  immediate 
action,  and  in  1765  allowed  colonial  lumber  to  be  shipped 
directly  to  Ireland  and  to  any  part  of  Europe  south  of  Cape 
Finisterre.'  In  addition.  Parliament  at  the  same  time 
granted  bounties*  on  lumber  imported  from  the  North 
American  colonies  into  Great  Britain,  which  resulted  in  a 
considerable  trade,*  and  in  the  payment  of  not  insignificant 
sums  by  the  British  treasury.* 

Colonial  iron  also  enjoyed  preferential  treatment  in  the 
British  market.    Its  enumeration  in   1764  aroused  some 

•  B.  T.  Com.  Scries  I,  49  li  114. 
« S  Geo.  Ill,  c.  45- 

'Ibid. 

*  B.  T.  Com.  Series  11,  6a6  Qq  54. 

» Account  of  bounties  paid  on  colonial  timber,  etc.,  from  Christmas,  1765, 
to  Christmas,  1771: 

1766  £1933 

1767  6556 

1768  6386 

1769  6557 

1770  5525 

Ihd.  Qq  55. 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE     AWS  OF  TRADE 


"5 


legitimate  opposition.'  Some  Cork  merchants  pointed  out 
that  this  regulation  would  hurt  the  Irish  linen  industry 
which,  in  part,  relied  on  colonial  flaxseed,  because  the  seed 
had  to  be  kept  absolutely  dry,  and  consequently  could  be 
shipped  with  security  only  on  top  of  iron  and  lumber.*  In 
1765  Parliament  took  this  into  consideration,  and  permitted 
the  colonics  to  export  their  iron  directly  to  Ireland.*  At  the  > 
same  time,  the  production  of  bar  iron  in  the  colonics  was 
further  encouraged.* 

During  the  war,  the  temporary  possession  by  Great  Britain 
of  a  number  of  the  French  West  Indies  had  led  to  the  ex- 
portation of  large  quantities  of  rice  from  South  Carolina  to 
those  islands.'  As  rice  was  an  enumerated  commcKlity,  this 
trade  became  illegal  in  1763,  on  the  return  of  Martinique 
and  Guadeloupe  to  France.  Georgia  and  South  Carolina,  the 
colonies  chiefly  interested,  were  naturally  loath  to  lose  these 
markets.  Accordingly  they  petitioned  Parliament  for  per- 
mission to  export  rice  to  the  foreign  colonics.'    The  northern 

'  John  Dickinson  said  that  this  restriction  was  "  thought  particularly 
severe,"  and  that  mixed  cargoes  of  iron,  lumber  and  provisions  had  yielded  satis- 
factory results  in  the  Portuguese  and  other  markets.  The  Late  Regulations 
respecting  the  British  Colonies  Considered,  1 765,  in  Dickinson,  Writings  (cd. 
P.  L    Ford)  I,  p.  2a6. 

B.  T.  Com.  Series  I,  49  li  114.     Stephen  Hopkins,  The  Rights  of  the  Col- 
0B3«s  Examined  ( l»rovidence,  1765),  p.  14,  also  called  attention  to  the  bad  effect 
ttmt  The  enumeration  of  lumber  would  have  on  the  Irish  linen  industry,  as 
CBsoes  were  usually  composed  of  lumber  and  flaxseed. 
5  Geo.  ni,  c.  45  §  xxii. 

'  Ibid.  §  x-xiii. 

•  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  ig  R  47;  The  Regulations  Lately  Made  (London,  1765), 

P-S3- 

*  Commons  Journal  ao,  pp.  606,  98a. 


i^ 


t 


«*l 


j!l 


Ji 


ill 


226 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


•! 


/ 


British  continental  colonies  opposed  such  a  measure,  as  it 
would  enable  rice  to  compete  with  their  food-stuffs  in  the 
French  and  Spanish  colonial  markets.*  In  1764,  however, 
Parliament  allowed  rice  to  be  exported  directly  from  Georgia 
and  South  Carolina  to  any  part  of  America  south  of  those 
colonies,*  and  in  the  following  year  extended  this  permis- 
sion to  the  North  Carolina  product  as  well.'  At  the  same 
time,  a  new  regulation  was  adopted  which  removed  one  of 
the  chief  disadvantages  involved  in  the  enumeration  of  rice, 
and  greatly  facilitated  its  reexportation  from  Great  Britain 
to  foreign  markets.* 

Reviewing  these  purely  commercial  regulations  of  the 
years  1764  and  1765,  it  is  apparent  that  their  aim  was  to 
encourage  and  not  to  restrict  colonial  industry.  The  efforts 
of  the  government  to  secure  the  expanding  North  American 
market  for  British  manufacturers,*  and  to  promote  the  devel- 

•  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  19  R  47. 

•  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  27. 

'  5  Geo.  Ill,  c.  45,  §  xix.  Rice  thus  exported  from  the  colonies  had  to  pay 
one-half  of  the  old  subsidy  of  1660,  i.e.  about  7<f.  a  cwt.  Cf.  Carkesse,  op.  cU., 
p.  bcxz.  But  the  duties  thus  paid  were  to  be  devoted  to  defraying  the  cost  of 
defending  the  colonies.    5  Geo.  Ill,  c.  45,  $  xx. 

•  Rice  could  be  shipped  directly  to  European  ports  south  of  Cape  Finistene, 
but  if  destined  ultimately  for  the  Dutch  or  German  markets,  it  had  to  be  shipped 
via  Great  Britain.  In  1 765  it  was  provided  that,  as  rice  was  frequently  brought 
to  British  ports  only  in  order  to  be  immediately  exported,  and  whereas  in  such 
instances  the  necessity  of  paying  the  full  British  duties  was  burdensome,  there- 
fore in  future,  on  the  declaration  of  an  intention  to  reexport  immediately  the 
entire  cargo  in  the  same  vessel,  only  one-half  of  the  old  subsidy  had  to  be  paid. 
4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  45,  5  xxi. 

•Thus  in  1765  the  importation  of  foreign  silk  stockings,  gloves,  and  mitts 
into  Great  Britain  or  its  dominions  was  prohibited.    5  Geo.  Ill,  c.  48. 


READJUSTMENT  OF  THE  LAWS  OF  TRADE  22/ 

opment  of  the  British  West  Indies  at  the  expense  of  French 
commerce  can  be  described  more  conveniently  in  connection 
with  the  reforms  in  the  administration  of  the  laws  of  trade 
and  with  the  attempts  to  create  a  colonial  revenue  in  order 
to  defray  a  part  of  the  cost  of  defending  the  colonies. 


y 


^'»i 


CHAPTER  XI 

REFORMS  IN  THE  ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  LAWS  OF 
TRADE,  I763-176S 

The  illegal  trade  of  the  colonies  with  the  enemy  during 
the  war  gave  a  vital  interest  to  the  entire  question  of  contra- 
band trade,  and  directed  the  attention  of  the  British  govern- 
ment to  the  system  as  a  whole.  The  experiences  during 
the  war  formed  to  a  great  extent  the  basis  for  those  reforms 
in  the  administrative  machinery  that  were  carried  into  effect 
after  the  peace  of  1763. 

The  navy's  success  in  partially  breaking  up  the  intercourse 
with  the  enemy  led  naturally  to  a  proposal  for  its  use  in 
checking  smuggling  after  the  war.  Contraband  trade  was  a 
chronic  evil  in  Great  Britain  and  in  the  Empire  as  a  whole, 
and  was  a  natural  phenomenon  in  that  age  of  poor  communi- 
cations, and  hence  necessarily  of  lax  administrative  control. 
In  the  colonies  it  included  not  only  violations  of  the  imperial 
laws  of  trade,  but  also  of  the  provincial  revenue  laws.* 
That  section  of  the  Navigation  Act  of  1660  which  confined 
all  trade  within  the  Empire  to  British  and  colonial  shipping 
gave  to  officers  of  the  royal  navy  authority  to  seize  vessels 
that  violated  this  regulation.'    As,  except  sporadically,*  there 

'  Cf.,  e.g.,  Sharpe  Correspondence  III,  p.  99. 
» la  Ch.  II,  c.  18,  §  i. 

•  For  some  apparent  violations,  see  B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  579,  no.  17.. 

22S 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


229 


were  virtually  no  such  violations,  and  as  only  custom-house 
officials  were  authorized  to  seize  vessels  offending  against 
the  numerous  other  provisions  of  the  acts  of  trade/  the 
activity  of  the  navy  in  enforcing  the  colonial  system  had 
been  insignificant.* 

At  various  times,  however,  special  vessels  had  been  em- 
ployed in  the  colonies  to  stop  smuggling;  and  during  a  long 
course  of  years,  the  governors  had  regularly  and  persistently 
urged  that  this  would  be  the  most  effective  way  to  uproot  all 
illegal  trade.  Accordingly,  in  1763,  profiting  by  the  expe- 
rience gained  during  the  recently  concluded  war,  Parliament 
passed  an  act  authorizing  the  employmc  t  of  the  navy  in  pre- 
venting contraband  trade  on  the  coasts  of  Great  Britain  and 
Ireland,  and  in  the  colonies  as  well.'  At  the  same  time,  the 
authority  over  vessels  hovering  on  the  coasts,  which  years 
before  this  had  been  granted  to  British  custom-house  offi- 
cials,* was  extended  to  those  in  Ireland  and  in  the  colonies.* 
Ships  of  the  navy  were  thereupon  immediately  employed 
for  these  purposes  in  the  colonies,  where  this  expedient  was 
decidedly  unpopular.' 

The  minister  responsible  for  this  measure  was  George 
Grenville,  who  at  the  time  of  its  introduction  was  First  Lord 


M 


•  13  and  14  Ch.  II,  c.  11,  §  xv. 

'  Under  Charles  I,  however,  the  navy  had  been  regularly  used  to  prevent 
the  colonies  from  sending  their  produce  to  foreign  countries. 

•  3  Geo.  Ill,  c.  22,  §  iv.    For  the  use  of  such  vessels  in  Great  Britain,  see 
"The  State  of  the  Nation"  (London,  1765),  pp.  16-17. 

*SGeo.  I,  c.  II. 

•  3  Geo.  Ill,  c.  22,  S  viil. 
•B.T.  Mass.  78  LI  67,  73. 


330 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


of  the  Admiralty,  and  at  the  time  of  its  passage,  head  of 
the  Ministry  in  which  he  occupied  the  positions  of  First  Lord 
of  the  Treasury  and  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.*  Gren- 
ville's  chief  interest  centred  on  internal  policy,  and  the  motto 
of  his  administration  was  economy  and  reform.  The  war 
had  left  the  British  exchequer  in  a  depleted  condition,  and 
this  fact  led  to  an  investigation  of  all  the  possible  ways  of 
increasing  the  revenue.' 

The  two  statutes  affecting  the  colonies,  from  which  an 
increased  revenue  might  possibly  be  secured,  were  first, 
that  of  1673  imposing  certain  moderate  duties  on  inter- 
colonial trade;  and  secondly,  the  Molasses  Act  of  1733. 
The  latter  law  had  been  to  a  great  extent  ignored,  but  during 
the  war  an  attempt  had  been  made  to  enforce  it  with  a  view 
to  checking  the  trade  with  the  French.  These  efforts  had 
aroused  considerable  opposition  in  the  colonies,  and  had  been 
considerably  relaxed  on  the  approach  of  peace  and  its  final 
conclusion.'  The  revenue  derived  from  both  of  these  statutes 
had  been  insignificant,  amounting  to  only  about  one  quarter 
of  the  cost  of  collection.* 

>  Commons  Journal  29,  pp.  6ao,  630;  Cal.  Home  Office  Papers,  1760-1765, 
p.  236. 

'  C/.  Grenville  Papers  11,  pp.  113, 114. 

•  This  can  be  seen  in  the  revenue  statistics  already  given.  On  Sept.  1 7, 1 763, 
Hutchinson  wrote  to  Richard  Jackson:  "Such  indulgence  has  been  shown  of 
late  to  that  branch  of  illicit  trade  that  nobody  has  considered  it  as  such ;  vessels 
arriving  and  making  their  entries  for  some  small  acknowledgements  as  openly 
as  from  our  own  Islands  without  paying  the  duties."    Quincy,  op.  cit.  p.  430- 

•The  average  yearly  revenue  from  these  two  statutes  for  thirty  years  was: 
in  the  continental  colonies,  £700  to  £800;  in  the  West  Indies,  £1100  to  £1200. 
The  establishment  of  the  custom-house  officials  in  all  the  colonies  amounted  to 


'^ 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


231 


The  Molasses  Act  was  diametrically  opposed  to  the  most 
fundamental  interests  of  the  northern  continental  colonies, 
and  consequently  could  not  easily  be  enforced.  But  in  addi- 
tion, the  British  customs  service  in  the  colonies  was  in  part 
both  inefficient  and  venal.  The  trade  with  the  enemy  had 
been  in  some  degree  carried  on  with  the  corrupt  connivance 
of  these  officials.  By  law  they  had  extensive  discretionary 
powers,  of  which  the  chief  was  authority  to  accept  in  full 
payment  amounts  less  than  the  lawful  duties.*  Thus,  in^ 
stead  of  exacting  the  full  duties  under  the  law  of  1733,  the 
officers  of  the  customs  frequently  allowed  the  importation 
of  foreign  West  Indian  products  on  the  payment  of  small 
sums  of  money  which,  it  appears  in  some  instances,  they 
retained  for  their  own  uses.'  In  1763,  in  consequence  of 
this  abuse,  such  compositions  for  duties  were  absolutely 
forbidden.'  In  addition,  in  some  instances,  the  actual 
appointees  to  the  positions  in  the  customs  service  remained 
in  England,  and  delegated  their  functions  to  deputies.  The 
Board  of  Trade  had  in  vain  striven  against  this  vicious  sys- 
tem. As  the  salaries  of  the  customs  officers  were  in  them- 
selves small,  and  as  they  were  still  further  reduced  by  this 
practice,  some  of  them  yielded  to  the  temptation  of  aug- 


.5 


ii 


£7600 yearly.  TheRegulationsLatelyMade(LondoD,  i765),p.  57;  Grenville 
Papers  II,  pp.  113,  114.  For  details  regarding  the  officers  of  the  customs  in 
the  colonies,  see  John  Chamberlayne,  Magns  Britannis  Nutitia  (London, 
I7SS).  part  n,  pp.  96-98. 

'  13  and  14  Ch.  II,  c.  11,  §§  xvii,  stviii. 

•N.J.  Col.  Doc.  ix,  pp.  403-404.    Cf.  Quincy,  of.  eit.,  p.  430. 

•Order  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Cust  —  Nov.  15,  1763,  printed  in 
Hugh  Gaine's  "New-York  Mercury,"  no.  649  fc    Vpril  a,  1764. 


1 


1^  \ 


1  '     i 


ii 


m 

I 

i 
111 


33a 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4-I76S 


menting  their  income  by  corrupt  means.'  Thus  a  number 
of  posts  in  the  service  had  become  sinecures.  The  Com- 
missioners of  the  Customs  reported  that  this  was  one 
reason  for  the  small  revenue  arising  in  the  colonies.  To 
Orenville,  as  the  embodiment  of  administrative  efficiency, 
such  a  system  was  particularly  obnoxious.  Shortly  after 
the  formation  of  his  ministry,  he  ordered  all  colonial  customs 
officials  residing  in  England  to  proceed  immediately  tc  their 
posts  in  the  colonies.' 
In  addition  to  these  steps,  on  July  9,  1763,  special  instruc- 

'  On  Sept.  1 7, 1 763,  Hutchinson  wrote  to  Richard  Jackson :  "The  real  cause 
of  the  illicit  trade  in  this  province  has  been  the  indulgence  of  the  officers  of  the 
customs,  and  we  are  told  that  the  cause  of  their  indulgence  has  been  that  they 
are  quartered  upon  for  more  than  their  legal  fees,  and  that  without  bribery 
and  corruption  they  must  starve."  Quincy,  op.  cU.  p.  430.  Similarly,  in 
1764,  James  Otis  wrote:  "With  regard  to  a  few  Dutch  imports  that  have  made 
such  a  noise,  the  truth  is,  very  little  has  been  or  could  be  run,  before  the  appara- 
tus of  guardships;  for  the  officers  of  some  ports  did  their  duty,  while  others 
may  have  made  a  monopoly  of  smuggling,  for  a  few  of  their  friends,  who  prob- 
ably paid  them  large  contributions;  for  it  has  been  observed,  that  a  very  small 
office  in  the  customs  in  America  has  raised  a  man  a  fortime  sooner  than  a  Gov- 
ernment. The  truth  is,  the  acts  of  trade  have  been  too  often  evaded;  but  by 
whom?  Not  by  the  American  merchants  in  general,  but  by  some  former 
custom-house  officers,  their  friends  and  partisans."  The  Rights  of  the 
British  Colonists  Asserted  and  Proved  (Boston,  1764),  p.  58.  In  estimating 
the  value  of  this  statement,  the  controversial  character  of  the  pamphlet  should 
be  taken  into  account.  Similarly,  in  1 764,  an  anonymous  pamphleteer  said  that 
the  Molasses  Act  had  demoralized  the  custom-house  officials,  who  "made  a 
very  lucrative  jobb  of  shutting  their  eyes,  or  at  least  of  opening  them  no  farther 
than  their  own  private  interest  required."  An  Essay  on  the  Trade  of  the 
Northern  Colonies  (London,  1764),  p.  20.  See  also  Howard,  A  Letter  from  a 
Gentleman  at  Halifax,  Newport,  1765. 

'  GrtnviUe  to  Horace  Walpole,  Sept.  8, 1763.  Grenville  Papers  II,  pp.  113, 
114.   Cf.  also  Correspondence  of  Colonial  Governors  of  Rhode  Island,  II,  p.  355. 


I 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


233 


tions  were  sent  to  the  colonial  governors  to  take  all  possible 
measures  to  prevent  illegal  trade,  especially  the  fraudulent 
and  clandestine  importation  of  foreign  products  and  manu- 
factures into  the  colonies.'  In  the  meanwhile,  the  Treasury 
Department,  over  which  Grenvih  •  especially  presided,  was 
carefully  investigating  the  subject  as  a  whole,  and  on  Octo- 
ber 4, 1763,  reported  thereon.  This  report  pointetl  out  that 
the  income  derived  from  the  customs  in  America  was  very 
small  and  had  not  increased  with  the  growth  of  commerce ; 
and  that,  "thro'  Neglect  Connivance  and  Fraud,"  the  reve- 
nue was  impaired,  and  in  addition  the  commerce  of  the  col- 
onies diverted  from  its  natural  course,  in  not  being  confined 
to  the  metropolis.  The  Lords  of  the  Treasury  remarked 
that  this  was  a  question  of  great  importance,  especially  be- 
cause the  military  establishments  in  the  colonics  necessitated 
a  large  revenue,  and  because  the  increased  territory  rendered 
the  regulation  of  colonial  trade  a  matter  of  immediate  neces- 
sity. Furthermore  they  added  that  they  had  endeavored 
to  remove  the  causes  of  "the  Deficiency  of  this  Revenue 
and  the  Contraband  Trade  with  other  European  Nations," 
and  had,  with  this  object  in  view,  ordered  all  the  officials 
under  them  to  be  fully  instructed  in  their  duties,  to  repair 
to  their  respective  stations  and  to  execute  the  law.  In  addi- 
tion, as  contraband  trade  had  "hitherto  been  carried  on  with 
too  much  Impunity,"  they  recommended  that  strict  instruc- 


II 


It 


'  These  instructio>.5  were  sent  by  the  Secretary  of  State,  ERrcmont.  Sharpc 
Correspondence  III,  pp.  10a,  103.  See  also  Wentworth  to  Kgrcmont,  Oct.  20, 
1763.  Am.  and  W.I.  i6i.  Egremont  laid  CM  stress  on  the  loss  in  revenue 
due  to  the  evasion  of  the  duties. 


234 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


1 


M 

I    I 


If 


tions  to  enforce  the  laws  be  sent  to  the  governors.'  This 
report  was  immediately  approved,  and  a  short  time  there- 
after, the  Board  of  Trade  sent  the  desired  instructions  to  the 
governors.' 

It  will  be  noticed  that  this  report  emanated  from  the  Treas- 
ury Department,  and  not  from  the  Board  of  Trade,  which 
was  the  body  especially  intrusted  with  the  management  of 
colon  1  affairs.  This  fact  is  significant.  It  indicates  that 
the  chief  object  in  view  was  to  improve  the  revenue,  and  in 
this  respect,  it  sounds  a  new  note,  but  one  not  altogether 
foreign  to  the  old  colonial  system.  It  marks  a  reversion  to 
the  policy  of  the  Stuarts,  in  whose  regulations  of  colonial 
trade  can  be  traced  a  fixed  intention  to  improve  the  British 
customs  revenue.  During  the  eighteenth  century  this  fiscal 
motive  had,  however,  been  distinctly  subordinated  to  the 
broader  economic  one.  A  rigid  execution  of  the  Molasses 
Act  might  materially  increase  the  revenue,  and  consequently 
it  was  on  this  law  that  the  colonial  customs  officials  to  a 
great  extent  concentrated  their  attention.'  Furthermore,  as 
small  duties  were  paid  on  foreign  goods  shipped  from  Great 
Britain  to  the  colonies,  a  strict  enforcement  of  the  laws 

'  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  18  Q  74;  Am.  and  W.L  387,  folio  76.  See  also  the 
report  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Customs  to  the  Lords  of  the  Treasury, 
Sept.  16,  1763.     Brit.  Mas.  Addit.  MSS.  8133,  C  folio  85. 

'  B.  T.  Journals  71,  p.  241 ;  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  45,  pp.  306-309;  Col.  Rec 
of  Rhode  Island  VI,  p.  375.  The  commander-in-chief,  Amhers  ,  was  also 
instructed  to  give  his  support  to  the  enforcement  of  the  laws.  Halifax  to 
Amherst,  Oct.  11,  1763.    Am.  and  W.I.  77. 

•  See,  e.g.,  advertisement  in  the  "  Pennsylvania  Gazette,"  no.  1836,  March  i, 
1764,  dated  at  the  custom  house,  Salem,  N.  J.,  Dec.  36, 1763,  enjoining  obedience 
to  the  Molasses  Act.    B.  T.  N.J.  9  K  42. 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


23S 


would  also  in  this  respect  somewhat  increase  the  British 
revenue.  Besides,  this  policy  would  give  the  mother  country 
a  firmer  hold  on  the  North  American  market,  and  would 
thus  add  to  her  prosperity  and  concomitantly  to  the  produc- 
tivity of  the  British  fiscal  system. 

A  more  rigid  execution  of  the  law  and  a  reform  in  the  cus- 
toms service  would  not,  however,  do  away  with  all  those 
administrative  defects  that  had  been  exposed  by  the  trade 
with  the  enemy.  But  Grenville  was  painstaking  and 
methodical  and,  prior  to  legislating,  wished  to  hear  further 
from  the  colonial  governors.  Though  they  had  continually 
sent  in  reports  as  to  the  nature  and  extent  of  contraband 
trade,  little  of  an  exact  nature  was  known  about  it.  The 
instructions  of  1763  brought  forth  detailed  replies  from  the 
colonies,*  which  enabled  the  government  to  legislate  during 
the  parliamentary  session  of  1764. 

For  the  purpose  of  considering  the  extent  of  illegal  trade, 
the  American  colonies  may  be  roughly  divided  into  three 
groups,  those  in  the  West  Indies,  the  plantation  colonies  on 
the  continent,  and  the  Northern  provinces.  In  the  important 
older  colonies  of  the  first  group,  especially  in  Barbados  and 


'i' 


i' 


'A  convenient  list  of  these  reports  may  be  found  in  Cal.  Home  Office 
Papers,  1760-1765,  p.  655.  Cf.  also  nos.  1555,  1603.  The  predominance  of 
the  financial  note  in  the  regulations  of  1764  and  1765  is  indicated  by  the  fact 
that  the  Secretary  of  State  sent  these  reports  to  the  Treasury  office,  and  not  to 
the  Board  of  Trade.  On  July  9,  1763,  the  Earl  of  Egremont  wrote  to  the 
colonial  governors  about  illegal  trade,  and  on  Aug.  11,  1764,  the  Earl  of  Hali- 
fax did  likewise.  Both  of  these  despatches  elicited  detailed  replies,  which  it 
is  advisable  to  consider  together.  See  Wentworth's  despatches  of  Oct.  ao, 
1763,  and  Nov.  18, 1764,  in  Am.  and  W.I.  i6i. 


336 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


Jamaica/  there  was  comparatively  little  or  no  violation  of  the 
law.  Thus  the  Governor  of  Barbados  was  able  to  write  to 
the  secretary  of  state :  "  I  have  the  pleasure  to  inform  you 
that  I  apprehend  very  little  Illicit  Trade  is  attempted  in  this 
Colony."  '  On  the  other  hand,  in  the  comparatively  unim- 
portant newly  acquired  colonies,  and  in  the  Virgin  Islands 
where  the  government  was  not  fully  organized,  there  was 
considerable  contraband  trade.  Almost  the  entire  produce 
of  Dominica  and  St.  Vincent,  whose  inhabitants  were  in  the 
main  French,  was  carried  to  St.  Lucia,  a  French  island.* 
Similarly,  the  former  French  colony  Grenada  sought  to 
retain  its  accustomed  trade  relations,  and  shipped  a  consider- 
able quantity  of  cocoa  and  coffee  to  the  French  West  Indies, 
importing  thence  in  turn  the  manufactures  of  France.* 
These  unsatisfactory  conditions  were,  to  a  great  extent,  a 
direct  result  of  the  dislocation  produced  by  the  transfer 
of  these  islands  from  the  French  to  the  British  flag, — 
from  one  commercial  empire  to  a  similarly  organized,  but 
different  one. 

In  the  Southern  colonies  on  the  continent,  the  situation  was 
different  and  far  more  satisfactory.  Dobbs  reported  that 
illicit  trade  was  scarcely  known  in  North  Carolina,  and  that 


III 


ill* 


"  Lyttelton's  Answers  to  Queries  for  1763:  B.  T.  Jam.  37  Cc  19;  Lyttelton 
to  Halifax,  Jan.  12,  1764:  Col.  Cor.  Jam.  III. 

'Charles  Pinfold  to  Halifax,  Nov.  17,  1764.    Col.  Corr.  Barbados  I. 

•  This  produce  consisted  of  coffee,  cocoa,  and  tobacco,  all  enumerated  com- 
modities.   This  trade  was  stopped  in  1 765. 

♦Lords  of  the  Admiralty  to  Halifax,  July  7,  1765,  transmitting  extracts 
from  the  despatches  of  Rear- Admiral  Tyrrel.  Cal.  Home  Office  Papers,  1 760- 
1765,  p.  573f  no-  1825- 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


337 


during  the  nine  years  of  his  tenure  of  office,  only  one  seizure 
had  been  made,  and  that  even  in  this  instance  no  fraud  had 
been  intended.'  Likewise,  in  Maryland,  there  was  little  or 
no  violation  of  the  law,  except  that  a  small  quantity  of 
tobacco  was  exported  to  the  neighboring  provinces,  without 
paying  the  duties  that  the  Crown  had  granted  for  the  support 
of  William  and  Mary  College  in  Virginia.'  In  the  latter 
province,  also,  there  was  virtually  no  illegal  trade.  In  1764, 
Fauquier  wrote  to  Halifax  that  he  believed  Virginia  stood 
"as  clear  of  illicit  practices  in  Trade  as  any  country  that 
trades  at  all,"  so  much  so  that  the  men-of-war  did  not  find 
it  worth  their  while  to  watch  at  all.  As  in  Maryland,  some 
tobacco  was  sent  to  the  other  British  colonies  without  paying 
the  duties  which  in  part  supported  the  local  college,  and  in 
addition,  some  small  quantities  of  fruit  and  wine  were  im- 
ported directly  from  Portugal.'  In  South  Carolina,  accord- 
ing to  William  Bull,  there  had  been  "  few  Suspicions,  &  fewer 
Instances  of  Persons ' '  having  broken  the  laws  of  trade.  Bull 
also  added  that  he  had  never  heard  of  any  vessel  coming  to 
the  province  contrary  to  the  Act  of  Navigation,  and  that 

'  Arthur  Dobbs  to  Halifax,  Jan.  14,  1764.  Am.  and  W.I.  214.  Cf.  B.  T. 
No.  Ca.,  14  E  II,  76. 

•Horatio  Sharpe  to  Egremonl,  Oct.  4,  1763;  Same  to  Halifax,  Oct.  20, 
1764.    Am.  and  W.I.  197. 

•Fauquier  to  Halifax,  Nov.  20,  1764.  Am.  and  W.I.  205.  "The  Chief 
Fraud  I  have  been  apprized  of  has  bee.i  the  shipping  off  Tobacco  to  his  Maj- 
esty's other  Colonies  without  paying  the  Duty  appropriated  to  the  Support  of 
William  and  Mary  College;  but  a  late  Seizure  of  some  New  England  Vessels, 
has  I  beliu've  pretty  well  put  a  Stop  to  that  practice."  In  addition,  Fauquier 
wrote,  that  the  ships  coming  from  Lisbon  brought  some  chests  yf  fruit,  which 
were  generally  given  as  presents  to  the  shippers  of  tobacco,  and  also  sometimes 


'i 


n 


238 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


I 


while  some  illicit  trade  might  be  carried  on,  it  wat  "  in  a 
very  inconsiderable  degree."  ' 

The  conditions  prevailing  in  the  Northern  colonics  were 
more  complicated,  and  require  a  more  exhaustive  analysis. 
New  Hampshire,  with  its  small  coast-line  and  single  port, 
was  apparently  not  implicated  in  contraband  trade.  In  1 765, 
Wentworth,  who  had  been  its  governor  for  twenty-one 
years,  wrote  to  the  secretary  of  state:  "I  have  made  it  my 
first  care  to  Prevent  the  evils  now  Complained  of,  and  which 
have  given  so  much  Trouble  ...  I  have  both  the  Pleasure 
and  Satisfaction  to  assert  with  truth,  that  not  one  Cargoe  of 
Prohibited  Goods  has  been  Landed  within  the  Limits  of 
My  Government  since  my  Arrival  in  it."  * 

From  the  neighboring  colony  of  Massachusetts,  Governor 
Francis  Bernard  reported  on  October  25,  1763,  that  he  be- 
lieved the  laws  of  trade  to  be  "no  where  better  supported 
than  they  are  in  this  province;"  and  that  since  the  failure 

some  liquor  or  wine,  but  he  added:  "This  is  rather  a  small  Venture  of  the 
Captain,  and  by  no  means  a  general  Cargo  of  the  Ship." 

'  Bull  to  Halifax,  Nov.  a8,  1764.  Am.  and  W.I.  233.  On  Nov.  aj,  1763, 
Governor  Thomas  Boone  also  wrote  to  the  secretary  of  stale  on  the  same 
subject,  without  giving  any  precise  information,  but  saying  that  eleven  years' 
acquainUnce  with  nearly  every  province  of  America  had  convinced  him  of  the 
necessity  of  the  steps  taken  to  prevent  illegal  trade.  As  far  as  South  Carolina 
was  concerned,  he  said  that  he  had  been  very  diligent  in  seeing  that  the  laws  of 
trade  were  enforced.    Ibid. 

'WentworthtoEgremont,  Oct.  20, 1763.  Am.  and  W.L  161.  The  follow- 
ing year,  Nov.  18,  1764,  Wentworth  wrote  to  Halifax  that  upon  strict  inquiry 
he  finds  that  since  1741  only  one  vessel  has  been  suspected  of  being  engaged  in 
contraband  trade.  This  case  concerned  only  30  to  40  hhds.  of  foreign  molasses, 
and  nothing  positive  could  be  learned  about  it.  Ibid.  Cf.  also  Wentworth 
to  the  Board  of  Trade,  March  4, 1764.    B.  T.  New  Hampshire  5  D  14. 


'I 


ADMINISTRATIVE  HEFORMS 


239 


in  1 761  of  the  attack  on  the  Vice-Admiralty  Court  and  the 
custom-house  officials,  "the  Merchants  here  in  general  have 
acted  in  such  a  manner  as  to  intitle  themselves  to  all  proper 
favour."  Bernard  admitted,  as  did  Fauquier  of  Virginia, 
that  there  had  been  an  indulgence  "time  out  of  mind  al- 
lowed" in  a  trifling  but  necessary  matter,  in  that  small  quan- 
tities of  fruit  and  wine  were  allowed  to  be  imported  directly 
from  Lisbon.  But  this,  he  correctly  pointed  out,  was  in  itself 
of  but  slight  importance,  ana  besides,  did  not  run  counter 
to  the  spirit  of  the  old  colonial  system.*  Bernard  likewise 
added  that  he  did  not  pretend  that  Massachusetts  was  entirely 
free  from  all  breaches  of  the  law,  but  that  the  offenders,  if 
discovered,  were  severely  punished.'  This  report  did  not 
discuss  the  "Molasses  Act,"  which  was  extensively  and  even 
openly  violated  in  Massachusetts,  such  evasions  constituting 
unquestionably  the  bulk  of  the  illegal  trade  of  that  province,' 


>. 


'  Am.  and  W.I.  167.  Cf.  also  Bernard's  answers  to  the  Queries,  Sept.  5, 
1763.    B.  T.  Mass.  78  LI  67,  68. 

'  At  this  time  a  vessel  with  its  cargo  was  condemned  without  any  defence 
for  loading  rice  without  giving  the  necessary  bond.  In  1763,  also,  a  ship,  the 
Freemason,  was  condemned  with  its  cargo  for  coming  to  Boston  with  wine 
from  Bordeaux.  As  the  wine  had  not  been  actually  landed,  there  was  some 
doubt  as  to  the  technical  legality  of  this  condemnation,  and  an  appeal  was 
taken  to  the  High  Court  of  Admiralty.  Bernard  to  Halifax,  Dec.  24,  1 763 : 
Am.  and  W.I.  167;  B.  T.  Mass.  78  LI  67;  Quincy,  op.  cit.  pp.  387-392. 

'Bernard  strongly  opposed  the  policy  of  this  act,  and  on  Sept.  5,  1763, 
w  Dte  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  recommending  that  the  important  trade  in  mo- 
lasses from  the  West  Indies  be  not  touched,  either  by  executing  the  old  law  or 
by  passing  a  new  one.  B.  T.  Mass.  78  LI  67-68.  In  1764  Bernard  freely 
admitted  that  "if  conniving  at  foreign  sugar  &  molasses,  &  Portugal  wines 
&  fruit,  is  to  be  reckoned  Corruption,  there  was  never,  I  believe,  an  uncor- 
rupt  Custom  House  Officer  in  America  ♦ni  within  twelve  months."    Quincy, 


I, 


140 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


■  ii 


In  Rhode  Island  the  conditions  were  peculiar ;  the  colony 
was  virtually  a  petty  independent  republic,  and  opposed 
the  custom-house  oflScials  as  the  representatives  of  an 
outside  authority.'  The  colony,  however,  produced  no 
enumerated  commodities,  and  hence  was  necessarily  free 
from  any  important  violations  of  this  phase  of  the  colo- 
nial system;  nor,  on  the  other  hand,  does  it  appear  that 
there  was  any  extensive  illegal  importation  of  foreign 
manufactures.*  The  Molasses  Act,  however,  was  flagrantly 
and  openly  ignored.  Of  the  fourteen  thousand  hogsheads 
of  molasses  imported  into  the  colony,  all  but  twenty-five 

op.  cit.  pp.  423,  424.  It  should  be  noted  that  Bernard  was  suspected  of  adding 
to  his  income  by  countenancing  these  evasions. 

'Halifax  to  Rhode  Island,  June  9,  1764.  Am.  and  W.I.  197.  See  also 
Bernard  to  Halifax,  Dec.  14, 1764.  Ibid.  In  this  despatch  Bernard  said  that 
it  was  difficult  even  in  a  royal  colony  to  guard  the  smaller  ports,  and  that  "it 
would  be  too  much  to  require  an  elective  governor  to  be  earnest  in  discovering 
&  prosecuting  frauds  of  trade." 

'  This  statement  is  to  some  extent  based  on  "  An  Essay  on  the  Trade  of  the 
Ncnhem  Colonies  "  (London,  1764),  pp.  g,  10.  A  good  outline  of  this  pam- 
phlet may  be  found  in  the  "  Monthly  Review  "  (London,  1764),  XXX,  pp.  464- 
466.  The  title-page  conveys  the  impression  that  it  was  a  rejjrint  from  a 
Philadelphia  edition.  Hildebum  (Issues  of  the  Press  in  Pennsylvania,  II,  p.  la) 
gives  it  among  the  Philadelphia  imprints  of  1764,  but  he  does  not  state  that  he 
actually  saw  the  pamphlet.  M.  C.  Tyler  (Literary  History  of  the  American 
Revolution,  I,  p.  56),  saw  only  the  London  edition,  but  on  the  strength  of  its 
title-page,  used  this  pamphlet  as  an  expression  of  the  sentiment  of  the  Middle 
colonies.  The  essay  appeared  in  a  Rhode  Island  newspaper,  "  The  Providence 
Gazette  "  for  Jan.  1 4  and  ai ,  1 764,  and  hence  could  not  have  been  reprinted  from 
a  Philadelphia  edition  of  that  year.  It  is  signed  with  the  initial  P.,  as  was 
Stephen  Hopkin's  anonymous  pamphlet,  "The  Rights  of  the  Colonies  Exam- 
ined," Providence,  1765.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  Hugh  Gaine's  "New- 
York  Mercury,"  no.  641  for  Feb.  6, 1764,  in  reprinting  thisessay,  acknowledged 
its  indebtedness  to  the  "Providence  Gazette." 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


«4I 


hundred  were  foreign  in  origin,  yet  virtually  no  duties  were 
collected  thereon.' 

Connecticut's  foreign  commerce  was  in  itself  small,  and 
consequently  this  colony's  participation  in  illegal  trade  could 
not  be  of  serious  importance.  When  pointing  this  out  in 
1763,  Governor  Fitch  also  wrote  he  had  used  his  utmost  en- 
deavors to  enforce  the  law,  and  that,  possibly  in  consequence 
thereof,  all  violations  had  ceased.'  The  following  year  he 
likewise  stated  that  the  officials  of  the  customs  were  very 
careful  and  diligent,  and  that  no  illicit  trade  was  carried  on.' 
The  Sound  was,  however,  a  convenient  place  for  smugglers,* 
and,  despite  Fitch's  assertions,  it  appears  that  some  foreign 
goods  V  '?  smuggled  into  Massachusetts  *  and  into  New 
York*  from  Connecticut.  New  Jersey,  like  Connecticut, 
had  but  lit^'e  foreign  trade,  and  its  waters  also  furnished  a 
convenient  means  for  smuggling  into  New  York.'    In  1764, 


"  Memorial  of  Rhode  Island  against  the  Molasses  Act  in  B.  T.  Prop.  21X57; 
Col.  Rec.  of  R.I. VI,  pp.  378-383 ;  "New-York Mercury,"  Nov.  la,  1 764,  no. 681. 
'  Fitch  to  Egremont,  Sept.  14,  1763.    Am.  and  W.I.  197. 
•FitchtoHalifax,Nov.  13, 1764.    Ibid.  Cy.  also  B.T.  Prop,  ai  X  33, 176a. 

*  Cf.  t  T.  Prop.  13  S  I. 

'In  1764  Bernard  reported  that  some  foreign  goods,  especially  teas,  had 
been  smuggled  into  Boston,  but  as  that  port  was  particularly  well  watched, 
they  could  not  have  been  imported  there.  Soon  thereafter,  he  learned  that 
two  Dutch  vessels  had  been  able  to  get  into  two  of  the  smaller  ports  of  Connec- 
ticut, and  he  surmised  that  these  goods  came  thence.  Bernard  to  Halifax, 
Dec.  14,  1764.    Am.  and  W.I.  167. 

•  Colden  to  Halifax,  Oct.  9, 1764:  Am.  and  W.I.  176.  Colden  to  Board  of 
Trade,  Dec.  7,  1763:  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  584.  Cf.  also  B.  T.  N.Y.  34 
Mm  13,  14. 

'Colden  to  Halifax,  Oct.  9,  1764:  Am.  and  W.I.  176;  N.Y.  Col.  Doc 
Vn,  p.  584.    Cf.  B.  T.  N.J.  9  K  17. 


i 


343 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


however,  Governor  Franklin  was  able  to  assure  the  secre- 
tary of  state  that  since  his  arrival  in  New  Jersey,  two  years 
prior  to  this,  he  had  had  no  information  regarding  any  con- 
traband trade,  and  that  the  officers  of  the  customs  had 
eflfectually  stopped  the  greatest  part,  if  not  all,  of  such  vio- 
lations of  the  law  in  his  government.' 

Like  Rhode  Island,  Pennsylvania  was  virtually  an  inde- 
pendent community,  having  but  slight  political  connection 
with  the  mother  country,  and  consequently  little  exact  in- 
formation about  conditions  in  the  colony  was  forwarded  to 
England.  It  was  generally  believed  that  the  traders  in 
Philadelphia,  New  York,  Rhode  Island,  and  Massachusetts 
were  the  chief  violators  of  the  laws  of  trade,  including  therein 
the  Molasses  Act.'  In  1763,  the  governor  of  the  colony, 
James  Hamilton,  wrote  rather  ambiguously  that  he  had 
always  endeavored  to  stop  contraband  trade,  but  that  he 
had  not  met  with  the  success  he  should  have  liked.'  His 
successor,  John  Penn,  however,  wrote  in  the  following  year 
that,  whatever  irregularities  may  theretofore  have  occurred 
in  Pennsylvania,  at  that  time  no  illegal  trade  seemed  to  be 
practised.* 

In  contrast  to  this  meagre  information  from  Pennsylvania, 
fairly  complete  evidence  is  available  regarding  New  York. 

'  Franklin  to  Halifax,  Nov.  8, 1764.    Am.  and  W.I.  190. 

*  Wentworth  to  Egremont,  Oct.  ao,  1763.    Am.  and  W.L  161. 

*  James  Hamilton  to  Egremont,  Oct.  8,  1763.  Am.  and  W.L  197.  Ham- 
ilton wrote  that  he  approved  of  the  um  of  the  navy  to  stop  illegal  trade,  and 
that  he  would  do  his  utmost  with  the  same  end  in  view. 

*  John  Penn  to  Halifax,  Dec.  10, 1 764.  Am.  and  W.I.  197.  He  added  that 
the  stationary  ships  of  war  on  the  coast  of  America  had  been  very  effective, 
and  that  the  officers  of  the  navy  and  of  the  customs  were  vigilant  in  per- 
formins  their  dutv. 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


243 


Colden  was  the  executive  head  of  this  colony,  and  forwarded 
to  the  government  detailed  reports,*  which  throw  considerable 
light  not  alone  on  conditions  prevailing  in  New  York,  but 
also  on  those  in  the  other  colonies.  In  the  first  place,  Colden 
wrote  to  the  Earl  of  Egremont:  "Your  Lordship  cannot 
easily  conceive  hov/  weak  the  hands  of  Government  are  in 
this  province,  &  how  much  the  Governor  is  disabled  in  secur- 
ing the  King's  Right,  &  in  putting  the  laws  of  trade  in  execu- 
tion." This  arose  in  part,  as  he  pointed  out,  from  the  fact 
that  the  judges  were  closely  allied  to  the  leading  families, 
and  in  all  cases  of  importance  were  apt  to  decide  against 
the  Crown,  and  in  favor  of  their  relatives.  As  to  the  extent 
of  such  violations,  Colden  reported  that  "without  doubt  much 
illicit  Trade  is  carried  on  in  this  place,  and,  tho'  more  of  it 
has  been  detected  and  punished  in  this  Port,  than  in  any 
of  the  other  Colonies,  I  am  persuaded  there  is  not  less  among 
them,  in  proportion  to  the  Trade."  He  asserted  also  that 
New  York  customs  officials  were  more  careful  than  those  of 
the  neighboring  colonies.' 

The  chief  infraction  of  the  colonial  system  described  by 
Colden  consisted  of  a  direct  trade  from  Holland  to  the  colo- 
nies. This  was  carried  on  in  two  ways.  British  vessels 
bound  from  Holland  for  America  touched  at  some  port  in 
the  mother  country,  where  they  entered  and   paid  duties 

•  Colden  to  Egremont,  Sept.  14, 1763:  Am.  and  W.I.  176;  Same  to  Board 
of  Trade,  Dec.  7,  1763:  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  584;  Same  to  Halifax, 
Oct.  9,  1764:  Am.  and  W.I.  176. 

•  The  smuggling  of  foreign  goods  into  New  York  from  Connecticut  and  New 
Jersey,  Colden  wrote,  had  been  stopped  by  the  navy's  "puting  Hands  on  Board 
suspected  vessells  before  they  got  into  any  Port" 


^11 


344 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


on  only  a  portion  of  their  lading,  and  then,  protected  by 
the  custom-house  documents  which  they  had  received  in 
Great  Britain,  landed  their  entire  cargoes  in  the  colonies. 
The  other  method  was  to  sail  from  Holland  with  papers 
indicating  the  Dutch  colonies  as  the  point  of  destination, 
but  with  leave  to  stop  at  some  British  colony.  This,  Golden 
pointed  out,  "saves  them  from  the  officers  in  case  the  land- 
ing of  the  goods  be  not  discovered."  '  The  chief  com- 
modities thus  illegally  imported  were  tea  and  gunpowder.' 

From  this  summary  analysis  of  the  governors'  reports, 
it  will  be  uftparent  inat,  while  there  were  numerous  in- 
fractions of  the  colonial  system,  its  eflfectiveness  as  a  whole 
was  not  seriously  impaired.  The  Molasses  Act,  which  was 
not  an  integral  part  of  the  system,  was,  however,  largely 
ignored,  so  much  so  that  in  a  number  of  instances  the  gov- 
ernors treated  it  as  an  obsolete  law,  and  did  not  trouble 
themselves  with  giving  any  information  about  its  evasion. 
Of  the  three  fundamental  principles  of  the  system,  two  were 
apparently  almost  completely  intact.  Golonial  trade  was,  if 
not  wholly,  at  all  events  to  an  overwhelmingly  preponderant 
extent,  confined  to  British  and  colonial  shipping,  and  the 
enumerated  commodities  were  as  a  general  rule  shipped  to 
Great  Britain.     Of  the  third  fundamental  principle,  —  that 

'These  methods  had  already  been  called  to  the  attention  of  the  British 
goverament  by  Hardy  in  1757,  and  by  DeLancey  in  1758.  B.  T.  Journals  65, 
Nov.  3,  1757;  B.  T.  N.Y.  34  Mm  13,  14,  /,3,  42.  Colden  said  that  an  act 
of  Parliament  would  be  necessary  to  cope  with  such  practices. 

'  This  trade  was  carried  on  from  Hamburg  as  well  as  from  Holland.  In 
1764  Colden  reported  that  the  navy  had  put  an  end  to  this  trade.  The  follow- 
ing year  he  wrote  to  Halifax  that  "no  illidte  trade  has  been  discovered  of 
late."    N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  710. 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


»4S 


of  making  the  mother  country  the  staple  of  the  European 
and  Asiatic  goods  consumed  in  the  colonies,  —  the  violations 
were  more  serious.  It  is  impossible  to  estimate  their  ex- 
tent in  quantitative  terms.'  Fruits  and  wines  were  imported 
directly  from  Portugal,  but  this  practice  was  commercially 
unimportant  and,  though  violating  the  letter  of  the  law,  did 
not  seriously  aflfect  the  principle  underlying  it.  Then,  foreign 
European  and  Asiatic  products  were  to  a  certain  extent  im- 
ported directly  into  the  colonies,  and  in  other  instances  they 
were  imported  through  Great  Britain  without  paying  the 
British  duties.  The  chief  articles  thus  smuggled  were  tea' 
and  gunpowder. 
In  this  connection  it  should  also  be  noted  that  in  the  main 

'  The  author  of  The  Regulations  Lately  Made  (London,  1765),  pp.  ga,  93 
correctly  says  that  the  extent  of  illegal  trade,  "as  it  is  in  its  Nature  private,' 
cannot  be  certainly  known,"  but  he  adds  the  vague  generalization,  "that  it  h 
carried  to  a  dangerous  Excess,  U  an  indisputable  Fact."    He  maintained  that 
vesseU  continually  traded  from  Hamburg,  Holland,  and  ports  in  the  German 
Ocean,  and  from  the  foreign  colonies  to  those  of  Britain ;  and  that  "the  Con- 
currence of  all  these  several  Modes  of  evading  the  Acts  of  Navigation,  can  alone 
account  for  the  Demands  of  'he  Colonies  upon  their  Mother  Country,  being 
vasUy  disptoportioned  to  their  Consumption."    He  sought  further  to  strengthen 
this  conclusion  by  pointing  out  that  very  small  quantities  of  the  finer  grades  of 
foreign  linens,  of  wines,  and  of  tea  were  exported  from  Great  Britain  to  Amer- 
ica.   But  these  facts  can  be  otherwise  explained.    Thus  wines  reexported 
from  Great  Britain  could  not  compete  with  Madeira  and  similar  wines  that 
could  legally  be  imported  directly  into  the  colonies.    This  pamphleteer  then 
haaards  the  estimate  that  foreign  merchandise  to  the  value  of  £700,000  was 
yeariy  smuggled  into  the  colonies,  an  amount  considerably  in  excess  of  the 
foreign  goods  imported  from  Great  Britain.    These  statements  are  to  a  large 
extent  pure  guess-worit,  and  are  far  less  reliable  evidence  than  are  the  official 
reports  of  the  governors. 

'  In  176s  it  was  estimated  that  the  yearly  consumption  of  tea  in  the  colonies 
was  1,500,000  lbs.,  while  they  imported  from  Great  Britain  only  150,000  lbs. 


i    -' 


1:1 


24^ 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


there  was  little  inducement  to  violate  the  laws  prohibiting 
the  colonies  from  importing  European  and  Asiatic  goods 
from  any  place  but  Great  Britain,  as  this  regulation  did 
not  to  a  marked  extent  increase  the  cost  of  foreign  goods. 
Thus  in  1762,  the  Virginia  Committee  of  Correspondence, 
after  referring  to  the  fact  that  most  European  goods  reex- 
ported from  Great  Britain  to  the  colonies  received  a  draw- 
back of  all  the  duties  paid  with  the  exception  of  2^  per 
cent,  said:  "This  can  be  no  temptation  to  any  man  in  his 
Senses  to  run  the  risque  of  smuggling.'"  This  regulation, 
however,  did  somewhat  increase  the  price  of  such  foreign 
goods  in  the  colonies,  and  consequently  they  must  have 
encountered  some  difficulty  in  competing  with  similar  goods 
illegally  imported.  Hence  the  very  fact  that  large  and  in- 
creasing quantities  of  foreign  goods  were  reexported  from 
Great  Britain  to  the  colonies  indicates  in  some  measure 
that  their  illegal  importation  into  the  colonies  was  not  in 
general  extensively  carried  on.' 

(The  Regulations  Lately  Made,  pp.  ga,  93.)  This  statement  is  largely  a 
haphazard  one,  and  seems  to  be  based  on  the  fact  that  the  statistics  showed 
a  much  smaller  per  capita  consumption  of  tea  in  the  colonies  than  in  Great 
Britain.  During  the  ten  years  ending  April,  1763,  1,674,000  lbs.  of  tea  were 
exported  from  Great  Britain  to  the  colonies,  while  during  the  same  period  the 
mother  country  consumed  38,760,000  lbs.,  and  Ireland  1,808,000  lbs.  (The 
State  of  the  Nation,  London,  1765,  p.  18.)  It  is,  however,  a  well-established 
fact  that  the  consumption  of  tea  was  not  so  wide-spread  in  the  colonies  as  it 
was  in  England,  and  consequently,  even  allowing  for  the  smuggling  of  tea  into 
Great  Britain,  the  disparity  is  not  so  remarkable.  Hence  it  would  appear  that 
the  estimate  of  an  American  consumption  of  1,500,000  lbs.  is  far  too  large.  Cf. 
also  Pownall,  op.  cU.  pp.  190-193. 

'  Va.  Mag.  XI,  p.  143. 

*  Thus  of  the  total  exports  from  London  to  New  York  during  the  six  years 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS  247 

These  reports  of  the  governors  and  the  experience  gained 
during  the  war  enabled  Parliament  to  legislate  in  1764. 
Under  the  prevailing  system,  British  West  Indian  products 
received  preferential  treatment  in  the  mother  country's 
market.  During  the  war  foreign  sugars  had  been  imported 
from  the  continental  colonies  as  British  sugars,  thus  evading 
the  high  differential  duties  and  vitiating  the  preferential 
system.  As  the  ensuing  illegitimate  profits  were  large,  such 
frauds  were  also  subsequently  prevalent  in  some  of  the  West 
Indian  colonies.'  Accordingly,  in  1764,  the  preferential 
system  was  safeguarded  by  requiring  adequate  certificates 
and  affidavits  as  to  the  origin  of  the  commodities.' 

It  had  been  pointed  out  by  one  of  the  colonial  governors 
that  some  violations  arose  from  the  fact  that  vessels  engaged 
in  the  colonial  coasting  trade  did  not  have  to  make  entries 
at  the  custom-house.»  Accordingly,  Pariiament  ordered 
that  no  vessel  could  sail  from  one  colony  to  another  without 
clearing  with  the  officers  of  the  customs.*  Then,  on  the 
strength  of  Colden's  reports,  and  those  of  his  predecessors 
from  Christmas,  1758,  to  Christmas,  1764.  somewhat  over  one-fifth  consisted 
of  such  foreign  goods.  Customs  Records  in  Public  Record  Office,  Ledgers 
Imports  and  Exports,  vols.  59-64. 

'Cal.  Home  Office  Papers,  1760-1765,  p.  573. 

'4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  15,  §  XX.  Ini766  it  was  further  provided  that  all  foreign 
sugars  imported  into  Great  Britain  from  the  continental  colonies  "shall  be 
deemed  and  Uken  to  be  French  sugars."  6  Geo.  Ill,  c.  ja,  §  xxiii.  The  clause 
m  the  act  of  1764  was  suggested  by  the  West  India  planters.  Mauduit  Feb 
II,  1764,  in  Mass.  HUt.  Soc.  Coll.  Series  I,  vol.  VI,  p.  195. 
•Thomas  Boone,  Nov.  aj,  1763.  Am.  and  W.I.  323. 
•  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  IS,  S  xxix.  Small  open  vessels,  under  twenty  tons  in  bur- 
den, not  laden  with  dutiable  and  prohibited  goods  were  exempted  by  5  Geo. 
"I.  c.  45.  S  XXV. 


• 


i 


348 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-176$ 


I      1 


during  the  war,  it  was  also  provided  in  1764  that  in  future 
no  ship  could  clear  from  Great  Britain  for  any  colony  unless 
the  entire  cargo  had  been  laden  and  shipped  there.'  In 
addition,  foreign  vessels  at  anchor  or  hovering  on  the  coasts 
of  the  colonies,  and  not  departing  when  warned,  were,  unless 
in  distress,  declared  forfeited.'  Similariy,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent illegal  trade  with  the  French,  all  commercial  intercourse 
with  St.  Pierre  and  Miquelon  was  forbidden." 

As  a  result  of  the  fact  that  the  colonial  customs  officials 
had  been  interfered  with  in  the  execution  of  their  duties 
by  damage  suits,  it  was  furthermore  provided  that  in  cases 
where  the  court,  while  releasing  the  seizure,  still  held  that 
there  had  been  a  probable  cause  for  making  it,  these  officers 
should  not  be  liable  for  damages.  In  such  cases  also  the 
owner  of  the  seized  goods  or  vessel  was  not  entitled  to  re- 
cover the  costs  of  the  suit.*  In  addition,  the  owner  of  the 
seizure,  not  the  officer,  had  to  prove  his  case,*  and  all  persons 
claiming  seized  goods  had  to  deposit  security  to  cover  the 
costs  of  the  suit.'  In  order  still  further  to  protect  these 
officers.  Parliament,  in  1765,  forbade  the  colonies  to  reduce 
their  fees.' 

■  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  15,  f  XXX.    TIlis  naturally  did  not  api^y  to  Madeira  wines, 
to  Irish  linens,  etc.,  which  woulrt  'M  imported  directly  into  the  colonies,     i  xxxi. 
'  Ibid.  S  xxxiii. 
'  Ibid.  §  XXXV. 

•  Ibid,  i  xlvi. 

•  Ibid,  i  xlv. 

'  "id.  §  xliv.  Governor  Thomas  Boone  of  South  Carolina  suggested  this, 
Nov.  23, 1763.    Am.  and  W.I.  213.    Cf.  B.  T.  So.  Ca.  20  M  103. 

'  5  Geo.  Ill,  c.  4S,  §  xxvii.  The  naval  officers  were  entirely  paid  by  fees, 
and  the  collectors  in  part  by  fees  and  also  by  sdaries.    These  fees  were  deter- 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


349 


In  1764,  Parliament  also  made  a  change  in  the  system 
of  colonial  vice-admiralty  courts.    The  Navigation  Act  of 
1660  had  given  jurisdiction  to  the  admiralty  courts  in  the 
case  of  one  class  of  seizures/  and  in  167 1  this  jurisdiction 
was  further  extended.'    But  in  the  latter  half  of  the  seven- 
teenth century,  while  in  the  West  Indies  cases  arising  out  of 
violations  of  the  laws  of  trade  were  frequently  tried  in  the  ad- 
miralty courts,  in  the  continental  colonies  they  were  tried 
in  the  ordinary  civil  courts  acting  with  a  jury.    As  these 
juries  would  rarely  give  a  verdict  for  the  Crown,  even  if 
the  evidence  was  indisputable,  it  was  found  necessary,  toward 
the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century,*  to  jjive  jurisdiction  in 
all  cases  involving  the  acts  of  trade  to  vice-admiralty  courts, 
which  shortly  thereafter  were  erected  in  all  the  colonies.* 
These  courts  rendered  decisions  without  juries,  and  on  this 
ground,  as  well  as  for  the  reason  that  they  represented  a 
foreign  jurisdiction,  they  were  in  general  disliked  by  the 
colonies.    At  all  times  throughout  the  eighteenth  century 
there  was  a  latent  conflict  between  these  courts  and  those 
of  the  colonies,  and  on  several  occasions  it  became  acute. 
During  the  war,  some  of  the  vice-admiralty  courts,  influ- 

mined  by  the  local  legislatures.    Thus  in  1748  Virginia  passed  a  law  settling 
the  fees  of  these  officials,  but  providing  that  only  one-half  of  these  fees  was  to 
be  paid,  if  the  vessel  belonged  wholly  to  the  inhabitants  of  Virginia.    Hening 
VI,  1748,  Ch.  36,  IS  vii,  viii,  ix. 
'  la  Ch.  II,  c.  r8,  {  i. 

•  32  and  23  Ch.  II,  c.  26,  $§  x,  xi.    Cf.  Bollan's  Memorial  in  B.  T.  Mass. 
74  Hh  53,  and  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  34,  pp.  20,  83. 

•  7  »nd  8  Wm.  Ill,  c.  aa,  {  vii. 

•  Adm.  Sec  Out-Letters  1047,  PP-  3.  53.  54.  96,  98,  loi,  103,  104,  144, 
«49.  »5o- 


),l 


J  I 


350 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I754-I76s 


1,    I 

! 


enced  by  colonial  sentiment,  had  refused  to  condemn  vessels 
engaged  in  illegal  trade  with  the  enemy.  Likewise,  since 
the  statute  of  1696  that  had  established  this  system,  many 
acts  had  been  passed  by  Parliament  regulating  colonial  trade, 
some  of  which  did  not  clearly  and  unquestionably  give 
jurisdiction  to  the  colonial  vice-admiralty  court*.*  Hence 
difficulties  arose,  and  it  was  deemed  advisable  to  reform  the 
system.'  Consequently,  in  1764,  Parliament  provided  that 
all  penalties  arising  from  any  violation  of  the  acts  of  trade 
should  be  recovered  in  any  colonial  court  of  record,  in  any 
colonial  court  of  admiralty,  or  in  any  court  of  vice-admi- 
ralty, which  may  or  shall  be  appointed  over  all  America,  at 
the  election  of  the  informer  or  prosecutor.*  In  accordance 
with  this  act  of  Parliament,  power  was  given  to  the  Com- 
missioners of  the  Admiralty  to  establish  such  a  general 
court.*  On  May  28, 1764,  they  ordered  the  appointment  of 
the  Earl  of  Northumberland  as  Vice- Admiral  of  all  America,' 
and  on  the  following  day  that  of  William  Spry  as  Judge  of 
the  Vice-Admiralty  Court  of  all  America,  under  the  style  of 

■  Memorial  of  Bollan.    B.  T.  Mass.  74  Hh  53. 

'  In  their  report  of  Oct.  4,  1763,  the  Commissioners  of  the  Treasury  com- 
mented on  the  difficulty  of  getting  seizures  condemned,  and  recommended  the 
establishment  of  a  uniform  system  in  the  colonies.    B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  18  Q  74. 

'  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  15,  I  xli.  The  Stamp  Act  of  1765  gave  appellate  jurisdic- 
tion to  this  general  vice-admiralty  court,  but  by  its  repeal  in  1766,  this  right  to 
hear  appeals  was  also  taken  away  from  this  court.  5  Geo.  Ill,  c.  la,  {  Iviii; 
6  Geo.  Ill,  c.  53.  C}.  an  interesting  memorial  on  the  colonial  admiralty  courts 
in  Am.  and  W.I.  387,  folios  68  el  teq.  See  also  Whately  to  Charles  Yorke, 
Feb.  16,  1765,  enclosing  a  memorial  on  the  admiralty  jurisdiction  in  the  colo- 
nies.   Brit.  Mus.  Addit.  MSS.  3951 1  (Hardwicke  Papers  DLXIII). 

*  Adm.  Sec.  Original  Patents  (Vice-Admiralty  and  Subordinate  Offices),  40. 

*  Adm.  Sec.  Out-Letters  1057.    Admiralty  to  Sir  Thomas  Salusbury. 


ADMINISTRATIVE  REFORMS 


351 


"Commissary  Deputy  and  Surrogate,"  with  powers  concur- 
rent with  those  of  the  existing  colonial  admiralty  courts,  but 
with  no  power  to  hear  appeals  from  them.' 

Reviewing  these  administrative  reforms,  it  is  apparent 
that  their  effect  was  to  strengthen  the  hands  of  the  imperial 
government.  A  strict  enforcement  of  the  laws  of  trade 
meant  also  a  firmer  hold  on  the  North  American  market, 
and  similarly,  the  execution  of  the  Molasses  Act  meant  a 
development  of  the  British  West  Indies  at  the  expense  of  the 
French  c  lonies  and  hence  of  French  commerce.  These 
clearly  defined  objects  were,  however,  subordinate  to  the 
fiscal  motive.  The  strained  condition  of  the  British  finances, 
and  the  increased  expenditure  necessitated  by  the  vast 
territorial  accessions  to  the  Empire,  emphasized  the  urgency 
of  the  financial  problem.  The  question  of  colonial  defence 
assumed  greater  importance,  and  it  was  to  this  question  and 
to  securing  from  the  colonies  some  portion  of  the  enlarged 
expenditure  which  it  necessitated  that  the  British  govern- 
ment devoted  its  chief  attention. 

'  Adm.  Sec.  Out-Letters  1057.  Same  to  S«me.  His  salary  of  £800  was 
to  be  paid  out  of  the  King's  share  of  the  seizures,  or  if  this  were  insufficient,  by 
the  Treasurer  of  the  Navy.  For  Spr/s  commission,  see  Brit.  Mus.  .\ddit. 
MSS.  35910  (Hardwicke  Papers  DLXII,  folio  aas). 


ill 


! 

ll':*l 
* 


li 


i   I 


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t  i 

!  I 

I  I 

!  f 


CHAPTER   XII 

INDIAN  POLICY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE,   1763-1765 

The  removal  of  France  from  Canada  did  not  diminish 
the  necessity  of  an  adequate  system  of  colonial  defence. 
In  England  it  was  recognized  at  the  time,  that  the  peace  was 
only  a  truce  in  the  prolonged  struggle  with  France,  and  that 
it  would  be  highly  dangerous  not  to  be  prepared  for  a  fresh 
war  at  some  more  or  less  remote  future  date.*  The  pride  of 
France  was  wounded  to  the  quick  by  the  series  of  humiliating 
disasters,  and  it  was  unreasonable  to  expect  that  this  nation, 
whose  predominance  but  a  few  years  before  had  seemed  in 
the  eyes  of  all  to  threaten  the  balance  of  European  power, 
would  feebly  submit  j  a  position  of  decided  inferiority. 
Immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  peace,  France  sought 
for  a  means  of  retrieving  her  fortunes,  and  in  encouraging 
the  separatistic  tendencies  of  the  North  American  colonics, 
endeavored  to  cripple  her  rival.'  The  prospect  of  renewed 
hostilities  with  France  was  thus  alwaj-s  in  the  background ; 
in  the  foreground  of  colonial  defence  was  the  Indian  ques- 
tion, which  had  assumed  alarming  dimensions.  By  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  a  fringe  of  land  along  the  coast 
of  America  had  been  enlarged  to  half  a  continent,  for  the 

'  Cf.  Soame  Jenyns,  op.  cit.  passim;  Shtrpe  Correspondence  III,  p.  388. 
•  Henri  Doniol,  Histoire  de  U  Participation  de  la  France  I,  pp.  4,  5. 

asa 


INDIAN  POLICY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  253 

greater  part  unoccupied  except  by  Indians,  who  were,  in  the 
main,  hostile  to  the  Engh'sh.  In  addition,  the  entire  fur 
trade  had  come  into  British  hands,  and  this  also  necessitated 
the  occupation  of  the  numerous  posts  established  by  the 
French  in  the  interior.  Thus  the  military  question  was  an 
important  one,  and  sir-  Srly,  also,  the  closely  related  prob- 

lem  of  regulating  l* 

sive  settlement. 
Until  the  mi' ;'r  , 

government  b,      i.  ir 

the  separate     <.i-»i  .c 

commercial  1  1  tic  t 

tant.    With  the  uc.l 

trade  had,  however, 

times    it    constituted 


i.', 


1  trade  demanded  a  comprehen- 


i!i'    11  'In 


Ti-.f  \ 


:  .  century,  the  British 
'f  Indian  affairs  to 
■ '^  h'ii  xiT  foundation,  the 
1^'  aU>f4jnes  had  been  impor- 
-  i  '"unada,  the  bulk  of  this 
•'  ini..  F  ,;nch  hands,  yet  at  all 
L  Insignificant  feature  of  the 
economic  life  of  the  British  colonies.  The  success  of  the 
French  was  due  in  great  measure  to  the  centralized  form 
of  their  government,  and  similarly  the  failure  of  the  Eng- 
lish  resulted  from  the  fact  that  each  colony  sought  to  secure 
as  great  a  share  of  the  Indian  trade  as  was  possible, 
and  thwarted  the  endeavors  of  its  compef'tors.  The  result 
of  this  rivalry  had  been  pernicious,  not  only  in  facilitating 
the  success  of  the  French  in  the  fur  tr  k,  but  also  in 
alienating  the  Indians.  This  alienation  as  further  in- 
creased by  the  general  character  of  E"g  ish  colonization, 
which,  by  the  effective  occupation  of  the  soil,  drove  the 
Indians  from  their  accustomed  hunting-grounds.  As  Pow- 
nall  said,  the  English,  "with  an  insatiable  thirst  after 
landed  possessijns,"  forced  the  Indians  away  from  their 


w 


r 


254 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-' 76S 


I  i 


1} 


lands.*  In  contradistinction,  the  extensive  nature  of  French 
colonization  did  not  seriously  interfere  with  '.h'-  ordinary 
pursuits  of  the  natives 

The  chief  object  of  the  British  government  in  calling  to- 
gether the  Albany  Congress  of  1754  had  been  to  place  Indian 
affairs  under  the  joint  management  of  the  colonies.  On 
the  failure  of  this  plan,  the  government  was  forced  to  under- 
take the  matter  itself,  and  appointed  Sir  William  Johnson ' 
and  Edmund  Atkin '  as  agents,  respectively  for  the  North- 
em  and  Southern  Indians.  These  officials  were  especially 
intrusted  with  superintending  the  political  relations  with 
the  native  tribes.  The  commercial  relations  were  still 
left  to  each  separate  colony,  and  the  results  thereof  continued 
as  unsatisfactory  as  they  had  been  hitherto.  Early  in  1756 
Dinwiddie  pointed  out  the  necessity  of  requiring  a  license 
from  all  traders,  and  of  so  regulating  the  trade  that  Indians 
should  neither  get  too  much  rum  nor  be  cheated  in  the  price 

'  Memorial  in  Pownall  to  Pitt,  Jan.  15,  1758.  Am.  and  W.I.  71.  This 
was  subsequently  printed  in  Pownall,  Administration  of  the  Colonies  (sd  ed. 
London,  1765),  appendix,  pp.  la,  13.  Pownall  added:  "The  Indians  unable 
to  bear  it  any  longer  told  Sir  William  Johnson  that  they  believed  soon  they 
shou'd  not  be  able  to  Hunt  a  Bear  into  a  Hole  in  a  tree  but  some  English- 
man wou'd  claim  a  right  to  the  property  of  it  as  being  his  Tree."  This  story, 
though  ben  travato,  is  not  accurate.  At  the  conference  in  1 753  between  John- 
son and  the  Iroquois,  one  of  the  Indians  made  the  above  statement,  but  he 
referred  to  the  French  as  well,  not  alone  to  the  English.  N.  Y.  Col.  Doc.  VI, 
p.  813. 

'  Board  of  Trade  to  Henry  Fox,  Feb.  17,  1756.  Am.  and  W.I.  605.  Al- 
ready, in  1755,  Johnson  had  been  appointed  by  Braddock;  in  1756  he  and 
Atkin  received  commissions  from  the  Crown. 

•  Board  of  Trade  to  Henry  Fox,  May  13, 1756:  Am.  and  W.I.  605;  B.  T 
Plant.  Gen.  15  O  138;  B.  T.  Journals  64,  June  34, 1756. 


INDIAN  POLICY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  255 

Umt  they  obtained  for  their  furs.>  At  the  same  time, 
Shirley  also  sent  to  the  Board  of  Trade  a  sketch  of  such  a 
plan,  which  was  based  on  the  Massachusetts  scheme  of 
regulating  the  trade.'  During  the  war  it  was  impossible 
to  maugurate  a  general  system,  while  at  the  same  time  the 
necessity  thereof  was  strongly  emphasized  by  the  alienation 
of  the  Indians,  who  in  general  not  only  sided  with  the  French 
when  the  issue  was  in  doubt,  but  who,  even  after  the  fall 
of  Montreal,  were  ever  on  the  eve  of  an  organized  revolt 
against  British  authority. 

This  dissatisfaction  of  the  Indians  was  due  to  many 
causes:  to  French  incitement;  to  the  intrusion  of  English 
settlers  on  their  lands;  to  the  abandonment  by  the  English 
of  the  French  policy  of  giving  to  the  natives  presents  of 
guns  and  clothing ;  and,  above  all,  to  the  low  moral  charac- 
ter of  the  English  traders.*    In  1761  the  secretary  of  state 
Egremont,  wrote  to  Amherst,  condemning  in  strong  terms 
the  shameful   conduct  of  the  colonial    traders  in  taking 
advantage  of  the  Indians,  and  pointing  out  that  the  French 
by  pursuing  a  different  course,  had  deservedly  succeeded  in 
gaining  the  confidence  of  the  native  tr?bes.* 

'  B.  T.  Va.  as  W  ao8. 

I  This  was  sent  at  the  request  of  the  Board  of  Trade.  B.  T.  Mass  74  Hh  68. 
In  I7S6  Dinwiddie  attributed  the  Indians'  distrust  of  the  English  to  the 
traders,  who  are  the  most  abandoned  Wretches  in  the  World  "  B  T  Vt 
»S  W  ao8.  See  also  Sir  William  Johnson's  despatch  of  June  ,8,  1766,  in  Am* 
and  W.I.  388;  and  Ms  despatch  of  July  x.  ,763  to  the  Board  of  ^rade  in  NY. 
Lol.  Doc.  VII,  pp.  515-526. 

wr^t^o  l^  'J^.  T^""^  '^'-  "     ''"  '^P"'  '«•  '7^^'  ^^'^  B*™*"! 
wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade  that  the  Indian,  "are  sufiTered  to  run  in  debt 

beyond  their  abilities  &  then  are  allowed  to  sell  their  children  to  pay  their  debts  • 


i 


i  p 


v 


356 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754"' 765 


I  ; 


m 


A  few  months  later  the  Board  of  Trade  wrote  to  the  gov- 
ernor of  South  Carolina,  approving  of  his  scheme  to  in- 
duce the  neighboring  colonies  to  unite  on  a  general  plan 
for  regulating  the  Indian  trade,  and  expressing  the  hope 
that  this  would  in  some  degree  remove  the  mischiefs  and 
inconveniences  that  had  resulted  from  the  passage  by  the 
different  provinces  of  partial  acts,  "not  only  differing  from, 
but  frequently  obstructing  and  counteracting  each  other." 
In  the  Board's  opinion  this  was  the  chief  cause  of  the  jeal- 
ousy and  di^:ontent  among  the  Indians,  which  had  led  to 
such  disastrous  results.    At  the  same  time  the  Board  added : 
"We  are  inclined  to  think,  that  our  Interest  with  respect  to 
the  Indians  never  can  be  settled  with  stability,  but  by  the 
interposition  of  the  Parliament  of  Great  Britain,  in  making 
some  general  Regulations  for  the  management  of  Indian 
Affairs,  upon  some  general  Plan,  under  the  sole  direction 
of  the  Crown  &  its  Officers."  ' 

This  conchision  was  reenforced  the  following  year,  when 
the  discontent  of  the  natives  led  to  an  Indian  war  of  unpar- 
alleled magnitude,  under  tV^  able  leadership  of  Pontiac. 
On  October  7,  1763,  a  proclamation  was  issued  prohibiting 
the  settlement  of  any  lands  west  of  the  sources  of  the  rivers 
flowing  into  the  Atlantic,  and  requiring  all  Indian  traders  to 

They  are  suffered  to  harass  one  another  at  Law  for  trivial  disputes,  which 
sometimes  end  in  the  ruin  of  both  parties;  when  they  are  condemned  in  crimi- 
nal prosecutions,  they  are  subjected  to  Fines  instead  of  corporal  punishment, 
so  that  where  the  Criminal  only  ought  to  be  corrected,  his  family  is  ruined ; 
In  civil  actions,  they  are  charged  with  exorbitant  costs,  when  it  is  known  they 
have  nothing  to  pay  with."    B.  T.  Mass.  78  LI  14. 

'  Board  to  Thomas  Boone,  June  3, 176a.    B.  T.  So.  Ca.  ag,  p.  171. 


INDIAN  POUCY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  257 

take  out  licenses  from  the  colonial  governors.'    This  was 
merely  a  provisional  arrangement'  pending  the  formulation 
by  the  Board  of  Trade  of  a  comprehensive  scheme  for  regu- 
lating the   trade.    The  essential  thing  was  to  protect  the 
Indians  from  the  traders,  as  otherwise  friendly  relations 
could  not  be  established.'    Accordingly,  all  trade  was  to  be 
confined  to  the  various  posts,  where  it  could  be  supervised 
by  the  military  commanders.     All  traders  were  to  take  out 
licenses  and  to  give  security  to  obey  such  regulations  "as 
shall  be  thought  necessary  for  the  effectual  Prevention  of 
those  fraudulent  Practises  which  have  produced  so  many 
bad  Consequences,  and   which  it    appears   impossible    to 
prevent  by  any  other  Means."  * 

^  Before  inaugurating  a  definite  scheme,  the  Board  of 
'  ..  >le  wrote  to  the  Indian  agents  asking  for  their  well-ma- 
tured opinions.'  In  reply  to  this  request,  the  agent  for  the 
Northern  Indians,  Sir  William  Johnson,  prepared  a  detailed 
plan.'    He  emphasized  the  necessity  of  employing  a  much 

'Hening  VII,  pp.  663-669;  Annual  Register  1763,  pp.  ^  el  srq.;  Pa 
Arch.,  4th  Senes  III,  pp.  ,4,^,48.  See  also  Gal.  Home  Office  Papers.  1760- 
i?0S.  P-  303,  no.  993. 

'  N.Y.  Col.  Dot.  VIII,  p.  21.  Cf.  Washington,  Writings  (ed.  W.  C.  Ford) 
11,  pp.  Sio,  2ai. 

JOn  Sept.  ,9.  1763.  the  Board  of  Trade  wrote  to  Sir  William  Johnson: 

We  are  convinced  that  nothing  but  the  speedy  establishment  of  some  well 

digested  and  general  plan  for  the  regulation  of  our  Commercial  and  political 

concerns  with  them  (the  Indians)  can  effectually  reconcile  their  esteem  and 

affections."    N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  367. 

•  Halifax  to  Amherst,  Oct.  19, 1 763.    Am.  and  W.I.  77 

•  Board  of  Trade  to  John  Stuart,  Aug.  j,  1763,  in  B.  T.  So.  Ca.  29,  pp. 
»95-«97;  Same  to  Johnson  in  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  533. 

•  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  pp.  572  ct  seq.;  579  et  seq. 


!??■ 


f^ 


I 


It 


258 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  i754-«765 


larger  force  of  men  in  the  service,  advised  the  annual  giving 
of  presents  to  the  Indians,  and  in  addition  recommended 
that  the  trade  be  confined  to  a  number  of  posts  "agreeable  to 
certain  regulations  for  the  prices  of  goods  and  Furrs."    In 
1 764,  the  Board  of  Trade  prepared  a  tentative  plan,  according 
to  which  Indian  affairs  were  to  be  divided  into  two  districts 
under  the  charge  of  officers  appointed  by  the  Crown.    These 
officers  were  to  have  power  "to  sett  aside  all  local  interfering 
of  particular  Provinces,  which  has  been  one  great  cause  of 
the  distracted  state  of  Indian  Affairs  in  general."    As  John- 
son had  suggested,  the  trade  was  to  be  confined  to  certain 
posts,  and  those  engaged  in  it  were  to  take  out  licenses.' 
It  is  obvious  that  such  a  comprehensive  system  would  entail 
considerable  expense.    On  this  occasion,  as  on  many  others 
in  the  histor)-  of  the  British  Empire,  the  financial  question 
was  the  decisive  factor.    The  Ministry  had  no  intention 
of   saddling   the  already  overburdened    taxpayer   in    the 
mother  country  with  this  additional  outlay;  the  colonies 
not  only  objected  to  the  extension  of  imperial  authority  that 
this  scheme  necessitated,'  but  in  addition  they  would  not 
voluntarily  contribute  the  necessary  funds,  nor  would  they 
submit  to  parliamentary  taxation;   finally,  it  was  difficult 
to  devise  a  satisfactory  system   of  duties  on  the  trade,  by 
means  of  which   the  cost  of  its   management   could  be 
defrayed.* 

'  NY.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  pp.  634-641 ;   Pa.  Arch.,  Hazard  Scries  IV,  pp.  182-192. 

'  NY.  Col.  Doc.  VIII,  p  655. 

•  In  1764  Colden  wrote  that  "the  most  effectual  method  to  raise  the  duties 
on  the  Indian  Trade,  for  defraying  the  expence  of  the  regulation  of  that  Trade" 
would  be  by  collecting  at  the  trading  posts  duties  in  kind  on  the  fur  sold  there. 


INDIAN  POLICY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  359 

It  was  mainly  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  the  financial 
question  that  the  Board  of  Trade  did  not  in  1764  present 
its  plan  to  Parliament.    This  difficulty  was  still  further  in- 
creased in  the  following  year  by  the  troubles  over  the  Stamp 
Act,  and  by  the  refusal  of  the  colonies  to  submit  to  parlia- 
mentary taxation.    To  make  the  trade  self-supporting,  and 
at  the  same  time  to  "avoid  meddling  with  the  Question  of 
the  Right  to  lay  Duties  in  America  by  Parliament  "  '  was 
a  problem  beset  with  insuperable  obstacles.    In  1767  Shel- 
burne  wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade,  pointing  out  that  the 
system  was  not  entirely  satisfactory  from  the  commercial 
standpoint,  and  that  the  governors  did  not  correspond  with 
the  superintendents  and  obey  the  rules  established  by  them. 
He  laid  especial  stress,  however,  on  the  "enormous"  expense 
necessitate.1  by  the  plan,  and  asked  the  Commissioners  to 
report  on  the  entire  subject.'    Early  in  1768='  the  Board  of 
Trade  reported  that  cl!  relations  with  the  Indians  should  be 
In  the  hands  of  the  Crown,  and  that  the  regulation  of  the 
trade  was  important  because  it  affected  the  political  rela- 
tions with  the  Indians.     They  added,  however,  that  their 
plan  of  1764  was  defective,  and,  besides,  very  expensive. 
Furthermore  they  pointed    out  that    the    expense    might 
exceed  the  value  of  the  end  in  view,  "and  being  greater 
than  the  Trade  can  bear  must,  if  the  present  Plan  should 

'  Franklin,  Writings  IV,  pp.  467-475-  The  question  whether  Parliament 
or  the  local  assrml.Iics  should  repeal  the  provincial  laws  rcgulafng  the  Indian 
trade  was  also  one  of  the  chief  obstacles. 

'  N.Y.  Col.  I)„c.  VII,  p.  981. 

•Ibid.  VIII,  pp.  ,9-3,;  Pa.  Arch  ,  Hazard  Series  IV,  p[)  313-320. 


^ 


f; 


I*: 


26o 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  I7S4-I76S 


I 


li  i 


It  -. 


be  permanent,  either  fall  upon  the  Colonies,  in  which 
Case  it  will  be  impracticable  to  settle  the  proportion  each 
Colony  should  bear,  or  become  a  burthen  upon  this  Country, 
which  we  humbly  conceive,  would  be  both  unreasonable 
and  highly  inconvenient."  Therefore  the  Board  of  Trade 
advised  that  the  plan  of  regulating  the  Indian  trade  be 
abandoned,  and  that  its  management  be  again  intrusted 
to  the  colonies.'  This  recommendation  was  shortly 
thereafter  adopted.'  Thus  a  well-matured  plan,  which 
was  far  in  advance  of  the  prevailing  system,  and  one 
which  was  highly  necessary  in  order  to  maintain  peaceful 
relations  with  the  Indians,"  had  to  be  abandoned  primarily 
because  of  the  expense  and  of  the  virtual  impossibility  of 
creating  a  revenue  in  America. 

The  inefficient  regulation  of  the  Indian  trade  by  the  sepa- 
rate colonies  was  an  important  factor  in  alienating  the 
natives  from  the  English,  and  was  one  of  the  immediate 
causes  of  their  organized  revolt  in  1 763,  shortly  after  the 
conclusion  of  the  treaty  of  peace.  Prior  to  the  outbreak  of 
hostilities  with  France  in  1754,  Great  Britain  had  maintained 
only  small  garrisons  on  the  continent.  In  addition,  the 
mother  country  had  provided  presents  for  the  Indians.  But 
in  the  main,  the  colonies  had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  Indian 
wars.  It  was,  however,  recognized  that  the  provincial  spirit 
of  the  colonies  handicapped  them  in  their  relations  with  the 
natives,  and  that  it  would  be  highly  advisable  to  create  a 

'"As  a  means  of  avoiding  much  difficulty,  and  saving  much  expense  both 
at  present  and  in  future." 

»  NY.  r.l.  Doc  VIII,  pp.  55-58.     1768. 
*Ibid    VII,  p.  702. 


INDIAN  POUCY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  261 

military  union  of  the  colonies  for  purposes  of  defence.  On 
the  failure  of  such  plans  in  1754  and  1755.  it  became  appar- 
ent  that  it  would  be  necessary  for  the  mother  country  to 
mamtain  permanently  in  the  colonies  a  much  larger  force 
than  had  been  customary  hitherto.' 

The  experiences  during  the  war  had  also  convinced  the 
government  that,  on   account   of   their  particularism,  the 
colonies  could  not  be  trusted   to  provide  adequately  for 
their  own  defence,  and  that  the  safety  of  the  Empire  de- 
manded   the   permanent    establishment    of   a    relatively 
strong   force    in    the  colonies.     Besides,  as  a    result   of 
the  conquest  of  Canada,  the  Indian  question  had,  from 
the  military  standpoint,  assumed  large  proportions.    For- 
merly almost  all  the  land  indisputably  British  had  been 
settled,  and  the  question  of  defence  against  the  Indians  had 
been  a  comparatively  simple  one.    Now,  the  numerous  forts 
m  the  interior  had  to  be  garrisoned,  and  this  necessitated  a 
large  increase  in  the  number  of  troops  permanently  stationed 
on  the  continent.    Owing  to  their  lack  of  union,  the  colo- 
nies did  not  desire,  nor  were  they  able,  to  undertake  this    ' 
cleariy  indispensable  work.    Besides,  they  had  a  tendency  to 
underrate  the  military  power  of  the  Indians.'  Consequently, 

JS^a  ^ff.^'  '"^'  ^'"'""  ^""  '^♦^  '"  J*«'«h  Willard  that  some 
m.mbe«  of  Parhament  had  told  him  that  it  wa,  intended  by  some  persorsof 
consequence  ,„  keep  a  standing  force  in  the  colonies  with  a  mflitary  ch':sU^; 
Coll.  Mass.  Hist.  S<k.  Series  I,  vol.  6,  p.  up. 

'On  Nov.  18,  ,763,  Sir  William  Johnson  wrote  to  the  Board  of  Trade-  "I 
apprehend  from  what  I  have  formeriy  &  now  w,t>te  on  this  Subject   it  will  /' 
.pp«jr  dearly  to  Your  Lordship,  that  the  Colonies  had  all  alon    n  g.ecl 
ITZ  "  '."T  Understanding  with  the  Indian,  and  from  I  mistak  n 
««.«.  had  greatly  despised  them,  without  considering  that  it  is  in  their  power 


i^ 


ii' 


363 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  l7$4-»765 


w 


the  British  government  could  not  do  otherwise  than  establish 
a  permanent  standing  army  in  America.  There  was  no 
alternative  course.  Furthermore,  apart  from  the  facts 
that  brought  about  this  decision,  the  return  of  peace  with 
France  would  not  of  itself  have  allowed  the  withdrawal  of 
the  British  troops,'  as  they  were  absolutely  essential  in  sup- 
pressing the  formidable  Indian  rebellion  that  Pontiac  had 
organized.*  The  attitude  of  the  colonies  during  this  war 
still  further  proved  the  necessity  of  the  measure. 

This  insurrection  became  so  serious  that  on  October  i8, 
1763,  Halifax,  then  secretary  of  state,  wrote  to  Amherst  in- 
structing him  to  call  if  necessary  on  the  colonies  for  as- 
sistance.* In  this  despatch  there  was  no  direct  intimation 
that  the  colonies  were  not  to  receive  any  compensation  for 
their  services.  The  situation  was,  however,  decidedly  dif- 
ferent from  that  of  the  preceding  years.  The  French  war 
had  been  primarily  an  imperial  one;  the  Indian  outbreak 
affected  the  colonies  much  more  concretely  than  it  did  the 
Empire.  As  the  war  was  thus  predominantly  a  colonial  one, 
and  one  which,  according  to  the  well-established  theory  and 
custom  of  imperial  defence,  should  have  been  in  the  main 
borne  by  the  colonies,  it  is  not  surprising  to  find  that  Gren- 
ville  indorsed  this  draft  despatch  of  Halifax  with  the  foUow- 

at  pleasure  to  lay  waste  and  destroy  the  Frontiers.  —  this  opinion  arose  from 
our  Confidence  in  our  Scattered  Numbers  and  the  Parsimony  of  our  People, 
who  from  an  error  in  Politics  would  not  expend  five  pounds  to  save  twenty." 
B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  ig  R  51- 

>  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VIll,  p.  aa 

» Am.  and  W  I.  98. 

•  Am.  and  W.I.  77- 


INDIAN  POLICY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  36J 

ing  words:  "It  is  not  intended  ro  empower  him  (Amherst) 
to  make  promises  to  ye  Colonies  of  any  repayment  from 
hence  of  what  they  shaU  expend  for  their  own  defence." 
In  accordance  with  this  amendment  of  the  Prime  Minister, 
a  few  days  thereafter  Halifax  wrote  to  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  that,  in  case  he  should  have  to  call  on  the  colonies  for 
assistance,  he  should  not  give  them  the  slightest  expectation 
of  any  reimbursement.' 

As  the  situation  was  a  most  serious  one,  Amherst  asked 
New  York,  New  Jersey,  Pennsylvania,  and  Virginia  to  fur- 
nish some  troops,  but  he  refrained  from  calling  on  the  New 
England  colonies.'    This  led  to  a  number  of  difficulties.* 
The  New  York  Assembly  thought  it  unreasonable  that  all 
the  colonics  had  not  been  asked,  and  agreed  to  contribute 
their  quota  only  if  the  New  England  colonies  did  likewise.* 
New  Jersey  followed  the  example  of  New  York.*    On  ac- 
count of  the  lack  of  response  to  the  requisitions,  Gage,  who 
toward  the  end  of  1763  succeeded  Amherst  as  commander- 
in-chief,  also  asked  the  New  England  colonies  for  aid.' 
Massachusetts  refused  to  respond  to  his  request,  not  being 
willing  to  submit  to  any  dictation  from  New  York.^    The 
^  Halifax  to  Amherst,  Oct.  aa,  1763.    Am.  and  W.I.  77. 

•  Pa.  Areh.,  4th  Series  III,  pp.  34^,5,,    Amherst  asked  Pennsylvania 
only  to  raise,  clothe,  and  pay  1000  soldiera. 

•  Golden,  Dec.  8,  1763,  to  Halifax.    Am.  and  W.I.  176.    See  also  Report 
on  Canadian  Archives,  1885,  p.  144. 

•  For  further  details,  see  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VH,  pp.  586,  587 

'William  Franklin  to  Halifax,  Jan.  la,  ,764.    Am.  and  W.I.  190.    See 
also  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  IX,  pp.  398-402. 

•  R.I.  Col.  Rec.  VI,  pp.  376,  377;  Canadian  Arch.,  1885,  p.  19a 
'  Bernard  to  Halifax,  Feb.  d,  1764.    Am.  and  W.I.  167. 


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New  Hampshire  Assembly,  on  the  ground  that  neither 
Connecticut  nor  Massachusetts  had  complied,  likewise  re- 
fused,  alleging  also  that  they  could  not  support  the  charge 
of  the  two  hundred  men  requested  by  Gage  "at  so  great  a 
Distance  as  Niagara." '  Similarly,  Rhode  Island  would 
not  raise  the  troops  demanded  by  the  Commander-in-Chief. 
Some  of  these  difficulties  were  overcome.  Thus  Connecticut 
finally  agreed  to  levy  a  small  body  of  soldiers.'  But  in 
Pennsylvania,  the  old  dispute  between  the  proprietors  and 
the  legislature  interfered  with  the  grant  of  effective  support.' 
Virginia,  however,  had  responded  energetically  to  Amherst's 
requisition.*  New  York  ultimately  raised  somewhat  over 
one-half  of  the  number  of  troops  desired,  whereupon  New 
Jersey  agreed  to  pro\  ide  three  hundred  instead  of  the  six 
hundred  that  Amherst  had  requested.* 

The  general  attitude  of  the  colonies  is  comprehensively 
described  by  the  governor  of  New  Jersey  in  a  despatch  in 
which  he  discussed  the  difficulty  of  raising  troops  in  the 
colonies.  On  March  6,  1764,  William  Franklin  wrote  to  the 
Board  of  Trade:  "The  Want  of  Union  among  the  Colonies 
must  ever  occasion  Delay  in  their  military  Operations.  The 
first  that  happens  to  be  called  upon  postpones  coming  to  any 


I     ! 


'  Wentworth  to  Halifax,  March  a,  1764.    Am.  and  W.I.  161. 

'  Fitch  to  Halifax,  March  aj,  1764.    Am.  and  W.I.  197. 

'Gage  to  Haldimand,  Feb.  15,  1764  in  Canadian  Arch.,  1885,  pp.  144, 
145;  Halifax  to  John  Penn,  Oct.  18,  1763  in  Am.  and  W.L  197.  Cf.  N.Y. 
Col.  Doc.  Vn,  pp.  529,  530,  S70 

'  Fauquier  to  Egremont,  April  8,  1763,  and  Halifax  to  Fauquier,  Oct  19, 
1763.    Am.  and  W.I.  aoj. 

*  Franklin  to  Halifax,  March  6, 1764.    Am.  and  W.I.  190. 


INDIAN  POUCY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  365 

Determination  tiU  'tis  known  what  the  other  Colonies  will 
do;  and  each  of  those  others  think  they  have  an  equal  Right 
to  act  in  the  same  Manner.    This  procrastinating  Conduct 
owmg  to  the  Jealousies  and  Apprehensions  each  Colony 
has  lest  it  should  happen  to  contribute  Somewhat  more  than 
Its  Share,  is  the  Reason  why  the  American  Levies  are  some- 
times delay'd  till  the  Season  for  Action  is  ncariy  elapsed  "  « 
In  view  of  these  facts,  the  following  words  of  Halifax  seem 
somewhat  mild.    On  May  ,2,  ,764,  he  wrote  to  Colden- 
"It  were  much  to  be  wished  that  the  several  Colonies  whose 
assistance  was  required  had  chearfully  exerted  themselves 
to  raise  the  full  numbers  of  Men  demanded  of  them  by 
His  Ma'"  Commander-in-Chief." ' 

Thus  it  was  again  demonstrated  that  the  requisition  sys- 
tem was  absolutely  unworkable.    Its  inefficacy  rendered  the , 
establishment  of  a  standing  army  in  America  essential     In  ^ 
fact,  the  failure  of  the  colonies  to  respond  to  the  requisitions 
in  1764  forced  both  Amherst  and  Gage  to  disobey  their 
instructions  to  reduce  the  regular  force  in  America.'     The 

'B  T.N.J.  9  K  4,.    See  abo  FrwiUln'i  ipeech  to  the  New  Tenev  le«. 

K  the  father  of  th»  governor,  when  e««ined  before  the  Houk  of  Common, 
n  1766  tried  nther  disingenuously  to  put  the  attitudeof  the  colonies  in  .  more 

"^N^  srDo:^":v,::  ^  ^^^  ^~"-  ^^'-  -•  -  -  - 

heL^tn    '  '-J^'! ''^  '**^"«  '^  »™y  'o  «he  pea«  establishment.  Am- 
em  had  ventured  to  keep  two  additional  regiments.    In  his  letter  of  April 

i!'JL    K?"!!.  ''*;  "'""°  "^^  ""*"  •^'*"«  P^'"  t-y  the  colonic" 

.!^  I    "^        '***'"  ""^  •*"  "^'"'"'»  »^-    Cal-  »omt  Office  Papers. 
»76o-x765,  p.  4ao.  no.  I3SS.    C/ no.  1356.  «  f *pers, 


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BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


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British  government  was  left  no  choice,  and  was  forced  to 
keep  a  large  force  on  the  continent. 

This  measure  was  a  direct  result  of  existing  military 
conditions.  As,  however,  it  was  generally  recognized  in 
England  that  there  was  in  the  continental  colonies  a 
marked  tendency  toward  independence,  the  fact  that  such 
a  standing  army  would  serve  as  a  counteracting  agency  was 
not  totally  ignored.*  At  most,  however,  if  at  all  a  motive 
of  this  measure,  it  was  a  distinctly  subordinate  one.  Until 
the  revolutionary  movement  was  well  under  way,  several 
years  after  the  adoption  of  this  policy,  but  very  slight,  if  any, 
stress  was  laid  on  the  American  army  as  a  weapon  of  coer- 
cion. 

Prior  to  the  French  war,  only  small  garrisons  had  been 


'  On  Aug.  15, 175s,  Shirley  wrote  to  Robinson  urging  the  conquest  of  Can- 
ada, denying  the  probability  of  the  secession  of  the  North  American  colonies, 
and  adding:  "At  all  Events,  they  could  not  maintain  such  an  Independency, 
without  a  Strong  Naval  Force,  which  it  must  forever  be  in  the  Power  of  Great 
Britain  to  hinder  them  from  having:  And  whilst  His  Majesty  hath  7000  Troops 
kept  up  within  them,  &  in  the  Great  Lakes  upon  the  back  of  six  of  them,  with 
the  Indians  at  Command,  it  seems  very  easy,  provided  the  Governors  &  j>rin- 
cipal  Civil  Officers  are  Independent  of  the  Assemblies  for  their  Subsistence, 
&  commonly  Vigilant,  to  prevent  any  Steps  of  that  kind  from  being  taken." 
Am.  and  W.I.  82.  There  is  also  extant  in  the  British  archives  an  unsigned  and 
undated  plan  of  the  forts  and  garrisons  necessary  for  the  security  of  America. 
This  plan  was  probably  drawn  up  in  1763.  It  specifies  five  reasons  for  keep- 
ing an  army  in  America,  of  which  the  second  is  "to  retain  the  Inhabitants  of 
our  antient  Provinces  in  a  State  of  Constitutional  Dependance  upon  Great 
Britain."  The  fort  at  Crown  Point,  it  was  claimed,  would,  among  other 
advantages, "  be  usefull  in  guarding  against  Disobedience,  or  Defection  amongst 
the  Inhabitants  of  the  Maritime  Provinces,  who  already  begin  to  entertain  some 
extraordinary  opinions  concerning  their  Relation  to,  &  Dependance  on  their 
Mother-Country."    B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  18  Q. 


INDIAN  POUCY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE 


267 


maintained  in  the  American  colonies,  and  the  expense  in- 
volved thereby  was  comparatively  insignificant.  Exclusive 
of  the  expenditure  of  the  Ordnance  Board,  it  amounted  to 
only  about  ;^8o,ooo  yearly.  Of  this  amount  only  ;£i  3,000 
was  spent  for  the  forces  in  those  provinces  that  ultimately 
formed  the  United  States.  The  establishment  of  a  standing 
army  of  ten  thousand  men  in  America  after  1763  greatly  in- 
creased this  outlay.*  The  yearly  cost  of  this  force  was  about 
£320,000,  and  consequently  it  involved  an  additional  ex- 
penditure of  about  £  220,000.*  These  troops  were  distrib- 
uted in  the  West  Indies  and  on  the  continent,  but  almost 

'  In  1764,  the  expenditure  of  the  War  Office  for  these  garrisons  in  America 
was  £252,093;  in  1765,  ;S268,0S4;  in  1766,  £272,737.  Commons  Journal  29, 
p.  681 ;  30,  pp.  21,  470,  471.  In  1764  Pariiament  voted  £372,774  for  the  garri- 
sons in  the  plantations,  and  in  Minorca  and  Gibraltar,  of  which  £120,681 
was  for  Minorca  and  Gibraltar.  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  23.  In  1765  and  1766  the 
respective  parliamentary  grants  were  £327,502  and  £332,183.  5  Geo.  Ill, 
c.  40;  6  Geo.  Ill,  c.  41.  If  from  these  two  latter  grants  there  be  deducted  the 
cost  of  the  garrisons  in  Minorca,  Gibraltar,  and  Africa,  it  would  appear  that 
£60,000  less  than  the  amount  given  above  was  spent  on  the  garrisons  in  America 
during  these  two  years.  This  apparent  discrepancy  arises  from  the  fact  that 
Parliament  also  appropriated  £60,000  from  the  income  that  it  was  expected 
would  be  derived  from  the  American  revenue  acts  toward  defraying  the  cost 
of  these  garrisons.  Commons  Journal  30,  pp.  352,  780.  Thus  the  cost  of  the 
army  was  about  £260,000  yearly.  This,  however,  does  not  include  the  outlay 
of  the  Ordnance  Board  for  the  American  army.  In  1764  Pariiament  granted 
£"5A39  to  the  Ordnance  Board,  and  in  1765  £230,193,  but  the  estimates 
of  this  department  do  not  carefully  specify  the  amounts  spent  in  the  colonies. 
4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  23,  5  Geo.  Ill,  c.  40  §§  18, 19;  Commons  Journal  30,  pp.  25-27. 
A  considerable  sum  was,  however,  thus  spent,  about  £60,000  yearly.  Com- 
mons Journal  29,  pp.  686, 687;  Am.  and  W.I.  387  fo.  63;  G.  B.  Hertz,  The  Old 
Colonial  System  (Manchester,  1905),  p.  74.  Thus  the  total  cost  of  the  Ameri- 
can army  was  about  £320,000  yeariy.  See  also  Treas.  Misc.  Various,  Bundle 
197  (Estimate  Book,  pp.  6,  10). 

'  In  reaching  this  result,  the  cost  of  the  garrisons  in  the  colonies  prior  to 


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268 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


the  entire  increase  in  expenditure  was  due  to  the  necessity  of 

keeping  a  considerable  body  of  soldiers  in  North  America.* 

According  to  the  well-recognized  theory  and  practice  of 

imperial  defence,  this  expense  should,  in  part  at  least,  have 

been  defrayed  by  the  colonies.    It  was  generally  held  that 

the  mother  country's  duty  as  regards  protection  did  not 

include  the  maintenance  of  permanent   garrisons  in  the 

colonies.    Thus  even  James  Otis  said  that  it  was  not  "an 

unreasonable  thing"  to  ask  the  colonies  to  contribute  tr  the 

support  of  this  standing  army  because  ^'qui  sentit  commodum 

sentire  debet  et  onus."  '    Great  Britain  owed  the  colonies 

protection,  but  by  this  was  meant  military  assistance  during 

war,  and,  more  especially,  naval  defence  at  all  times.    The 

failure  of  the  colonies  in  1754  to  provide  for  their  defence 

by  means  of  a  union,  and  the  subsequent  unwillingness  of 

a  number  of  them  to  cooperate  vigorously  with  the  British 

1755  had  been  raised  to  £100,000  by  estimating  the  expense  of  the  Ordnance 
Board  at  that  time  at  £30,000  yearly. 

•  Am.  and  W.I.  387,  fo.  63.  Of  the  twenty  battalions  in  America,  fifteen 
were  located  on  the  continent,  and  five  in  the  West  Indies.  Brit.  Mus.  Addit. 
MSS.  33030  (Newcastle  Papers  CCCXLV,  p.  19).  In  addition,  Great  Britain 
supported  the  civil  establishments  in  Nova  Scotia,  Georgia,  and  in  East  and 
West  Florida,  and  paid  the  cost  of  managing  Indian  affairs.  3  Geo.  Ill,  c. 
17;  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  23;  s  Geo.  Ill,  c.  40;  6  Geo.  Ill,  c.  41.  See  Treas. 
Misc.  Various,  Bundle  197  (Treas.  Book  of  Payments,  1 760-1 769,  pp.  47- 
50).  These  and  other  minor  items  would  bring  the  entire  charge  on  the 
British  exchequer  on  account  of  the  military  and  dvil  establishments  in  the 
colonies  up  to  about  £380,000  yearly. 

'  Otis,  The  Rights  of  the  British  Colonists  Asserted  and  Proved.  (Boston, 
1764),  pp.  35,  36.  In  1765  Stephen  Hopkins  frankly  said:  "The  protection 
pr(»nised  on  the  part  of  the  crown,  with  chearfulness  and  great  gratitude 
we  acknowledge,  hath  at  all  times  been  given  to  the  colonies."  The  Rights  of 
the  Colonies  Examined  (Providence,  1765),  p.  9. 


INDIAN  POLICY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  269 

forces,  led  at  the  time  to  numerous  proposals  that  Parlia- 
ment should  impose  taxes  on  the  colonies  in  order  to  make 
them  bear  their  equitable  share  of  the  burden  of  defence.' 
These  suggestions  were  inopportune  on  account  of  the  im- 
pending war;  they  were  not  rejected,  but  merely  laid  aside. 
During  the  war  itself  the  matter  was  not  dropped.    A 
colonial  stamp  tax  was  proposed  to  Pitt.*    The  backward- 
ness of  several  colonies,  notably  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania, 
led  many  to  the  conclusion  that  parliamentary  taxation  was 
the  only  remedy.'    In  1757  Loudoun  wrote  to  Pitt,  "that 
if  some  Method  is  not  found  out  of  laying  on  a  Tax,  for  the 
Support  of  a  War  in  America,  by  a  Brittish  Act  of  Parliament, 
it  appears  to  me,  that  you  will  continue  to  have  no  Assistance 
from  them  in  Money,  and  will  have  very  little  Assistance  in 
Men."  *    The  difficulty  in  securing  adequate  support  from 

'  Shaipe  Correspondence  I,  p.  99. 

'  Pari.  Hist.  16,  p.  105. 

•  In  I7S7,  Governor  Sharpe  of  Maryland  wrote  that  it  grieved  him  to  think 
that  we  should  find  such  difficulty  in  raising  a  paltry  sum  to  support  a  few  hun- 
dred  men  to  defend  our  frontiers,  when  we  could  afiford  to  support  1000  more 
for  the  general  service,  if  Pariiament  compelled  us.  "There  is  scarcely  a  Per- 
son of  Common  Sense  among  us  but  laments  that  no  Act  of  Pariiament  has  been 
yet  made  for  that  purpose,  for  my  own  part  I  am  of  Opinion  that  nothing  eke 
can  eiiectually  preserve  these  Colonies  from  Ruin."  Sharpe  Correspondence 
11,  pp.  85,  86.  C/  also  Sharpe  to  Calvert,  Nov.  9,  1757.  ibid.  II,  p.  100. 
On  Nov.  IS,  1757,  Sharpe  wrote  to  Loudoun:  "Indeed  the  superiou.  Class  of 
People  in  every  part  of  the  province  are  already  much  dissatisfied  at  the  Assem- 
bly's proceedings  &  declare  pubUckly  that  they  should  be  well  pleased  if  the 
Legislature  of  Great  Britain,  would  ease  the  Assembly  of  the  trouble  of  framing 
supply  Bills  by  Compelling  u-  by  an  Act  of  Parliament  to  raise  £20,000  an- 
nually by  a  Poll  Tax  as  the  Quota  of  this  Province  towards  carrying  on  the 
War."    Ibid.  II,  p.  105. 

*Pitt  Correspondence  I,  p.  44.    On  Nov.   10,  1757,  Brigadier  Waldo 


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BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  17541765 


the  colonies  during  the  war  with  France,  and  subsequently 
thereto  during  the  Pontiac  conspiracy,  convinced  the  British 
government  that  parliamentary  taxation  was  the  sole  and 
only  means  of  obtaining  from  the  colonies  their  just  share 
of  the  cost  of  their  own  defence.'  Thus  on  March  10,  1764, 
Calvert  wrote  to  Governor  Sharpe  of  Maryland  that  he  had 
predicted  that  colonial  taxation  would  be  inevitable  on  the 

suggested  a  comprehensive  scheme  of  colonial  taxation.  Am.  and 
W.I.  81. 

'  According  to  a  private  letter  sent  early  in  1 76a  from  London  to  New  Jersey, 
it  was  reported  at  that  time  that  Parliament  would  lay  a  tax  on  America. 
N.J.  Col.  Doc.  IX,  p.  339.  In  the  controversial  literature  of  1764  and  1765, 
a  large  number  of  colonial  writers  asserted  that  the  colonies  had  contributed 
their  full  proportion  during  the  war.  See,  e.g.,  Oxenbridge  Thacher,  The  Sen- 
timents of  a  British  American  (Boston,  1764),  p.  6;  James  Otis,  The  Rights 
of  the  British  Colonists  (Boston,  1764),  pp.  57,  58;  Stephen  Hopkins,  The 
Rights  of  the  Colonies  Examined  (Providence,  1765),  pp.  9,  32.  It  should  be 
noted  that  these  were  New  England  writers,  and  that  Massachusetts  had  been 
exceptionally  public-spirited.  In  addition,  this  colony  had  suffered  consider- 
ably from  the  fact  that  the  expenses  of  the  war  were  in  great  part  met  by  taxes 
and  not  by  loans.  In  1766  Franklin  made  a  similar  assertion,  stating  that  the 
colonies  had  "raised,  paid,  and  clothed  near  25,000  men  during  the  last  war; 
a  number  equal  to  those  sent  from  Britain,  and  far  beyond  their  proportion." 
Franklin,  Writings  IV,  p.  437-  Cf.  ibid.  pp.  402,  405;  Pari.  Hist.  16,  p.  139. 
As  far  as  concerned  the  campaigns  of  1 758  and  1 759,  this  statement  is  only  some- 
what inaccurate.  Cf.  Cal.  Home  OflSce  Papers  1760-1765,  p.  24,  no.  98.  It 
should  be  remembered,  however,  that  these  soldiers  were,  as  a  rule,  enlisted 
only  for  a  few  months,  and  that  a  large  proportion  of  their  cost  was  paid  by  Par- 
liament. As  far  as  concerned  the  years  1755, 1756, 1757, 1760, 1761,  and  1762, 
Franklin's  sUtement  is  a  gross  exaggeration.  In  1760  the  colonies,  exclusive 
of  South  Carolina,  provided  only  15,862  soldiers.  Minutes  of  the  Provincial 
Council  of  Pennsylvania  IX,  p.  48.  Then  for  the  campaign  of  1 761,  for  which 
two-thirds  of  the  previous  levies  were  asked,  the  colonies  voted  to  raise  10,607 
men,  of  which  they  actually  raised  only  8796,  and  of  these  but  1266  remained 
in  service  during  the  winter.  Corr.  of  Col.  Gov.  of  Rhode  Island  II,  p.  349. 
These  general  broad  statements  were  made  during  a  heated  controversy,  and 


t. 


INDIAN  POLICY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  271 

return  of  peace  because  of  "the  colonies  remiss**  of  Duty 
to  the  Crown  &  themselves  in  defence  g»  the  Enemy  the 
French,  who  neither  at  the  commence  nor  during  the  War 
in  America  where  our  equals,  either  in  Strength  or  Circum- 
stances, our  Colonies  Superiour  in  all,  &  with  a  Little  Assist- 
ance our  People  of  the  Colonies  might  have  subdued  the 
French."  But  an  army  had  to  be  sent  from  England  which 
gained  the  victories  whiih  resulted  in  the  peace  of  1763. 
Since  then,  a  "War  has  broke  out  upon  the  Colonies  by  the 
Savages,  the  colonies  neglect  by  tiieir  provincial  Legislatures 
not  raising  subsidies  to  avert,  nor  in  defence,  stand  still  & 
see  their  Neighbours  cruly  Butchered  by  the  Savages, 
squabling  ab»  framing  Assessm*  Bills  to  pass,  tho'  in  Defense 
bound  to  his  Majesty  &  themselves,  send  to  the  mother 
country  for  money  aid  &  assistance  of  Troops."  * 

In  consequence  of  the  patent  fact  that  the  colonies,  as 
a  whole,  would  not  voluntarily  contribute  their  share  of 
the  military  burden,  it  was  decided  to  tax  them  for  this 
purpose.*  This  decision  was  the  logical  result  of  events 
from  the  year  1754  on.  The  British  government  might 
again  have  tried  to  form  a  union  of  the  colonies  as  it  had  done 


i 


in  so  far  as  they  imply  that  the  colonies  as  a  whole  were  zealous  in  prosecuting 
the  war,  are  diametrically  opposed  to  the  actual  facts. 

'  Sharpe  Correspondence  III,  p.  145.  Cf.  also  Daniel  Dulany,  Considera- 
tions on  the  Propriety  of  Imposing  Taxes  (»d  ed.  Annapolis,  1765),  p.  ai; 
Franklin,  Writings  IV,  p.  427. 

'  Thus  on  Feb.  33,  1763,  Rigby  wrote  to  the  Duke  of  Bedford:  "I  under- 
stand part  of  the  plan  of  the  army  is,  and  which  I  very  much  approve,  to  make 
North  America  pay  its  own  army."  Bedford  Correspondence  HI,  p.  21a 
Cf.  Sharpe  Correspondence  III,  pp.  87,  88. 


I 


I* 


273 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


\  '♦ 


in  1754;  but  the  colonies  had  shown  such  an  aversion  to  the 
scheme  that  any  such  attempt  was  inevitably  doomed  to 
failure.  On  the  other  hand,  the  mother  country  might  have 
borne  the  whole  burden  of  defence,  even  though  this  would 
have  violated  the  prevailing  theory  and  custom.  Such  a 
step  was,  however,  decidedly  inadvisable,  not  only  because 
it  might  be  the  entering  wedge  for  still  larger  future  increases 
in  the  colonial  budget,  but  also  because  of  the  existing  strain 
on  British  finances.  The  war  had  about  doubled  the  debt,* 
which  stood  at  the  exceedingly  large  figure  of  one  hundred  and 
thirty  million  pounds,  with  an  annual  interest  charge  of  four 
and  one  half  million  pounds.'  In  addition,  Great  Britain 
was  spending  large  sums  on  the  navy,  which  was  regarded 
as  the  Empire's  main  bulwark.  Even  after  the  conclusion 
of  peace.  Parliament  granted  annually  one  and  a  half 
million  pounds  for  this  purpose.'  Consequently,  British 
financial  resources  were  severely  strained,  and  the  already 
overburdened  taxpayer  in  the  mother  country  was  in  no 
humor  to  undertake  more  than  his  fair  share  of  the  expense 
of  defending  the  colonies.*    In  the  eyes  of  the  colonies,  the 


r.' 


'  The  Regulations  Lately  Made,  p.  56;  Dowell,  A  History  of  Taxation  and 
Taxes  in  England  II,  p.  138. 

*  Commons  Journal  ig,  pp.  433,  7<3o. 

'In  1763,  Parliament  granted  £3,040,661;  in  1764,  ;£i,43o,568,  besides 
£630,000  on  account  of  the  navy's  debt;  in  1765,  £i,439,734'  3  Geo.  HI,  c. 
17;  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  33;  s  Geo.  Ill,  c.  40. 

*  The  land  tax  in  Great  Britain  was  45.  in  the  pound,  producing  about 
£1,600,000.  4  Geo.  Ill,  c.  a ;  5  Geo.  Ill,  c.  5.  It  was  hoped  that  the  colonial 
revenue  would  in  part  enable  the  government  to  reduce  this  tax  to  35.  Walpole, 
Memoirs  Geo.  HI,  vol.  II,  pp.  398-300;  Lothian  MSS.  (Hist.  MSS.  Com. 
1905),  p.  37s. 


1     . 

It: 


INDIAN  POLICY  AND  COLONIAL  DEFENCE  273 

imposition  of  a  parliamentary  tax  on  America  would,  how- 
ever, violate  the  principle  of  "  no  taxation  without  represen- 
tation." This  principle  they  regarded  as  the  basis  of  civil 
and  political  liberty;  and  even  if  its  violation  could  be  jus- 
tified  in  their  eyes,  it  meant  that  the  colonies  were  to  con- 
tribute funds  toward  the  support  of  an  army  over  whose 
actions  they  would  have  no  control.  The  adoption  of  either 
alternative  of  this  dilemma »  was  bound  to  lead  the  British 
government  into  serious  difficulties.  But  some  decision 
was  imperative,  for  a  policy  of  inaction  would  have  been"^ 
suicidal. 

'  As  a  possible  solution  of  the  difficulty,  it  was  suggested  in  1754  that  the 
colonies  should  send  members  to  Parhament.    (FranUin,  Writings  III,  p 
23B.)    James  Otis  favored  this  plan.    (The  Rights  of  the  British  ColonUts, 
PP-  35,  36,  59)    WiUiam  Knox  likewise  advanced  this  proposition,  and  said 
Uiat  Grenville  approved  of  it.    (Knox,  Extra  Official  State  Papera  II,  p.  31 ) 
Soame  Jenyns  maintained  that  the  idea  was  impracticable.    (The  Objections 
to  the  Taxation  of  our  American  Colonies,  pp.  17,  18.)    The  idea  was  never 
seriously  considered,  and  did  not  commend  itself  either  to  the  mother  country 
or  to  the  colonies.    C/.  John  Dickinson,  Writings  (ed.  P.  L.  Ford)  I  p  i8c 
Among  the  British  State  Papers  for  1747,  but  probably  of  an  eariier  date,  U  an 
elaborate  scheme  for  colonial  taxation  emanating  from  one  of  the  Northern 
oolon.es.    The  author  thereof  wrote:  "Whereas  it  may  perhaps  be  objected 
tiiat  It  will  be  hard  for  these  Countrys  to  have  Laws  imposed  upon  them  by  the 
Pariiament  of  Great  Brittain  where  they  have  none  to  represent  them  I  begg 
leave  to  propose  Uiat  each  Govemm?  on  this  Continent  may  have  Liberty  to 
eUect  persons  either  residing  in  these  Countrys  or  Great  Brittain  to  sit  in  Par- 
liament."    Am.  and  W.L  603. 


1^ 

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S.    i 


CHAPTER  XIII 

THE  REVENUE  ACTS  OF   1764  AND   1765 

Early  in  the  year  1763,  it  was  definitely  known  that  it  was 
the  intention  of  the  British  government  to  keep  an  army  of 
ten  thousand  men  in  America,  and  that  the  colonies  were 
expected  to  contribute  to  its  support.  The  statesman  who 
carried  this  policy  into  effect  was  George  Grenville.  Of  a 
scientific  and  unimaginative  temperament,  with  a  distinctly 
legal  cast  of  mind,  he  adopted  a  policy  fraught  with  disas- 
trous consequences.    The  justice  of  the  demand  that  the 

/  colonies  should  defray  in  part  the  cost  of  their  permanent 
military  establishment  was  clear  to  all.  The  old  requisition 
system  was  patently  unworkable.  Hence  inevitably  recourse 
was  taken  to  parliamentary  taxation,  of  whose  formal  legality 
there  could  be  but  little  doubt.  In  adopting  this  policy, 
Grenville  met  with  no  opposition  in  Great  Britain,  and  the 
attitude  of  the  colonies  was  such  that  he  had  little,  if  any, 
reason  to  foresee  the  gravity  of  its  results.  On  March  12, 
1 763,  the  agent  of  Massachusetts  officially  informed  the  colony 
of  the  contemplated  step,  yet  eleven  months  later  he  was  still 
without  instructions,  and  consequently  did  not  work  against 
the  measure.    "Nor  do  I  find,"  he  wrote,  "  the  least  disposi- 

^   tion  in  the  other  agents  to  oppose  it."  *    It  remained  then  to 

'  Jasper  Mauduit  to  the  Speaker  of  the  House  of  Representatives  in  Massa- 
chusetts, Feb.  II,  1764.     Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Coll.  Series  I,  vol.  VI,  pp.  194-19S 

874 


-^.^' 


THE  REVENUE  ACTS  OF  1764  AND  1765  375 

decide  in  what  form  Parliament  should  create  such  a  colonial 
revenue,  and  to  this  task  Grenville  devoted  especial  care 
and  attention. 

On  May  5,  1763,  the  Earl  of  Egremont,  as  Secretary  of 
State  for  the  Southern  department  in  Grenville's  cabinet, 
instructed  the  Board  of  Trade  to  report  "in  what  Mode, 
least  Burthensome  &  most  palatable  to  the  Colonics,  can 
they  contribute  towards  the  Support  of  the  Additional 
Expence,  which  must  attend  their  Civil  and  Military 
Establishments,"  in  consequence  of  the  newly  acquired 
territory  and  the  number  of  forts  therein.*  The  Board  of 
Trade,  over  which  Shelbume  then  presided,  gave  an  evasive 
answer,  merely  stating  that  they  were  as  yet  powerless  to 
form  any  opinion.*  It  will  be  noticed  that  at  this  time  the 
intention  was,  that  this  revenue  should  likewise  be  devoted 
toward  defraying  that  portion  of  the  regular  governmental 
expenses  in  the  colonies,  which  was  defrayed  by  the  British 
exchequer.'    Great  Britain  paid  in  part  the  salaries  of  a 

In  the  instructions  of  Boston  to  ite  representatives,  May,  1764,  surprise  was 
expressed  "that  when  so  early  NoUce  was  given  by  the  Agent  of  the  Intentions 
of  the  Ministry  to  burthen  us  with  new  Taxes,  so  littie  Regard  was  had  to  this 
most  interesting  Matter,  that  the  Court  was  not  even  called  together  to  consult 
about  it  till  the  latter  end  of  y*  Year;  the  Consequence  of  which  was,  that  In- 
structions could  not  be  sent  to  the  Agent,  tho  sollicited  by  him,  till  the  Evil 
had  got  beyond  an  easy  Remedy."  Samuel  Adams,  Writings  I,  p.  4. 
'  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  17  Q  31 ;  Ibid.  45,  pp.  212-262. 

•  Ibid.  45,  p.  260. 

•  On  Jan.  11,  1764,  Dobbs  wrote  to  Halifax:  "I  apprehend  the  British 
I^riiament  may  lay  Duties  upon  goods  imported  into  the  Several  Colo- 
nies to  Support  the  Troops  Necessary  to  Secure  our  great  acquisitions  on  this 
Continent,  as  also  to  support  the  additional  officers  of  revenue."  Am  and 
W.I.  214. 


ip 


tf. 


376 


BRITISH    COLONIAL  POUCY,  1 754- 'r^S 


number  of  the  colonial  governors,  those  of  North  and 
South  Carolina,  as  well  as  those  of  the  Bahamas  and  the 
Bermudas.'  In  addition,  Parliament  annually  provided  for 
the  governmental  expenses  of  Georgia  ant.  lova  Scotia, 
and,  subsequent  to  the  peace,  for  those  of  East  and  West 
Florida  as  well.  The  idea  of  devoting  the  colonial  revenue 
to  such  purposes  was,  however,  abandoned  by  Grenville. 
Nor  was  it  his  intention  to  use  this  revenue  to  pay  the 
salaries  of  the  governors,  judges,  and  other  Crown  ofllicials 
in  the  remaining  colonies,  thus  freeing  them  from  their 
dependence  on  the  provincial  assemblies.  His  object  was 
not  to  remodel  the  system  of  government  prevailing  in  the 
colonies,  but  merely  to  create  a  revenue  which  should  in 
/  part  defray  the  cost  of  the  American  army.  At  the  time 
of  the  introduction  of  the  Stamp  Tax,  it  was  Grenville's 
intention  to  use  the  colonial  revenue  solely  for  military  pur- 
poses,' and  the  acts  of  1764  and  1765  distinctly  appropriated 
these  funds  to  such  objects  alone. 

Toward  this  purpose  of  creating  an  American  revenue, 
nothing  was  done  in  the  parliamentary  session  of  1763; 
but  in  1764,  the  "Sugar  Bill"  was  passed.  This  was  a 
comprehensive  measure,  whose  openly  expressed  aim  was. 


5  I 


I  ? 


'  B.  T.  Barbados  29  Aa  104;  Treas.  Misc.  Various,  Bundle  197  (Treasuiy 
Book  of  Payments,  1760-1769). 

'  Knox,  Extra  Offical  State  Papers  11,  pp.  24,  25.  Cf.  also  Jasper  Mauduit 
in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Series  I,  vol.  VI,  pp.  194,  iv)S;  Is^el  Mauduit  in  Almon, 
Biographical  Anecdotes  II,  pp.  86,  87.  In  his  answer  to  Soame  Jenyns's 
.jamphlet,  James  Otis  correctly  said:  "I  cannot  find  any  intention  of  applying 
any  part  of  the  new  American  revenue  to  the  discharge  of  the  provincial  dvil 
list."    Considerations  on  Behalf  of  the  Colonists  (2d  ed.  London,  1 765),  p.  27. 


THE  REVENUE  ACTS  OF  1764  AND  1765  2;; 

In  the  first  place  to  raise  a  colonial  revenue,  and  in  the 
second    to  reform   the  old  colonial   system,  both   In  Its 
administrative  and  in  Its  economic  features.    It  was  the 
first  statute  distinctly  taxing  the  colonies,  and  marked  a 
radically  new  departure  In  colonial  policy.    The  intent  of  the 
act  Is  clearly  stated  In  the  words  of  the  preamble :  "  Whereas 
It  is  just  and  necessary,  that  a  revenue  be  raised  in  your 
Majesty's  said  dominions  in  America,  for  defraying  the  ex- 
penccs  of  defending,  protecting  and  securing  the  same," 
Parliament  imposes  a  series  of  taxes  in  the  colonies.*    The 
revenue  arising  from  this  act,  less  the  charges  of  collection, 
was  to  be  paid  into  the  exchequer,  "and  shall  be  reserved,' 
to  be,  from  time  to  time,  disposed  of  by  parliament,  towards 
defraying  the  necessary  expences  of  defending,  protecting, 
and   securing,   the  British  colonies    and    plantations    in 
America." ' 

The  duties  imposed  by  this  act  were  various  in  nature. 
In  the  first  place,  Grenvilie  availed  himself  of  the  existing 
Molasses  Act  of  i733.»  The  law  imposed  very  high  duties 
on  foreign  sugar,  rum,  and  molasses  imported  into  the  colo- 
nies, but  until  1759  it  had  been  virtually  Ignored.  Its  aim 
had  been  to  develop  the  British  West  Indies  at  the  expense  of 
the  French  colonies,  and  consequently  of  French  commerce. 
Owing  to  the  dissatisfaction  with  the  terms  of  the  treaty  of 
peace,  this  policy  was  now  revived.  The  Molasses  Act  was 
made  perpetual,*  but  at  the  same  time  was  fundamentally 
modified.    In  order  to  encourage  the  production  of  indigo 


•  4  Geo.  in,  c  IS  §  i, 

•  6  Geo.  II,  c.  13. 


•/Wi.  |xi. 
*4Geo.in,c.  is§v. 


\i 


I 


i! 


■  ; 


l«  ! 


\  \ 


278 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-176S 


in  the  British  colonies,  such  as  South  Carolina,  where  it  had 
become  a  firmly  established  industry,  a  duty  was  imposed 
on  foreign  indigo  imported  into  the  colonies.*  Instead  of  the 
old  duty  on  foreign  rum,  its  importation  was  absolutely 
forbidden.'  This  prohibition  resulted  from  the  fact  that 
Guadeloupe  and  Martinique,  while  in  British  hands,  had 
learned  to  make  rum.  As  France,  in  the  interests  of  its 
brandy  industry,  prohibited  rum,  these  colonies  had  no  regu- 
lar outlet.*  Consequently  this  prohibition  was  designed  to 
hurt  French  industry,  and  to  benefit  the  British  West  Indies 
and  the  continental  colonies  as  well,  in  both  of  which  run. 
was  extensively  manufactured.  The  old  duty  on  raw  sugar 
was  maintained,  and  an  additional  duty  was  levied  on  foreign 
refined  sugar.*  The  continental  colonies  were  not,  however, 
seriously  affected  by  these  duties,  as  they  experienced  diffi- 
culty in  procuring  foreign  sugars.'     In  fact,  no  one  of  these 

•  In  addition,  a  duty  of  £2  igs.  gd.  a  cwt.  was  imposed  on  foreign  coffee 
imported  into  the  colonies  from  any  place  but  Great  Britain.  This  duty  had  a 
similar  object  in  view  and  was  very  high,  the  value  of  coffee  being  £3  a  cwt. 
The  Regulations  Lately  Made,  p.  76.  '  §  xviii. 

•  The  Regulations  Lately  Made,  pp.  78,  79. 

•  Foreign  white  or  clayed  sugar  imported  into  the  British  colonies  had  to  pay 
£1  2*  a  cwt.  over  and  above  the  duty  of  ss.  a  cwt.  imposed  in  1733.  It  was 
claimed  that  these  duties  interfered  with  the  carrying  trade  of  the  Northern 
colonies,  as  French  sugars  were  brought  in  small  vessels  from  the  West  Indies 
to  the  continental  colonies,  where  they  were  trans-shipped  in  larger  vessels  to 
Europe.  During  the  war,  the  question  arose  whether  or  not  such  sugars  had  to 
pay  the  duties.  The  matter  was  definitely  settled  in  1 766,  when  a  warehousing 
system  was  provided,  by  means  of  which  sugars,  as  well  as  other  foreign  prod- 
ucts, could  be  reshipped  from  the  colonies  without  paying  any  duties.  6  Geo. 
Ill,  c.  S2  5  xvi.    Cf.  also  on  this  The  Regulations,  etc.,  pp.  86,  87. 

•  In  the  Rhode  Island  memorial  of  1764  against  the  renewal  of  the  Molasses 
Act,  it  was  stated,  that  as  far  as  concerned  their  staple,  sugar,  the  British  West 


THE  REVENUE  ACTS  OF   1764  AND   1765 


279 


duties  or  regulations  was  important,  either  from  the  fiscal  or 
from  the  commercial  standpoint. 

Chief  interest  centred  on  the  molasses  duty,  which, 
according  to  the  act  of  1733,  was  sixpence  a  gallon.  This 
duty  was  virtually  prohibitory,  and  as  foreign  molasses  was 
absolutely  essential  to  the  Northern  colonies,  the  law  could 
not  be  enforced.  It  was  recognized,  ho  ever,  that  a  re- 
duction of  the  duty  would  both  yield  a  revenue  and  also 
protect  the  British  West  Indies  from  French  competition. 
In  March  1763,  Charles  Townshend,  then  first  Lord  of 
Trade,  proposed  to  reduce  the  duty  to  twopence.'  The 
matter  was,  however,  dropped  in  Parliament  and  de- 
ferred until  the  next  session.*  All  in  England  agreed 
"that  a  practicable  duty  should  be  laid,  and  the  payment 
of  it  enforced."  Some  thought  the  duty  should  be  fourpence ; 
Grenville  was  satisfied  with  twopence;  and  the  agents  of 
the  continental  colonies  endeavored  to  procure  its  reduction 
to  but  one  penny."     The  West  Indian   interest,  however, 

Indies  could  receive  no  prejudice  from  this  trade  of  the  continental  colonies  with 
the  foreign  planUtions,  "  for  it  is  well  known  that  the  Policy  of  both  the  French 
and  Dutch  has  confined  the  Trade  of  Sugar  to  themselves  so  that  we  never  ob- 
tain any  of  that  Commodity  from  them  save  now  and  then  a  small  Quantity  of 
an  ordinary  lUnd;  which  is  generally  procured  (not  without  Hazard)  by  the 
Assistance  and  Address  of  those  Merchants  there  who  help  us  in  the  Transaction 
of  our  Business."    B.  T.  Prop,  ai  X  57. 

'  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Series  I,  vol.  VI,  p.  193;  Cal.  Home  Office  Papers,  1760- 
1765,  p.  a66,  no.  811. 

'Commons  Journal  29,  p.  617. 

•  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  Series  I,  vol.  VI,  p.  193.  On  Aug.  3,  1763,  Hutchinson 
wrote  to  Jackson :  "To  reduce  the  duty  to  a  penny  per  gallon  I  find  would  be 
generally  agreeable  to  the  people  here,  &  the  merchants  would  readily  pay  it." 
Quincy,  op.  at.  p.  435. 


if  ^1 


U  'J 


aSo 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


was  very  influential  and  succeeded  in  having  the  duty 
established  at  threepence.'  In  place  of  a  prohibitive  tax, 
a  revenue  duty  was  imposed,  which  could  and  did  yield  a 
fair  return. 

In  addition  to  the  Molasses  Act,  there  was  in  existence 
prior  to  1764  another  act  of  Parliament  in  the  form  of  a  reve- 
nue bill,  whereby  the  colonies  were  aflFected.  This  was  the 
law  of  1673,  which  imposed  small  export  duties  on  some  co- 
lonial products  when  shipped  to  another  British  colony.  In 
1764,  coffee  and  pimento  were  added  to  this  list  of  products; 
these  duties  were,  however,  unimportant.' 

Then,  Grenville  made  use  of  the  fact  that  large  quantities 
of  wine  were  consumed  in  America.  The  bulk  thereof  was 
imported  directly  from  the  wine  islands  off  the  coasts  of 
northern  Africa,  especially  from  the  Madeiras,  practically 
none  being  shipped  from  Great  Britain  to  the  colonies.  Com- 
paratively high  import  duties  were  imposed  on  such  wines 
when  imported  into  the  colonies  from  these  islands,  while 
wine  imported  from  Great  Britain  had  to  pay  only  low  duties.' 


Si' 


'  Mauduit,  Feb.  11, 1764,  in  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.  as  ante  p.  194.  4  Geo.  HI, 
c.  IS  i  vi.  The  author  of  The  Regulations  Lately  Made,  p.  79,  estimated  the 
expense  of  smuggling  under  the  old  act  at  i  J  i.  a  gallon.  This  is,  however, 
merely  a  surmise,  and  is  patently  a  gross  exaggeration.  The  price  of  molasses 
.  was  approximately  js.  a  gallon.  Brit.  Mus.  Addit.  MSS.  33030  (Newcastle 
Papers  CCCXLV,  folio  137). 

'British  cofifee  7J.  a  hundredweight;  British  pimento  id.  a  pound.  Ibid. 
§§  ii,  "i- 

'  Every  tun  of  Portuguese,  Spanish  or  other  wine,  except  French,  imported 
from  Great  Britain,  loj. ;  every  tun  of  Madeira  or  similar  wines  imported 
directly,  £7.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the  British  duties  on  wines  thus  re- 
exported to  the  colonies  were  reduced  from  £11  ly.  6d.U>£3  10s.    Thus  there 


THE  REVENUE  ACTS  OF  1764  AND  1765 


281 


Thus  the  object  of  these  duties  was  not  only  to  raise  a  reve- 
nue, but  also  to  divert  the  wine  trade  of  the  colonies  from  the 
Madeiras  to  Great  Britain.  It  was  one  of  the  measures 
whose  distinct  object  was  to  give  the  mother  country  a  greater 
command  of  the  colonial  market. 

Furthermore,  the  act  of  1764  imposed  import  duties  in  the 
colonies  on  certain  classes  of  Oriental  and  French  textiles,' 
whose  use  had  been  absolutely  prohibited  in  Great  Britain.* 

Grenville  also  adopted  another  device  to  increase  the  reve- 
nue. As  already  pointed  out,  the  British  fiscal  system  was 
so  arranged  that  foreign  products  could  be  shipped  from  the 
mother  country  to  the  colony  on  the  payment  of  slight  duties. 
The  general  rule,  to  which  there  were  some  important  excep- 
tions, was  that  all  the  duties  were  repaid  on  foreign  goods 
reexported  from  Great  Britain  except  one-half  of  the  "Old 
Subsidy"  of  1660.  The  amount  of  duty  retained  was, 
roughly  speaking,  2^  per  cent."  Under  this  system  a  con- 
siderable part  of  the  exports  from  Great  Britain  to  the 

was  created  a  differential  duty  of  £3  a  tun  in  favor  of  wines  imported  fium  Great 
Britain.    Ibid.  §  xii.    Cf.  The  Regulations,  etc.,  pp.  74,  75,  92,  93. 

'  Peisian,  Chinese,  and  East  Indian  silks  and  printed  calicoes,  as  well  as 
foreign  cambrics  and  French  lawns. 

'  II  and  13  Wm.  HI,  c.  10;  7  Geo.  I,  stat.  I,  c.  7;  18  Geo.  TI,  c.  36.  Cf. 
The  Regulations,  etc.,  p.  70. 

•In  1761  the  total  amount  thus  repaid  on  foreign  goods  exported  to  the 
colonies  was  ;£99,osi.  The  chief  items  were  £39,500  on  calicoes,  and  £a8,ooo 
on  German  linens.  B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  626  B  31.  The  drawbacks  on 
foreign  linens  exported  from  England  to  the  colonies  were  in  175  a  £40,063, 
and  in  1753  £40,749.  Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  Bundle  77.  These 
drawbacks  amounted  to  nearly  90  per  cent,  of  the  entire  duties.  Thus  in  1 743, 
120  ells  of  German  Unen  paid  £r  13s.  sHd.  duty,  and  the  drawback  thereon 
amounted  to  £1   8».  &Hd.    B.  T.  Com.  Series  I,  40  BB  15. 


•:    11 


d 


?   »1 


n 


283 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


*t 


colonies  consisted  of  foreign  goods.*  The  proportion 
varied,  but  was  approximately  one-quarter  of  the  whole.* 
In  1764,  this  system  was  changed  in  that  thereafter  no  part 
of  the  old  subsidy  of  1660  was  to  be  repaid  of  U  t  ii  goods 
exported  from  Great  Britain  to  the  American  colonies.* 
This  subsidy  amounted  to  5  per  cent  of  the  value  of  the 
commodities  as  determined  by  the  "Book  of  Rates." 

It  is  absolutely  impossible  to  figure  exactly  to  what  extent 
this  change  increased  the  revenue.*  The  amount  was  prob- 
ably about  ;£20,ooo  yearly.'  This  increase  would  naturally 
appear  solely  in  the  British  customs-revenue;  and  though 
virtually  a  direct  tax  on  the  consumer  in  America  and  the 
West  Indies,  it  would  not  form  a  direct  part  of  the  fund 
devoted  to  defraying  the  cost  of  defending  the  colonies. 

*  During  the  decade  from  1 721  to  1730,  the  average  annual  exports  from  Eng- 
land to  the  continental  colonies  wete  £471,000,  of  which  ;gi36,ooo  consisted  of 
foreign  goods.  The  corresponding  figures  for  the  decade  1739  to  1748  were 
;g748,ooo  and  £334,000.    Am.  and  W.I.  687. 

'  For  full  details  during  the  years  1758  to  1763,  see  Customs  Records,  Ledg- 
ers of  Imports  and  Exports,  vols.  59-64. 

'  §J  xiii,  xiv.  There  were  certain  exceptions,  as  wine,  which  has  already 
been  noted.  Then,  white  calicoes  and  muslins,  in  addition  to  not  drawing 
back  any  part  of  the  old  subsidy,  could  not  draw  back  £4  t$s.  in  £100,  i.e. 
one-third  of  the  net  duties  granted  in  1700  and  1704.  It  should  be  noted  that 
those  textiles,  on  w'  .  his  act  imposed  duties  when  imported  into  the  colo- 
nies, still  continue  ly  only  the  half  subsidy.  11  and  13  Wm.  Ill,  c  10; 
32  Geo.  II,  c.  32. 

*  As  was  said  in  1765,  "no  exact  Calculation  can  be  made  of  the  Produce  to 
be  expected  from  this  Duty."    The  Regulations,  etc.,  pp.  59, 60. 

*  The  increase  was  2}  per  cent,  but  the  values  as  given  in  the  book  of  rates 
are  to  a  great  extent  arbitrary.  The  total  exports  of  foreign  goods  from  Great 
Britain  to  the  colonies  in  the  five  years  1769  to  1773  were  £3,766,934.  B.  T. 
Com.  Misc.  Trade  Sutistics,  voL  7. 


THE  REVENUE  ACTS  OF  1764  AND   1765 


283 


This  change  in  the  drawback  system  likewise  favored  the 
sale  of  British  manufactures  in  the  colonies,  since  those  of 
foreign  countries  were  burdened  with  an  additional  tax, 
which,  though  slight,  unquestionably  had  some  effect.* 

Apart  from  the  increase  in  the  British  revenue  by  the  change 
in  the  drawback  system,  the  act  of  1764  produced  in  the  short 
time  in  which  it  was  in  force,  ^^25,000  yearly.'  Of  this 
amount,  about  three-quarters  was  derived  from  the  duties 
on  molasses  and  wines."    Thus,  figuring  the  increase  in  in- 

'  This  was  important  chiefly  in  connection  with  foreign  coarse  linens.  The 
Regulations,  etc.,  pp.  60-70. 

'  Payments  into  the  exchequer  under  the  following  acts: 

ACT  OF  i67j       act  of  1733      ACT  OF  1 764 

176s  £a.954  £6.274  £3.2»7 

1766  7.373  786  ai,990 

1767  3.90s  29.244 

Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  vol.  59.  These  are  net  amounts ;  the  gross 
amount  for  the  act  of  1764  was  about  ^£4600  per  annum  more.  See  Treas. 
Misc.  Various,  Bundle  197  (Estimate  Book,  p.  38) ;  Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc. 
(England)  Bundle  80 :  (An  account  of  the  produce  of  4  Geo.  III.). 

*  An  account  of  the  produce  of  the  duties  imposed  by  4  Geo.  III.  from  Sept. 
39, 1764,  as  far  as  the  accounts  have  been  received. 

Dated:  Custom-House,  London,  Nov.  13, 1766. 

Import  duties: 

White  sugar  £6 

Raw  sugar  5,389 

Indigo  9S 

Madeira  wine  12,835 

Porto  wine  859 

Textiles  3,509 

Molasses  17.699 

Export  duties: 

Coffee  1,089 

Pimento  126 


Treas.  Ace.  Rev.  Misc.  (England),  Bundle  80. 


£41,610 


284 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  1754-1765 


i    '  E 


come  due  to  the  change  in  the  drawback  system  at  £20,000, 
this  act  produced  a  revenue  of  ;£45,ooo,  contributed  in 
varying  degrees  by  the  West  Indian  and  North  American 
colonies.  This  revenue  would,  however,  cover  only  about 
one-seventh  of  the  cost  of  the  American  army,  and  was  con- 
siderably less  than  the  colonies'  just  proportion  of  the  mili- 
tary establishment. 

That  the  act  of  1764  would  not  produce  an  adequate 
colonial  revenue  'vas  recognized  at  the  time.  When  Gren- 
ville  introduced  the  bill  in  the  House  of  Commons,  he  stated 
that  it  was  his  further  intention  to  institute  a  colonial  stamp 
tax.'  Action  thereon  was,  however,  deferred  until  1765, 
as  Grenville  desired  to  give  the  colonies  time  to  consider  it, 
and  also  the  option  of  suggesting  some  other  tax  that  might 
be  more  agreeable  to  them.  He  told  the  colonial  agents 
that,  if  America  preferred  a  diflferent  method,  he  would  be 
content,  provided  only  the  money  were  raised.'  This  pro- 
posal aroused  intense  opposition  ii.  the  colonies,*  but  as  the 
only  alternative  suggested  by  them  was  the  hopelessly  im- 
practicable requisition  system,*  Grenville  persisted  in  his 

•  Commons  Journal  29,  p.  935;  The  Regulations,  etc.,  p.  loi;  N.Y.  Col. 
Doc.  VII,  p  646;  Sharpe  Correspondence  III,  pp.  108,  109.  On  Henry 
MrCulloh's  connection  with  this  tax  see  Grenville  Papers  II,  pp.  373,  374; 
Brit.  Mus.  Addit.  MSS.  35910  and  35911  (Hardwicke  Papers  DLXII  and 
DLXIII). 

'  Almon,  Biographical  Anecdotes  II,  pp.  86,  87;  William  Knox,  The  Claim 
of  the  Colonies  to  Exemption  from  Taxes  (London,  1765),  pp.  27  et  seq. 

•  Va.  Mag.  of  Hist.  XII,  pp.  6,  9;  Votes  and  Proceedings  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  of  Pemisylvania  (Phila.  1775),  V,  pp.  355,  356,  376. 

•  Cf.  Soame  Jenyns,  The  Objections  to  the  Taxation  of  our  American  Colo- 
nies (aded.  London,  1765),  pp.  15, 16. 


THE  REVENUE  ACTS  OF  1764  AND  1765  285 

intention.  He  did  not  appreciate  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
nor  did  any  one  else  in  England,  not  even  the  colonial  agents. 
The  British  govt  -nment  was  used  to  strenuous  popular  oppo- 
sition to  new  taxes,  and  realized,  as  Grenville  said,  "that  all 
men  wished  not  to  be  taxed."  '  Only  two  years  before,  the 
imposition  of  a  tax  on  cider  in  England  had  resulted  in  dis- 
turbances of  so  serious  a  nature  that  the  soldiers  had  to  be 
called  upon  to  restore  order.' 

Accordingly,  in  1765,  Grenville  introduced  the  famous 
Stamp   Act,    which    became   a    law   after   meeting   with 
virtually  no  opposition.'    In  conformity  with  its  custom 
not  to  receive  petitions  against  revenue  bills,  the  House 
of  Commons  rejected  those  from  the  colonies  against  this 
measure.    The  same  action  was   taken  in   regard  to  a 
petition  against  the  cider  tax,  that  had  led  to  the  above- 
mentioned    disturbances    in    England.*    The    Stamp   Act 
was  passed,  as  the  preamble  distinctly  states,  because  a  fur- 
ther revenue  was  necessary  for  defraying  the  expense  of 
protecting  the  American  colonies.    According  to  it,»  all  legal 
and  commercial  documents,  pamphlets,  newspapers,  alma- 
nacs,  cards  and  dice  in  the  colonies  had  to  have  a  stamp 
affixed  to  them.    The  revenue  arising  therefrom,  less  the 
charges  of  collection,  was  to  be  kept  as  a  separate  fund  in  the 
exchequer,  and  was  to  be  disposed  of  by  Parliament  for  the 
defence  of  the  colonies.    The  amount  of  this  revenue  was 
variously  estimated  at  from  ;e6o,ooo  to  ;Cioo,ooo,  of  which  a 

'  Almon,  op.  cit.  II.  p.  88.  .  Pari.  Hist.  16,  pp.  34  el  seq. 

•  Walpole,  Geo.  Ill,  vol.  I,  p.  198.  « Walpole,  Geo.  HI,  vol.  II,  p.  56. 

•  5  Geo.  in,  c.  la. 


386 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4->76S 


large  part,  probably  about  one-half,  would  have  been  paid 
by  the  West  Indian  colonies.'  Thus  the  acts  of  1764  and 
1765  were  calculated  to  produce  a  total  revenue '  of  from 
about  £105,000  to  £145,000.  In  other  words,  these  acts 
would  yield  an  income  sufficient  to  meet  from  one-third 
to  somewhat  less  than  one-half  of  the  cost  of  the  American 
army.  This  revenue  was  to  be  derived  from  all  the  colonies, 
though  the  chief  outlay  was  occasioned  by  the  garrisons  on 
the  continent  of  America. 

•  Pari.  Hist.  t6,  p.  183;  Sharpe  Correspondence  HI,  p.  287;  Walpole,  Geo. 
in,  vol.  II,  p.  189;  Grenville  Papers  II,  pp.  373.  374;  Brit.  Mus.  Addlt. 
MSS.  33030  (Newcastle  Papers  CCCXLV,  folios  95,  197,  334).  The  gross 
produce  of  the  stamp  taxes  in  Great  Britain,  exclusive  of  those  on  apprentices 
which  were  not  extended  to  America,  vas  £i4a,ooo,  and  the  net  produce 
£121,000.    Ibid,  folio  334- 

» This  includes  the  increase  in  the  British  customs  revenue  due  to  the  change 
m  the  drawback  system. 


•f! 


^  \ 


CHAPTER  XIV 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 

These  various  measures  of  the  years  1764  and  1765 
meant  an  expansion  of  the  sphere  of  the  imperial  govern- 
ment's activity,  and  hence  necessarily  greater  control  over 
the  colonies.  The  movement  was  to  a  large  extent  one  of 
increased  administrative  efficiency,  and  though  not  aimed 
at  colonial  self-government,  inevitably  implied  some  diminu- 
tion of  colonial  freedom  of  action.  The  use  of  the  navy 
for  administrative  purposes,  the  presence  of  an  army  in 
America,  the  imperial  regulation  of  Indian  trade,  and  in 
general  the  increased  number  of  British  officials,  all  em- 
phasized in  concrete  form  the  fact  that  the  colonies  were  not 
independent  communities,  but  parts  of  a  larger  political 
system,*    On  these  broad  grounds,  this  general  policy  was 

*  Thete  was  also,  on  the  part  of  some  in  England,  an  intention  to  extend  the 
Episcopal  system  to  America.  This  step  seemed  not  improbable  in  1763,  but 
it  did  not  actually  become  a  part  of  British  policy.  The  proposal  aroused 
considerable  opposition  in  New  England.  In  1764,  however,  Franklin  said 
that  "a  Bishop  for  America  has  been  long  talk'd  of  in  England,  and  probably 
from  the  apparent  Necesnty  of  the  Thing,  will  sooner  or  later  be  appointed; 
because  a  Voyage  to  England  for  Ordination  is  extreamly  inconvenient  and  ex- 
pensive to  the  young  Clergy  educated  in  America;  and  the  Episcopal  Churches 
and  Clergy  in  these  Colonies  cannot  so  conveniently  be  governed  and  regulated 
by  a  Bishop  residing  in  England,  as  by  one  residing  among  those  committed 
to  his  Care."  Franklin,  Writings  IV,  p.  237.  See  also  N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VH, 
PP-  348-349;  Charles  Chauncy,  A  Letter  to  a  Friend  (Boston,  1767),  pp.  45 

387 


388 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


I*  I 


distasteful  to  the  colonies.  It  checked,  or  rather  ran  counter 
to,  the  tendency  toward  autonomy  that  had  hitherto  been 
a  marked  feature  of  the  constitutional  development  of  the 
Empire. 

The  use  of  the  navy  as  part  of  the  administrative  machinery 
was  disliked  by  the  colonies.  Governor  Bernard  wrote  that 
"  if  these  extraordinary  Custom  house  officers,  whose  Service 
as  it  is  new,  is  the  more  invidious,  do  not  appear  to  have  the 
public  support  of  the  Crown  in  what  they  do,"  a  conspiracy 

et  seq.;  John  A<kn«,  Writings  III,  p.  464;  Samuel  Adams,  Writings  I, 
p.  149;  A.  L.  Cross,  The  Anglican  Episcopate  and  the  American  Colonies, 
PP-  14s.  146  and  passim.  The  reform  movement  also  manifested  itself  in  other 
directions.  In  1739  Parliament  provided  that  sailors  in  the  colonies  should 
contribute  to  the  support  of  Greenwich  Hospital  in  the  same  manner  as  did 
those  in  Great  Britain,  a  Geo.  II,  c.  7.  This  law  had  not  been  executed,  but 
a  few  years  after  the  peace  it  was  determined  to  make  it  effective.  In  1768, 
Henry  Hulton  was  appointed  "Principal  Deputy  Receiver"  of  these  dues 
for  America,  while  in  the  various  colonial  ports,  subordinate  receivers  *eie 
appointed.  Though  the  fishermen  of  Salem  and  Marblehead  refused  to  sub- 
mit to  the  law,  Hulton's  account  shows  that  from  July  j  to  Oct.  10, 1768,  £396 
net  was  collected  from  New  London,  Rhode  Island,  Salem,  Marblehead, 
Vhiladelphia,  and  the  Southern  Potomac  district.  Considerable  opposition 
was  encountered.  Thus,  in  1768,  Hulton  wrote:  "Great  Clamours  have 
arisen  against  me  for  the  measures  I  am  taking  for  a  more  exact  Collection  of 
the  Duty."  See  despatches  of  Henry  Hulton,  June  ag,  Sept.  11,  Oct.  i,  Oct. 
10,  1768,  in  Admiralty,  Greenwich  HospiUl,  Misc.  Various,  131.  Another 
matter  which  still  continued  to  create  friction  was  the  reservation  of  mast 
trees  in  the  colonies  for  the  use  of  the  royal  navy.  This  policy  was  predomi- 
nantly military  in  nature,  and  was  adopted  in  consequence  of  the  difficulty  of 
procuring  large  masts,  and  in  view  also  of  the  desirability,  mainly  from  the 
standpoint  of  national  security,  of  not  being  dependent  upon  the  Baltic 
countries  for  anything  that  was  indispensable  to  the  development  of  British 
naval  strength.  The  system  was  in  many  respects  defective,  and  was  but 
inadequately  carried  into  effect.  (B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  44,  pp.  147-156; 
Pownall,  op.  cU.  pp.  196-198.)     In  1758  Wentworth  wrote  that  there  was 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


aSg 


or  combination  against  them  will  be  formed,  similar  to  that 
in  Massachusetts  during  the  war.'  Oxenbridge  Thacher, 
one  of  the  leading  American  controversial  writers,  gave  voice 
to  this  dissatisfaction,  and  likewise  complained  of  the  excep- 
tional powers  granted  to  the  custom-house  officials.'  The 
creation  of  a  vice-admiralty  court  for  all  America,  acting 
without  juries,  in  especial  aroused  discontent.*  It  was  urged 
that  the  individual  was  inadequately  protected,  as  the  vice- 
admiralty  judges  not  only  decided  both  on  the  law  and  on 
the  facts,  but  also  had  a  pecuniary  interest  in  securing  con- 
demnations, since  they  were  entitled  to  a  small  percentage 
thereof.    Besides,  under  the  new  system  a  seizure  could  be 

"a  Genera!  Combination  among  the  people  to  destroy  the  King's  tiirher." 
(B.  T.  New  Hampshire  4  C  4;  B.  T.  Plant.  Gen.  49.)    The  officers  to 

execute  the  law  were  frequently  sued  for  trespass,  and  many  other  diC  ties 
were  encountered.  (B.  T.  New  Hampshire  4  C  14;  Ibid.  5  D  10;  Wentworth 
to  Halifax,  Oct.  ao,  1763,  in  Am.  and  W.L  161.)  This  opposition  was, 
however,  to  a  great  extent  confined  to  the  dlrectiy  interested  localities,  and 
was  not  supported  by  the  governments  of  New  England.  Thus,  in  1760, 
the  agent  of  Connecticut,  Jared  Ingersoll,  represented  to  the  Board  of  Trade 
the  expediency  of  having  a  court  of  admiralty  established  in  Connecticut  for 
the  more  effectual  prosecution  of  the  laws  made  for  preserving  the  woods. 
(B.  T.  Journals  68,  p.  176.)  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  necessity  of 
this  general  policy,  as  far  as  New  England  was  concerned,  was  to  a  great  extent 
removed  by  the  conquest  of  Canada,  where  there  was  an  abundance  of  mast 
trees. 

'  B.  T.  Mass.  78  LI  73.  See  also  Bernard  to  Jackson,  Nov.  a6,  1763,  in 
Quincy,  op.  cit.  p.  431,  and  Lord  Colville  to  Philip  Stephens,  Halifax,  Jan. 
aa,  1764,  with  enclosures,  in  Adra.  Sec.  In-Letters,  Bundle  48a. 

'The  SentimenU  of  a  British  American  (Boston,  1764),  p.  10.  Cf.  also 
Stephen  Hopkins,  op.  cU.  p.  15. 

•Instructions  from  Braintree  to  their  represenUtives  in  1765.  John 
Adams,  Writings  III,  pp.  465,  «t  seq.  See  also  John  Dickinson,  Writings  I,  pp. 
17s,  184. 


I 


ago 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-17A5 


y 


I 
fi\ 


'If;, 


removed  for  trial  from  any  colony  to  Halifax,  thus  putting 
the  possibly  innocent  owner  to  great  expense  and  loss.' 
These  complaints  had  unquestionably  some  justification, 
because  the  system  was  liable  to  abuse.  It  was  not,  how- 
ever, intended  to  abuse  it,  and  it  is  not  clear  that  any  of  the 
evils  inherent  in  it  actually  took  effect.  For,  as  Moses  Coit 
Tyler  has  well  said,  the  colonies  "made  their  stand,  not 
against  tyranny  inflicted,  but  o.ily  against  tyranny  antici- 
pated." ' 

These  exceptional  powers  were  granted  because  other- 
wise the  laws  could  not  be  executed.  As  an  eminent 
Rhode  Island  lawyer,  Martin  Howard,  said  at  the  time,' 
"if,  my  friend,  customs  are  due  to  the  crown ;  if  illicit  com- 
merce is  to  be  put  an  end  to,  as  ruinous  to  the  welfare :  —  If, 
by  reason  of  the  interested  views  of  traders,  and  the  conni- 
vance of  courts  and  custom-house  officers,  these  ends  could 
not  be  compassed  or  obtained  in  the  common  and  ordinary 
way ;  tell  me,  what  could  the  government  do,  but  to  apply 
a  remedy  desperate  as  the  disease :  There  is,  I  own,  a  severity 
in  the  method  of  prosecution,  in  the  new  established  court 
of  admiralty,  under  Doctor  SPRY,  here;  but  it  is  a  severity 
we  have  brought  upon  ourselves.  When  every  mild  expedi- 
ent, to  stop  the  atrocious  and  infamous  practice  of  smuggling, 
has  been  try'd  in  vain,  the  government  is  justifiable  in  mak- 
ing laws  against  it."    It  was  only  by  means  of  such  extraor- 

'  Oxenbridge  Thacher,  op.  cU.  pp.  7-9;  T-mes  Otis,  The  R'ghte  of  the 
British  Colonists,  p.  53;  Stephen  Hopkins,  op.  jU  pp.  9,  14,  15. 

'  Literary  History  of  the  Am.  Rev.  I,  p.  8. 

•A  Letter  from  a  Gentleman  at  Halifax  (Newport,  1765),  in  A.  B.  Hart, 
Am.  Hist,  told  by  Contemporaries  II,  pp.  396,  397. 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


991 


dfnary  expedients  that  the  British  government  could  at  all 
execute  the  existing  laws,  and  carry  out  its  policy.  The  very 
animaiity  that  Howard's  pamphlet  aroused  in  Rhode  Island 
—  he  met  with  personal  violence  at  the  hands  of  the  mob '  — 
shows  to  what  extent  anarchic  conditions  had  crept  into  the 
imperial  system,  and  how  impossible  it  was  to  enforce  the 
law  without  resorting  to  exceptional  measures. 

The  purpose  of  these  measures  was  to  make  effective 
the  laws  of  trade,  and  more  especially  the  revenue  acts  of 
1 764  and  1 765.  The  stricter  enforcement  of  the  old  colonial 
system  aroused  some  opposition.  This  resulted  mainly  from 
the  fact  that  the  c  stom  of  allowing  wines  and  fruits  to  be 
imported  directly  ir  -  the  colonies  from  Spain  and  Portugal 
was  no  longer  countenanced.'  It  was,  however,  the  execu- 
tion of  the  Molasses  Act,  which  was  not  an  integral  part 

woc5''"  ""'"''  ^^"^  ^"f*"'  ^760-1765.  p.  609,  no.  1959;  Brit.  Mus.  Add't. 
MSS.  33030  (Newcastle  Papers  CCCXLV,  folios  76  el  srq.). 

'Thus  it  was  said  in  1765:  "I  believe  the  Stamp  Act  would  not  have  met 
with  so  violent  an  opposition,  had  not  the  Colonists  in  general,  previous  to 
that,  been  greatly  chagrined  at  the  rigorous  execution  of  the  laws  of  trade  " 
The  Xew  York  "  New  Gazette  or  The  Weekly  Post-Boy  "  no.  lao;  for  Feb.  ao, 
1766,  in  Adra.  Sec.  In-Letters  3819.  In  the  expres.sion  "laws  of  trade"  is 
e^dently  included  the  "Molasses  .\ct"  of  1733  and  the  "Sugar  Act"  of  1764. 
In  general,  the  contemporary  American  writers  did  not  complain  of  the 
stncter  enforcement  of  the  law,  except  in  so  far  as  it  involved  the  payment 
of  duties  on  foreign  West  Indian  products,  and  the  stopr«iKc  of  the  direct 
importation  of  wines  and  fruits  from  Spain  and  Portugal  In  1764  it  was 
claimed  that  the  colonies  could  not  import  Spanish  and  Portuguese  fruits  via 
Great  Britain,  as  they  were  perishable,  and  that  while  these  articles  in  them- 
selves were  "of  little  consequence."  still  they  wer«  profitable  and  encouraged 
the  colonial  fisheries.  An  Essay  on  the  Trade  of  the  Northern  Colonics 
(London,  1764),  pp.  10,  23.  For  a  similar  complaint  in  1767,  made  by  the 
Massachusetu  agent,  de  Berdt,  Sce  Papers  relating  to   Public  Events  in 


■i 


y 


292 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


w 


of  the  colonial  system  proper,  that  aroused  the  chief  dissatis- 
faction. In  1 764  Governor  Franklin  informed  the  Board  of 
Trade  that,  as  a  result  of  the  enforcement  of  this  law,  there 
were  "great  Murmerings  among  the  Merchants,  and  others, 
in  North  America." '  The  discontent  sprang  chiefly  from 
the  duty  on  foreign  molasses,  which,  though  cut  in  two  in 
1764,  was  still  considered  burdensome.^ 

Molasses  was  imported  in  large  quantities  by  the 
Northern  colonies,  and  formed  the  basis  of  a  considerable 
part  of  their  commercial  life.  The  British  West  Indies 
could  hot  furnish  an  adequate  supply,  nor  could  they  con- 
sume the  entire  surplus  quantity  of  food-stuffs,  fish,  and 
lumber,  produced  by  the  continental  colonies.  Conse- 
quently the  trade  to  the  foreign  West  Indies  was  absolutely 
essential  to  the  prosperity  of  the  North  American  colonies. 
Furthermore,  it  was  this  trade  that  in  part  enabled  these 
colonies  to  pay  for  the  British  manufactures  that  they 
consumed.  In  1764,  Colden  correctly  asserted  that  it 
was  "evident  to  a  demonstration  that  the  more  Trade 
the  Colonies  in  North  America  have  with  the  Foreign  Colo- 


ill.l« 


Massachusetts  (Phila.,  1856),  pp.  44  et  seq.  As  already  pointed  out,  this 
trade  was  not  in  itself  important,  and  subsequent  to  the  stricter  enforcement 
of  the  law,  the  colonies  imported  these  products  via  the  Madeiras.  Ibbetson 
to  Board  of  Trade,  1765,  in  B.  T.  Com.  Series  II,  579. 

'  N.J.  Col.  Doc.  IX,  pp.  402-404.  Cf.  "  New- York  Mercury  "  no.  639  for 
Jan.  23,  1764. 

'  As  already  mentioned,  Rhode  Island  officially  pointed  out  the  comparative 
unimportance  of  the  duties  on  foreign  sugar.  Cf.  also  Samuel  Adams,  Writings 
I>  PP-  3^1  3*f  62.  In  1767,  however,  Massachusetts,  through  its  agent  de  Berdt, 
complained  about  the  sugar  duties.  Papers  relating  to  Public  Events  in  Mas- 
sachusetts, pp.  44,  45. 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


293 


»  I 


nies,  the  more  they  consume  of  the  British  Manufactures 
Similarly,  in  1766,  it  was  claimed,  and  to  a  great  extent  with 
justice,  that  "a  free  Trade  with  the  foreign  West-India 
Islands,  is  of  far  more  consequence  to  North  America  than 
any  other  Considerations."*  These  arguments  were  ad- 
vanced by  all  the  colonial  writers,  and  to  an  overwhelming 
extent,  constituted  the  chief  burden  of  the  complaint  against 
the  act  of  1 764.'  But  the  economic  grievance,  though  by  no 
means  insignificant,  should  not  be  overestimated.  Although 
opposed  to  the  policy  of  which  this  act  was  an  expression, 
Pownall  claimed  that  a  revenue  could  be  collected  if  a  moder- 
ate duty  of  twopence  a  gallon  were  imposed  on  molasses ; 
that  the  three-penny  duty  of  the  act  of  1764  was  not  in  any 
way  destructive;  and  that  the  "clamour"  against  it  was 
"groundless."  * 

'N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  612. 

•The  New  York  "New  Gazette"  No.  1207  for  Feb.  20,  1766,  in  Adm. 
Sec.  In-Letters  3819.  Cf.  also  Dartmouth  MSS.  (Hist.  MSS.  Com.  XI,  5) 
P-  331;  Quincy,  op.  cit.  p.  445. 

•Oxenbridge  Thacher,  op.  cit.  p.  14,  15;  James  Otis,  op.  cit.  pp.  76,  77; 
John  Dickinson,  Writings!,  pp.  223,  226;  Stephen  Hopkins,  op.  cit.  pp.  12-14; 
Dartmouth  MSS.  (Hist.  MSS.  Com.  XI,  5)  p.  331;  Franklin,  Writings  IV,  pp. 
243,  244;  Pownall,  op.  cit.  pp.  5,  6;  An  Essay  on  the  Trade  of  the  Northern 
Colonies,  pp.  4-21 ;  "  A  Few  Thoughts  on  the  Method  of  improving  and  secur- 
ing the  Advantages  which  accrue  to  Great  Britain  from  the  Northern  Colo- 
nies," printed  in  "New-York  Mercury,"  no.  671  for  Aug.  27, 1764.  See  also  the 
same  paper  for  Jan.  23,  1764.  The  best  exposition  of  the  case  of  the  colonies 
is  the  offic-r.i  petition  of  Rhode  Island.  B.T.  Prep.  21  X  57.  Herein  it  was 
pointed  ou  that  molasses  formed  the  basis  of  Rhode  Island's  commerce,  and 
that  14,000  hhds.  thereof  were  annually  imported,  of  which  only  2500  came 
from  the  British  colonies. 

♦  Pownall,  op.  cit.  pp.  192-195.  Rhode  Island  and  Massachusetts  were 
especially  affected  by  this  duty.    The  former  colony  imported  1,150,000 


294 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I754->76S 


This  law  was  only  in  part  designed  to  injure  French  com- 
merce by  giving  British  West  Indian  products  preferential 
treatment  in  the  markets  of  North  America.  In  addition, 
its  purpose  was  to  create  a  colonial  revenue,  and  with  this 
object  in  view,  it  imposed  a  number  of  duties  besides  those 
on  foreign  West  Indian  products.  This  was  the  first  act 
whose  main  purpose  was  to  tax  the  colonies,  and  as  such,  it 
aroused  some  opposition ;  *  but  from  the  fact  that  it  closely 
resembled  in  its  outward  form  several  existing  laws,  whose 
validity  had  not  bet'i  seriously  questioned,  it  was  difficult 
to  assail  it  on  this  ground.' 

The  discontent  of  the  colonies  at  the  legislation  of  1764 
burst  into  a  flame  on  the  passage  of  the  Stamp  Act 
of  1765.  So  universal  and  so  violent  was  the  opposition, 
that  it  was  found  absolutely  impossible  to  execute  the  law.' 

gallons  of  molasses  yearly,  on  which  the  duty  would  have  been  £t4,31S- 
Hopkins,  op.  cU.  pp.  la,  13. 

'  Thacher  {op.  cit.  pp.  5,  7)  attacked  it  on  the  ground  that  a  tax  was  laid 
"without  the  consent  of  the  representatives  of  the  colonists."  Cf.  also  Va. 
Mag.  XII,  pp.  6-9;  "New-York  Mercury,"  no.  671  for  Aug.  27, 1764;  Votes 
and  Proceedings  of  the  House  of  Representatives  of  Pennsylvania  (Phila.  1775) 
V,  pp.  355,  356;  Samuel  Adams,  Writings  I,  p.  5. 

'  Va.  Mag.  XII,  p.  10.  James  Otis  (op.  cit.  pp.  42,  43),  however,  pointed 
out  that  if  Parliament  could  lay  taxes  on  trade,  it  could  also  levy  internal 
taxes.  "There  is  no  foundation,"  he  said,  "  for  the  distinction  some  make  in 
England  between  an  internal  and  an  external  tax  on  the  colonies."  John 
Dickinson,  on  the  other  hand,  said:  "We  should  willingly  pay  a  moderate 
duty  upon  importations  from  the  French  and  Spaniards  without  attempting 
to  run  them."  Dickinson,  Writings  I,  p.  224. 

•Pari.  Hist.  16,  pp.  111-136;  Am.  and  W.I.  388,  586.  Brit.  Mus. 
Addit.  MSS.  22679;  Same  35911  (Hardwicke  Papers  DLXIII);  Same  33030 
(Newcastle  Papers  CCCXLV,  folios  50  et  seq.).  This  opposition  extended 
to  a  number  of  the  insular  colonies.    B.  T.  Bermudas  20  P  108;  Adm. 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


295 


This  opposition  in  part  was  due  to  the  tax  itself,'  and 
in  part  resulted  from  its  imposition  by  Parliament.    As 
already  pointed  out,  the  legislation  of  1764  and  1765  was 
designed  to  produce  a  colonial  revenue  of  from  ;Cio5,ooo 
to  ;^i45,ooo.    Apparently  this  was  a  very  small  sum,  but 
in  reality  it  was  a  very  large  one  from  the  colonial  view- 
point.   The  legislation  of  the  provincial  assemblies  was 
exceedingly  limited  in  scope,  and  consequently  the  colonists 
were  not  accustomed  to  paying  heavy  taxes.    As  Loudoun 
said  in  1757,  "the  Taxes  which  the  People  pay  in  this 
Country,  are  really  so  trifling,  that  they  do  not  deserve 
the  Name."  *    Pownall  likewise  pointed  out,  that  while 
a  low  tax  in  North  America  would  produce  o99,ooo,  this 
sum   was,   in   fact,   more   than    the   colonies     hemselves 
actually   levied.     "The    whole   charge    of    the    ordinary 
expence  of  government  in  the  province  of  Massachusetts'- 
Bay,  which  does,  by  much  more  to  the  support  of  govern- 
ment, and  other  public  services  than  any  other  province, 
is,  in  time  of  peace,  sterling  12,937/.  i«w.  whereas  that 
of    New- York,  is  not  more    than    about    sterling,    4000/. 
annually."  '    The  Board  of  Trade  at  this  time  also  prepared 

Sec.  In-Letters  3819;  Dartmouth  MSS.  (Hist.  MSS.  Com.  14,  X)  p.  495. 
Governor  Pinfold  wrote  that  Barbados  had  obeyed  the  law  despite  the  fact 
that  "their  North  American  correspondents  have  spared  neither  Threats,  or 
Entreaties  to  persuade  us  to  imitate  their  outragious  and  Rebellious  Conduct  " 
B.  T.  Barbados  36  Ff  68. 

'  John  Adams,  Writing"  III,  p.  465;  John  Dickinson,  Writings  I,  pp.  329- 
233;  Dulany,  Considerations  on  the  Propriety  of  Imposing  Taxes  (ad  ed. 
Annapolis,  1765),  pp.  24,  25;  Va.  Mag.  XII,  p.  9;  James  Otis,  Considerations, 
etc.,  p.  20. 

'  Pitt  Correspondence  I,  p.  44.  •  Pownall,  op.  cil.  pp.  98-100. 


39^ 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   1754-176$ 


an  account  of  the  colonial  civil  establishments,  according 
to  which  the  continental  colonies  paid  annually  for  these  pur- 
poses about  ;£6o,ooo,  and  the  West  Indies  approximately 
the  same  sum.'  Though  these  accounts  are  not  accurate 
or  complete,  and  though  they  omit  all  consideration  of  the 
local  taxes  pa?d  in  the  colonies,  yet  they  show  in  an  unmis- 
takable manner  that  the  parliamentary  taxes  of  1764  and 
1765  would  have  greatly  increased  the  normal  burden  of 
taxation  in  the  colonies,*  —  but  by  no  means,  however,  to  a 
degree  incommensurate  with  their  wealth. 

In  addition,  the  colonies  complained  of  the  method  by 
which  the  tax  was  imposed.  Thus  Washington  wrote  that 
the  colonists  looked  "upon  this  unconstitutional  method  of 
taxation  as  a  direful  attack  upon  their  liberties."  '  In  general 
they  claimed  that  it  was  a  fundamental  principle  of  the  British 
constitution  that  the  subject  could  be  taxed  only  by  his  rep- 


•  Am.  and  W.I.  387,  folio  121. 

'  It  was  also  complained  that  these  taxes  would  cause  an  outflow  of  money 
to  Great  Britain.  Cj.  Hopkins,  op.  rit.  p.  23.  It  is  obvious,  however,  that 
the  establishment  of  a  standing  army  in  America,  of  which  a  large  proportion 
of  the  cost  was  to  be  paid  by  the  mother  country,  would  have  a  diametrically 
opposite  effect.  Furthermore,  provision  was  made  that  the  money  arising 
from  the  Stamp  taxes  should  not  be  remitted  to  Great  Briuin.  Sharpe  Corre- 
spondence III,  pp.  286,  287.  The  above  accounts  do  not  include  the  extraor- 
dinary taxes  levied  by  the  colonies  to  extinguish  their  own  war  debts.  In 
1766  it  was  contended  in  England  that  the  ability  of  the  colonies  to  pay  these 
parliamentary  taxes  was  amply  proven  by  the  fact  that  of  this  debt  £1,750,000 
had  been  paid  ir  three  years,  and  that  the  bulk  of  the  balance,  £760,000, 
would  be  paid  in  tT*o  years  more.  Ibid.  Ill,  p.  287.  Cf.  Almon,  Biographical 
Anecdotes  II,  pp.  93,  94. 

'  Washington,  Works  <^cd.  Ford)  II,  p.  209.  C/.  Samuel  Adams,  Writings 
I,  p.  9. 


L^ 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


297 


resentatives.*  Any  other  system,  according  to  such  colonial 
publicists  as  Stephen  Hopkins '  and  James  Otis,"  was  tanta- 
mount to  slavery. 

The  doctrine  of  "no  taxation  without  representation"  is 
one  of  those  vague  [>olitical  principles,  which  can  neither 
be  subjected  to  scientific  analysis,  nor  carried  to  their 
logical  conclusion,  but  which  are  possibly  all  the  more 
implicitly  believed  in  because  their  meaning  cannot  be 
explicitly  expounded.  Both  parties  held  firml)-  to  this 
doctrine,  but  each  interpreted  it  differently.  According 
to  the  British  view,  the  colonies  were  virtually  represented 
in  Parliament,  and  there  was  a  valid  basis  for  this  con- 
tention in  the  historically  illogical  system  of  representa- 
tion prevailing  in  the  mother  country.  The  colonists,  ac- 
customed to  a  more  symmetrical  practice,  rejected  this 
claim,*  and  contended  that  only  if  their  representatives  sat 

•John  Dickinson,  Writings  I,  pp.  175,  184;  Daniel  Dulany,  op.  cit.  p.  8. 
In  1764  the  Virginia  Committte  of  Correspondence  said  that  "the  most  vital 
Principle  of  the  British  Constitution"  was  that  -lo  subject  could  be  made 
subservient  to  laws  without  his  consent  or  that  of  his  representatives.  Va. 
Mag.  XII,  p.  10. 

"  Those  "whose  property  may  be  taken  from  them  by  taxes,  or  otherwise, 
without  their  own  consent,  and  against  their  will,  are  in  the  miserable  condi- 
tion of  slaves."  Hopkins,  op.  cit.  p.  4.  Cf.  also  James  Otis,  Considerations 
on  Behalf  of  the  Colonists  (2d  ed.  London,  1765),  p.  11;  Votes  and  Proceed- 
ings (Phila.  177s)  V,  p.  376. 

•  Otis  said  that  Pariiamentary  taxation  was  "absolutely  irreconcileable  with 
the  rights  of  the  Colonists,  as  British  subjects,  and  as  men.  I  say  men,  for  in 
a  state  of  nature,  no  man  can  take  my  property  from  me,  without  my  consent: 
If  he  does,  he  deprives  me  of  my  liberty,  and  makes  me  a  slave."  Otis,  The 
Rights,  etc.,  p.  38. 

♦Dulany,  op.  cit.  pp.  6  et  seq.;  Samuel  Adams,  Writings  I.  p.  30. 


\\ 


298  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   I7$4->76S 

at  Westminster  would  this  principle  remain  inviolate.*  In 
addition,  the  colonies  feared  that  this  colonial  revenue  would 
be  used  to  pay  the  salaries  of  the  colonial  governors,  thus 
destroying  the  great  influence  of  the  provincial  legislatures." 
This,  however,  did  not  form  a  part  of  GrenviUe's  policy, 
and  the  misunderstanding  was  one  of  many,  which  m  that 
age  of  poor  communications  made  harmonious  relations 
between  mother  country  and  colony  virtually  impossible. 

Owing  to  the  intense  opposition  of  the  colonies,  the  Stamp 
Act  was  repealed  in  1766.'  The  British  merchants  were  to 
a  great  extent  united  in  urging  this  step,  fearing  not  only  the 
loss  of  the  American  market,*  but  also  the  non-payment  of 
the  very  large  amounts  that  the  colonies  owed  them. 
But  in  Addition,  GrenviUe  was  no  longer  in  office,  and  his 

•There  was  also  considerable  opposition  to  the  Stamp  Act  on  arcountof 
the  fact  that  all  cases  arising  under  it  were  to  be  tried  in  the  adm.rahy  courts. 

Samuel  Adams,  Writings  I,  p.  46.  _•,:.„»„  th,.  Stamo 

« Golden  said  that  this  was  the  chief  reason  for  the  opposition  to  the  SUmp 

taxes.    N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  VII,  p.  797- 

'  Cdden"diculed  the  idea  that  the  colonies  would  be  able  to  do  without 
British  woollens,  and  asserted  that  the  New  ^'^^^^^^■^^T';^^'"':^ 
was  designed  solely  to  influence  English  opinion.    N.Y.  Col.  Doc.  Vn.  PP-  799. 
Z     Similarly  James  Otis  said:  "However  I  can  never  hear  Amencan  manu- 
^ur^  Loil    talked  of,  without  being  disposed  to  a  violent  fit  of  Uughter^ 
My  contempt  is  inexpressible,  when  I  perceive  statesmen  at  home  amusmg  the 
I'bThey  affect  to  despise,  with  the  imminent  danger  from  A-ncan  r^anufac 
tories."  Considerations  on  Behalf  of  the  Colonists  (,d  ed.  London.  x^65).  p.^3^ 
•Pari  Hist.  16.  pp.  133  ««  «9-    See  also  Brit.  Mus.  Addit.  MSS.  33030 
(Newcle  pipers'  CCXLV).    In  a  letter  addressed  to  WilUam  Burke  dated 
Decx^.  176S   it  was  sUted  that  "some   housands  of  industnous  artificers 
^  suffering  in  this  neighbourhood  for  the  want  of  remittances  from  Amenca 
Tdtm  1  fear  of  sending  goods  there."    Cal.  Home  Office  Papers.  Z760- 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


299 


successor,  Rockingham,  was  averse  to  using  the  coercive 
measures  that  were  indispensable  if  the  law  was  to  be  en- 
forced. This  Ministry  also  took  under  consideration  the 
complaints  against  the  "Sugar  Act"  of  1764,'  and  modified 
it  to  meet  the  wishes  of  the  colonies.  The  opposition  had 
been  aroused  mainly  by  the  dutv  on  foreign  molasses.  This 
was  repealed  in  1766,  and  in  its  place  a  very  low  duty  of  one 
penny  a  gallon  was  imposed  on  all  molasses,  whether  British 
or  foreign,  imported  into  the  colonics.*  At  the  same  time, 
other  changes  were  also  made,'  but  this  was  by  far  the  most 
important.    This  statute  removed  the  chief  economic  objec- 

176s,  p.  638,  no.  2064.  According  to  Walpole,  "the  weapon  with  which  the 
Colonies  armed  themselves  to  most  advantage,  was  the  refusal  of  paying  the 
debts  they  owed  to  our  merchants  at  home,  for  goods  and  wares  exported  to 
the  American  provinces.  These  debts  involved  the  merchants  of  London, 
Liverpool,  Manchester,  and  other  great  trading  towns,  in  a  common  cause 
with  the  Americans,  who  forswore  all  traffic  with  us,  unless  the  obnoxious 
Stamp  Act  was  repealed."  Memoirs  Geo.  Ill,  vol.  II,  p.  i53-  According  to 
the  general  estimate,  these  debts  amounted  to  the  large  sum  of  four  million 
sterling.  Daniel  Dulany.o^.  cU.  p.  aa;  "New-York Mercury,"  no.636  for  Jan.2, 
1764;  Dickinson,  Writings  I,  p.  217.  Apparently  this  was  even  an  underesti- 
mate.   For  details,  see  Brit.  Mus.  Addit.  MSS.  (Newcastle  Papers  CCCXLV, 

folios  104,  204). 

'  Sharpe  Correspondence  III,  pp.  296,  297.  T'- ;  London  merchants  were 
also  instrumental  in  having  the  duty  on  molasses  lowered.  Corr.  of  Col.  Gov. 
of  Rhode  Island  II,  p.  361.  For  details  as  to  the  reasons  of  the  various 
changes  made  in  1766,  see  Brit.  Mus.  Addit.  MSS.  33030  (Newcastle  Papers 
CCCXLV,  folios  243  et  seq.). 

» 6  Geo.  Ill,  c.  S3,  §5  i,  iv. 

•The  duties  on  foreign  sugar  were  retained,  but  the  cost  of  Bntish  sugars 
to  the  continental  colonies  was  reduced  by  removing  the  export  duties  of 
1673,  amounting  to  is.  6d.  a  hundredweight  on  brown  and  muscc  .ado,  and  51. 
a  hundredweight  on  white  sugar.  The  export  duties  imposed  in  1764  on 
British  colonial  pimento  and  coffee  were  repealed,  but  low  duUes  were  imposed 


300 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-176$ 


I 


tions  to  the  revenue  act  of  1764.  Thus  the  Rhode  Island 
agent,  Joseph  Sherwood,  wrote  to  Governor  Ward:  "Every 
Grievance  of  which  you  Complained  is  now  Absolutely 
and  totally  removed,  a  joyfuU  and  a  happy  Event  for  the  late 
Disconsolate  Inhabitants  of  America."  * 

The  repeal  of  the  Stamp  Act  and  the  abolition  of  the 
objectionable  duty  on  molasses  seemed  to  restore  harmo- 
nious relations.'  The  calm  was,  however,  only  superficial. 
The  controversies  of  these  two  years  had  raised  some 
fundamental  questions,  on  which  there  could  be  little  hope 
of  mutual  agreement.  The  imperial  administrative  system 
had  been  successfully  defied,  and  in  especial  the  authority 
of  the  colonial  customs  officials  had  been  completely  under- 
mined. Fuithermore,  the  main  principles  of  Grenville's 
policy  had  not  been  discarded  by  the  British  government. 

The  presence  of  a  large  standing  force  in  the  colonies 
necessitated  the  extension  of  the  Mutiny  Act  to  America,' 
and  though  this  statute  was  modified  to  suit  colonial  condi- 
tions,* it  aroused  considerable  opposition,  especially  in  New 
York.'    Besides,  the  plan  of  creating  a  colonial  revenue  had 

on  their  importation  into  the  British  colonies.  Then  the  import  duties  on 
East  Indian  and  French  textiles  were  abolished,  and  instead  foreign  cambrics 
and  French  lawns  had  to  pay  export  duties  when  shipped  from  Great  Britain 
to  the  colonies.  There  were  also  a  number  of  other  regulations  in  this  com- 
prehensive statute. 

'  Corr.  of  Col.  Gov.  of  Rhode  Island  II,  p.  384. 

'  John  Adams,  Writings  II,  pp.  223,  224. 

•  s  Geo.  Ill,  c.  33. 

« Cal.  Home  Office  Papers  1760-1765,  pp.  529,  534;  Corr.  of  Col.  Gov.  of 
Rhode  Island  II,  p.  562;  Grenvillc  Papers  III,  pp  ii-ij- 

•Cy.  Samuel  Adams,  Writings  I,  p.  no.    It  was  in  connection  with  these 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


301 


not  been  abandoned,'  and  there  still  remained  in  force  a 
number  of  colonial  customs-duties  imposed  by  Parliament. 
At  first  the  colonies  were  not  united  in  opposing  such  indirect 
taxes.  Franklin  admitted  that  Parliament  might  have  "a 
natural  and  equitable  right"  to  levy  them.'  But  colonial 
opinion  was  rapidly  advancing,  and  the  opposition  to  the 
Stamp  Act  extended  to  these  indirect  taxes  as  well.  Whately, 
the  Secrctar}'of  the  Treasury,  informed  Grenvillc  that "  the 
rage  of  the  people  seems  not  to  be  confined  to  the  Stamp  Act ; 
the  Officers  of  the  Customs  are  also  the  object  of  it,  and  if 
that  should  be  avowed,  then  the  clear  point  is,  whether  the 
Parliament  has  a  right  to  impose  any  taxes  at  all  there."  ' 
In  1764,  the  Rhode  Island  legislature  forbade  the  governor 
to  administer  the  oaths  to  the  British  customs  officials, 
and  thus  prevented   the  laws  from  being  executed."    As 

troubles  that  Chatham,  on  Feb.  3, 1767,  wrote  to  Shelbume:  "America  affords 
a  gloomy  prospect.  A  spirit  of  infatuation  has  taken  possession  of  New  York: 
their  disobedience  to  the  mutiny  act  will  justly  create  a  great  ferment  here, 
open  a  fair  field  to  the  arraigners  of  America,  and  leave  no  room  to  any  to  say 
a  word  in  their  defence."    Chatham  Correspondence  III,  p.  188. 

'  On  Jan.  27, 1767,  Grenville  wrote  to  the  Eari  of  Buckinghamshire:  "Yes- 
terday and  to-day  we  have  had  some  debates  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the 
estimates  for  the  American  troops,  and  the  enormous  expense  attending  them, 
amounting  in  the  whole  to  above  £400,000,  or  near  a  shilling  in  the  pound  on 
the  land.  This  I  proposed  should  be  all  defrayed  by  America  and  the  West  In- 
dies, after  having  reduced  it  near  one  half  by  striking  of!  the  unnecessary  articles. 
Mr.  Townshend  in  answer  to  this,  though  I.  refused  to  consent  to  it,  yet  held 
a  very  strong  language  that  America  ought  to  pay  that  expense."  Lothian 
MSS.  (Hist.  MSS.  Com.  1905)  p.  275.  Cf.  Chatham  Correspondence  III, 
p.  178. 

'  ParL  Hist.  16,  p.  149.  '  Grenville  Papers  III,  p.  100. 

'Bernard  to  Halifax,  Dec.  14,  1764.  Am.  and  W.I.  167.  Halifax  to  the 
Governor  of  Rhode  Island,  June  9,  1764.    Ibid.  197. 


'■/' 


I 

i 


303 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


! 


.1 


a  result,  in  1765,  these  ofRcials  in  Rhode  Island  came  to 
the  conclusion  that  the  custom-house  could  not  be  carried  on.* 
In  1765,  one  of  the  collectors  in  Maryland  complained  of 
an  assault  made  on  him  while  he  was  executing  his  duties, 
which  necessitated  his  being  always  fully  armed.'  Similarly 
in  Massachusetts,  these  of&cials  did  not  dare  to  execute 
the  laws.*  The  Stamp  Act  riots  had  completely  under- 
mined their  authority,  and  had  rendered  the  imperial  ad- 
ministrative system  absolutely  ineflfective. 

In  addition  to  collecting  the  duties  imposed  by  the  acts 
of  1673,  1733,  1764,  and  1766,  it  was  also  the  duty  of  these 
officials  to  enforce  the  laws  of  trade.  Prior  to  1763  the  gen- 
eral attitude  of  the  colonies  toward  the  old  colonial  system 
had  been  one  of  acquiescence.  The  controversies  over  the 
acts  of  1764  and  1765,  however,  brought  the  laws  of  trade 
into  the  political  arena,  and  led  to  an  examination  of  their 
validity.  Thus,  as  late  as  1764,  James  Otis  said  that  the 
French  "can  send  none  of  their  manufactures  here;  and  it 
is  the  wish  of  every  honest  British  American  that  they  never 
may ;  'tis  best  they  never  should ;  we  can  do  better  without 
the  manufactures  of  Europe,  save  those  of  Great-Britain, 
than  with  them."  *    Similar  statements  were  made  by  other 

•  Gal.  Home  Office  Papers,  1760-1765,  p.  610.  See  also  Corr.  of  Col.  Gov. 
of  Rhode  Island  II,  ,376-381. 

'Col.  Home  Office  Papers,  1760-1765,   p.  552,  no.  1748. 

•  Quincy,  op.  cit.  p.  445.    Hutchinson  to  Pownall,  May  11,  1766. 

•  James  Otis,  The  Rights,  etc.,  p.  76.  In  another  p>assage  he  says:  "A 
prodigious  revenue  arises  to  the  Crown  on  American  exports  to  Great-Britain, 
which  in  general  is  not  murmured  at:  No  Manufacture  of  Europe  besides 
British,  can  be  lawfully  bro't  here;  and  no  honest  man  desires  they  ever 
should,  if  the  laws  were  put  in  execution  upon  all."    Ihid.  p.  58. 


-^ 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


303 


colonial  writers  also  at  this  time.'  In  the  following  year, 
however,  Otis  proceeded  to  question  the  justice  of  the  system 
as  a  whole.  "Can  any  one  tell  me,"  he  asked,  "why  trade, 
commerce,  arts,  sciences,  and  manufactures,  should  not  be 
as  free  for  an  American  as  for  a  European  ?"  Though  ridi- 
culing the  idea  that  the  colonies  could  supply  themselves 
with  manufactures,  he  said:  "Is  there  anything  in  the  laws 
of  natrre  and  nations,  anything  in  the  nature  of  our  allegiance 
that  forbids  a  colonist  to  push  the  manufacture  of  iron  much 
beyond  the  making  of  a  horse-shoe  or  a  hob  nail  ?"  Noth- 
ing, he  added,  could  prove  to  him  "the  rectitude"  of  the 
entire  system  of  regulating  colonial  trade.'  Similarly,  a 
Virginian,  Richard  Bland,  claimed  that  "these  acts,  which 
imposed  severer  restrictions  upon  the  trade  of  the  colonies, 
than  were  imposed  upon  the  trade  of  England,  deprived  the 
colonies,  so  far  as  these  restrictions  extended,  of  the  privileges 
of  English  subjects,  and  constituted  an  unnatural  difference 
between  men  under  the  same  allegiance,  bom  equally  free, 
and  entitled  to  the  same  civil  rights."  ' 


'  In  1764  such  a  writer  said  "that  whatever  business  or  commerce  in  any  of 
the  Northern  Colonies  interferes  with,  or  is  in  any  way  detrimental  to  the  true  in- 
terest, manufactories,  trade,  or  commerce  of  Great  Britain,  we  reasonably  expect 
will  be  totally  prohibited."  An  Essay  on  the  Trade  of  the  Northern  Colonies 
of  Great  Britain  in  North-America  (London,  1764)  p.  9.  Similariy,  in  1765, 
after  a  very  partisan  analysisof  the  colonial  system,  John  Dickinson  said :  "  How- 
ever under  all  these  restraints  and  some  others  that  have  been  imposed  on  us 
we  have  not  till  lately  been  unhappy."    Dickinson,  Writings  I,  p.  217. 

» Otis,  Considerations,  etc.,  pp.  22-23.    Cf.  also  p.  38. 

» Richard  Bland,  An  Enquiry  into  the  Rights  of  the  British  Colonies  (Lon- 
don, 1769),  p.  18.  Bland  referred  especially  to  the  act  of  1673,  which  had 
imposed  duties  on  intercolonial  trade. 


I 


304 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POUCY,  I7J4-I7«! 


This  change  In  attitude  toward  the  old  colonial  system 
was  only  partially  based  on  economic  grounds.  The  new 
drawback  system  and  the  stricter  enforcement  of  the  laws 
had  a  tendency  to  increase  the  cost  of  European  and  Asiatic 
goods  to  the  colonial  consumer.  This  was  clearly  recognized 
for  instance  by  James  Otis  in  1764,  yet  at  the  ''nc  he  asserted 
that  the  system  was  favored  by  "every  honest.  British  Ameri- 
can." •  Dickinson  went  further  and  claimed  that  as  a 
result  of  the  system  the  mother  country  was  expensive  to  the 
colonies,  and  not  they  to  Great  Britain.'  Though  grossly 
exaggerating  the  injurious  effects  of  the  laws  on  the  colonies, 
Dulany  did  not  deny  the  mother  country's  right  in  the  prem- 
ises.* These  statements,  that  the  system  worked  to  the 
disadvantage  of  the  colonies,  were  in  part  made  in  order 

•  Otis  (The  Rights,  etc.,  p.  76)  asserted  that  the  French  could  undersell 
British  manufactures.  It  should  be  noted  that  France  was  also  afraid  of 
Great  Britain  supplying  her  colonies.  Thus,  in  r;>.j,  v>  n'ral  Ro<!ni  y  wrote 
to  Grenville  that  the  French  alleged  that  the  English  possession  of  Dominica 
was  dangerous  to  them,  as  a  clandestine  trade  would  be  carried  on  thence  to 
Martinique  and  Guadeloupe,  "supplying  them  with  India  goods,  Negroes,  and 
provisions  at  a  much  cheaper  rate  than  the  Dutch  from  Eustatia,"  —  Dominica 
being  much  nearer.    Grenville  Papers  II,  p.  25. 

» Dickinson  (Writings  I,  pp.  338,  239)  asserted  that  as  a  result  of  the  system, 
the  colonies  paid  more  for  their  manufactures,  and  obtained  less  for  their 
enumerated  products  than  under  unrestricted  conditions,  and  that  the  differ- 
ence was  virtually  a  tax  on  them.  He  claimed  likewise  that  the  laws  regulat- 
ing colonial  manufactures  were  in  ultimate  analysis  equivalent  to  a  tax. 

•  Daniel  Dulany,  op.  cil.  pp.  j6,  a?,  34,  37-  I"  another  passage  he  said: 
"It  is  not  contended  that  the  Colonies  ought  to  be  indulged  in  a  general  Liberty 
of  Exporting  and  Importing  every  Thing  in  what  Manner  they  please,"  but 
"they  have  a  good  Plea  against  all  Rigour  and  Severity."  Ibid.  p.  43.  In  the 
appendix,  Dulany  disaissed  in  detail  the  eflects  of  the  old  colonial  system,  saying 
"a  Law  which  restrains  one  Part  of  the  Society,  from  exporting  it's  products 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


30$ 


to  answer  the  Briti'»h  contention  that  the  colonics  con- 
tributed nothing  to  the  cost  of  imperial  defence.'  But  in 
part  also  the  attack  on  the  colonial  system  resulted  from 
the  fact  that  the  laws  of  trade  were  a  potent  historical 
argument  in  favor  of  the  validity  of  Parliament's  authority, 
which  the  colonies  were  beginning  to  question. 

The  laws  of  trade,  however,  figured  prominently  only 
in  the  controversies  of  1764  and  1765.  After  the  repeal 
of  the  objectionable  molasses  duty  in  1766,  they  were 
scarcely  at  all  mentioned  in  the  subsequent  revolutionary 
controversies.  There  were  at  times  complaints '  against  some 
features  of  the  system,  but  the  general  attitude  of  the  colonies 

to  the  most  profitable  Market,  in  favrur  of  another;  or  obliges  it  to  import 
the  Manufactures  of  one  Country  that  are  dear,  instead  of  those  of  another 
that  are  cheap,  is  effectually  a  Tax."  Dulany  then  proceeded  in  a  totJ-'iy  un- 
scientific and  arbitrary  manner  to  estimate  the  amount  of  this  tax.  The 
resulting  absurdly  exaggerated  amount  is  all  the  more  significant,  because  he 
admitted  the  right  of  the  mother  country  so  to  regulate  colonial  trade.    Ilrid. 

P'>-  49-SS- 

■Samuel  Adams,  Writings  I,  pp.  42,  43.  Richard  Bland  (An  Enquiry, 
p.  19)  said  that  if  Parliament  could  impose  all  kinds  of  taxes  on  the  colonies, 
then  they  ought  to  have  the  same  freedom  of  commerce  as  Great  Britain  in 
order  to  be  enabled  to  pay  such  taxes. 

'  In  1 767  Washington  wrote :  "  I  could  wish  it  was  in  my  power  to  congratu- 
late you  on  the  success  in  having  the  commercial  system  of  these  colonies  put 
upon  a  more  enlarged  and  extensive  footing,  than  it  is."  Washington,  Writings 
II,  pp.  aio,  an.  See  also  Dennys  de  Berdt's  memorial  of  1767  in  Papers 
Relating  to  Public  Events  in  MassachusetU  (Philadelphia,  1856),  pp.  44  et  seq. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  system  was  made  considerably  more  restrictive  in 
1766,  when  it  was  provided  that  even  non -enumerated  colonial  products  could 
not  be  shipped  directly  to  any  foreign  port  in  Europe,  excepting  those  south 
of  Cape  Finisterre  and  the  Spanish  ports  in  the  Bay  of  Biscay.  6  Geo.  Ill, 
c.  Sh  i§  M«,  xxxi.  Such  colonial  products  could  be  shippec"  ^'rcct  to  Tr,"  md. 
7  Geo.  in,  c.  2. 

X 


VS 


! 


3o6 


BRITISH   COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4-I76S 


If- 


is  well  represented  by  John  Adams,  who  in  1774  in  his 
"  Novanglus,"  said :  "  Great  Britain  has  confined  all  our  trade 
to  herself.  We  are  willing  she  should,  so  far  as  it  can  be  for 
the  good  of  the  empire  "  '  It  is  also  not  without  some  signifi- 
cance that  the  comprehensive  indictment  of  Great  Britain 
embodied  in  the  Declaration  of  Independence  contains.,  if 
any,  only  a  passing  allusion  to  the  commercial  system.' 

The  chief  effect  of  the  controversies  of  1764  and  1765 
was  to  bring  the  authority  of  Parliament  into  dispute.  Co- 
lonial opinion  developed  slowly,  and  only  gradually  reached 
the  position  that  the  provincial  legislatures  were  "the  only 

'  The  passage  continues:  "But  we  say  that  we  ought  to  be  allowed  as  credit, 
in  the  account  of  public  burdens  and  expenses,  so  much,  paid  in  taxes,  as  we 
are  obliged  to  sell  our  commodities  to  her  cheaper  than  we  could  get  for  them 
at  foreign  markets.  The  difference  is  really  a  tax  upon  us  for  the  good  of 
the  empire.  We  are  obliged  to  Uke  from  Great  Britain  commodities  that  we 
could  purchase  cheaper  elsewhere.  This  difference  is  a  tax  upon  us  for  the 
good  of  the  empire.  We  submit  to  this  cheerfully;  but  insist  that  r-e  ought 
to  have  credit  for  it  in  the  account  of  the  expenses  of  the  empire,  because  it  is 
rei<",y  a  tax  upon  us."  Later  in  the  same  work  Adams  said:  "We  nave,  by 
our  own  express  consent,  contracted  to  observe  the  Navigation  Act,  and  by  our 
implied  consent,  by  long  usage  and  uninterrupted  acquiescence,  have  submitted 
to  the  other  acts  of  trade,  however  grievous  some  of  them  may  be."  Adams, 
Writings  IV,  pp.  46,  113,  114.  Six  years  after  this  date,  when  Adams  wa.T  in 
Amsterdam  seeking  aid  for  the  seceding  colonies,  he  naturally  laid  stress  on 
the  commercial  benefite  that  would  accrue  to  the  Dutch  from  the  future  in- 
dependence of  the  United  States,  and  consequently  said  that  the  Americans 
"universally  aspire  after  a  free  trade  with  all  the  commercial  worid,  instead  of 
that  mean  monopoly,  in  which  they  were  shackled  by  Great  Britain,  to  the 
disgrace  and  mortification  of  America,  and  to  the  injury  of  all  the  rest  of 
Europe."    Ibid.  VII,  p.  269. 

» George  III  is  accused  of  assenting  to  laws  "for  cutting  off  our  Trade  with 
all  Parts  of  the  World."  This  vague  statement  s«>mingly  refers  specifically 
to  the  Boston  Port  Bill,  and  not  to  the  colonial     -  em  as  a  whole. 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


307 


i 


supreme  authorities"  in  the  colonies.*  This  conclusion 
was  a  logical  result  of  the  endeavor  of  the  colonies  to  set 
some  limits  wy  r  Parliamentary  supremacy.  Prior  to  1763, 
Parliamen  had  passed  ".  'arge  number  of  laws  affecting  the 
colonies;  ic  bulk  of  t  cse  statutes  regulated  the  external 
trade  of  tht  :o'onip«,  bur  some  directly  affected  their  internal 
life.  Such,  among  others,  were  the  acts  regulating  colonial 
currency  and  manufactures,  and  that  establishing  an  Ameri- 
can post-office.  In  the  eyes  of  the  colonies  it  was,  however, 
a  long  stride  from  such  measures  to  one  taxing  the  internal 
trade  of  the  colonies*  Pitt,  illogically  and  unscientifically, 
maintained  that  Parliament's  absolute  legislative  authority 
over  the  colonies  did  not  include  the  power  of  taxation,  but 
from  the  colonial  viewpoint  this  power  and  that  of  legislation 
were  virtually  synonymous.  The  chief  function  exercised 
by  the  provincial  assemblies  was  the  levying  of  taxes,  and  if 
this  power  were  concurrently  exercised  by  the  imperial  legis- 
lature, the  very  foundation  of  colonial  self-government  would 
in  their  eyes  be  undermined.  The  extent  to  which  this 
power  would  be  exercised  by  Parliament  could  neither 
be  foreseen  nor  controlled.  Thus  it  was  only  in  1764 
and  1 765  that  the  colonies  fully  realized  what  was  implied 
by  the  sovereignty  of  Parliament;  and  they  groped  in  the 

•  "Novanglus"  in  John  Adams,  Writings  IV,  p.  105.  Alreadyin  1765,  Col- 
den  wrote  to  Secretary  Conway  that  when  it  became  known  that  the  Stamp  Act 
would  be  passed,  a  number  of  articles  were  published  attacking  it.  At  first 
they  denied  only  the  right  of  Parliament  to  lay  internal  taxes,  but  ultimately 
they  denied  the  legislative  authority  of  Pariiament  in  the  colonies.  N.Y.  CoL 
Doc.  VII,  p.  759. 

'Va.  Mag.  XII,  p.  9. 


M 


I 


3o8 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4->76S 


dark  for  some  means  of  checking  the  legal  omnipotence  of 
that  legislative  body.  This  attitude  is  well  represented 
by  the  Virginia  Committee  of  Correspondence,  which  in 
1764  wrote  to  the  colonial  agent  in  London:  "It  liiay, 
perhaps,  be  thought  presumptious  in  us  to  attempt  or 
even  to  desire  any  Thing  which  may  look  like  a  restraint 
upon  the  controlling  Power  of  Parliament;  We  only  wish 
that  our  just  Liberties  &  Privileges  as  free  born  British 
Subjects  were  once  properly  defin'd."  * 

Thus  the  policy  of  Grenville  led  directly  to  a  searching 
inquiry  into  the  nature  of  the  imperial  constitution.'*  Colo- 
nial opinion  was  at  the  outset  not  clearly  defined.  It  was, 
however,  patent  that  parliamentary  supremacy  could  be  used 
as  a  powerful  check  on  the  tendency  toward  independence 
that  had  already,  to  a  marked  degree,  manifested  itself. 
This  tendency  is  plainly  visible  in  the  facts  of  colonial  his- 
tory. But  the  colonists  were,  to  a  great  extent,  unconscious 
thereof,  and,  as  a  rule,  asserted  their  loyalty  to  the  mother 
country.'  Such  assertions  are,  however,  no  proof  of  the 
existence  of  this  sentiment.*    As  in  many  other  historical 

'  Va.  Mag.  XII,  p.  9.  The  Committee  added :  "  We  doubt  not  that  the  Wis- 
dom of  a  British  parliament  will  lead  them  to  distinguish  between  a  Power 
and  Right  to  do  any  act." 

•  It  was  partly  in  order  to  vindicate  its  authority  that  Parliament  passed 
the  Sump  Act.  In  1 765  Benjamin  Franklin  wrote  that  he  had  done  his  utmost 
to  prevent  the  passage  of  this  measure,  "but  the  Tide  was  too  strong  against  us. 
The  nation  was  provoked  by  American  Claims  of  Independence,  and  all  Par- 
ties joined  in  resolving  by  this  act  to  settle  the  point.  We  might  as  well  have 
hindered  the  sun's  setting."    Franklin,  Writings  IV,  p.  390. 

•  Cj.  Samuel  Adams,  Writings  I,  p.  38. 

« Pownall  said  that  the  colonies  were  "zealously  loyal."    His  experience 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


309 


mo\  ments,  the  real  motive  was  obscured  because  its  revo- 
lutionary character  would  have  injured  the  cause.  The 
expression  by  the  colonies  of  a  desire  for  independence  would 
inevitably  have  put  on  them  the  burden  of  proof,  would  have 
united  all  parties  in  Great  Britain  against  them,  and  would 
have  alienated  many  supporters  in  America.  Hence  the 
colonies  to  a  great  extent  ignored  the  underlying  cause  of 
their  actions,  and  in  all  sincerity  expressed  a  loyalty,  which 
in  reality  they  did  not  feel.  For  if  in  loyaltv  there  is  implied 
any  idea  of  sacrifice,  then  this  sentiment  was  to  a  marked 
degree  absent  in  the  colonies.  Their  allegiance  was  purely 
utilitarian,  and  its  fundamental  basis  had  disappeared  with 
the  conquest  of  Canada.  There  was  a  substantial  founda- 
tion of  truth  in  the  query  of  Soame  Jenyns  who,  as  member 
of  the  Board  of  Trade,*  had  full  opportunity  of  knowing  the 
colonies  well.  "Are  they  only  Englishmen,"  he  ^sked  in 
1765,  'when  they  soUicit  for  Protection,  but  not  l^nglish- 
men  when  taxes  are  required  to  enable  this  Country  to  pro- 
tect them  ?  "  *  It  was  this  unconscious  desire  fo  complete 
self-government,  which  could  be  realized  only  by  political 
independence,  that  explains  the  intensity  of  the  opposition 
aroused  by  Grenville's  policy.  As  Osgood  has  said:  "In 
this  last  idea  that  of  national  independence,  lies  the  secret 
spring  of  the  revolt."  ' 

was,  however,  largely  confined  to  Massachusetts,  \*rhich  during  his  governor- 
ship had  shown  great  activity  in  prosecuting  the  war. 

'  Cal.  Home  Office  Papers,  1760-1765,  pp.  119,  237,  360,  672. 

'  Soame  Jenyns,  op.  cU.  p.  9. 

•  H.  L.  Osgood,  England  and  the  Colonies,  Pol.  Sci.  Quart.  II,  p.  441.  In 
addition,  Osgood  says,  "there  was  nothing  that  can  be  called  tyrannical  or 


^ 


V(i 


310  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-17^5 

The  theory  of  the  imperial  constitutio  auit  ultimately 
prevailed  in  the  colonies  was  that  they  were  united  to  Great 
Britain  solely  through  the  Crown.'  Such  expressions  of 
opinion  were  not  infrequent  even  at  the  outset  of  the  revo- 
lutionary controversies.  In  1764  it  was  reported  that  the 
Governor  of  Rhode  Island  had  publicly  said  "that  the  par- 
liament of  Great  Britain  had  no  more  right  to  make  laws  for 
them  than  they  had  for  the  Mohawks."  Bernard,  in  trans- 
mitting this  information,  added  the  comment  that  "these  two 
Republicks  (Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut)  then  are  the 
Allies  of  Great  Britain  &  not  the  Subjects.*' '  Stephen  Hop- 
kins, the  governor  referred  to,  claimed  that  "in  an  imperial 
state,  which  consists  of  many  separate  governments,  each  of 
which  hath  peculiar  privileges,  and  of  which  kind  it  is  evi- 
dent the  empire  of  Great-Britain  is;  no  single  part,  though 
greater  than  another  part,  is  by  that  superiority  intituled  to 

unconstitutional  in  the  plans  of  Grenville,  Townshend,  or  Lord  North.  Severe 
measures  were  not  resorted  to  till  they  were  provoked  by  colonial  resistance." 
Ibid.  p.  467. 

'  At  the  present  day  Parliament  is  still  the  sovereign  legislature  for  the 
entire  British  Empire.  Cf.  Bernard  Holland,  Imperium  et  Libertas,  pp.  268, 
269.  This  legal  omnipotence  is,  however,  largely  theoretical  and  is  so  con- 
tradictory to  the  prevailing  facts,  that  many  have  adopted  the  view  advanced 
by  the  American  colonies  four  generations  ago.  Thus  Lord  Rosebery  re- 
cently spoke  of  Canada  and  Australia  as  being  "united  only  to  the  mother  coun- 
try by  the  Crown."  "London  Times,"  weekly  ed.  XXXI,  p.  199.  Similarly, 
Herbert  Paul  speaks  of  the  colonies  as  "united  by  the  golden  link  of  the 
Crown."     History  of  Modem  England  V,  p.  loi. 

'Bernard  to  Halifax,  Dec.  14,  1764.  Am.  and  W.L  167.  What  Hopkins 
actually  said  was  even  stronger:  "What  have  the  King  and  Parliament  to  do 
with  making  a  law  or  laws  to  govern  us  by,  any  more  than  the  Mohawks 
have."    R.I.  Hist.  Tracts,  9,  p.  xvi. 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


3" 


make  laws  for,  or  to  tax  such  lesser  part ;  but  all  laws,  and 
all  taxations,  which  bind  the  whole,  must  be  made  by  the 
whole."  He  illustrated  his  conception  of  the  British  Em- 
pire by  comparing  it  to  the  decentralized  German  system.* 
Likewise  in  1765,  a  writer  in  a  New  York  newspaper  en- 
quired: "Can  any  plausible  Argument  be  urged  for  the 
supposed  Subordination  of  the  Colonies  to  Great  Britain, 
but  what  has  equal  Force  with  regard  to  the  Subordination 
of  the  Electorate  of  Hanover?  "  * 

The  British  view  of  the  constitutional  nature  of  the  Empire 
was  well  represented  in  the  declaratory  act  that  was  passed 
by  Parliament  simultaneously  with  the  repeal  of  the  Stamp 
Act.  According  to  it.  Parliament  "had,  hath,  and  of  right 
ought  to  have,  full  power  and  authority  to  make  laws  and 
statutes  of  sufficient  force  and  validity  to  bind  the  colonies 
and  people  of  America,  subjects  of  the  Crown  of  Great  Brit- 
ain, in  all  cases  whatsoever."  '  From  the  legal  standpoint, 
this  view  was  unassailable.  It  was  somewhat  vulnerable 
from  the  historical  standpoint,  as  Parliament  had  hitherto 
not  exercised  all  its  legal  powers,  notably  that  of  taxation. 
It,  however,  totally  failed  to  take  into  account  that  the 

'  Stephen  Hopkins,  op.  cil.  p.  19. 

'  "New  York  Gazette  or  Weekly  Pcst-Boy,"  no.  1201  for  Jan.  9,  1766,  in 
Am.  and  W.L  Bundle  586.  It  is  also  not  without  significance  that  in  1764,  the 
Board  of  Trade  wrote  to  the  Governor  of  New  Jersey,  in  connection  with  an 
act  of  that  colony  appointing  an  "Agent  for  the  Province  at  the  Court  of  Great 
Britain,"  that  it  appeared  to  them  "to  be  a  ridiculous  Affectation  in  the  As- 
sembly to  cloath  an  Officer,  who  is  merely  an  Attorney  to  transact  their  Affairs 
with  a  Character  that  belongs  only  to  the  Minister  of  a  Foreign  Prince."  N.J. 
Col.  Doc.  IX,  pp.  445,  446. 

•  6  Geo.  m,  c.  la. 


<. 


312  BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,   17S4-I76S 

colonies  were  growing  to  political  maturity,  and  that  they 
resented  the  idea  of  subordination  implied  in  the  doctrine 
of  parliamentary  supremacy.' 

As  the  British  view  could  not  be  attacked  on  legal 
grounds,  the  colonics,  in  opposing  the  supremacy  of 
Parliament,  were  to  a  great  extent  forced  to  rely  on 
the  then  current  doctrines  of  natural  law,  according  to 
which  certain  rights  are  inherent  in  man.'  Thus  in 
1764,  James  Otis  admitted  that  the  colonies  were  dependent 
on  and  subject  to  Great  Britain,  and  that  therefore  over 
against  the  subordinate  legislatures  Parliament  had  the 
undoubted  power  and  lawful  authority  to  make  acts  for 
the  general  good.  But  he  added  that  this  authority  was 
limited  by  the  natural  rights  of  the  colonists  as  men.' 
These  conflicting  views  were  irreconcilable  both  in  theory 
and  in  practice,  and  led  ultimately  to  the  disintegration  of 
the  Empire. 

This  essay  covers  but  a  short  space  of  time,  that  embraced 
by  the  dates  of  1754  and  1765.  Yet  these  few  years  wit- 
nessed both  a  vast  extension  of  the  British  Empire,  and 
also  the  beginnings  of  an  organized  movement  tending 
toward    its    disruption.     The   disintegrating   forces    were 

'  In  1765  John  Adams  wrote:  "Is  there  not  something  extremely  fallacious 
in  the  common -place  images  of  the  mother  country  and  children  colonies? 
Are  we  the  children  of  Great  Britain  any  more  than  the  cities  of  London, 
Exeter,  and  Bath?  .Are  we  not  brethren  and  fellow  subjects  with  those  in 
Britain,  only  under  a  somewhat  different  met?  od  of  legislation,  and  a  totally 
different  method  of  taxation?"    John  Adams,  Works  III,  p.  461. 

'  Ibid.  Ill,  pp.  449,  456,  457. 

» Otis,  The  Rights,  etc.,  pp.  32,  33,  38.  Cf.  also  Otis,  Considerations,  etc., 
p.  36;  Richard  Bland,  op.  cit.  p.  19. 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


313 


present  at  the  outset  of  the  colonial  movement,  and  were 
allowed  full  scope  when  the  removal  of  the  French  danger 
severed  the  chief  tie  uniting  the  North  American  colonies 
to  Great  Britain.  In  the  annals  of  the  British  Empire 
during  this  decade,  the  most  vital  fact  was  the  conquest 
and  subsequent  retention  of  Canada.  It  made  the 
American  Revolution  inevitable.  The  colonies  had  little 
or  no  imperial  sentiment,  and  their  aggressive  individualism 
prevented  the  establishment  of  an  efficient  system  of  im- 
perial administration.  The  same  forces  that  delayed  for 
one  hundred  years  the  creation  of  a  national  state  out  of 
the  seceding  colonies,  brought  about  the  disruption  of  the 
old  British  Empire.  This  result  might  not  have  followed 
had  the  British  government,  after  1763,  been  willing  to 
relax  still  further  the  political  ties,  and  to  allow  the 
colonies  in  bulk  to  assume  the  virtually  complete  powers 
of  self-government  that  Rhode  Island  and  Connecticut 
enjoyed.  This  was,  however,  impossible.  There  were 
a  number  of  important  questions,  affecting  the  American 
colonies  as  a  whole,  which  could  not  be  handled  satisfactorily 
by  each  province  separately.  These  were  primarily  the 
system  of  military  defence  and  the  closely  related  Indian  ^ 
problem.  As  the  colonies  had  shown  absolutely  no  inclina- 
tion whatsoever  to  join  in  a  plan  of  union  for  such  purposes, 
it  became  incumbent  upon  the  imperial  government  to  inter- 
fere. This  necessitated  a  colonial  revenue,  unless  the 
mother  country  were  to  assume  the  entire  burden  of  defence, 
which  would  have  been  inequitable  and  would  have  aroused 
intense  dissatisfaction  in  England. 


(!' 


\, 


n 


3M 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  1754-1765 


f 


i  t 


I 


r 

m 

fit 


The  question  of  defence  was  predominant  throughout 
the  transitional  years  from  1754  to  1765,  and  gives  a  certai; 
unity  to  the  period.  It  is  not  often  that  one  who  has  taken 
an  active  part  in  events  is  able  to  perceive  their  full  signifi- 
cance. Benjamin  Franklin  was  as  a  rule  not  such  a  man, 
yet  in  one  instance  at  least  he  showed  keen  historical  insight. 
In  1789  he  said :  "On  Reflection  it  now  seems  probable,  that 
if  the  foregoing  Plan  (that  of  the  Albany  Congress  of  1754) 
or  something  like  it  had  been  adopted  and  carried  into  Execu- 
tion, the  subsequent  Separation  of  the  Colonies  from  the 
Mother  Country  might  not  so  soon  have  happened,  nor  the 
Mischiefs  suffered  on  both  sides  have  occurred  perhaps 
during  another  Century.  For  the  Colonies,  if  so  united, 
would  have  really  been,  as  they  then  thought  themselves, 
sufficient  to  their  own  Defence,  and  being  trusted  with 
it,  as  by  the  Plan,  an  Army  from  Britain,  for  that  pur- 
pose would  have  been  unnecessary;  The  Pretences  for 
framing  the  Stamp  Act  would  then  not  have  existed,  nor 
the  other  Projects  for  drawing  a  Revenue  from  America  to 
Britain  by  Act  of  Parliament,  which  were  the  Causes  of 
the  Breach."  •  The  controversies  that  led  ultimately  to 
the  American  Revolution,  grew  out  of  this  military  ques- 
tion, and  in  its  narrower  phase  this  movement  was  the 
direct  result  of  the  inherent  difficulty  of  creating  an  effi- 
cient and  equitable  system  of  defence  in  a  decentralized 
empire. 

In  its  broader  phase,  the  fundamental  question  at  issue 
was  the  political  independence  of  the  American  colonies. 
*  Franklin,  Writings  III,  pp.  3a6,  337  n. 


COLONIAL  OPPOSITION 


315 


The  struggle  on  the  side  of  the  colonies  was  only  super- 
ficially concerned  with  increased  civil  and  political  liberty; 
it  was  essentially  a  movement  for  national  independence. 
This  movement  came  into  violent  conflict  with  British  im- 
perialism, whose  aim  was  to  increase  the  administrative 
efficiency  of  the  Empire.  Both  the  British  and  the  colonial 
ideals  were  justifiable  from  their  respective  viewpoints,  each 
one  being  in  harmony  with  one  of  the  two  underlying  ten- 
dencies in  modern  historical  evolution.  Ever  since  the  dis- 
ruption of  the  Carolingian  Empire,  the  most  marked  tendency 
in  the  political  evolution  of  the  Western  world  has  been 
the  creation  of  ever  greater  political  entities.  The  American 
Revolution  ran  counter  to  this  movement,  in  so  far  as  it  led 
to  the  political  disintegration  of  the  Anglo-Saxon  race.  It 
ran  with  this  stream  to  the  extent  that  it  was  a  factor  in 
moulding  a  group  of  separatistic  communities  into  the 
American  nation.  The  American  Revolution  is,  however, 
also  a  milestone  in  the  other  great  movement  of  modern 
history.  Concomitant  with  the  creation  of  increasingly 
large  poli^  '^al  groups,  has  been  the  tendency  to  give  the  in- 
dividual ever  greater  control  over  the  governmental  activities 
of  these  groups.  Only  to  a  very  limited  extent  was  the 
separation  of  the  colonies  from  Great  Britain  produced  by  a 
deprivation  of  civil  liberty.  But  as  the  movement  resulted 
from  a  desire  on  the  part  of  the  colonies  to  gain  complete 
control  of  their  own  destinies,  the  American  Revolution  has 
a  distinct  place  in  the  history  of  democracy.  This  place  is 
in  reality  an  unduly  exalted  one,  for  it  is  the  legend  that  has  ^ 
des'cloped  around  the  movement,  rather  than  the  actual 


I! 


I 


n 


3«6 


BRITISH  COLONIAL  POLICY,  I7S4-I7«$ 


revolution  itself,  that  has  been  the  influential  factor  in  the 
development  of  democratic  ideas. 

It  is  too  early,  at  this  day,  to  decide  dogmatically,  whether 
the  movement  spelt  progress  or  reaction,  or  merely  a  tem- 
porary regression  necessary  to  a  further  step  In  advance.  It 
is  easily  conceivable,  and  not  at  all  improbable  that  the 
political  evolution  of  the  next  centuries  may  take  such  a 
course  that  the  American  Revolution  will  lose  the  great  sig- 
nificance that  is  now  attached  to  it,  and  will  appear  merely 
as  the  temporary  separation  of  two  kindred  peoples  whose 
inherent  similarity  was  obscured  by  superficial  differences, 
resulting  from  dissimilar  economic  and  social  conditions. 


INDEX 


^1 


Abercromby,    General    James,    55    n., 

60  n.,  61,  63,  85. 
Adams,   John,    166  n.,    197  n.;    citjd, 

288  n.,   289,   295,  300,  307;    quoted, 

306,  312  n. 
Adams,  Samuel,  cited,   288  n.,   292  n., 

296,  297,  298,  300,  30s,  308. 
Albany   Congress   (1754),    '8   ff.,    234; 

plan  of  union  formulated  at,  20-23; 

Franklin's  retrospective  view  of  (1789), 

3'4- 
Albemarle,  General,  67  n.,  68  n. 
Alcoholic  liquors,   proposed  excise  on, 

37-38- 

Almon,  J.,  cited,  140  n.,  284,  296  n.; 
publication  of  "Montcalm  Letters"  by, 
172  n. 

Amherst,  General,  60  n.,  64-65,  262, 
263;  on  colonial  trade  with  French 
West  Indies,  109-111;  activity  of, 
in  breaking  up  unlawful  commerce, 
109-113. 

Andrews,  Judge  John,   120  n. 

Antigua,  exports  from  England  to 
(1746-67),  138  n. ;  imports  to  Eng- 
land from  (1761-62),  145  n. 

Austrian  Succession,  War  of,  com- 
mercial relations  between  colonies 
and  French  West  Indies  during,  73. 

Bahamas,  garrison  in,  1 1 ;  Parliamen- 
tary grant  to  (1737),  12  n.;  provision 
by  Parliament  for  pay  of  governor  of, 
276. 

Bankruptcy  laws,  difEculties  over  colo- 
nial, 186. 

Barbados,  law  in,  prohibiting  trade  with 
French,  89;  exports  from  England 
to  (1746-67),  138  n.;  imports  to 
England  from  (1761-62),  145  n.; 
Assembly  of,  dissatisfied  with  Peace 
of    Paris,     158;     absence    of    illsgal 


trade  in  (1763),  235;  reception  of 
Stamp  Act  in,  294  n. 

Barbary  pirates,  7. 

Barons,  collector  at  Boston,   119. 

Beaver  skins,  trade  in,  213-215. 

Belcher,  Governor  Jonathan,  46  n., 
50  n. 

Bermudas,  garrison  in,  11;  Parlia- 
mentary grant  to,  1737,  12  n.; 
exports  from  England  to  (1746-67), 
138  n. ;  Parliamentary  provision  for 
payment  of  governor  of,  276. 

Bernard,  Governor  Francis,  64  n., 
113  n.,  117  n.,  118;  report  of,  on  state 
of  illegal  trade  in  Massachusetts, 
338-»39;  quoted,  255  n.,  310;  on 
custom-house  officials.  288-289. 

Bladen,  Martin,  135  n. 

Bland,  Richard,  303,  305  n.,  312. 

Bollan,  William,  208,  261  n. 

Boone,  Governor  Thomas,  238  n.,  248  n. 

Boscawen,  Admiral,  77,   105. 

Boston,  merchants  of,  seek  to  engage  in 
French  West  Indian  trade,  118; 
custoi  i-house  troubles  at,  119-121; 
complaint  of  treasonable  spirit  of 
independence  in,  168  n. 

Boundary  disputes  between  colonies, 
49-50- 

Bounties,  system  of  granting,  to  colo- 
nial products,  194,  209;  on  manu- 
factures when  exported,  195;  on 
hemp  and  undressed  flax,  217;  on 
indigo,  318;  on  colonial  timber 
(1765-71),  224  n. 

Bourguet,  Alfred,  cited,  152  n. 

Braddock,  General  Edward,  27,  44,  77; 
instructions  to,  regarding  expenses, 
28  n. ;  inadequate  support  given  by 
colonies,  45  n.,  47  n.;  Washington's 
criticism  of  troops  of,  174. 

Braddock  expedition,  53. 


i 


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■\  h 


III} 


I 


3»7 


i 


318 


INDEX 


Bull,  Governor  William,  103-104,  i?8; 

quoted,   114. 
Burke,  I'UlmuncI,  quoted,   aoS. 
Burke,  William,  [Mimphlet  by,  143-146; 

reply   tu    Franklin's   pamphlet,    147- 

Burnaby,  rited,  130,  169,  18]  n.,  197  n., 
198  n.,  i03  n.,  209. 

Calicoes,  import  duties  on,  by  act  of 
1764,  381,  ]8]  n. 

Canada,  participation  of  colonies  in 
campaigns  against,  8-9,  53  9  61  ft.; 
discussion  over  retention  of,  in  pref- 
erence to  Guadeloupe,  140,  142  ff. ; 
imports  to  England  from  (1761),  149; 
ceded  to  Great  Britain,  153;  effect 
of  conquest  of,  on  colonies,  160-161, 

Caj*  Breton,  French,  economic  rela- 
tions  between    British   colonies   and, 

74. 

Carkesse,  Charles,  cited,  323,  326. 

Carulinas,  exports  from  England  to 
(1746-67),  138  n.;  imports  into 
England  from  (1757-62),  130  n. 
See  North  Carolina  and  South  Caro- 
lina. 

Chamberlayne,  John,  cited,  331  n. 

Chauncy,  Charles,  cited,  287  n. 

Choiseul,  Due  de,   153  n. 

Clergy  of  Virginia,  and  Two-penny 
Act,   184. 

Clinton,  Governor  George,  41-43,   189. 

Cocoanuts,  colonial  production  of,  33i. 

Coffee,  export  duties  on,   380. 

Coffee  production,  221-222. 

Colden,  Cadwallader,  42,  loi,  no-iii, 
137  n.,  189,  298  n.;  quoted,  191, 
358  n.,  292-293;  on  illegal  trade  in 
Northern  colonies  (1763),  243. 

Colonies,  attempted  co6peration  of, 
for  defence,  9;  military  protection 
of,  10-14;  congress  of  American, 
at  Albany  (1754),  18-23;  requisi- 
tion system  in,  52  ff. ;  extent  of  co- 
operation of,  in  French  war,  60-69; 
eighteenth-century  view  of,  in  Great 
Britain,  132-133;  solely  for  com- 
mercial purposes,  134;  continental 
contrasted  with  tropical,  135  ff. ; 
change  of  view  of,  as  sources  of  supply 


to  view  of  as  markets  for  British 
produce,  139;  effect  on  continental, 
of  removal  of  French  from  Canada, 
160  ff. ;  constitutional  development 
of,  160-167;  self-g»>vernment  in, 
161-163;  attitude  of,  in  matter  of 
furnishing  troops  for  war  against 
Pontiac,   263-265. 

Commerce,  relation  between  eighteenth- 
century  colonization  and,   132-135. 

Compositions  for  duties,  231. 

Con  lecticut,  represented  at  Albany 
Congress,  19;  contribution  of,  to 
expeditions  against  Du  Quetne,  Niag- 
ara, and  Crown  Point,  53  n.;  Par- 
liamentary grant  to,  54  n.;  public 
spirit  in,  58,  60,  64,  68;  extent  of 
co6per.\tion  of,  in  French  campaigns, 
60-69;  prohibition  of  exportation  o( 
provisions  except  to  British  ports,  83 ; 
freedom  in,  from  unlawful  trade  with 
enemy,  92;  Amherst  complains  of 
trade  with  French  West  Indies  from, 
112;  report  of  state  on  illegal  trade 
in  (1763),  24t. 

Contraband  of  war,  provisions  deemed, 

93- 

Contraband  trade,  228  ff.;  Grenville's 
measures  to  prevent,  229-333;  in- 
structions to  colonial  governors  con- 
cerning, 333-335;  reports  concern- 
ing, from  various  colonies,   235-244. 

Coram,  Thomas,   133  n.,  219  n. 

Cotes,  Admiral,  104. 

Cotton,  importation  of,  from  Guade- 
loupe to  England,  149. 

Cotton  duties,  31. 

Crown  Point  expedition,  53,  54,  60  n. 

Crump,  General,  104. 

Cuba,  English  and  colonial  troops  in, 
68  n. 

Cumings,  Archibald,  colonial  taxation 
schemes  of,  38-40. 

Curayoa,  a  centre  of  illicit  trade  wtfh 
French,  79,  95  n. 

Currency  problem  in  the  colonies,  -n~ 
188;    Parliamentary  measures  at5?"- 

Jng.  307- 
Custom-houses,  establishment  of,  230  r. 
Customs  officers,  extensive  discretionar 

powers    of,     231 ;     irregularities    m. 

331-233;     Grenville's    measures    r- 


INDEX 


319 


Harding,  ija;  American  dislike  for, 
a88  ff.;  difficultiei  of,  in  Rhode 
Island,  Marylaml,  and  Mauachuwtta, 

Customi  troubles  in  Boston,  1 17-123. 

Dalrymple,   Governor,    134   n.,    146  n. 

Damage  suits  against  customs  uffitials, 
11K-121,  148. 

De  Berdi,  Dennys  de,  57  n.,  191  n.,  305; 
quoted.   175,   176,   178  n. 

Debts,  ((uestion  of  settlement  of,  in 
Virginia,  179-183. 

Deerslcins,  encouragement  of  exporta- 
tion of,    713. 

Defence  of  .American  colonies,  requisi- 
tion system  for  providing  forces  for, 
5 J  ff.,  263 -'65;  system  of  Parlia- 
mentary taxation  adopted,  274. 

"  Defiance,"  the,  at  Monte  Cristi,  98  n. 

Del^nicy,  Governor  James,  18  n.,  19, 
75  n.,  115  n.,  125,  189;  forwards  plan 
of  union  to  England,  23;  quoted, 
S7  n.,  61  n. ;  activity  of,  in  suppress- 
ing illegal  exportation  of  provisions, 
loo-ioi ;    death  of,   loi. 

Delaware,  iron  and  steel  factories  in, 
198  n. 

Denny,  Governor,  go,  91. 

De  Peyster  family,  implicated  in  un- 
lawful trade  with  French  West  Indies, 
in  n. 

Dirl(inson,  John,  cited,  225  n.,  273  n., 
293,  205.  '97.  ^99  n-.  303.  3°4 ;  quoted, 
294  n- 

Dtesltau,  Johnson's  defeat  of,  S4- 

Dmwidilie,  ('■overnor,  16,  59,  74,  77, 
254  quoted,  18,  43,  44,  45;  proposals 
of,  --uarding  colonial  taxation,  43-45. 

Dobhit  I  iovernor  Arthur,  49  n.,  62, 
69.  230-237;  quoted,  205,  279  n. , 
fhanprrj  in  commercial  system  sug- 
aesiec   by,   211. 

r»»B»nua,  15;  exports  from  England 
.0  '-06-67).  138  n.;  becomes  British 
ur~—  PeacT  of  Paris,  154;  contra- 
^Tmaa  trade  in.  after  Peace  of  Paris,  236. 

Diraaaas,  John  (Bishop  of  Salisbury), 
i..    n. 

I>!»«niing.   quoted,   169-170. 

Dnawbacks,  40.  194  ff.,  209. 

Imiaey,  uovcmor,  20  n. 


Dulany,  Daniel,  186  n.;  cited,  295,  297, 

299  n.,  304. 
Dummcr,  Jeremiah,  quoted,   171  n. 
Du  Quesne,  expeditbn  against,   53  n., 

60  n. 
Dutch,   friction   between    English   and, 

over     trade     with     Fremh,     94-96; 

whaling  industry  of,  210.  lit ;   illegal 

trade     between     American     colonists 

and,  243-244. 
Duties,    revenue,    31    ff. ;    compositions 

for,  131.    St*  Customs. 

Egremont,  Secretary,  66-67;  commends 
Amherst  for  breaking  up  unlawful 
commerce,  1 13  n. 

Emlxirgo,  on  provisions  to  French, 
72  ff.;  Irish,  78,  81,  82;  laid  by 
Amherst  on  Middle  and  Northern 
colonies,  113. 

Emigration,  distouragorirnt  of,  from 
Great  Britain  (r/60),  133. 

Enumerated  list,  the,  74,  199;  de- 
|>endence  of  West  Indian  colonies 
on  monopoly  secured  by,  209;  to- 
bacco-producing colonies  not  de- 
pendent on,  209 ;  effect  of,  on  various 
industries,  209-210,  214  ff.,  221  ff. ; 
beaver  on  the,  214;  enlargement  of 
(1764),  221  ff. 

Episcopal  system,  proposed  extension 
of,  to  .America,  287  n. 

Erwing  vs.  Cradock,  case  of,   1 20-1 21. 

Exports,  statistics  of,  from  England  to 
colonies,  137-139. 

Fauquier,  Governor  Francis,  91,  181, 
188  n.;    quoted,  7  n.,  237. 

Fitch,  Governor,  iii,  241. 

Flags  of  truce,  vessels  known  as,  89,  93 ; 
from  American  colonies,  90;  end 
put  to,  106;  favorable  dccisi.  "s  in 
cases  of,  in  Pennsylvania,  127. 

Flax,  bounties  on,  217. 

Florida,  illegal  trade  with  French  in, 
103-104;  exports  from  England  to 
(1766-67),  138  n.;  reasons  for  re- 
tention of,  by  Treaty  of  Paris,   140, 

Forbes,  General,  60  n.,  62,  63. 
Forces,    distribution   of,  for  defence  of 
colonies,  12  n.    See  tjarrisons. 


i 


320 


INDEX 


Fox,  Henry,  80,  81. 

France,  questions  between  England 
and,  14-15;  trade  between  American 
colonies  and  (1755),  74  ff- 

Frankland,  Admiral,  quoted,  8a  n. 

Franldin,  Benjamin,  18,  36,  34  n.,  38  n., 
46,  47  n.,  265  n.;  cited,  58,  259,  293; 
quoted,  17  n.,  61  n.,  197  n.,  204  n., 
308  n. ;  plan  of  union  of,  20-21; 
quoted  on  plan  of  union,  22,  33  n.; 
quoted  on  parliamentary  union,  39; 
on  British  retention  of  Canada  by 
peace  of  1763,  146-147;  on  regula- 
tions restricting  colonial  trade,  306; 
pamphlet  on  "Interest  of  Great 
Britain  Considered,"  137  n.,  146,  147, 
157;  on  proposed  extension  of  Epis- 
copal sys'.em  to  America,  287  n.; 
retrospective  opinions  of  (1789), 
quoted,  314. 

Franklin,  Governor  William,  191 ; 
report  by,  on  illegal  trade  in  New 
Jersey,  342;  quoted,  264-265,  392. 

"  Freemason,"  case  of  the,  239  n. 

Frothingham,  quoted,  18  n. 

Fur  trade,  the  Canada,  140,  144,  149, 
213  ff.,  253. 

Gage,  General,  263,  364,  265. 

Ganibier,  Samuel,  127. 

Garrisons,  colonial,  10,  12  n.,  260  fF. ; 
Shirley's  estimate  of  force  required 
for  (1756),  48;  Dobbs's  estimate, 
49  n. ;  cost  of,  after  1763,  267;  Par- 
liamentary taxation  of  colonies  for 
maintenance  of,  374  ff. 

Gee,  Joshua,  quoted,  301  n. 

Georgia,  garrison  in,  1 1 ;  appropria- 
tions for  settlement  of,  12;  military 
protection  of,  12  n.;  disbandment  of 
regiment  in,  13;  non-support  given 
Braddock  by,  47  n.;  inability  to 
provide  for  defence,  59;  motives  for 
settlement  of,  133  n. ;  exports  from 
England  to  (1746-67),  138  n.;  rice 
trade  of,  335-336;  governmental 
exfienses  of,  provided  by  Parliament, 
276. 

Gibraltar,  Parliamentary  provision  for 
griTison  in,  12  n.,  13  n. 

Ginier  duties,  31. 

Glen    James,  17. 


Grain,  exportation  of,  from  Great 
Britain  and  Ireland  limited,  84. 

Grants,  Parliamentary,  for  colonial 
defence,  12  n.,  13  n.;  to  colonies, 
for    military    services    (1756,    1757), 

54-58. 

Grenada,  exports  from  England  to 
(1761-67),  138  n.;  becomes  British 
territory,  154;  contraband  trade  in, 
after  Peace  of  Paris,  336. 

Grenville,  George,  quoted  on  protection 
and  obedience,  6  n.;  opposed  to 
cession  of  St.  Lucia  and  Guadeloupe, 
159  n.;  administration  of,  339-330; 
quoted,  363;  carries  into  effect 
system  of  Parliamentary  taxation 
of  colonies  for  military  defence, 
374  ff.;  Stamp  Act  introduced  by, 
385;  policy  of,  leads  to  inquiry  into 
nature  of  imperial  constitution,   308. 

Grenville,  Henry,  cited,  15  n. 

Guadeloupe,  capture  of,  and  effect  on 
colonial  trade,  130;  exports  from 
England  to  (1761-63),  138  n.;  Canada 
vs.,  as  a  colonial  acquisition,  143  ff. ; 
imports  to  England  from  (1761-62), 
145  n.,  149;  remains  French  under 
Peace  of  Paris,  153;  Pitt  on  cession 
of,  156;   manufacture  of  rum  in,  278. 

Guiana,  French,  colonial  trade  extends 
to,   III  n. 

Gum  trade,  French  monopoly  of, 
broken,  213  n. 

Gunix>wder,  illegal  importation  of,  by 
.\merican  colonies,  244,  245. 

Haldane,  Governor  George,  99  n. 
Halifax,  Earl  of,  quoted,  7. 
Hamburg,    illegal   trade   with   America 

from,  244  n. 
Hamilton,  Governor  James,  91,  105  n., 

126;    report   by,  on  illegal  trade  in 

Pennsylvania,  242. 
Hardy,  Sir  Charles,  79,  106,  124  n. 
Hardy,  Governor  Josiah,  191. 
Harrington,  James,  quoted,  165-166. 
Hart,  A.  B.,  cited,  390. 
Hats,  colonial  manufacture  of,   197  n. 
Havana,   colonial  troops  in  the  attack 

on,  67-68;   exports  from  England  to 

(1761-63),  138  n. 
Hawke,  Admiral,  105. 


INDEX 


321 


Hemp,  colonial  production  of,  a  15-1 17. 
Henry,  Patrick,  on  the  Two-penny  Act, 

185;    quoted,  304. 
Holland,  Bernard,  cited,  310  n. 
Holmes,  Admiral  Charles,   107-108. 
"Hoop,"  ca3e  of  the,  72  n. 
Hopkins,  Governor  Stephen,  139,  297; 

quoted,  22  n.,  92,  268  n.,  310;   cited, 

157  n.,  199  n.,  289  n.,  293,  296  n. 
Howard,  Martin,  pamphlet  by,  290. 
Hudson's   Bay,   exports  from   England 

to  (1746-67),  138  n. 
Hudson's  Bay  Company,  211,  213,  214, 

"5- 
Hulton,  Henry,  288  n. 
Hunter,     Governor     Robert,     37,     38; 

quoted,  33  n.,   166-167. 
Hutchinson,  Governor,  quoted,    18    n., 

230  n.,  232  n.,  379  n. 

"Immanuel,"  case  of  the,  94  n. 

Independence,  spirit  of,  in  American 
colonies,  167-169;  in  Rhode  Island, 
167,  240,  264,  291,  301. 

Independence  of  judiciary,  188  ff. 

Independent  companies  in  New  York 
and  South  Carolina,  13. 

Indian  affairs,  management  of,  10,  17, 
18,  2S3  ff. ;  failure  of  Albany  Congress 
on  point  of,  33. 

Indian  insurrection  (1763),  356,  263  ff. 

Indigo,  bounty  on,  218;  protection  of, 
by  act  of  1764,  277-278. 

IngersoU,  Jared,  289  n. 

Ireland,  provisions  from,  sold  to  French, 
74;  embargo  laid  on  provisions  in, 
78,  80;  illegal  shipments  from,  79; 
embargo  ineffective,  82;  tobacco- 
growing  in,  prohibited,  196. 

Iron,  opposition  to  enumeration  of, 
334-225. 

Iron  Act  of  1750,   197  ff. 

Iron  industry  (1764),  223. 

Iroquois  Imlians,  attempts  to  secure 
friendship  of,  17. 

Jamaica,  military  protection  of,  by 
Parliamentary  provision,  10,  12  n. ; 
illegal  trade  in,  carried  on  with  French, 
89  n.;  exports  from  Tngland  to 
(1746-67),  138  n.;  imports  to  Eng- 
land  from   (1761-63),    I4S   n. ;    sclf- 

V 


governing  powers  of,  in  eighteenth 
century,  161-162;  resolutions  of  As- 
sembly of  (1757),  163;  Act  of  1758 
relative  to  currency,  186;  absence  of 
illegal  trade  in  (1763),  236. 

Jenyns,  Soame,  162,  189  n.,  252,  276  n., 
284;    quoted,  309. 

Johnson,  Sir  William,  appointed  colonel 
of  Six  Nations,  27;  in  charge  of 
Indian  affairs,  28,  254;  Parliamentary 
grant  to,  54;  opinion  of,  on  Indian 
policy,  257-238,  261  n. 

Judiciary  question,  in  New  York,  188- 
191 ;   in  New  Jersey,  191-193. 

Kalm,  Peter,  cited,  170,  207. 

Keith,  Sir  William,  40,  200  n. 

Kennedy,  New  York  collector  of  cus- 
toms, 115  n. 

Keys,  A.  M.,  cited,  189,  192. 

Knowles,  Admiral,  quoted,  73. 

Knox,  William,  quoted,  168-169;  cited, 
223  n.,  273  n.,  276  n.,  284. 

Land,  proposed  taxation  of,  40,  45  n. 
Lawrence,     General    Charles,     quoted, 

177  n. 
Lawsuits,  brought  against  customs  offi- 
cials,   119-125,   248;    over  "flags  of 

truce,"  127. 
Leeward  Islands,  military  protection  of, 

12  n. 
"Lettres  de  Montcalm,"  172-173,  203. 
Liquors,  duties  on,  37-38,  42. 
Little,  Otis,  cited,  139  n.,  145  n. 
Livingston    family,    implicated    in    un- 
lawful trade  with  French  West  Indies, 

III  n. 
Logwood,  duty  on,  suggested,  39  n. 
Long    Island     Sound,    smuggling    on, 

241. 
Loudoun,     General,    58,    S9>     81,    85, 

269. 
Louisburg  expedition,  9,  60  n.,  171  n.; 

Wolfe's  sneer  at  American  troops  in, 

174  n. 
Louisiana,    projected    attack    on,    68; 

illegal  trade  with  French  in,  103-104; 

ceded  to  Great  Britain,  153. 
Lumber  trade  (1764),  223-224. 
Lyttelton,    Governor    W.    H.,    quoted, 

163  n.,  236. 


t 


k 


I  mi 


ii 


322 


INDEX 


Madeira,  colonial  trade  to,  7. 

Mansfield,  Lord,  76. 

Manufactures,  bounties  paid  on,  when 
exported,  195. 

Marriott,  James,  on  Dutch  trade  with 
French,  95  n.;    cited,   133,  154  n. 

Martinique,  experts  from  England  to 
(1761-62),  138  n.;  remains  French 
under  Peace  of  Paris,  153;  Pitt  on 
cession  of,  156;  manufacture  of  rum 
in,  278. 

Maryland,  contribution  of,  to  expedi- 
tions against  Du  Quesne,  Niagara, 
and  Crown  Point,  53  n. ;  slight 
supimrt  to  Braddock  from,  55;  takes 
troops  from  under  King's  command, 
59;  failure  of,  to  codperate  in  French 
campaigns  (i 758-1 760),  60-69;  law 
passed  by,  forbidding  trade  with 
French,  78;  exports  from  England 
to  (1746-67),  138  n.;  imports  into 
England  from  (1757-62),  150  n. ; 
exportation  of  hemp  to  England 
from  (1768-69),  ai8  n.;  freedom 
from  contraband  trade  in  (1764), 
236. 

Massachusetts,  boundary  dispute  with 
New  York,  49-50;  contribution  of, 
to  expeditions  against  Du  Quesne, 
Niagara,  and  Crown  Point,  53  n.; 
public  spirit  in,  54  n.,  58,  6c,  64,  68; 
Parliamentary  grant  to,  54  n. ;  extent 
of  coiiperation  of,  in  French  cam- 
paigns, 60-69;  acts  passed  by,  to 
prohibit  supplying  of  provisions  to 
French,  78;  friction  caused  in,  by 
enforcement  of  Molasses  Act,  117  ff. ; 
attempt  in,  to  have  writs  of  assistance 
declared  illegal,  118,  122-123;  early 
talk  of  independence  in  (1709),  167- 
168;  iron  and  steel  factories  in,  198 
n. ;  troubles  over  bankruptcy  laws  in, 
186;  manufacture  of  linen  in,  205; 
whaling  industry  in,  219-220;  report 
on  state  of  illegal  trade  in  (1763), 
238-239;  attitude  of,  on  question  of 
furnishing  troops  in  Pontiac's  war, 
263 ;  authority  of  customs  officials  in, 
undermined,  302. 

Massie,  Joseph,  cited,   146  n.,   195  n., 

202. 

Mauduit,  Israel,  276  n. 


Mauduit,  Jasper,  cited,  158  n.,  a  19  n^ 
276  n. 

Melvill,  Robert,  89  n. 

Mereness,  quoted,  69  n. 

Middle  colonies  not  of  value  according 
to  commercial  test,  135. 

Minorca,  Parliamentary  provision  for 
military  force  in,  12  n.,  13  n. 

Miquelon,  colonial  commercial  inter- 
course with,  forbidden,  248. 

Molasses,  import  duties  on,  38,  42  n. ; 
illicit  trade  in,  87 ;  duty  on,  by  bill 
of  1764,  279-280;  large  importations 
of,  into  America,  292;  modification 
of  duties  on,  299. 

Molasses  Act  of  1733,  33-34,  41,  iS7i 
159,  179,  206  n.,  230;  revival  of, 
and  partial  enforcement,  and  results, 
114  ff. ;  enforcement  of,  by  Grenville, 
233  ff. ;  violation  of,  in  Massachusetts 
and  Rhode  Island,  239-241 ;  dis- 
satisfaction aroused  by  execution  of, 
391-293 ;  made  perpetual  but  modified 
by  bill  of  1764,  277. 

Montcalm  letters,  published  by  J. 
Almon,  172  n.;   cited,  203,  203  n. 

Monte  Cristi,  continental  colonial  trade 
with,  96  ff. ;  seizure  of  ships  trading 
with,  106  ff. 

Montreal,  fall  of,  66. 

Montserrat,  exports  from  England  to 
(1746-67),  138  n. ;  exportation  of 
hemp  from  England  to  (1762-63), 
316  n. 

Moore,  Commodore,  89,  104. 

Moore,  Governor  Henry,  96  n.,  115  n. 

Morris,  Governor  Lewis,  29  n.,  191. 

Morris,  Robert  Hunter,  168  n.,  191. 

Murray,  William,  attorney-general,   76. 

Murray,  Governor,  213  n. 

Mutiny  Act  extended  to  America,  300. 

Naval-store  bounties,  209,  210. 

Navigation  act  of  1660,  31  n.,  196,  228. 

Navigation  laws,  readjustment  of,  193  ff. 

Navy,  English  dependence  on,  for 
safety  in  trade,  6-8;  instrumentality 
of,  in  stopping  unlawful  trade  with 
French,  105  ff.,  114;  use  of  to  check 
smuggling,  228  ff. ;  dislike  of  use  of, 
by  American  colonists,  288  ff. 

Negro  insurrections,  10. 


INDEX 


323 


"Neutral  islands,"  West  Indies,  15. 

Nevis,  exports  from  England  to  (1746- 
67).  J  38  n. 

New  England,  campaigns  of,  against 
Nova  Scotia  and  Canada,  8,  9,  60  n., 
171  n.,  174  n. ;  Parliamentary  grant  to, 
54  n.;  trade  of,  with  Monte  Cristi, 
98-^;  colonies  in,  found  wanting 
according  to  commercial  test,  135; 
exports  from  England  to  (1746-67), 
138  n.;  imports  into  England  from 
(1757-67),  150  n.;  issues  of  paper 
money  in,  187;  exportation  of  hemp 
from  England  to  (1762-64),  216  n. 
See  Massachusetts,  Rhode  Island, 
etc. 

Newfoundland,  garrison  in,  11;  mili- 
tary provision  for,  12  n.;  esteemed  as 
a  fishing  establishment,  134;  exports 
from  England  to  (1746-67),    138  n. 

Newfoundland  fisheries,  152-153. 

New  Hampshire,  contribution  of,  to 
expeditions  against  Du  Quesne,  Ni- 
agara, and  Crown  Point,  53  n.; 
Parliamentary  grant  to,  54  n. ;  poverty 
of,  prevents  aiding  in  colonial  defence, 
59 ;  extent  of  cooperation  of,  in  French 
campaigns,  60-69;  trading  with 
French  punishable  by  death  in,  78- 
79;  freedom  of,  from  illegal  trade 
(1764),  238;  refuses  troops  for  war 
against  Pontiac,  264. 

New  Jersey,  not  represented  at  Albany 
Congress,  19;  apathetic  attitude  of 
(1754),  20  n.;  boundary  dispute  with 
New  York,  50  n.;  contribution  of, 
to  expeditions  against  Du  Quesne, 
Niagara,  aiA  Crown  Point,  53  n.; 
Parliamentary  grant  to,  54  n.;  atti- 
tude of,  under  requisition  system, 
59;  disparity  in  numbers  of  troops 
furnished  by,  59,  61,  62;  Quaker 
influence  in,  59 ;  extent  of  cooperation 
of,  in  French  campaigns,  60-69; 
judiciary  question  in,  191-192;  con- 
traband trade  in  (1764),  241;  req- 
uisition of  troops  from,  for  Indian 
insurrection  (1763),  263. 

Newport,  centre  of  Rhode  Island  trade 
with  French  West  Indies,  112. 

New  Providence,  exports  from  England 
to  (1756-57).  J38  n. 


New  York,  lack  of  colonial  codperation 
for  defence  of,  under  requisition 
system,  9  n.;  Parliamentary  pro- 
vision for  protection  of,  11,  13  n. ; 
expenditures  for  military  force  in,  13 ; 
boundary  disputes  engaged  in  by, 
49-50;  contribution  of,  to  expeditions 
against  Du  Quesne,  Niagara,  and 
Crown  Point,  53  n. ;  Parliamentary 
grant  to,  54  n.;  public  spirit  shown 
in,  58,  64,  68;  enriched  by  French 
and  Indian  war,  61 ;  extent  of  co- 
operation of,  in  French  campaigns, 
60-69;  supplies  from,  furnished 
French  forces,  74;  exportation  of 
provisions  to  French  prohibited,  78; 
steps  taken  to  prevent,  79-80;  trade 
to  Monte  Cristi  from,  100;  Am- 
herst's evidence  of  illicit  trade  of, 
110-112;  friction  caused  in,  by 
enforcement  of  Molasses  Act,  117; 
exports  from  England  to  (1746-67), 
138  n.;  imports  into  England  from 
(1757-62),  150  n.;  judiciary  question 
in,  188-191 ;  iron  and  steel  manu- 
facture in,  198  n. ;  exportation  of 
hemp  from  England  to  (1763-64), 
216  n. ,  contraband  trade  in  (1763), 
242-243;  requisition  of  troops  from, 
for  Indian  insurrection  (1763),  263- 
264;  opposition  in,  to  Mutiny  Act, 
300. 

Niagara,  expedition  against,   53,   54. 

North  Carolina,  boundary  disputes  of, 
50  n. ;  contribution  of,  to  expeditions 
against  Du  Quesne,  Niagara,  and 
Crown  Point,  53  n.;  Parliamentary 
grant  to,  55;  inability  to  provide  for 
defence,  59 ;  remissness  of,  in  raising 
troops  for  French  campaigns,  60-69; 
exportation  of  hemp  to  England 
from  (1768-69),  218  n. ;  freedom 
from  contraband  trade  in  (1764), 
236-237;  Parliamentary  payment  of 
governor  of,  276. 

Northumberland,  Earl  of,  Vice-Admiral 
of  America,  250. 

"No  taxation  without  representation," 
doctrine  of,  297  S. 

"Novanglus,"  Adams's,  quoted,  306. 

Nova  Scotia,  campaign  against,  8,  9, 
53.    54;     garrison    in,    11;    military 


, 


itfi 


'ii 


p 


11^1 


1  I 

ill 


in 


324 


INDEX 


protection  of,  la  n.;  expenditures 
in  settling  and  fortifying,  13;  not 
Included  in  Albany  Congress  plan 
of  union,  30  n. ;  motives  for  settle- 
ment of,  133  n.;  exports  from  Eng- 
land to  (1746-67),  138  n.;  first 
Assembly  of,  161  n.;  governmental 
expenses  of,  provided  for  by  Parlia- 
ment, 376. 

"Oceana,"  James  Harrington's,  165. 

Oglethorpe,  James,  13  n.,  133  n. 

Ohio  Valley,  French  in,  14,  16. 

"Old  Subsidy"  of  1660,  381. 

Osgood,  H.  L.,  quoted,  309. 

Oswald,  James,  83. 

Otis,  James,  308,  368,  373  n.,  397,  313; 
cited,  157  n.,  2go,  393,  395;  quoted, 
3o6,  333  n.,  394  n.,  397  n.,  398  n., 
3o».  303.  304- 

Pamphlets,  war  of,  on  question  of 
continental  and  tropical  coloniza- 
tion, 140-151. 

Paper  money,  in  Virginia,  180-183; 
in  New  England,  187;  I  arliamentary 
regulation  of  issue  of,   187-188. 

Parliament,  competency  of,  to  pass 
revenue  act,  38;  dispute  as  to  au- 
thority of,  in  colonies,  306-308; 
present  position  of,  in  Empire,  310 
n.;  declaratory  act  passed  by,  de- 
fining its  powers,  311. 

Parsons'  Cause,  the,  184. 

Partridge,  Richard,  41. 

Passes,  for  protection  of  colonial  vessels 
against  Barbary  pirates,  7  n. ;  issued 
in  interests  of  unlawful  trade,  90,  iii. 

Penn,  Governor  John,  343. 

Penn,  Thomas,  91. 

Pennsylvania,  inadequate  support  given 
Braddock  by,  47  n.,  55;  contribution 
of,  to  expeditions  against  Crown 
Point,  Du  Quesne,  and  Niagara,  53  n. ; 
forces  raised  in,  for  three  campaigns 
(1758-1760),  60-69;  lack  of  public 
spirit  shown  in,  during  French  war, 
60-69;  supplies  from,  furnished 
French  forces,  74;  steps  taken  by, 
to  prohibit  supplying  of  provisions 
to  French,  78;  trade  with  enemy 
carried  on  by,  90-91 ;    exix>rts  from 


England  to  (1746-67),  138  n.;  im* 
ports  into  England  from  (1757-63), 
150  n.;  iron  and  steel  factories  in, 
tgS  n.;  exportation  of  hemp  from 
England  to  (•  763-64),  316  n.;  illegal 
trade  in  (1763),  343;  requisition  of 
troops  from,  for  Indian  insurrection, 
363. 

Philadelphia,  unlawful  trade  from,  with 
French,  loi ;  trials  of  "  flags  of  truce" 
in,  137. 

Phips,  S.,  quoted,  44  n. 

Pimento,  growing  of,  33 1;  export  duties 
on,  380. 

Pinfold,  Governor  Charles,  83  n.,  158  n. ; 
quoted,  395  n. 

Piracy,  7. 

Pitt,  William,  4,  55,  56,  59,  93,  131,  133; 
on  the  illegal  trade  with  French,  105, 
133;  leads  opposition  to  terms  of 
Treaty  of  Paris,  154;  praise  of  colo- 
nial troops  by,  174  n.;  on  extent  of 
Parliamentary  authority  over  colonies, 

307- 
Plan  of  union,   Albany  Congress,   30- 

31;    rejection  of,  by  colonies,  33-33. 
Poll-tax,   Dinwiddle  suggests  a,  45  n.; 

Shirley's  suggestion  of  a,  49. 
Pontiac,  356,  363. 
Popham,  Allen,  99  n. 
Popple,  Governor  William,  88  n.,  m  n. 
Porto  Rico,  why  not  retained  by  Great 

Britain  in  peace  of  1763,  140. 
Portugal,  shipment  of  rice  to,  35 ;  illegal 

importations     from,     into     America, 

i4S.  291- 
Postal  system,  colonial,  34,  307. 
Pownall,  Governor  Thomas,  60-61,  91, 

187  n.,   194,   204,   313  n.,   353,   393, 

395,  308  n. 
Pratt,  Benjamin,  190. 
Preferential  duties,  194,  199,  347. 
Prize  duties,  33-33,  37. 
Provisions,   attempts  to   prohibit  trade 

in.  with  French,  73  S.,  78,  81,  83,  113. 

See  Contraband  trade. 
Pulteney  (Earl  of  Bath),  quoted,  143. 

Quaker  ii..1uence  in  New  Jersey,  59. 
Quebec,  fall  of,  131. 
Quincy,  J.,  cited,  330,  239,  303. 
Quit-rents,  Virginia,  45  n.,   183  n. 


INDEX 


325 


Rebates,  40,  194  ff.,  309. 

Requisition  system,  5a  ff. ;  failure  of, 
in  Fontiac's  war,  263-966;  suc- 
ceeded by  system  of  Parliamentary 
taxation,  274. 

Revenue,   collection  of.    5w  Customs. 

Revenue  bills.  Parliamentary,  31  ff. 

Reynolds,  Governor  John,  47  n., 
193  n. 

Rhode  Island,  represented  at  Albany 
Congress,  19;  contribution  of,  to 
expeditions  against  Du  Quesne,  Ni- 
agara, and  Crown  Point,  53  n.; 
Parliamentary  grant  to,  54  n. ;  un- 
willingness of,  to  aid  in  common 
defence,  59;  extent  of  coSperation 
of,  in  French  campaigns,  60-69; 
violation  in,  of  embargo  on  provisions, 
83;  trade  with  enemy  carried  on  by, 
90,  92;  trade  of,  with  French  in 
Florida  and  Louisiana,  103-104; 
trade  with  French  West  Indies  from, 
112;  independent  attitude  of  (1709), 
167;  not  affected  by  Iron  Act  of  1750, 
199  n.;  spirit  of  independence  in, 
240;  violations  of  Molasses  Act  in, 
240-241 ;  refuses  troops  for  Pontiac's 
war,  264;  evidences  in,  of  colonial 
opposition  to  Grenville's  taxation 
measures,  291;  molasses  the  basis 
of  commerce  of,  293  n. ;  objections 
in,  to  customs  ofiScials,  361. 

Rice,  duties  on,  35-36;  colonial  trade 
in,  225-226. 

Robinson,  Sir  Thomas,  33,  34,  28  n., 
55  n.,  141;  Dinwiddle's  letters  to, 
43.  44,  45;  General  Braddock  writes 
to,  45  n. 

Rockingham,  succeeds  Grenville,  299. 

Roubaud,  renegade  Jesuit,  173  n. 

Royal  colonies,  162. 

Rule  of  1756,  94,  J06. 

Rum,  excise  on,  proposed,  38,  40; 
illicit  trade  in,  87;  importation  of 
foreign,  forbidden,  278. 

Russia,  hemp-production  in,  ai6. 

St.  Eustatius,  headquarters  of  illegal 
trade  with  French,  79,  93,  95  n.; 
beef  shipped  from  Ireland  to,  86. 

St.  KJtts,  imports  to  England  from 
(1761-62),  145  n- 


St.  Lucia,  15;  ceded  to  France  by 
Treaty  of  Paria,  153-154;  Pitt  on 
cession  of,  156. 

St.  Pierre,  commercial  intercourse  with, 
forbidden,  248. 

St.  Vincent,  15;  provisions  from  Bar- 
bados  in,  89 ;  exports  from  England  to 
(1766-67),  138  n. ;  becomes  British 
under  Peace  of  Paris,  154;  contra- 
band trade  in,  after  Peace  of  Paris, 
336. 

Salt,  importation  of,  310  n.,  211. 

Scott,  Sir  William,  judgments  of,  73  n., 
93  n.,  94  n. 

Seizures  of  vessels,  126-128. 

Senegal,  acquisition  of,  breaks  France's 
monopoly  of  gum  trade,  313  n. 

Sharpe,  Governor,  29  n. ;  quoted,  69  n., 
369  n. 

Shepherd,  W.  R.,  cited,  69  n. 

Sherwood,  Joseph,  128;  quoted,  300. 

Ship-buDding,  196,  30i. 

Shirley,  Governor  William,  18,  39,  103, 
127,  255;  quoted,  78,  366  n.;  Parlia- 
mentary union  and  Parliamentary 
taxation  favored  by,  46-49;  on 
desirability  of  taking  Canada,  140- 
141, 142 :  cannot  foresee  that  conquest 
of  Canada  will  affect  unity  of  the 
Empire,  171. 

Silk  duties,  281. 

Six  Nations,  Sir  William  Johnson  ap- 
pointed colonel  of,  27. 

Smith,  W.  R.,  cited,  11  n.,  192  n. 

Smuggling,  328  ff. 

South  Carolina,  garrisons  in,  11;  ex- 
penditures for  military  force  in,  13; 
exportation  of  rice  from,  35-36; 
boundary  dispute  between  North 
Carolina  and,  50  n.;  Parliamentary 
grant  to,  55;  troops  raised  in,  against 
Indians,  65  n.;  favorable  effect  of 
indigo  bounty  in,  218;  rice  trade  of, 
225-236;  absence  of  contraband  trade 
in  (1764),  337;  Parliamentary  pay- 
ment of  governor  of,  276. 

Southern  colonies,  condition  of  illegal 
trade  in,  after  Peace  of  Paris,  336- 
238. 

Spain,  Smoortation  of  wine  from,  pro- 
hibite.       91. 

Spanish  i  .jcession.  War  of,  8,  33,  73. 


I 


**s 


ill: 

<:   i] 


326 


INDEX 


Spotfwood,  Goveraor,  qwAed,  34  n. 

Spry,  Wflliam,  950,  090. 

Sttmp  Act,  38  n.,  4ii  >59>  'l^i  V'^t^ 

of,  185 ;  colonial  oppoaition  to,  294  ff- ; 

repeal  of,  298. 
Stanley,  Hans,  153  n. 
Sugar,  duties  on,  31,  35  n.,  38,   378; 

exporUtion  of,  from  Guadeloupe  to 

En^nd,  149. 
Sugar  Bill  of  1764,   159;    passage  "of, 

»76;    aim  of,   277;    duties  imposed 

by,  377-384;  modification  of,  399. 

Taxation  of  colonies  for  military  defence, 
371-273,  374  ff. 

Tea,  illegal  importation  of,  by  Ameri- 
can colonies,  244,  345,  346. 

Thacher,  Oxenbridge,  cited,  157  n^ 
389,  390,  293,  294  n. 

Thomas,  Governor,  94,  95  n. 

Tobacco,  duties  on,  31,  32,  35  n.,  337-, 
"Two-penny  Act"  concerning,  183  ff.; 
British  and  Irish  farmers  prohibited 
from  growing,  196. 

Tobago,   15;    ceded  to  Great  Britain, 

154- 
TortoU,  exports  from  England  to  (1756 

-67),  138  n. 
Townshend,  Charles,  379. 
Trade,  of  colonies,  3-4,  7»  ^  i   •*»<*- 

justment  of   laws   of,    193   ff.,   305; 

illegal,  see  Contraband  trade. 
Treaties,  British,  with  Barbary  coiaairs. 

Treaty  of  Neutrality  of  1686,  75. 
Treaty  of  Peace  of  1763,   139;    terms 

of,  affecting  Canada  and  West  Indies, 

153-154;  discussion  of,  by  supporters 

and  opponents,  154-159. 
Tucker,  Josiah,  cited,  134  n,  303  n. 
Two-penny  Act,  183  ff. 
Tyler,  Moses  Coit,  on  Two-penny  Act, 

183  n.;   quoted,  340  n.,  390. 

Vice-admiralty  courts,  119  ff.,  949-351, 
289-391. 

"Viper,"  the,  at  Monte  Cristi,  98  n. 

Virginia,  money  sent  for  defence  of,  16; 
represented  by  DeLancey  at  Albany 
Congress,  19 ;  opposition  in,  to  postal 
system,  34  n.;  quit-rents  in,  45  «•. 
183   n.;    boundary  dispute   between 


North  CaroKmt  and,  50  n.;  con- 
tribution of,  to  expeditions  against 
Du  Quesne,  Niagara,  and  Crown 
Point,  53  n. ;  ParHamenUry  grant  to, 
55;  attitude  of,  under  requisition 
system,  59;  quota  of  troop*  raised 
in,  for  French  campaigns  (175ft- 
1760),  60-49;  Dinwiddie's  embargo 
on  provisions  in,  77;  exports  from 
England  to  (1746-67),  ijs  n.;  im- 
ports into  En^nd  from  (1757-63), 
150  n.;  question  of  currency  for 
wttlement  of  debts  in,  179-183; 
issue  of  paper  money  in,  180-183; 
Two-penny  Act  in,  184  ff.;  troubles 
over  bankruptcy  laws  in,  186;  ex- 
portation of  hemp  to  England  from 
(1768-69),  318  n.;  absence  of  con- 
traband trade  in  (1764),  337;  req- 
uisition of  troops  from,  for  Indian 
insurrection  (1763),  363. 
Virgin  Islands,  contraband  trade  in, 
after  Peace  of  Paris,  336. 

Walpoie,  Horace,  quoted,  399  n. 
Walpole,  Sir  Robert,  40-4»- 
Washington,  George,  44,  63  n.,  174;  on 

Grenville's  taxation   measures,    396; 

quoted,  305  n. 
Wells,  Francis,  87. 
Wells,  Samuel,  quoted,  87  n. 
Wentworth,  Governor,  91, 147  n.,  333  n. ; 

report  of,  concerning  illegal  trade  in 

New  Hampshire,  338. 
West  Indian  products,  importation  of, 

39- 

West  Indies,  ideal  colony  commercially 
considered,  134;  exports  from  Eng- 
land to  (1746-47,  1766-67),  138  n.; 
Canada  vs^  as  colonial  acquisition, 
143  ff.;  exports  from  En^nd  to 
(1744,  1758),  151  n.;  slight  effect  on 
colonies  in,  of  conquest  of  Canada,  173. 

West  Indies,  French,  relations  between 
British  continental  colonies  and,  73- 
74;  provisions  sent  to,  from  Ireland 
and  America,  86  ff. ;  why  not  retained 
by  Great  Britain  in  peace  of  1763, 
140;  restoration  of,  by  Peace  of 
Pari^  153-154- 

Whale-fins,  importation  of,  into  England, 
319  n.,  331  n. 


INDEX 


327 


Whale  fiiheries.  at^-ait. 

Whitworth,  Sir  Charlc*,  137  n. 

WiUiam  and  Mary  CoUcgr,  dtiUcs  for 
rapport  of,  3»,  237. 

Wines,  imporution  of,  39;  Blegal  im- 
portation of,  by  Americans,  145; 
duties  on,  by  bill  of  1764,  380-381. 

Wolfe,  General,  condemnation  of  colo- 


aiti    troop*   hy,    174;    crfticiim    of 
military  operationa  Iqr,  175  n. 
WooUemt  colonial  marltct  for  English, 

139. 
Writs  of  assistance,  attempt  to  declare 
illegal,  118,  133-133,  30& 

\  Qge,  Fraods,  308. 


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Iff 


m 


The  Trade  Poliqr  of 
Great  Britain  and  her 
Q>lonies  since  I860 


Bj  CARL  JOHANNES  FUCHS 

Prtfmtr  »f  PtlitUml  Eetnsmf  i»  tkt  Univtriity  of  frtUmrg 
TruuUted  by  C  H.  M.  ArMUld 

WITH  A  rUPACX  BY 

The  Right  Hon.  J.  PARKER  5niTH 

Ftrmtrfy  FtlUvt  of  Trinity  CcUqit,  Camiri^p 


h 


An  example  of  a  large  and  valuable  body  of  literature  ex- 
isting in  Germany  dealing  with  the  trade  policy  of  foreign 
states,  with  the  scientific  object  of  ascertaining,  by  the  study 
of  the  actual  facts,  the  real  significance  of  the  history  of  the 
past  and  the  chief  tendencies  of  certain  forces  affecting  the 
present  position  of  trade.  Neither  accomplished  facts  nor 
future  possibilities  are  exaggerated  and  the  objective  stand- 
point is  maintained  throughout  The  necessary  deficiencies 
of  trade  statistics  are  not  overlooked  and  the  comparison  of 
figures  is  tested  in  various  ways. 

"Professor  Fuchs's  book  is  absolutely  immune  from  the 
common  failings  of  the  party  pamphlet  It  is  a  serious 
scientific  study  conducted  by  a  skilled  and  acute  investi- 
gator."—  Economic  Review, 


Cloth,    Svo,    xxix  -(-  411  pages,    fi.JO  net 


THE    MACMILLAN   COMPANY 

FTOUSHXBS.  64-66  FIFTH  AVSKXTX,  NEW  TOBK 


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Worki  by  PAUL  S.   RIHrSCH 

Prtftntr  tf  Ptliluai  Stittm  in  Ik*  Umi9*rtify  #/  WiuMukt 

WORLD  POLITICS 

At  the  F..ND  or  the  NiwrrEEirrH  CEwrwEy 
AS  Influenced  ey  the  Oeiemtal  Situation 

"  Dr.  Reinsch  sketches,  in  reviewing  the  world  politics,  the  tran- 
sition from  nationalism  to  national  imperialism  in  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  political  methods  of  the  new  national  imperialism, 
the  great  Powers  as  colonizers,  the  connection  between  coloniza- 
tion and  imperialism,  and  the  consequences  of  the  newest  policy. 
Among  these  consequences,  Dr.  Reinsch  places  a  decay  in  good 
government  at  home,  a  reaction  a^inst  the  political  and  social 
doctrines  of  liberalism,  and  a  erowth  of  one-man  power  and  an 
aristocratic  reaction  in  philosophy." — Boston  IVantmft. 


COLONIAL  GOVERNMENT 

Ab  Introduction  to  tbe  Study  of  Cotonial  InttitntioM 

"...  we  know  of  no  volume  of  the  same  size  that  convejrs  so 
much  information  as  his,  in  so  clear  and  orderly  a  manner,  or  one 
of  greater  utility  to  the  general  reader.  ...  If  it  were  possible 
to  require  every  Senator  and  Representative  to  pass  a  competitive 
examination  in  the  contents  of  this  little  volume  as  a  condition  of 
appointment  to  committee  work  having  to  do  with  the  depend- 
encies, the  prospect  for  the  sane  treatment  of  the  tremendous 
question  now  confronting  the  American  people  would  be  measur- 
ably improved,  and  the  greater  the  number  of  voters  that  can  be 
induced  to  study  it,  the  better  it  will  be  for  the  country." 

—  New  York  Tinus. 

COLONIAL  ADMINISTRATION 

"  Dr.  Reinsch  tells  of  the  varying  methods  that  have  been  em- 
ployed by  European  powers  in  their  dependencies,  and  of  the 
diverse  results  that  have  been  secured  by  them,  draws  from  their 
experience  what  he  considers  the  correct  conclusions,  and  leaves 
the  reader  to  apply  these  conclusions  to  the  case  of  the  United 
SUtes.  .  .  .  The  book  is  well  written,  and  should  have  a  wide 
reading  by  persons  who  take  an  earnest  interest  in  the  difficult 
problems  left  the  nation  by  the  war  with  Spain." — Chicago  Tribune, 

Each  is  in  the  Citiun's  Library,  Half  UaAer,  tiaj  net 


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